


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The Neumann Memorial Publication Fund of the Hebrew Union College

Volume XXX of the *Hebrew Union College Annual* is the third of this series to be subventioned by The Neumann Memorial Publication Fund of the Hebrew Union College, and is intended to serve as a memorial to Abraham and Emma Neumann, under the terms of the will of their son, Sidney Neumann of Philadelphia, who died at the age of eighty-four on February 5, 1958.

Sidney Neumann was a modest, self-effacing son of the House of Israel. A life-long member of Reform Congregation Keneseth Israel of Philadelphia, he was a loyal and devoted friend to three generations of its rabbis. Inspired in childhood by the eloquence of the dynamic personality of a member of the first graduating class of the Hebrew Union College, Rabbi Joseph Krauskopf, Sidney Neumann always felt a special bond of gratitude to the seminary whose graduates ministered to him and to his family. Although he never visited the College, he revered its meaning in his own life and in the life of American Jewry. A bachelor with no human ties beyond the friendship of a few devoted souls, he sought in his bequest to support those aspects of American Jewish life, both in Philadelphia and elsewhere, which best exemplified the ideals and aspirations of his teacher, Rabbi Krauskopf, and which harmonized with his own concept of that which is permanent and enduring.

In his will, therefore, Sidney Neumann bequeathed the fruits of a lifetime of hard work to the institutions which he respected and loved: the congregation to which he and his parents belonged, for the building and maintenance of a chapel; the National Agricultural College (founded as the National Farm School by Rabbi Krauskopf); the Philadelphia Home for the Jewish Aged; the Jewish Publication Society of America (co-founded by Rabbi Krauskopf); the Lucien Moss Home of Philadelphia; the Federation of Jewish Agencies of Greater Philadelphia; the Hebrew Union College and the American Jewish Archives — for scholarly publications. All these, in addition to some modest bequests to many other institutions and to a number of individuals.

It is noteworthy that these generous gifts were not meant to perpetuate his own name, other than through the recitation of Kaddish for him in the Keneseth Israel Temple and the Chapel of the Hebrew Union College; Sidney Neumann contributed these large sums so that an enduring memorial to his parents might be assured.

We, of the Hebrew Union College, therefore, take pride in saluting the spirit of Sidney Neumann with this volume of the *Hebrew Union College Annual* dedicated to the memory of his parents, Abraham and Emma Neumann. *Zeker zaddik librakah*: the memory of the righteous will be a blessing.

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THE MESSAGE OF DEUTERO-ISAIAH IN ITS SEQUENTIAL UNFOLDING

(*Concluded*)

JULIAN MORGENSTERN

Hebrew Union College - Jewish Institute of Religion, Cincinnati

V

THE TEXT OF ISA. 40-48

Isa. 48

CAREFUL examination of this chapter discloses first of all that two short passages, each the equivalent of a half-verse in length, have no relevance whatever to the theme of the address here recorded and are obviously displaced fragments, or perhaps quotations, from elsewhere in Biblical, prophetic literature. V. 22 occurs also in Isa. 57.21 (with only one, inconsequential textual divergence from the form here), where, just as here, it brings the chapter to a close. There at least its thought is integrated in some slight measure with that of the v. immediately preceding. Under any condition we need not hesitate to expunge v. 22 from this address.

Quite similarly v. 16b, manifestly in itself an incomplete, fragmentary statement, not only has no thought-connection whatever with either what precedes or what follows, but also it disturbs the natural thought-sequence. It is plainly a quotation, here altogether meaningless, from Zech. 4.9b; 6.15a β , inadvertently inserted here by some relatively late scribe or editor, and so should also unquestionably be omitted.

Furthermore, in v. 6a β some persons or things are addressed in the second person plural, while in the adjacent portions of the address the second singular is employed, manifestly with reference to the Jewish audience to whom the prophet is speaking. This suggests that v. 6a β may well have been displaced in some way from its original position in the address. This seems to be the case also with v. 13b; for it can hardly be the earth and the heavens, which, so v. 13a affirms, Yahweh's hands had at the very beginning of the world brought into being and set in place, which are now summoned, or

even challenged, by Yahweh to stand by together, seemingly in order to testify before or to debate with Him. Apparently this passage too is no longer in its proper position in the address. And this suggests, in turn, the possibility of displacement of other passages within the chapter. Under any condition some textual rearrangement of the address, as it lies before us in *MT* form, is unavoidable. But the task is not too difficult. And when completed, the prophet's address in its original form will have been recovered, with its logical thought-development and its cogent, irrefutable argument readily comprehensible.

3/3/3	שמעו זאת בית־יעקב / הנקראים בשם ישראל / וממעי יהודה יצאו הנשבעים בשם יהוה / ובאלהי ישראל יזכירו / לא באמת ולא בצדקה	1
3/3/3	כִּי <בשם> עיר־הקדש נקראו / ועל־אלהי ישראל נסמכו / יהוה צבאות שמו	2
3/3/3	מ <אשר> ידעתי כי־קשה אתה / וגיד ברזל ערפך / ומצחך <מצחך> נחושה	4
3/3	ואגיד לך מאז / בטרם תבוא השמעתיך	5
3/3	פְּתָאֲמֶר עָצְבִי עֵשׂ / ופסלי ונסכי צום	
3/2	קרא אני אליהם / יעמדו יחדו	13b
		14a +
3/3/3	הקבצו כלכם ושמעו / מי־בכם הגיד את־אלה / ואתם הלא תגידו קרבו אלי שמעו זאת / לא מראש בסתר דברתי / מעת היותה שם	6aβ 16a
4/4/4	אני	
3/3	אני־הוא אני ראשון / אף אני אחרון	12b
3/3	אף־ידי יסדה ארץ / וימיני טפחה שמים	13a
3/3/3	הראשונות מאז הגדתי / ומפי יצאו נְאֻשְׁמִיעִם / פתאם עשיתי נחבאנה	3
		6aa +
3/3	שמע תחזה כלה / <אני> יהוה אהבו	14b
3/3	יעשה חפצי בבבל / וזרעו מכשדים <תושעי>	
3/3	<> אני דברתי אף־קראתיו / הבאתיו וְאֶצְלִי דרכו	15
3/3	השמעתיך חדשות מעתה / ונצרות לא ידעתן	6b
3/3/3	עתה נבראו ולא־מאז / ולפני־יום לא שמעתם / פְּתָאֲמֶר הנה ידעתין	7
3/3	גם־לא שמעת גם־לא־ידעת / גם־מאז לא־פָתַחְתִּי אֹזֶן	8
3/3	כי־ידעתי <כִּי> בגוד תבגוד / ופשע מבטן קרא־לך	
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3/2	שמע אלי יעקב / וישראל מקראי	12a
3/3	כה אמר יהוה / גאלך קדש ישראל	17a
4/4	צאו מבבל ברחו מכשדים / בקול רנה הגידו <זאת>	20aαβ
4/4	השמיעה הוציאוה עדיקצה הארץ / אמרו גאל יהוה < יעקב	20aγb
	ולא צמאו בחרבות הוליכם / מים מצור הזיל למו / ויבקע צור	2I
4/4/4	ויזבו מים	
	אני יהוה אלהיך / מלמדך להשכיל <מעשיך> / מדריךך בדרך	17b
3/3/3	חלך	
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- I Hear ye this, O House of Jacob,
Those who call themselves by the name of Israel,
And have sprung from the loins of Judah,
Who swear by the name of Yahweh,
And acknowledge the God of Israel,
But not in truth nor in sincerity.
- 2 For by the name of the Holy City they call themselves,
And stay themselves upon the God of Israel,
Whose name is Yahweh of Hosts.
- 4 Because I knew that thou art stubborn,
That an iron sinew is thy neck
And thy forehead a brazen plate,
- 5 I would foretell unto thee in advance;
Before anything would happen I would let thee hear of it,
Lest thou shouldst say, "My idol did them,"
Or "My graven image" or "My molten image ordained them."
- 13b I challenge them;
Let them stand up together!
- 14a Assemble, all of you, and hearken!
Who among you hath foretold these things?
- 6aβ Or you, do you not foretell?
- 16a Draw near to Me; hear ye this!
From the very beginning I have not declared My fiat secretly;
From the moment when it (i. e. the world) came into being I was present.

- 12b I, the Existent One, even I, am the first;
Furthermore, I am the last.
- 13a Moreover, My hand laid the foundation of the earth,
And My right hand spread out the heavens.
- 3 The first things I foretold in advance;
Yea, from My mouth they issued forth and I announced
them;
Of a sudden I acted and they came to pass.
- 6aa Hearken, thou shalt behold the whole of it!
- 14b I, Yahweh, love him;
He will execute My purpose against Babylon,
And his arm will bring deliverance from the Chaldaeans.
- 15 I have decreed; moreover, I have summoned him;
I have made him come, and I shall make his course
successful.
- 6b I have let thee hear new things, of the present moment,
Things concealed, which thou hast not known.
- 7 Now were they brought into being, and not of old;
Yea, before today thou hadst not heard of them,
Lest thou shouldst say, "Behold, I have known them."
- 8 Verily, thou hast not heard, nor yet hast thou known (them),
Nor have I previously opened thine ear;
For I know that thou art utterly faithless;
Yea, rebellious one hast thou been called from birth.
- 9 For My name's sake I suspend Mine anger;
Yea, for My repute have I compassion upon thee
So as not to let thee be cut off.
- 10 Behold, I have refined thee, though not as silver;
I have purified thee in the furnace of affliction.
- 11 For Mine own sake, for Mine own sake do I act;
For how may My name be profaned?
Nor will I yield My prestige to any other.
- 12a Hearken unto Me, O Jacob,
Yea, Israel, summoned by Me!
- 17a Thus saith Yahweh,
Thy Redeemer, Israel's Holy One;
- 20 Go forth from Babylon, flee from the Chaldaeans;
With joyous shout announce this;
Let it be heard, make it to go forth to the end of the earth;
Say, "Yahweh hath redeemed Jacob;
- 21 Nor did they thirst in the waste places whither He brought
them;

- Water for them He made flow forth from the rock;
 Yea, He split the rock and the water gushed forth.”
- 17b I, Yahweh, thy God,
 Am He who teacheth thee to act with discernment,
 Who guideth thee in the way thou shouldst go.
- 18 Wouldst thou but hearken to My commandments,
 Then thy good fortune will be as the Euphrates,
 And thy merit like the ocean waves;
- 19 And thy posterity will be like the sand,
 And the offspring of thy loins like the grains thereof;
 Thy name will not be cut off from before Me.

This address, quite plainly, the prophet directs to a Jewish audience in Babylonia, manifestly a group of Jewish exiles resident there for approximately a half century. He denounces them for their insincerity and faithlessness. With their lips they profess loyalty to Yahweh, the god of their fathers, to their ancient homeland and its sacred city, Jerusalem, and to their ancestral traditions. In actual practice, however, they offer homage to idols or to the gods whom the idols represent, and credit them with everything which transpires in the world, particularly as it affects them and their immediate environment. As an ardent devotee of Yahweh this disturbs the prophet exceedingly. As the eager champion of the God of Israel, and that too in the thought and spirit of his prophetic predecessor, Ezekiel, he envisages Him as jealous of His reputation, particularly when brought into comparison or, in a way, even into competition, with other gods, and of course especially with the gods to whom these faithless Jewish exiles are offering their true homage, the native Babylonian deities, the gods of the land in which they are resident. Accordingly he portrays Yahweh as prepared to act in order to demonstrate, not merely His divinity as such, that He is as much a god as is any other god, or for that matter all other gods together, but more, far more, than this, that He surpasses all other gods in divine character and power. And so he represents Yahweh as challenging these other gods to a debate or to the semblance of a court trial in order to prove their divinity in comparison with His.

The true test of divinity, so the prophet proposes, not only here but also in subsequent addresses, is ability to foresee and foretell future events, to announce in advance what is destined to happen. This a god is able to do, impliedly, just because he himself plans and initiates these happenings and brings them to pass in execution of his plan, when the proper moment for this comes. Accordingly in vv.

13b, 14a, 6aß, 16a, 12b-13a, 3, arranged in this order, the prophet depicts Yahweh as issuing His challenge to these gods. The unity of this passage and its thought development, as thus reconstructed, are immediately self-evident. The plural forms of both pronouns and verbs, the latter in both the 2nd and 3rd persons, refer to the other gods or idols, specifically mentioned in v. 5b. It is they, and they alone, who in these vv. are directly addressed by Yahweh. Moreover, the appending of v. 6aß directly to v. 14a produces a closely unified and very effective 3/3/3 tristich. The thought implicit in it is that, having in v. 13 challenged the other gods to stand up in debate and prove their divinity as compared with His, Yahweh puts to them the decisive question, "Who among you, which particular one of you, has foretold, has announced in advance, and then (by clear implication) has brought to pass these things?" "These things" are the incidents which are now happening and which, so the prophet intimates, are setting the world of that day in turmoil. Apparently the prophet then represents, by a brief halt in his own words, Yahweh as waiting silently for a moment, long enough for some one or even several of those so-called gods to speak up and claim, each for himself, the credit for, and with that the authorship of, these world-happenings; but of course not a single god speaks up or utters even a single word. Accordingly, with the biting sarcasm, of which, we shall in due time see, he is the supreme master, the prophet represents Yahweh as asking these assembled gods, as the alternative to his first interrogation, the decisive, self-condemnatory question, "Or you, do you not foretell?" Manifestly to this taunting question too there is no response.

And having thus proved conclusively the total lack of divinity and of divine power on the part of these spurious gods, the prophet proceeds to prove the true and unchallengeable divinity of Yahweh by affirming one of his distinctive doctrines, that Yahweh, and He alone, is the Creator of the universe. He was at the beginning and He will be until the very end; therefore He is the Eternally Existent One. Moreover, in the course of the creation of the universe, and that too creation by divine fiat, by the mere utterance of His creative word, before He brought anything into existence He would announce in advance just what He proposed to do. Then He would speak His divine command, would announce it aloud, so that it could be heard everywhere; suddenly He acted, and the thing or things came into being even as He had planned and announced them. Such was His divine procedure at the very beginning, and such has been His divine procedure ever since.

And as further evidence, the ultimate, decisive proof, of His

divinity, and as further illustration of His normal procedure of announcing in advance, of foretelling, what is about to happen, what He is about to bring to pass, He, Yahweh, will now announce, through the medium of His prophet, His entire plan, new things, never before divinely announced or predicted, and therefore never heard previously by Israel or any other people, all the momentous things which are happening in the world at this very moment and their import, matters of concern for all mankind, viz. the advent of Cyrus, the Persian, and his uniform and widely expanding military successes up to this present moment, together with their promise for the future. All this too is Yāhweh's work, planned by Him for a specific purpose, and in due time to be brought to sure and complete fulfillment. And this divine purpose, to be mediated by Cyrus, is Israel's salvation, its deliverance from exile in Babylonia and its restoration to its ancestral land, its return thither through the intervening desert, with its innumerable obstacles and manifold, almost insurmountable hardships, in much the same miraculous manner as Yahweh had once before brought His people, following His deliverance of them from Egypt, through the then intervening desert to the goodly land which He had promised them. For this purpose He, and He alone, has called Cyrus, has brought him from his own native land, has prospered him and will continue to prosper him until this, His ultimate purpose, will be completely fulfilled.

The restoration by Yahweh of His exiled people from Babylonia to ancestral land had already been foretold by two Yahweh-inspired prophets, first Jeremiah and then Ezekiel, but only in broad, general terms and only for the vague, undetermined future. But now the time for this deliverance is drawing near. But the precise moment for and the manner of this all-important event, destined to transpire in the immediate future, Yahweh had not ventured to announce sooner, not even to Israel, His people. Instead He had perforce to withhold all this until this decisive moment; for, knowing full well Israel's utter untrustworthiness, particularly in relation to Himself, He realized that it would have deliberately misinterpreted, would have ascribed all this concatenation of events and the import thereof to some other god, who, so the further claim would have been, had foretold all this long before. And thus once again through Israel, His own people, Yahweh would have been discredited and, in comparison with these other presumptive gods, reduced to a position of disregard and shame.

But despite all this Yahweh could not dispense with Israel nor cast it off, as it unquestionably deserved. For the sake of His reputa-

tion as a god He had to retain Israel as His people; for a god without a people, through whom and for whom he might work, and thus demonstrate the measure of his divine power, and through whom he might be glorified in the sight of all mankind, was no true god at all, was completely lacking in divine quality and dignity, was unreal in every respect. Therefore for His own sake, Yahweh could not reject Israel as His people despite its manifest unworthiness, but must keep it, and must also restrain His amply justified wrath and bear with it. Accordingly He has sought to purify it, to purge it of its faithlessness to Him and of its hitherto constant disregard of His commandments and of the way of life He had enjoined for it. He had therefore sought to refine it in the furnace of affliction, i. e. through the suffering attendant upon military conquest, loss of national independence and exile to a distant land. This is of course in large measure a reaffirmation of Jeremiah's doctrine of מוסר, of the disciplinary character and purpose of the Babylonian conquest of Judah and the attendant Babylonian exile. All this Yahweh had wrought consciously and purposefully for His own sake; for under no condition could He permit His name to be profaned, nor that which was entirely to His credit and for His honor, and for His alone, to be accounted to some other being.

Accordingly He has no alternative. He must bear with His people and redeem it and restore it to its ancestral land; and the time for this is rapidly drawing near. This is the true import of what is now transpiring in the world. Through Cyrus, whom Yahweh has summoned as the agent of His ultimate purpose, Israel will be enabled to depart from Babylonia, and under Yahweh's protection will proceed safely through the desert, with its manifold hardships and dangers, and will at last attain its goal. And the nations, even unto the very end of the earth, beholding or hearing the report of this unparalleled deliverance of a conquered and exiled people and its restoration to and rehabilitation in its ancestral land, will at last recognize the true nature and transcendent, divine character and power of Yahweh and will render unto Him the homage which is His due and for which He is so solicitous.

Moreover, and with this alluring promise the prophet brings this address to a fitting and effectively climactic conclusion, since Israel is Yahweh's people and He, and He alone, is its true god, its true teacher of life's ways and its guide upon its entire course, if only it would hearken to His commandments, then it could confidently look forward to a safe and happy future, with its material well-being assured and with its population steadily increasing in such measure that its existence as Yahweh's own people would never cease.

Such is the steadily and logically unfolding argument of this address in the form in which we have in the aforementioned seminar reconstructed it. Instead of overhastily labelling almost one half of this chapter, actually the equivalent of ten out of twenty-two verses, as glosses, as was the procedure of the majority of earlier and highly regarded commentators, with the result that what little that would remain as the actual utterance of the prophet known as Deutero-Isaiah would convey no unified and adequate thought whatsoever, by the rearrangement of a few obviously dislocated but nonetheless thoroughly genuine passages, six verses in all, and their restoration to their seemingly original and certainly logical positions we have not only saved the entire chapter, with the exception of two brief passages, each the equivalent of approximately only a half-verse, for the prophet, but have recovered an address with a single, closely unified and cogent theme, logically and consistently developed, and singularly appropriate and meaningful for the particular audience to whom it was directed.

In discussing the textual emendations which we have found it necessary to make in order to recover as nearly as possible what we believe to have been the original form of this address, we shall of course here, and likewise in our treatment of the other addresses of Deutero-Isaiah, follow the order of vv. as we have rearranged them.

1. The emendation of וּמַעֲיִי וּמַעֲיִי to וּמַעֲיִי, proposed long ago and accepted by practically all commentators, is so obvious and necessary that it needs no argument to support it.

2. It is necessary for מַעֲיִי to read, with G, בְּשֵׁם עִיר. The 'מ' of מַעֲיִי undoubtedly resulted from the preservation of the final letter of the original בְּשֵׁם. The supplying of בְּשֵׁם recovers the thought originally set forth in v. 2a, the thought which alone is integral with that of the remainder of the v. The supplying of this word compels, for metrical considerations, the interpretation of עִיר־הַקֹּדֶשׁ as a by-name of Jerusalem, and therefore the reading of the two words together as a single beat. This is apparently the earliest instance in all Biblical literature of the designation of Jerusalem by this meaningful epithet (cf. also 52.1). It would seem then that this term was coined by Deutero-Isaiah. This suggests that already at the very commencement of his prophetic ministry Jerusalem, and with it of course the Temple, loomed large in the thought and vision of the prophet, though their specific part therein was as yet plainly undefined. For the ultimate role of Jerusalem and the Temple in the prophet's message cf. the note to 44.28 (incorporated into the address in Isa. 45, between vv. 19 and 20a).

4. For מַשְׂרִידֵי עֵתִי read with D(ead) S(ea) I(saiah)a (=DSIa) מַשְׂרִידֵי עֵתִי. In the MT text the parallelism of v. 4c with v. 4b is imperfect, since v. 4c has no word which in thought conforms to נִיד of v. 4b. Moreover, metrically a word is certainly missing in v. 4c. By supplying מִצָּחַת, "a plate (of armor)" (cf. I Sam. 17.6), obviously lost by haplography with וּמַצָּחַת, both the proper 3-beat meter and a very effective parallelism and also play on words are recovered.

5. V. 5aβ defines precisely מָאֻז of v. 5aα, viz. "in advance (of a coming event)"; so also in vv. 3, 8; however, in v. 7aα, where it contrasts with מַעֲתָה, מָאֻז must be translated "of old; in former times." Probably with Torrey (*The Second Isaiah*, 375)

we should vocalize עֲצָבִי. In v. 5b the ו which links פסל וסכי must be interpreted as 'correlative (= "or") rather than as 'connective (= "and"); accordingly the verb of which the two nouns are the subject should be read, as does *MT*, as a 3rd, sing., masc., זָנָם. The prophet's representation here of these faithless Jews speaking of their objects of worship and media of divination as "my idol, my image, etc." rather than as "my god" is a very effective expression of that satire, of which, as we shall see, he was a master.

14a. Since the whole of v. 14a is obviously a challenge directed to the idols mentioned in v. 5b, and since also within this tristich three verbs and two pronouns are in the 2nd plu., and since accordingly a 3rd plu., masc. pronoun would be utterly meaningless and decidedly confusing here, there can be little question that, following *S* and also some forty manuscripts, בָּהֶם should be emended to בָּכֶם.

12b. For אֲנִי־הוּא, "I, the Ever-Existent One," as a name of Yahweh, coined by Deutero-Isaiah, cf. Morgenstern, "Deutero-Isaiah's Terminology for 'Universal God'," *Journal of Biblical Literature*, LXII (1943), 269-280; Mowinckel, *He That Cometh*, 77.

16. There can be no question that, as maintained by Oort, Duhm, Cheyne and Torrey, v. 16b is a gloss. On the one hand, the second half, what would be the second stichos of a 3/3 distich, obviously lacks two words, with the result that it expresses no complete thought. And on the other hand, the half-verse, as it stands in *MT*, has absolutely no thought-connection either with v. 16a or with the theme of the entire address. Just as in Jer. 25.17; 26.12, 15, so here also the 1st per. pronominal suffix can refer only to the prophet. But in v. 16a the 1st per. refers to Yahweh. Undoubtedly, just as in Zech. 2.12, 13, 15; 4.9; 6.15, where the clause, which voices practically the same thought as here, disturbs the sequence of thought and is manifestly a gloss, so also here.

3. We must, quite obviously, with Duhm and Marti, emend the *MT* vocalization וְאֲשֵׁמֶעֱמָם.

6aa. Certainly for שָׁמַע חוֹחַ we should read שָׁמַע חוֹחַה, transferring the final letter of the first word to the beginning of the second word. This altogether minimal emendation recovers a simple and natural meaning for the stichos and makes it the proper and very effective introduction to the thought of the vv. which follow in the address, as we have reconstructed it, in which the "new things," viz. Yahweh's plan with regard to Cyrus, are disclosed.

14b. In v. 14ba a word has unquestionably been lost, a word indispensable to the thought and likewise to the very probable 3/3 meter of the distich in its original form, as we have reconstructed it by linking v. 6aa with v. 14ba. Certainly the most natural word here would be אֲנִי, with reference to Yahweh. And inasmuch as very close at hand, at the beginning of v. 15, there are two אֲנִי's, one of which is, where it stands, clearly superfluous for the thought and certainly disturbing of the meter, it seems altogether likely that this אֲנִי stood originally at the beginning of v. 14ba and was transposed to its present, improper position through scribal carelessness or confusion. The *MT* vocalization, אֶהְבֵּה, should certainly be emended to אֶהְבֵּנִי, which may be interpreted either as an impf. *qal*, 1st sing. (cf. Hos. 11.1; 14.5; Mal. 1.2) or as an act. part. *qal*, more probably the latter. The *MT* reading, חָפְצוֹ, would mean that Cyrus would, through Yahweh's favor, execute his own purpose against Babylon, viz. its conquest, certainly not an unnatural thought here. However, inasmuch as the passage clearly records Yahweh's plan and purpose, of which Cyrus was merely the agent, it seems altogether justifiable to emend, with Duhm, חָפְצוֹ to חָפְצִי, "My purpose." And indeed DSIa does read חָפְצִי (cf. De Boer, *Second Isaiah's*

Message: Oudtestamentische Studien XI [1956] 76). This reading brings out the thought which seems to animate the prophet in this, his initial address, that Yahweh's primary purpose with Cyrus is to effect the deliverance of Israel from the land of its exile and its restoration to its ancestral land. Apparently as yet he sees no larger world-purpose contemplated by Yahweh and to be achieved through Cyrus as the divinely appointed agent thereof. Certainly both the thought and meter of v. 14b γ in its *MT* form are incomplete; in fact the two words which at present constitute this verse-section convey no complete meaning at all. Obviously a word has been lost, and that too at the end of the line (cf. Morgenstern, "The Loss of Words at the Ends of Lines in Manuscripts of Biblical Poetry," *HUCA* XXV [1954], 41-84). And since the vss. offer no suggestion whatever in this connection, the missing word can be supplied only by conjecture. The context suggests that the missing word must be a verb, of which חרען would be the subject. The verb which in this setting suggests itself most naturally is חושע (cf. Isa. 53.1; 59.16; 63.5; Ps. 44.4; 98.1; Job 26.2). The supplying of this verb necessitates further the emendation of כשרים to כשרים. Thus reconstructed, an effective parallelism is established within the two stichoi of the distich in v. 14b $\beta\gamma$, a parallelism which suggests quite forcibly that Yahweh's purpose in making Cyrus victorious over the Chaldeans was in order to effect Israel's deliverance from Babylonia.

15. As has already been stated, the one אני in v. 15a is both superfluous to the thought and overloads the meter. Whether transposed to v. 14ba, as proposed, or not, it should under all conditions be omitted here. While והצליח is readily translatable and comprehensible as a perf., 3rd sing., masc., with Cyrus as the subject, the context would seem to require the first person, for certainly the natural continuation of the thought of הביאתי, "I (i. e. Yahweh) have caused him to come," is "And I shall make his course successful." Cheyne, Duhm, Marti and Torrey, following G, would emend ואצליח to ואצליח. However, realizing that this is Deutero-Isaiah's initial prophetic address and that in all certainty it was delivered quite some time, several years in all likelihood, before Cyrus' conquest of Babylon, the climax of his military program, it seems best to interpret the verb as referring to the future, and so read ואצליח.

6b. For ולא read, with DSIa and V, לא, and for ידעתם, with DSIa, ידעתן. With this latter reading the pronominal suffix of the verb agrees in gender and number with its antecedent, נצורה. However, this latter emendation of *MT* is not at all vital, since, as v. 7 illustrates graphically, either the masc. or the fem. plu. suffix may be used here.

7. For יום, without the article, with the connotation, "today," cf. Isa. 43.13; Ezek. 48.35.

8. The *MT* vocalization, פתחה, "thine ear was not wide open," is by no means impossible (cf. Isa. 60.11; Cant. 7.13). However, the continuation of the thought in v. 8b, giving Yahweh's motivation for action on His part, makes the reading of G, פתחתי, preferable to that of *MT* (so also Duhm and Marti). After ידעתי insert, with DSIa, the almost absolutely indispensable כי, probably lost by haplography with the preceding כי. For the precise connotation of בור here cf. De Boer, *op. cit.*, 52.

9. For וזהלתי it is of course absolutely necessary to read ולהלהתי; cf. Zeph. 3.19, 20; also Deut. 26.19; Jer. 13.11; 33.9. For זהלה with the connotation, "repute", cf. Ps. 48.11; 66.2; 102.22; 111.10. For אחטילך read, following Graetz, Cheyne and Marti, אחטל עליך. The consideration that this would be the only occurrence of the stem, חטט, in the entire Bible, and that its connotation here would be extremely uncertain, supports this emendation strongly.

10. The context plainly requires that בכסף be emended to ככסף. For בחרתיך read, with DSIa, בחנתיך.

11. Contextual, grammatical and metrical considerations establish with certainty that in v. 11b a word has been lost, a word which would be the proper subject of יהל, and which would likewise complete the necessary 3-beat meter of the stichos. The manifest parallelism of this missing word with וכבודי of the following stichos establishes further that this missing word can be only שמי (so also Torrey). For the import of the thought of Israel's profanation of Yahweh's name, here developed, but originating in Ezekiel's doctrine of "for His name's sake," cf. Ezek. 36.20-23; cf. also 20.39; 39.7; likewise Lev. 18.21; 19.12; 21.6; 22.2, 32 (all these passages are from the Holiness Code, and therefore are later than and in considerable degree directly reflect the thought of Ezekiel); Jer. 34.16; Amos 2.7 (a post-exilic gloss).

20. This v., linked with v. 21, constitutes a distinct thought-unit or strophe within this poetic address. The theme of the two vv. is the impending departure from Babylon and journey of the redeemed exiles to their ancestral land through the desert which intervenes between it and Babylonia, a journey distinctly reminiscent of redeemed Israel's traditional journey from Egypt through the desert to its eventual homeland. Accordingly these two vv. are cast very effectively in 4-beat measure, v. 20 as 4/4 double-distich and v. 21 as a 4/4/4 tristich. It is then obvious at a glance that metrical confusion exists in the *MT* of the second stichos of the first distich of v. 20, which has only three beats, while the stichos immediately following, the first stichos of the second distich of the v., has five beats. Furthermore, since הגידו is a transitive verb, it must have an object; but this is at present lacking. This difficulty is easily cleared up by transferring ואת from its position in *MT* to follow הגידו and by emending השמיעו to השמיעה and thus bringing it into perfect parallelism with הוציאה. Quite probably the final ה' השמיעה was lost by haplography with the next letter of the original text, the initial ה' of הוציאה, and then ואת was transposed from its original position in order to provide an object for both verbs, הגידו and השמיעה. Similarly the second stichos of the second distich of v. 20 has five beats, i. e. again one beat too many for the prevailing four-beat meter. Certainly one word must be omitted here. The only possible choice lies between עבדו and יעקב. And inasmuch as the context requires the specific mention of יעקב here, while nowhere in this address is there any intimation whatsoever that Yahweh had chosen Israel to be His servant, to perform a particular service for Him, there can hardly be any question that עבדו is the word to be elided here. Quite plainly it was interpolated here by some careless scribe or by some editor who remembered that in other addresses, which we have shown to be later than this address, Deutero-Isaiah did apply to Israel repeatedly the very meaningful title, עבד יהוה, and so assumed that it should have stood here also.

17b. This is quite plainly a 3/3/3 tristich; but in *MT* the second stichos has only two beats, and likewise in its present wording certainly does not express a thought consonant with or worthy of the theme of this address. Plainly the difficulty lies in the verb, להועיל. This verb has only one connotation, "to derive profit," and is never used transitively, so that it might be followed by a direct object or some other dependent word, which, if supplied here, would provide the stichos with its missing third beat. Plainly we need here a transitive verb of fitting meaning, a word of which להועיל would be a natural corruption, together with its object. Now ע is quite frequently a corruption of an original ש (for an unmistakable instance of this cf. ודשתי of Jud. 8.7 with וידע, the corruption of the original שדע, of v. 16 of the same chapter), while the combination of letters ווע, which exists in להועיל, lends itself even

more readily to corruption from an original ש . Accordingly in the seminar להועיל was emended to להשכיל, while, as the missing object of this verb, מעשך was supplied; for השכיל מעשים, "to act with discernment," cf. Deut. 29.8; I Kings 2.3; Ps. 64.10.

18. The use of וְיָהּ both here and, in altogether similar manner, in v. 19 occasions not a little difficulty. This *MT* reading permits only one translation, viz. "If only thou hadst (in former times) hearkened to My commands, then thy good fortune would have been ———, and thy seed would have been ———" (cf. Judg. 13.23; I Sam. 14.30; also Judg. 8.19). However, v. 19c, so both the tense of the verb and the dominant thought of the address indicate, deals with the future, and so must be translated as voicing the promise, "Thy seed will not be cut off," rather than a circumstance commencing in the past and continuing into the present, "Thy seed would not have been cut off." Actually for both וְיָהּ's we would expect either וְיָהּ or וְיָהּ (וְ) consecutive). And DSIa actually reads וְיָהּ for the וְיָהּ in v. 18, although it does read וְיָהּ in v. 19. Accordingly it seems proper to emend each וְיָהּ to וְיָהּ, and thus achieve that unity of thought and promise which this strophe, and with it the entire address in its original form unquestionably conveyed. Certainly בְּנֵהר, in *MT* correctly vocalized with the article, must be interpreted as meaning, not merely "like a river," as most of the vss. and also modern translations render it, but rather "like the Euphrates," as Targ. and perhaps also *S* render it. For these Judaeen exiles in Babylonia, dwelling, at least in large part, as ample evidence indicates, in Southern Babylonia, in reasonable proximity to the Euphrates, the simile here employed, which set the River in parallelism with the Ocean, would have been vivid and meaningful indeed.

19. Unquestionably it is well to read, with *G*, שְׁמוֹ for שֶׁמֶךְ. Unquestionably too in v. 19c at least the first לֹא is emphatic and so should be stressed by being read as a full beat. But this, in turn, would yield five full beats for v. 19c, something which the rules of Biblical Hebrew metrics forbid. Moreover, while כֶּרֶם, in the *nif.*, is occasionally used with שֶׁם as its subject (Isa. 55.13; 56.5), שֶׁמֶךְ is never so employed. Accordingly it seems best to expunge לֹא שֶׁמֶךְ from the text. Its presence here may well be due to dittography with the next ensuing word of the original text, שֶׁמֶךְ. Certainly with this elision the thought-formulation becomes decidedly more vigorous and effective. However, even with this elision the stichos still contains four beats, and the entire metrical unit, a tristich, the final and climactic metrical unit of the entire address, is a 3/3/4. However, this metrical form for an emphatic, and especially for the final, metrical unit of a poem or an address in metrical form is not uncommon in Biblical Hebrew usage (cf. Isa. 42.13; 45.22; 49.6). I hope to show also, in due time, that the address of Amos, delivered at Bethel, likewise ended on a 3/3/4. (This metrical form was brought to my notice by my good friend and highly esteemed colleague, Professor Robert Gordis, in commenting, in a personal communication, upon my own incorrect metrical arrangement of the above-cited v. in my article, "Isaiah 42.10-13," in *To Do and To Teach — Essays in Honor of Charles Lynn Pyatt* 1953, 27-38). Certainly the drawing out of the final stichos of a poem or address in poetic form by giving it an extra beat adds force to it and thus imparts a powerful, climactic effect to the poem or address. Such is certainly the case with this address in Isa. 48.

Isa. 47

Before attempting to interpret this chapter and to solve the various problems, some of them rather complex, which the task involves, it will be well to present its text, as reconstructed in the seminar.

3/2	1	רדי ושבי על-עפר / בתולת בתי-בבל
3/2		שבי לארץ אין-כסא / < > רכה ועונה
3/2	5	שבי דומם < > בחשך / בת כשרים
3/2		כי-לא תוסיפי יקראו-לך / גברת ממלכות
3/2	7	ותאמרי לעולם אהיה / גברת עד
3/2		לא-ישמת אלה על-לבך / לא-זכרת אחריתה
3/2	8	ועתה שמעייזאת עדינה / הישבת לבטח
3/2		האמרה בלבבה אני / ואפסי עוד
3/2		לא אשב אלמנה / ולא-אדע שכול
3/2	9	ותבאנה-לך שתי-אלה רגע / < > שכול ואלמן
3/2		כתמם יבאו עליך / < > בעצמת חבריך < >
3/2	10	ותבטחי בדעתך אמרת / אין מיראני
3/2		חכמתך < > היא שובבתך / < > ודעתך התעתך < >
3/2	11	ובאה עליך רעה / לא-תדעי שחרה
3/2		ותפל עליך הוה / לא-תוכלי כפרה
3/2		ותבא עליך פתאם / שאה לא-תדעי
3/2	12	עמדי נא קְסָבִיךְ / וברב קְשָׁפִיךְ < >
3/2		אולי תוכלי הועיל / אולי תנַעֲצִי
3/2	13	נלאת ברב יעצִיךְ / יעמדוניא ויושיעוך
3/2		ברי השמים < > המודיעים-לך / חדשים אשר-יבאו < >
3/2	14	הנם היו כקש / אש שרפתם
3/2		לא יצילו את-נפשם / מיד להבה < >
3/2	15	כן הידלך סחרִיךְ / באשר-יגיעת מנעוריך
3/2		איש לעברו תעו / אין מושיעך

- 1 Get down and sit in the dust,
O virgin daughter of Babylon;
Sit upon the ground throneless,
O tender and delicate one.
- 5 Sit in silence in the darkness,
O daughter of the Chaldeans;
For never again shall they call thee
Mistress of kingdoms.

- 7 But thou didst say, "Unto eternity shall I exist,
Mistress forever."
Thou didst not lay these things to heart;
Thou wast not mindful of her end.
- 8 But now hear this, O pleasure-seeking one,
Who art dwelling in security,
Who sayest in her heart, "I am,
And besides me there is none.
I shall not abide as a widow,
Neither shall I experience loss of children."
- 9 But both of these shall befall thee in a (single) moment,
Bereavement of children and widowhood.
In their fullest measure shall they befall thee,
Through the effect of thy sorceries.
- 10 For thou didst put thy faith in thy science; thou didst say,
"Nothing frightens me."
Thy sapience betrayed thee
(And thy science led thee astray).
- 11 So that misfortune shall come upon thee,
Whose blackness thou dost not know;
And disaster shall befall thee,
Which thou canst not avert;
And suddenly there shall overtake thee
Catastrophe, of which thou hast no foreknowledge.
- 12 Take now thy stand amidst thy magicians,
Yea, among thine innumerable sorcerers;
Perhaps thou mayest find some help,
Perhaps thou mayest gather counsel.
- 13 Thou hast exhausted thyself with thy host of counsellors;
Let them now stand up and save thee,
The scanners of heaven, who make known unto thee
New things, which are about to happen.
- 14 Behold, they are like stubble;
Fire consumes them;
They can not save themselves
From the flame's grasp.
- 15 So are unto thee thy soothsayers,
With whom thou hast busied thvself from thy youth;
They have gone astray, each one on his own course;
There is not one who might save thee.

I. V. 1a bids Babylon descend, of course from her lofty throne, which, figuratively, she occupied as mistress of the world (vv. 5, 7). בתִּישָׁרִים כִּי־לֹא תוֹסִיף. occurs again and verbatim in v. 5. There it is decidedly in place, both as to

thought-connection and meter, since it makes of v. 5 the expected $3/2$ double-distich, whereas here it both disturbs the thought and makes of v. 1, altogether unnecessarily and with decidedly weakening effect, a $3/2$ triple-distich. And inasmuch as in the original poem v. 5 followed immediately upon v. 1, the repetition of this clause here is manifestly the result of dittography. Furthermore, the omission of this clause here restores the thought-unity and the parallelism between the two original distichs of the v., heightens the vividness of the picture here, and likewise establishes close affinity with the picture set forth in Deut. 28.56a.

5. V. 5, with its initial word, שבי, "sit", continues directly the thought of v. 1b. Moreover, the command in v. 5a to conquered and humiliated Babylon, to sit in silence in the darkness, does not accord at all with that in vv. 2-3a, to cross over rivers, and thus go into exile or captivity. This is merely the initial evidence that vv. 2-4 are an extremely disturbing gloss, and that in the original poem v. 5 was the immediate continuation of v. 1. ובי confuses both thought and meter and is definitely superfluous, and so should be omitted. Its omission restores the expected $3/2$ meter.

7. Just as v. 5 continues immediately the thought of v. 1, so does v. 7 continue immediately the thought of v. 5; accordingly, like vv. 2-4, so v. 6 must likewise be a disturbing gloss; for further evidence thereof cf. below, pp. 18 ff. Appreciation of the fact that v. 7, like the entire remainder of the poem, is cast in $3/2$ meter enables us to readily grasp its true meaning; for certainly נברה must be the initial word of the second stichos of the first $3/2$ distich, and accordingly עד must be linked with it in order to complete the two-beat stichos, with the connotation "eternity" (cf. Isa. 9.5; 45.17; 57.15). Were אחריה emended to אחריהם, the antecedent of the pronominal suffix would be אלה of the preceding stichos, and the resultant thought would be, "Thou wast not mindful of their outcome." This emendation would establish perfect parallelism between the two stichoi, and may for this reason be preferable to the *MT* reading. Also the possibility must not be lost sight of that the emendation might be to אחרייתך, "thy end." All in all, however, since the *MT* reading offers a very reasonable thought, "her end," i. e. the inevitable end of a nation which deludes itself with the vain thought that it will remain world-mistress forever, it seems best to retain *MT*. Metrical considerations necessitate that לאישמה be read as one beat.

8. Here also appreciation of the $3/2$ meter enables us to readily grasp the thought of the v., and especially of 8b, in its true and full import.

9. אחר ביום disturbs the meter, is unnecessary to the thought, and so is plainly a gloss which defines רגע, and therefore should be omitted. For באו read, with *V*, *Targ.*, and probably also *G*, יבאו. Certainly either ברב כשפיר or בעצמת חבריך is superfluous as to thought and overloads the meter. The same combination of terms occurs again in v. 12, where, however, both expressions are essential to both thought and meter. And inasmuch as there the full expression, ברב כשפיר, occurs again, it is in all likelihood secondary here, and so is the phrase to be omitted. Likewise מאד, at the very end of the v., should be omitted because where it stands it is absolutely meaningless, is syntactically without connection, and also overloads the meter.

10. Just what the precise import of ברעתך, וחבטתי ברעתך, "But thou didst put thy faith in thine evil," might be it is difficult to imagine. Unquestionably instead of ברעתך a word must have stood here which would be an effective parallel of חכמתך, in the corresponding position in the second and parallel distich of this double-distich, a word of which ברעתך would be an obvious corruption. Duhm emends to ברעתך; and this emendation finds confirmation in the presence of this same word in the second stichos of the parallel distich as reconstructed. The דעה, the "science,"

of Babylon, was of course, as the context indicates, its extensive practice of divination and magic. Certainly *אין ראי* is meaningless here, for for Babylon, in the role of world-mistress, to say, "No one sees me," would be incomprehensible. Accordingly read *אין מיראני*, "Nothing frightens me." This relatively simple emendation supplies a thought natural and appropriate at just this stage of the unfolding theme of the poem. Because of her deep faith in her divinatory and magical practices Babylon fears nothing. Unquestionably v. 10aβb is in disorder and needs recasting. In the first place, inasmuch as the thought of the whole of v. 10b has already been expressed, and that too in practically identical wording, in v. 8aβ, where it accords with both thought and meter far better than it does here, it should certainly be omitted here. Furthermore, v. 10aβ must be the first stichos of the distich which parallels the distich of v. 10aa and so completes the double-distich. Moreover, this second distich, like the one which precedes it, must be a 3/2. But in its *MT* form there is one word too many in this stichos, while the second stichos of the distich is, particularly after the elision of the whole of v. 10b, completely lacking. Furthermore, the wording in the 3rd sing., *היא שובבתך*, of v. 10aβ indicates unmistakably that only one of the two nouns at present standing there can be the antecedent of *היא*, and so be original in this position. And this, in turn, suggests the ready solution of the problem of the missing second stichos. *ורעתך* must have been the first word of that two-beat stichos. This leaves only one word actually missing. And inasmuch as *ורעתך* in this second stichos is the complete parallel of *הכמתך* of the first stichos, this missing word must have been a verb which in thought paralleled closely *שובבתך* of the first stichos. With considerable confidence we propose *התעתך* (cf. Jer. 50.6). And inasmuch as this word and *ורעתך* end in the same three consonants, we can readily imagine that *התעתך* was lost through haplography. For *שובב* with the connotation, "to deal treacherously, to betray," cf. Ps. 60.3.

11. For *ויבא* read, with DSIa, and also as the syntax requires, *ושקרה*. For *שקרה* of *MT* read *שחקה* (cf. Lam. 4.8). Whether v. 11c is original or an editorial addition it is impossible to determine with assurance. Certainly this third distich, which makes the metrical unit a triple-distich, with its repetition of *לא ידעני*, and this too without any amplifying noun as its object, as in the first distich, is rather weak and its total effect is somewhat of the nature of a bathos. On the other hand, the possibility must not be dismissed that *ידעני* here has a specific meaning, suggested by its setting, viz. "to know through the use of Babylon's *דעה*, science (v. 10)," i. e. its divinatory techniques. The stichos would then say that even with all its divinatory practice Babylon can not possibly foresee the dread catastrophe impending over it. This thought would pave the way effectively for what the remaining portion of the poem has to say. Under any condition a definitive decision as to whether the distich is original or a gloss can not be reached, and so it seems best to retain it.

12. It seems proper to vocalize here *בהקריך*, "among thy magicians" (literally, "thy binders of knots" [for magical effect]), and *בשפיך*, "thy sorcerers." The reading of DSIa, *בחווריק*, apparently construing this word as an act. part. *qal*, supports this interpretation. Inasmuch as v. 12aβ is metrically disturbing here, adds nothing to, and even interrupts somewhat the sequence of, the thought, and particularly since it occurs again and practically verbatim in v. 15aβ, where it fits perfectly both as to thought and meter, it should unquestionably, with Duhm, be omitted here as a dittograph. Certainly *תערוצי*, "thou shalt inspire terror" or "thou shalt be terrified," can not be the proper word here. DSIa omits the whole of v. 12b, while *G* omits *תערוצי*. Both *Σ* and *V* seem to have read *תעצומי*, "thou mayest find strength," for *תערוצי*. However, in consideration of the thought of the very next

distich, and a simple emendation indeed, for תַּנְעִצִי read תַּנְעִצִי. This reading integrates this double-distich very closely with what follows.

13. For עֲצָחִיךָ read, with Duhm, Marti and Kittel, יַעֲצִיךָ, "thy counsellors." This comparatively minor emendation establishes a very close thought-unity between vv. 12 and 13 and in fact throughout all of vv. 12-15; for certainly these "counsellors" are the magicians and sorcerers of v. 12 and the soothsayers of v. 15, to whom, with biting sarcasm, the poet bids, in v. 12, Babylon turn in desperate hope that they may be able to offer her counsel which may perchance help her in some way. בְּכֹכְבִּים overloads the meter and is plainly a gloss, which attempts, though mistakenly, to define the two preceding words. הַבְּרִי שָׁמַיִם should certainly be emended to בְּרִי הַשָּׁמַיִם. The reference is to the Babylonian *bārû*-priests, the professional diviners, who foretold the future, not by observing the stars, as the defining gloss here states, but rather by hepatoscopy or extispicy (cf. Zimmern, *Beiträge zur Kenntniss der Babylonischen Religion*, 81-121; Haupt, *JBL*, 1900, 66 f.; also Isa. 44.25 and perhaps Jer. 50.36). V. 13b is manifestly unintelligible in its *MT* reading and likewise defies metrical arrangement. The reconstruction which we propose is so readily apparent and restores the expected meter so perfectly that it scarcely needs detailed exposition or further justification. Under any condition, with לָךְ following הַמִּוִּדְעִים, as we have reconstructed the distich, יָבֹאוּ after עֲלֶיךָ becomes completely superfluous, and, since it likewise disturbs the $3/2$ meter, should be omitted.

14. It seems well to emend הָיָה to הָיָה, for this would clarify the thought and make the statement more emphatic. לְהַמְסֵךְ should certainly, following DS1a, *V* and *S*, be vocalized לְהַמְסֵךְ. However, here the question arises again whether the third distich of this v. is integral to the thought and so is original. Actually its precise meaning in this setting is not clear, and under any condition adds little to the vigor of the thought here expressed. Moreover, it seems to disturb what would be without it a very close thought-connection between vv. 14ab and 15. Furthermore, v. 14c reads better as a $3/3$ than as a $3/2$, for, in order to permit the latter reading, it becomes necessary to read לְשִׁבְחֵנוּ as one beat, which, while not impossible, is certainly neither natural nor easy. All in all therefore it seems best, with Duhm, Marti and Cheyne, to regard v. 14c as an editorial gloss, based perhaps largely upon the graphic and effective picture in 44.14-20.

15. As the context demands, סֹחֵרִיךְ must be the subject of הָיָה and so should follow immediately after לָךְ. This rearrangement, confirmed by the gloss in v. 12a β , restores the expected $3/2$ meter. However, since יָנֵעַ is used regularly with the preposition 'ב', it is necessary to read, as in the dittograph in v. 12a β and also with some fifteen mss., בְּאֵשׁ. For metrical reasons and other considerations as well, this reading is preferable here to the retention of אֵשׁ of *MT* and the supplying of בָּם after יָנֵעַ. יָנֵעַ with סֹחֵרִיךְ with the connotation "magician, soothsayer" cf. Meissner, *Supplement zu den Assyrischen Wörterbüchern*, 71a. The use of specifically Accadian terms both here and in v. 13 suggests strongly that the author of this poem was a Jewish resident of Babylonia and thoroughly familiar with his cultural environment, in other words either a Jewish exile himself or the offspring of such a one. The final two words of this final distich of the poem constitute a powerful climax to the entire poem.

We have omitted vv. 2-4 and also v. 6 from the reconstructed poem on the ground that they are glosses, and this for various and cogent reasons. In the first place, it should be noticed that we are dealing here, not with what is essentially a prophetic address, directed to a specific group of people, but what is rather a poem of elegiac form and character, apostrophized to, or rather at, Babylon. Its theme is the narrowly impending downfall and eternal doom of Babylon as a nation. Ac-

cordingly, just as might have been expected, the entire poem is in $3/2$ meter, the characteristic meter of Biblical elegiac poetry, as Budde has demonstrated (*ZATW* II [1882], 1 ff.; XI [1891], 234 ff.). But vv. 2-4, 6 are in altogether different meter. Vv. 2-3 are in the four-beat meter, while v. 4 is in either $4/2$ or $3/3$ meter, depending upon whether שׁוּ is to be construed with what precedes or what follows. V. 6, in its *MT* form, seems to consist of one $4/2$ and one $3/3$ distich; actually, however, as we shall see, the v. was originally a $4/4/4$ tristich.

Certainly v. 4 can not be integral in the poem. It, and possibly also the altogether unintelligible v. 3b, and also v. 6, all passages which we hold to be interpolations, make specific mention of or reference to Yahweh. On the other hand, in the poem itself, as we have reconstructed it, there is no direct mention nor even suggestion of Yahweh, although there is every reason to believe that in the mind of its Jewish author Yahweh is the primary source of the impending downfall of Babylon. Furthermore, there is no explicit antecedent of the pronominal suffix of נִאֲלַנּוּ in v. 4, although unquestionably Israel, the author's people, is the implicit antecedent. Likewise in this v. Yahweh is referred to in the 3rd person, while apparently in v. 3b and certainly in v. 6 He is the speaker. The passage has close thought-affinities with five other passages in Isa. 40-48 (41.14; 43.14; 44.6, 24; 48.17), at least one of which (43.14), however, seems, as we shall learn in due time, to be a gloss. But it has equally close, or even closer, thought-affinities with six passages in Isa. 49-66 (49.7, 26; 54.5, 8; 60.16; 63.16), and of these one (54.5) repeats the thought here set forth in practically identical form and wording. It is accordingly a reasonable, and in fact an almost certain, inference that v. 4 is a gloss. Various hypotheses as to how it might have found its place here readily suggest themselves.

Just what the meaning of v. 3b may be and also what its true metrical form defy all possible conjecture. The various reformulations of the half-verse proposed by earlier commentators help little, if at all. The one thing sure is that, however scholars may emend them, the two verbs are both imperfects in the 1st sing., with Yahweh obviously the speaker. But, as has already been intimated, there is in this poem itself no place whatsoever for Yahweh to play such a role as this half-verse seems to suggest, whatever it may have been. Unquestionably v. 3b, regardless of however it be emended and interpreted, does not fit in any way into this poem, and so it too must be a gloss.

In v. 6 also Yahweh is quite obviously the speaker. The thought of the v. is plain and is somewhat reminiscent of Isa. 10.5-11 and also of Zech. 1.15. Furthermore, if the altogether superfluous נִחֲלֵהּ נִחֲלֵהּ be omitted as a disturbing scribal or editorial gloss, the v. stands out as an effective $4/4/4$ tristich. The assumption that נִחֲלֵהּ is a gloss is confirmed by the fact that the antecedent of the pronominal suffixes וְאַתָּם and לָהֶם is certainly not נִחֲלֵהּ, the noun immediately preceding, but the more remote עַמִּי. This natural connection of pronoun and antecedent the intervention of the two words which we would omit disturbs greatly.

When we turn to vv. 2-3a we find that together they constitute a $4/4$ double-distich and as a unit present a very graphic and effective picture of some conquered nation, presumably Babylon, being carried away into exile or captivity in some foreign land or lands, lands between which and Babylonia rivers intervene. What rivers these may be, whether the Euphrates and Tigris or other streams, is not indicated, and so it is impossible to determine in which direction and to what foreign lands, and therefore by what foreign conqueror, the passage envisaged the conquered nation being transported. But while the picture is graphic indeed, it accords not at all with either the metrical form or the dominant thought of the poem proper.

That is, as we have seen, couched throughout as an elegy over conquered Babylon in the regular elegiac 3/2 meter. Moreover, the poem proper seems not to envisage conquered Babylon as being carried away into captivity in some distant land, but rather as remaining in her native land and there reduced to the most abject conditions of conquest, subjection and national humiliation. Accordingly it seems best, as was already intimated in the discussion of v. 5, to regard vv. 2-3a, along with v. 6, as not parts of the original, elegiac poem, but rather, in view of their unquestionably high, literary merit and the effectiveness of the denunciation of Babylon in v. 6, as a fragment, or rather as two fragments, of a prophetic address, the remainder of which has apparently been lost. These two fragments we would reconstruct thus:

4/4	קחי רחים וטחני קמח / גלי צמתך חשפי שולך	2aba
4/4	גלי שוק עברי נהרות / תגל ערותך גמ־תראה חרפתך	2bβ-3a
	קצפתי על־עמי < > ואתנם בידך / לא שמת להם רחמים	6
4/4/4	על־יוקן הכבדת עלך מאד	

2aba Take millstones and grind flour;
 Open thy veil, draw up thy skirt;
 2bβ-3a Lay bare the thigh, cross over rivers;
 Let thy nakedness be revealed, yea thy shame become
 visible.
 6 I was angered at My people, so I gave them into thy possession.
 Thou didst not show them mercy;
 Upon the aged thou didst make thy yoke exceedingly heavy.

2ab. The command to grind flour is here put first, since impliedly this flour will be the food upon which conquered Babylon will subsist upon her journey into exile. The rivers which she will have to ford upon this enforced journey will be so deep that she will have to draw up her garments to the utmost and bare her nakedness completely to her utter shame. Despite G. R. Driver's lucid and inviting interpretation of שָׁבַל (in *Studies in Old Testament Prophecy in Honor of T. H. Robinson*, 58), inasmuch as DSIa reads שולך here, and also in the light of Jer. 13.26, it seems best to, with Nötscher (in *VT* I [1951], 300), adopt the DSIa reading.

It seems altogether probable, in view of the use of the four-beat meter throughout, that these two fragments, vv. 2-3a and v. 6, belonged to the same original address, although there, in all likelihood, they did not stand in immediate juxtaposition. Whether this original address was the work of Deutero-Isaiah or emanated from some other prophetic source it is of course impossible, for lack of adequate evidence, to determine with certainty. But the manifestly high, literary quality of these two fragments and also the bitterly hostile attitude of the author of at least v. 6 to Babylon because of its ruthless treat-

ment of conquered and exiled Israel, and likewise the fact that the two fragments both represent Yahweh as the speaker and the downfall of Babylon, as depicted in v. 6, as brought upon it by Yahweh in retribution for what it had done to Israel, together with the further fact that in these vv., just as in the elegiac poem itself, Babylon is addressed directly, a literary or hortatory procedure employed absolutely nowhere else in Isa. 40-48, or for that matter in all of Isa. 40-66, suggest very strongly that Deutero-Isaiah may well have been the author of the lost prophetic address, of which these vv. are a very small fragment. It is likewise quite probable that the thought implicit in the two final words of v. 1 is what induced the interpolation of vv. 2-3a in just this position.

A much more difficult question is whether the elegiac poem itself, which constitutes the nucleus of this chapter, should be ascribed to Deutero-Isaiah or to some other, unknown literary figure. The poem is scarcely prophetic in character. It suggests nowhere that the pending conquest and subjugation of Babylonia, here portrayed, would be the work of Yahweh or that Israel might have any concern therewith. Also there is nowhere in the poem the slightest suggestion that the conquest of Babylon would be by Cyrus, and especially by Cyrus called by Yahweh for this explicit purpose, and accordingly supported by Him in all his military projects. In fact, a matter to which Torrey has already called attention (*op. cit.*, 370), v. 8 implies clearly that at the time of composition of this poem no national danger confronted Babylon and she felt completely secure in her position as world-mistress. This suggests that this poem must have been composed at a time when Cyrus, even though perhaps already King of Anshan, did not as yet seem to present any threat to Babylon.

Furthermore, none of the distinctive doctrines or arguments of Deutero-Isaiah find expression or even the slightest suggestion in this poem, neither the doctrine of "for His name's sake," which, as we have learned, he had taken over from Ezekiel and which he employed extensively in the initial stages of his prophetic ministry and of the evolution of his total prophetic message, nor yet his bitter antipathy to idols, nor that the true test of divinity is ability to correctly foretell future events, nor his universalistic conception of the world, nor any other. Also, unlike in the assured addresses of Deutero-Isaiah, whose oft-recurring theme is denunciation of exiled Israel for its faithlessness to Yahweh, here there is no reference to nor suggestion of Israel whatsoever, but only denunciation of Babylon and announcement of its impending doom. On the other hand, the very high literary quality of the poem is manifest in every line, as is also the author's

uncompromising hostility to Babylon. Moreover, the author's intimate familiarity with the military and political aspirations of Babylon and also with its religious practices, and particularly its techniques of priestly divination and magic, indicate beyond all possibility of challenge that its author was definitely a Babylonian Jew, one who had the utmost contempt for Babylonian religion and its priestly officiants, and, by quite probable implication, also for the Babylonian deities in whose service these futile diviners functioned. All this would accord well with the thought and message of Deutero-Isaiah. Linguistically too the poem smacks somewhat of Deutero-Isaiah; cf. שִׁים עַל־לֵב (v. 7; cf. 41.22; 42.25); אַחֲרֵית (with the connotation, "outcome"; v. 7; cf. 41.22); אָפֶס (v. 8; cf. 40.17; 41.12, 29; 45.6, 14; 46.9); כִּקֵּשׁ (v. 14; cf. 40.24; 41.2). And the biting satire of vv. 12-15 reminds us strikingly of the various satiric utterances of the prophet in his different addresses, and particularly of the magnificently satiric passage in 44.9-20, one of the classic examples of satire in all world-literature, in which the prophet ridicules both idols and their makers and worshipers. That the prophet was a real master of satire is self-evident. And beyond all question this passage, 47.12-15, is in every respect worthy of him.

All in all then it seems altogether reasonable to ascribe this poem, in conformity with tradition, to Deutero-Isaiah, but to a relatively early moment in his life, before Cyrus had as yet appeared clearly upon the historic scene and likewise before the prophet's distinctive doctrines had begun to evolve, or at least to find concrete expression, or even before he had, as we have learned, initiated his actual, momentous prophetic career by reaffirming Ezekiel's doctrine of "for His name's sake." The poem would fit well into this early, pre-prophetic period of the prophet's life, when he had as yet no awareness of a call by Yahweh to become His spokesman and the medium of His revelation unto His people of His divine purpose for it and for all mankind, the period when, presumably still a relatively young man, endowed with literary power of high degree, the future prophet could give vivid expression to his deeply rooted hatred of Babylon, its government, its people and its religion in this powerful and stirring elegiac poem. Accordingly we may with reasonable assurance regard this poem as the earliest literary utterance of Deutero-Isaiah, the forerunner of his later, entire, prophetic career, earlier then even than his initial prophetic address, in Isa. 48.

Isa. 46

The text of this address is in a decidedly better state of preservation than that of any other of the prophet's extant addresses. No shifting whatsoever of the order of the vv., or even of portions thereof, is required, while the necessary textual emendations are relatively few and for the most part simple and readily discernible.

- 1 כרע בל קרס נבו / היו עצביהם לחיה ולבהמה / נשאתיהם עמוסות
משא לעיפה
4/4/4
- 2 קרסו כרעו יחדו / לאיכלו מלט נפשם / משם בשבי הלכו
3/3/3 שמעו אלי בית יעקב / וכל שארית בית ישראל / העמסים מנייבטן
- 3 הנשאים מניירחם
4/4/4
- 4 ועד־זקנה אני אשא / ועד־שיבה אני אסבל
3/3 אני אעמם ואני־אשא / ואני אסבל ואמלט
3/3 למי תדמיוני ותשווני / וחמשילוני ונדמה
3/3 הזלים זהב מכים / וכסף בקנה ישקלו
3/3 ישכרו צורף ויעשה־ראל / יסגדו אף־ישתחוו <אליו>
3/3 ישאֶהוּ על־כתף יסבלֶהוּ / ויניחֶהוּ תחתיו ויעמד <>
3/3 אף־יצַעַק אליו ולא־יעֲנֶה / מצרתו לא יושיעֵנו
3/3 זכרו זאת והתבוננו / השיבו הפושעים על־לב
3/3 זכרו ראשנות מעולם / כי־אנכי אל ואין־עוד / האלהים ואפס כמוני
3/3/3 10 מגיד מראשית אחרית / ומקדם אשר לא־נעשו
3/3 אמר עצתי תקום / וכל חפצי אעשה
3/3 קרא ממורה עבדי / מארץ מרחק איש־עצתי
3/3 < > דברתי אף אביאֶנָה / יעצתי אף אעשֶׂנָה
3/3 שמעו אלי אביר־לב / הרחוקים מצדקה
3/2 12 קרובה צדקתי לא־תרחק / ותשועתי לא תאחר
3/3 13 ונתתי בציון תשועה / לישראל תפארתִי <אשיב>

- 1 Bowed down is Bel, toppled over is Nebo.
Their images have passed over to beasts and cattle.
Carried aloft (by men) or borne (upon animals), they
are a burden unto exhaustion.
- 2 Toppled over, bowed down together,
They are unable to rescue themselves;
From there they go into captivity.

- 3 Harken unto Me, O House of Jacob,
 Yea, the entire remnant of the House of Israel,
 Ye who have been borne from birth, have been carried from the womb;
- 4 Yea, even unto old age will I carry;
 Yea, unto hoariness will I transport;
 I will bear along and I will carry,
 Yea, I will transport and I will rescue.
- 5 To whom would ye liken Me, or contrast Me,
 Or compare Me, so that we might seem alike?
- 6 They pour forth gold from the purse,
 And silver by scales they weigh out.
 They hire a goldsmith, and he fashions it into a god,
 Unto which they bow down, yea, prostrate themselves.
- 7 They lift it upon their shoulders, they transport it;
 Then they set it in its place, and it stands still;
 Moreover, should one cry unto it, it would not answer;
 From his distress it would not save him.
- 8 Remember this and consider,
 Ye rebels, recall it to mind;
- 9 Remember the very first things from of old,
 That I am God, and none other;
 God (am I), and there is none like unto Me.
- 10 (I), who from the beginning foretell the outcome
 And from the past things not yet transpired;
 Who say: My plan shall persist,
 Yea, My entire purpose will I perform;
- 11 Who summon My servant from the East,
 From a far-off land My agent.
 I have decreed, and I will indeed bring it to pass;
 I have planned, and I will surely perform it.
- 12 Harken unto Me, ye stubborn ones,
 Who are far from deliverance;
- 13 Close by is My deliverance, it is not far off,
 And My salvation will not delay;
 And in Zion will I establish salvation;
 Unto Israel My glory will I restore.

1. This v. abounds in difficulties of manifold character, some of them not easily resolved, nor always with complete certainty. Despite this, however, when interpreted in its close integration with vv. 2-7, the thought which the v. aims to convey becomes both clear and

certain. Cheyne would interpret vv. 1-2 as picturing the carrying off of these Babylonian idols as booty by the conqueror; and indeed v. 2b does seem to affirm that such would be their fate. It may well be therefore that at the time this address was spoken, manifestly before Babylon had been taken by Cyrus, the prophet did anticipate that the Persian monarch, conforming to a long-established practice, (cf. I Sam. 4-6), would carry off the images of the Babylonian gods to his native land as trophies of victory and of his complete subjection of hitherto all-powerful Babylonia. Actually Herodotus (I, 183) does record that Darius I failed in an attempt to carry away the golden image of Marduk from his temple in Babylon, but that his son, Xerxes, succeeded in so doing. But while this thought is definitely present in the prophet's message, it is here plainly only incidental. The dominant theme of this section of the address is the manner in which the images of the Babylonian gods must be carried by their worshipers, of course in the sacred procession of the Akîtu Festival, and this to the complete exhaustion of their bearers, contrasted with the meaningful fact that Yahweh, Israel's god, not only need not be carried by His worshipers, but also that He carries them Himself throughout life, from birth, or even from conception, until hoary old age. Implicit in this graphic contrast of Yahweh with the Babylonian gods is undoubtedly the fact that they are represented by idols, whereas Yahweh is represented by no idol. And implicit also is one further contrast, all to Yahweh's distinct advantage, viz. that the Babylonian gods, unable to protect their people from conquest, must soon be carried away, along with their people, into captivity in a foreign country, whereas Yahweh is about to restore His exiled people to their ancestral land and bring about the restoration there of His ancient sanctuary, the seat of His glory. The v. seems then to go on to say that, after having exhausted their human carriers, the images of the Babylonian gods must be transferred, still, impliedly, in the course of the festival procession, to the backs of animals, both domestic and wild, and even these, natural burden-bearers though they are, are likewise exhausted by the weight of their loads. The implication of the v. seems to be that in the sacred procession of the annual Akîtu Festival, starting at Esagilla, the Marduk temple in the city of Babylon, and proceeding thence down the sacred highway, Ai-ibur-šabum, to the wharf on the bank of the Euphrates, where they were loaded upon boats, to be transported to the sacred mountain, where the resurrection of Marduk was scheduled to take place on the third day thereafter, to be followed by the return of the idols, with the image of the resurrected Marduk at their head, still in the

sacred procession, to Esagilla, there to be restored to their former places (v. 7aβ; cf. Thureau-Dangin, *Rituel accadiens*, 146-148), the images of the gods were carried a part of the way, presumably on both the outgoing journey and the final stage of the return, i. e. then the two portions of the sacred procession which immediately contacted the sanctuary, upon the shoulders of the priests or official bearers, only, however, since the burden of them was far too exhausting to be borne all the way by human carriers, to be transferred at the proper place and moment to animal carriers. The mention of חיה here is, to say the least, a bit surprising, since its normal connotation is "wild beast," particularly as contrasted with בהמה, "domestic animal." Marti, however, holds that חיה may occasionally have the connotation, "beast of burden"; and his contention may well be borne out by Num. 35.3. In this connection also attention may be directed to the representation of the procession of Assyrian gods upon the rock-relief of Maltaya.¹ In this procession eight deities, each represented by its idol, participate, all borne along on the backs of animals, five of which are definitely wild beasts, probably sacred to the gods whose idols they carry, while three are distinctly domestic animals. The determination of the precise import of לחיה here is one of the difficulties inherent in the v. which can not be resolved with certainty. But this circumstance in no way qualifies the general interpretation of the v., and with it that of the entire address, proposed above.

The consecution of the perf., פָּרַע, by the part., קָרַס, is impossible. Inasmuch as all the verbs which follow in vv. 1-2 and continue the picture are perfects, and since all the versions interpret it as a perf., we should certainly read קָרַס. Unquestionably the connotation for 'היה ל', "to pass over to; to be transferred to," is a bit extreme; and yet 'היה ל' has such a wide range of meanings, occasionally approximating quite closely that here proposed (cf. Jer. 3.1; Hos. 3.3; Ruth 1.12), that we need hardly question this interpretation of the phrase here, particularly since it alone accords with the plain import of the v. as a whole and also with the main theme of the entire address. The suffix of נִשְׂאֵתֵכֶם of MT has no antecedent in the text, nor can it refer to the members of the prophet's audience. The only possible antecedent is עֲצֵבֵיהֶם; and certainly it was these idols which were carried along upon the shoulders of human beings in the Akitu Festival procession; accordingly emend to נִשְׂאֵתֵיהֶם (so Blank, *Prophetic Faith in Isaiah*, 50). Here and in vv. 2-4, 7 נִשָּׂא has the specific connotation, "to carry (upon the shoulders by a human being)" (cf. v. 7 and also 45.20b), whereas עָמַס connotes specifically "to load upon a beast of burden." סָבַל too has much the same meaning as נִשָּׂא; cf. סָבַל, "a porter." Accordingly נִשְׂאֵתֵיהֶם here can mean only "their (images thus far) carried aloft (by men)." Dill-

¹ Cf. Gressman, *Altorientalische Bilder zum Alten Testament*², (1927), 95 f. and picture #335.

mann, followed by Torrey, would interpret לַעֲיָפָה, "for a weary beast"; however, inasmuch as in Biblical Hebrew a fem. adjective frequently expresses an abstract concept (cf. Davidson, *Hebrew Syntax*, 16, §14), the word may very well be translated here "unto exhaustion."

2. This v. resumes the specific thought of v. 1a and advances it a stage further. Certainly the subject of the verbs in this v. is the Babylonian gods mentioned in v. 1a. A textual confusion, one, however, easily resolved, is almost self-apparent at the end of the second and the beginning of the third stichos. Obviously the parallelistic thought-contrast between these two stichoi can imply only that these gods could not save even themselves, much less their people, and that in consequence both gods and people must go into captivity. Certainly the expression מַלֵּט מִשָּׁם is meaningless in every way. Instead in v. 2b we expect beyond all question the very common expression, מַלֵּט נַפְשָׁם. And actually נַפְשָׁם does stand at the beginning of the third stichos, where it is plainly the subject of הִלָּכָה; but these two words, joined as subj. and pred. are senseless. On the other hand, מִשָּׁם, following immediately after מַלֵּט is, in part at least, a dittograph of the same word in the third stichos of v. 1, most probably in the original manuscript written immediately above. Accordingly נַפְשָׁם, of the third stichos here, omitting, however, the ו' of MT, should be transposed to the second stichos and follow immediately after מַלֵּט, as its natural object. But this leaves the third stichos lacking an essential word and beat. We suggest that the missing word is מִשָּׁם, and that, in part at least, the impossible מִשָּׁם of the second stichos is a corruption and displacement of this word. Obviously the final verb of the sentence was הִלָּכוּ, like the other verbs of the sentence in the third plu. and with the same subj. as they, viz. the Babylonian deities. The thought of v. 2c then is that "from there," i. e. from the spot where, in the course of the festal procession, their images have toppled over, as the very next and the climactic stage in the demonstration of the total impotence and lack of divinity of the so-called gods whom they represent, they must go off into captivity before their conqueror.

3. This v. is a 4/4/4 tristich. It may be noted here that the first three metrical units, in which the theme of this address is set forth, are all tristichs. In the second stichos of this tristich וְכָל must receive a full beat in order to provide the requisite four beats for the stichos; accordingly the word voices an emphatic thought, "yea, the entire, etc." Manifestly, as the very obvious parallelism implies, stichoi one and two of this tristich envisage practically the same group; consequently the second stichos deals only with the Judaeans exiles in Babylonia, the prophet's regular, and in fact his only, audience, and does not contemplate the exiles from the Northern Kingdom (so Kimchi), carried off by Sargon of Assyria almost two centuries earlier and settled by him far to the north; nor yet does it seem to contemplate, as Duhm and Marti suggest, the Jewish community remaining in Palestine.

4. This Torrey would translate "the same," i. e. "the changeless One." But the obvious and very effective parallelism of v. 4a, and in fact of all four stichoi which comprise the double-distich, suggest compellingly that הוּא is a corruption of an original verb which paralleled אֶסְבֵּל; accordingly emend to אֶשָּׂא. V. 4b repeats the various verbs used in vv. 1-4a, and specifically and in the same relative positions the two verbs used in v. 4a, to describe the carrying operation; thus it affirms that all that which the impotent Babylonian gods could not do for their people Yahweh can and will do for His people. But of these various verbs עָמַם is in MT conspicuous for its absence, while, on the other hand, עָשִׂי here is an expression somewhat surprising and even disturbing; accordingly emend to אָעֲמַם.

5. Certainly the context suggests, or even demands, that for וְחִשּׁוּ we read, with S, וְחִשּׁוּי.

Duhm, Marti, Cheyne and others hold that vv. 6-8 interrupt the natural consecution of thought from v. 5 to vv. 9 ff. and that they must therefore be an interpolation from some non-Deutero-Isaianic source. But such is not at all the case. Plainly these scholars have failed to grasp the true import of these vv. in this setting. They assume, altogether mistakenly, that these vv. contemplate the making of an image of Yahweh by faithless Jewish exiles in Babylonia and its then being carried from the workshop of the goldsmith who fashioned it by the Jew or Jews who had ordered it made, to his or their home, where it is set down in the place appointed for it, there to function as the household god. However, were this so, it would be difficult indeed to explain the use of the plural form of the seven verbs in vv. 6-7 to describe the action of a single person or even of a single household. Still less would there be justification for the affirmation of v. 7b, regardless of who its author might be, that if one cried to Yahweh for help, even though Yahweh were represented by a household idol, He could not respond. Moreover, in v. 8 these Babylonian Jews, whom the prophet is addressing, are called specifically "rebels; faithless ones." This certainly implies a much more radical departure from the true cult of Yahweh than the mere making an image of Him, grave though such an offense might have been regarded. This term implies specifically that these "rebels" have forsaken Yahweh more or less completely (cf. 48.1 f.) and have gone over, at the very least in considerable measure, to the positive worship of the Babylonian gods. Accordingly vv. 6-8 must be integral in this address, for they voice a thought essential to the main theme. They also express once again and in a manner quite characteristic of Deutero-Isaiah, the prophet's contempt for the Babylonian gods and for the idols which represent them, and for their unreality, their non-existence and their absolute impotence, and thus their complete antithesis to Yahweh, as He is depicted in vv. 9-10. In the light of these considerations it can scarcely be questioned that vv. 6-8 are integral in this address and essential to its thought. In fact vv. 6-7 give the immediate answer to the question stated so forcibly in v. 5, and, in turn, lead directly to the charge expressed with equal force in vv. 8-9. They say that, in significant contrast to Yahweh, Bel, Nebo and all the other Babylonian deities are naught but lumps of metal fashioned by a goldsmith into particular shapes, which are borne along in the festival procession, of course upon the shoulders of their devotees, and which, when the sacred procession is ended, are set down once again, each in its customary place in the sanctuary, where it remains stationary, unable to move itself from this position and, much more to the point, unable to respond to any appeal to it for help or to bring its worshipers deliverance from danger or distress. All this vv. 8-9 bid these faithless Jews bear in mind and ponder over whenever they would compare Yahweh with other gods, and particularly with the Babylonian gods.

6. V. 6a implies graphically that, as the most precious metal, gold was regularly carried in a purse or pouch, presumably in small pieces, the value of each of which was practically self-apparent, whereas silver was carried in bars or large lumps, the value of which could be determined only by weighing (cf. Morgenstern, "Two Prophecies from 520-516 B. C.," *HUCA* XXII [1949], 370, note 6). V. 6 constitutes quite obviously a $\frac{3}{3}$ double-distich, in the second stichos of the first distich of which וְתַמְשִׁלֶּנִּי, a long, four-syllabled word, with a conjunctive ו prefixed and a pronominal suffix at the end, must be read as two beats, and in the second stichos of the second distich of which a word is certainly missing, a word indispensable to both the thought and the meter; accordingly insert, with *S*, יִשְׁחָחוּ אֵלָיו after יִסְמְרוּ, a word essential to the thought of both this verb and of יִסְמְרוּ. It is manifestly another

instance of the loss of a word at the end of a line of Biblical poetry (cf. Morgenstern, "The Loss of Words, etc.," 67 f.). As has already been indicated, the antecedent of the participle, *הולים*, and therefore the subj. of the seven verbs in the third, plu. in vv. 6-7, can not possibly be the renegade Jews, who are addressed directly in the second plu. in vv. 5 and 8, for, in addition to other considerations, already cited, this sudden transition from second plu. to third plu. would have been inexplicable and its import incomprehensible. Had the thought of vv. 6-7 been that it was these renegade Jews who were having the image or images in question made, there would not only have been no reason whatsoever for not continuing to employ the second plu. for the seven verbs in vv. 6-7, now in the third plu., but there would have been every reason for so doing; for certainly the charge against these renegade Jews would then have been more direct, specific and condemnatory. Unquestionably then the two vv. contemplate the manufacture of an idol or idols upon commission by Babylonians, by their priests or other religious authorities, and for use in the official temple cult. For the making of such images, two images in fact, made of both wood and gold, for use in the ritual of the Akitu Festival cf. Zimmern, *Das babylonische Neujahrsfest*, 148; Thureau-Dangin, *op. cit.*, 132 f., ll. 190-216.

7. This v. consists of the customary two metrical units, of which the first, in v. 7a, is in MT a 3/3/3 tristich, while the second in v. 7b, is a 3/3 distich. Inasmuch as from v. 4 to this point the 3/3 distich has been the only metrical unit employed, and inasmuch too as v. 7 is definitely a close thought-unit with v. 6, and also since the third stichos in v. 7a actually merely defines the precise meaning of *ויעמד* at the end of the second stichos, "and it stands fast," i. e. "it does not move from its place," but adds nothing essential to the thought, it seems quite probable that this third stichos is an editorial, explanatory gloss; however, of this we can not be altogether certain. In the second stichos of the second distich, that in v. 7b, metrical considerations require that *לא* receive a full beat; and this, in turn, makes the word emphatic, "it can not ever save him." This brings this significant theme into the foreground as a basis of comparison of Yahweh with the Babylonian deities and paves the way effectively for the climactic thought of this address, set forth in its closing utterance, v. 13, the assurance and the promise that, in significant contrast to the inability of the Babylonian gods, whom these faithless Jews are strongly inclined to worship, to work salvation in any manner, salvation even for themselves and their own people, Yahweh's salvation of His people is near at hand and is constantly drawing closer. And this is, in turn, further and definitive evidence that vv. 6-8 are indeed an essential and integral part of this address.

8. Despite the efforts of Gesenius, Duhm and other scholars to read a meaning into *והתאששו*, a hapaxlegomenon, there can hardly be any question that a textual corruption lurks here, and that accordingly some textual emendation is necessary. Klostermann, Cheyne and Marti would emend to *והתאשמו*, "and acknowledge yourselves guilty," certainly a minimal textual emendation. However, since the *hitpa'el* of *אשם* occurs nowhere else, the emendation is questionable. *V* seems to have read *והתבששו*, "and be ashamed of yourselves," obviously an equally minimal emendation. But the *hitpölel* of *בוש* occurs only in Gen. 2.25, and so it too may perhaps be questioned here. *S* reads *והתבוננו*, "and consider"; and since this reading continues directly the thought of the preceding verb, *זכרו*, and with it the first stichos of the v. would voice a perfect thought-parallelism with the second stichos, this reading, approved by Ryssel and Dillmann, is decidedly preferable. Inasmuch as these faithless Jews are being addressed directly, it is necessary to read, in the second stichos, *הפושעים*, as a vocative. Certainly the thought-antecedent of *זאח* in the first

stichos of this v., all that which these rebellious Jewish exiles are bidden to remember, to ponder over and to recall to mind, is not merely what is told in vv. 1-5, but also and more immediately that which is stated directly and forcefully in vv. 6-7. Furthermore, זכרו as the first word of the distich in v. 8, parallels exactly וזכרו as the first word of the tristich in v. 9. Accordingly this charge in v. 8, to remember all that which is presented so vigorously and convincingly in vv. 1-7, leads on well and with heightening effect to the charge in v. 9, to remember the true nature of Yahweh, that He is the one, universal God, the sole Creator of the world, all of whose acts are the fulfillment of wisely and benevolently conceived purpose. This consideration is final and definitive proof that vv. 6-8 must be integral in this address.

9. This v. is obviously a 3/3/3 tristich. The third stichos must therefore commence with **אל**. **אלהים** and **אל** here are manifestly synonyms and have the connotation, "God," i. e. the one, sole world-God. However, whereas Deutero-Isaiah employs **אל** frequently with the connotation, "God," i. e. the one world-God (43.12; 45.21, 22; note also **האל** in 42.5), with him **אלהים** seems to connote "a god," rather than "God" (cf. 44.6; 45.5, 21). On the other hand, he employs **האלהים** once (45.18) to express the concept, "the God," i. e. "the God par excellence; the one world-God." Accordingly it seems proper to read **האלהים** here. This reading establishes between the second and third stichoi complete and perfect thought-parallelism. **ראשנות מעולם** can refer only to the successive stages of Yahweh's creation of the universe, Deutero-Isaiah's oft-cited proof that Yahweh is the one and only world-God, positively affirmed here in the second and third stichoi of this tristich; cf. 48.12b-13a, 3; 45.7, 12, 18; 42.5, 8 f.; 43.9, 18; 41.22.

10. The subject of the three participles, each the first word of the three successive distichs in vv. 10-11a, is of course **אנכי** of v. 9. This consideration establishes the close unity of vv. 9-11 and defines the full content of the thought which the prophet bids, in vv. 8-9, these renegade Jews to remember.

11. The distich in v. 11a refers quite obviously to Cyrus. The designation of him as **עַיִשׁ**, "a vulture," would be appropriate indeed in view of the rapidity and invariable success of his military operations (cf. 41.2 f.) and also of the likening of Nebuchadnezzar to an eagle, in Jer. 49.22; Ezek. 17.3 (so Dillmann and others). However, as Torrey has indicated, עַיִשׁ hardly provides an effective parallelism with **אִישׁ עֲצָתִי** of the second stichos, where such parallelism is plainly required. **אִישׁ עֲצָתִי** here certainly does not have the connotation, "man of My counsel," i. e. "My counsellor," the human being with whom Yahweh counselled, but rather, as the following distich, especially in its reconstructed form, clearly implies, "the man of My purpose." Accordingly Torrey would emend עַיִשׁ to **עַבְדִּי**, an emendation which we accept. Certainly the emendation is of minor range and, with the specific connotation, "My agent," rather than "My servant," provides the expected perfect and effective parallelism to **אִישׁ עֲצָתִי**. If this emendation be correct, it would be the very first instance in the several addresses of the prophet thus far of the use of the term, **עַבְדִּי**, with the pronominal suffix referring specifically to Yahweh (note that on quite independent and cogent grounds we have eliminated **עַבְדִּי** from 48.20). In this particular instance the term refers to Cyrus rather than to Israel. However, it may well be that, once employed by him, it had subconsciously such rich meaning and appeal for the prophet that in his very next address, approximately a year later, and constantly thereafter, he applied the term, **עַבְדִּי**, no longer to Cyrus, but only to Israel, as Yahweh's servant, the agent of His purpose of universal salvation (45.4; 44.1, 2, 21, 26; 43.10; 42.19; 41.8, 9). In v. 11b the first **אִף** is disturbing in several respects. Certainly the second and third **אִף**, each immediately preceding a

verb in the impf., first, sing., and each standing in the same respective position in its own stichos, are in parallelism and are essential to the thought of the v. But this first אף, standing before a verb in the perf., first, sing., is meaningless and likewise overloads the meter, and also weakens the effect of the two אף's which follow. Certainly it is the result of dittography and, with G, should be omitted. Each of the two authentic אף's must receive a beat in order to bring out the essential 3/3 meter; accordingly each must be interpreted as emphatic. Unquestionably יצרחי, a word whose use here would be not a little confusing and even disturbing, should, with *Duhm*, be emended to יעצתי, "I have planned." This word, representing a relatively minor emendation, accords well with the basic theme of the v., and even makes the parallelism between the two distichs of the v. perfect in every respect.

12. Many eminent scholars, following G, would emend אבירי to אבירי, but inasmuch as Jer. 4.9 indicates that אבירי לב means "ye who have lost courage; ye cowardly ones," a term which would certainly not fit these faithless Jews whom, in v. 8, the prophet has termed "rebels," it is far better to abide by the reading of MT. אבירי לב occurs also in Ps. 76.6, where it stands in parallelism with אנשי חיל, and apparently means "stouthearted." The term may well be compared with חוקי לב (Ezek. 2.4) and קשי לב (Ezek. 3.7), and, like those two terms, have the connotation, "stubborn ones." Such a denunciatory term would, in the prophet's mouth apply well to these Jewish renegades, who steadfastly refuse to be influenced by his argument and plea. צדקה here has unquestionably the same connotation as in v. 13a, where it is plainly in parallelism with תשועה, "salvation; deliverance" (so also 51.6; cf. 45.8 and also 56.1). The verb, צדק, was primarily a term describing legal or court procedure. Its primary connotation is "to be innocent"; *hif.*, "to declare (some one) innocent." And inasmuch as a person pronounced innocent by the court was immediately released from custody, the derivative noun, צדקה, whose primary meaning was "innocence, right, righteousness," quickly acquired the secondary connotations, "vindication" and "release; setting free." This last seems to be the particular meaning of the word both here and in v. 13, with specific reference to Yahweh's promised release or deliverance of His people from exile in Babylonia and their restoration to their ancestral land. With this particular connotation Yahweh's צדקה is indeed a perfect parallel to His תשועה.

13. For קרובי read, with DSIa, קרובה, "near." This reading heightens considerably the parallelism of the two stichoi of the first distich of the double-distich which constitutes the v. Certainly a word, necessary to complete the expected, or even the required, 3/3 meter, is missing at the end of the second distich of the v. This word was unquestionably a verb, one which would provide a fitting parallelism to נתתי at the beginning of the first stichos, and, coming at the very end of the second stichos, would establish a very effective parallelistic and chiasmic relationship between the two stichoi; accordingly supply אשיב (cf. Morgenstern, "The Loss of Words, etc.," 66 f.). חפצתי "My glory," i. e. undoubtedly "My glorious presence," in other words, "Myself."

The v. provides a climactic conclusion of overwhelming power to this address, for it sums up in potent and irrefutable manner the utter contrast of Yahweh with Marduk, Nabu and all the Babylonian gods whom these renegade Jewish exiles would accept and worship while rejecting Him. For while not only must the idols of the

Babylonian gods be carried in the festival procession to the utter exhaustion of their bearers (v. 1), and, when, at the close of the entire festival ritual, they are once again set down in their normal places in the temple, they can never move therefrom nor answer the appeals for help and salvation from danger and distress directed to them by their worshipers (v. 7), and in fact can not even save themselves and their people from conquest by a foreign power, manifestly Cyrus, but must eventually be carried off, along with the Babylonian people, into captivity in a foreign land (v. 2). Yahweh not only is represented by no idol, and so need not be carried, but instead carries His people throughout all existence (vv. 3 f.), but also is about to save His people, to deliver them from exile and bring them back to their ancestral land, and will even reestablish Himself in His ancient sanctuary in His sacred city in the midst of His restored people. In every respect Yahweh, Israel's god and savior, is the complete and positive antithesis to the altogether negative, unreal and completely impotent Babylonian gods. The effective climax thus reached establishes beyond all question that vv. 6-8 are integral in this address.

Isa. 45

As has already been said,¹ Isa. 45 is in many respects the climactic address of our prophet. In it he has completely, or almost completely, outgrown Ezekiel's doctrine of "for His name's sake" and arrived at his own distinctive doctrine and message. This message is that Yahweh is the one and only God, the true, universal God, the sole Creator of the world, that, moreover, He has created the world for dwelling, to be inhabited by men, that Cyrus and, impliedly, his posterity after him, is His appointed world-ruler, His "Anointed King," selected by Him for a specific purpose, viz. to conquer and govern and, again impliedly, to thus unify the entire world, to bring all nations and peoples under a single ruler, and through this medium pave the way for them to achieve that salvation for which they had sought so long and so eagerly, but hitherto all in vain, the termination forever of all warfare, destruction and devastation, and resultant world-peace, unity and security. But world-conquest and attendant world-unification by Cyrus, stimulated to this task by Yahweh, are merely the initial steps in the fulfillment of Yahweh's universal purpose and plan.

¹ Cf. Part I of this study, *HUCA* XXIX (1958), pp. 40 ff.

For before the nations can achieve world-peace through such unification, and thus ultimately find salvation, they must first come to recognize Yahweh as the one and only world-God, to render unto Him the homage which is His due, and to live the life which, so He has purposed from the beginning, all men should, or even must, live together. They must become a world-unit in the recognition and worship of Him as the one world-God as well as in acknowledgement of and obedience to a single world-king. Accordingly, in order to bring unto the nations and unto all mankind this understanding of Yahweh and of His real nature and universal, benevolent purpose for them, Yahweh has chosen Israel, His own people from of old, as His servant, His agent unto them, had in fact chosen it for this service from its very birth as a people. And that it may now perform this service truly and effectively, Yahweh will cause Cyrus to send Israel back from exile in Babylonia to its ancestral land, will bring about the restoration of Jerusalem and the Temple, and will again establish Israel there as His people. And the nations, and even Cyrus himself, beholding all this, beholding Israel's salvation by Yahweh, its own particular and sole god from ancient times, will come to realize that He alone is the one, true world-God, therefore their God also, and accordingly for them too the only possible source of salvation, the one and only Savior. And thus at last the world will come to be inhabited by men, by nations and peoples united in recognition and worship of the one world-God, and dwelling together amicably instead of destroying one another in endless warfare; and thus Yahweh's ultimate purpose will be brought to eventual fulfillment.

Very interestingly, many authoritative commentators, and particularly Kittel, Duhm, Marti, Cheyne and Torrey, make this address commence at 44.24, largely because *כֹּה אָמַר יְהוָה* there suggests the inauguration of a new message, and also because the mention of Cyrus by name in 44.28 and again in 45.1, the only passages in Isa. 40-48 where, despite numerous other references to him in these chapters, his name is cited, suggests that the closing portion of Isa. 44 constitutes a literary unit with Isa. 45. But 44.28 we shall interpolate into this address, immediately following 45.19, where, as we shall see, it fits perfectly and carries the thought a logical stage onward. Vv. 24-26a we shall retain as an integral part of the full address in Isa. 42-44, as we shall reconstruct this. Isa. 44.26b-27 we shall transpose to chapter 41. Accordingly the entire address with which we are now dealing is contained within the limits of chapter 45 plus 44.28. However, in addition to some comparatively slight textual rearrangement within the chapter, v. 8 must be omitted as either a doxological or an

editorial interpolation, while v. 14 must be transposed to Isa. 60, where, following immediately upon v. 11, it fits perfectly and effectively expands the thought of that passage.

The address falls into three distinct sections, in each of which the thought and message of the prophet are carried a logical and significant step forward. Section I (vv. 1-7) is formally addressed to Cyrus himself. In it the prophet represents Yahweh as, through him, speaking directly to Cyrus, whom He hails as His "Anointed One," i. e. as His appointed king, chosen by Him and in close and constant association with Him, and by Him made world-conqueror and world-ruler. In all this Yahweh has been motivated by a threefold purpose (vv. 4, 6-7), (a) that Cyrus himself may come to realize that it was Yahweh, and He alone, and no other god whatsoever, who had called him, called him by his own name, had prospered him and raised him to his present exalted and responsible position; and this He had done (b) primarily for the sake of Jacob, His servant, and Israel, His chosen one; and all this, Yahweh's calling Cyrus, His choice of Israel as His servant or agent, and Cyrus' impending, benevolent action with regard to Israel, all for the fulfillment of His, Yahweh's, ultimate and largest purpose, (c) that all the world, all mankind, from the extreme east to the remotest west, might come to comprehend that Yahweh alone is God, the one world-God, the sole Creator of the entire universe, the only possible Savior of mankind, and that besides Him there is no other god at all, not even Cyrus' own, native Iranian deities, Ormuzd and Ahriman, the gods of light and darkness, of good and evil.

It needs but a moment's thought to realize that under no condition could the prophet have addressed this message directly to Cyrus in person. It is inconceivable that the prophet might under any circumstance have been permitted to approach the person of the great king and speak to him directly in this challenging manner. Moreover, second thought must reveal that these vv., with their statement of Yahweh's threefold purpose, are integral to the address as a whole, and, further, that this entire address is a distinct, hortatory unit and is spoken to Israel alone, to an audience of Jewish exiles in Babylonia, Jewish exiles who, though not actually rejecting Yahweh, their ancestral deity, had to a very considerable extent lost faith in Him and had accordingly gone over in varying measure to the worship of the Babylonian gods.

In Section I of this address the prophet graphically represents Yahweh as fulfilling the initial stage of His threefold purpose, viz. convincing Cyrus himself that it was He, Yahweh, and He alone, who had called him by name, had given him victory and success in

all his undertakings, and had finally, as the fulfillment of his highest aspirations, elevated him to this exalted position, made him to be sole ruler of the entire world, His own Anointed One. Plainly the prophet is here attempting to refute Cyrus' own statement, undoubtedly widely publicized quite early in his reign, in order to strengthen the allegiance to him of the native Babylonians, that it was Marduk, the head of the Babylonian pantheon, who, seeking for his people a just and righteous ruler, one pleasing unto him, had called him, Cyrus, king of Anshan, by name, had made him victorious in all his military program, and, as the culmination thereof, had given Babylon itself to him, and this too without the slightest resistance.¹ That the prophet was personally acquainted with the public proclamation of Cyrus, of which this inscription is an incidental record, may be safely inferred from the prophet's specific statement that it was Yahweh, and no other god whatsoever, who had called Cyrus by name, had accompanied him upon his expeditions and regularly given him victory, and who had shattered bronze doors and broken iron bars, i. e. had opened city gates, before him, undoubtedly a reference to the surrender of Babylon to Cyrus with no resistance whatsoever. Moreover, the prophet's reference to the ungirding of kings and the girding of Cyrus in their stead unquestionably has in mind specifically Cyrus' capture and disposal of Nabunaid, the last native king of Babylon, and his assumption of the Babylonian kingship in the latter's stead. All this is practically self-evident. And equally apparent is it that the theme of Section I of this address is the first stage of Yahweh's threefold purpose, viz. Yahweh's demonstration to Cyrus personally that He, and He alone, and not at all Marduk, as Cyrus had officially proclaimed, nor yet his own ancestral gods, Ormuzd and Ahriman, as he may have told himself in his own innermost thoughts, had wrought all this for him, but only He, Yahweh, Israel's god, the one true world-God, He and none other.

Section II, vv. 9-17+v. 20b (and excluding v. 14) is addressed in its entirety directly to Israel, to the doubting, questioning and even faithless Jewish exiles in Babylonia. Its theme, or, perhaps more precisely, its motivation, is the response of Yahweh, uttered through the prophet, to the people's doubting and challenging reaction to the prophet's statement of the second stage of Yahweh's ultimate purpose with Cyrus, viz. that what He had done for Cyrus and the high

¹ Cf. the Cyrus inscription in Pritchard, *Ancient Near Eastern Texts Relating to the O. T.*, 315 f.

position of world-King to which He had elevated him were ultimately for the sake of His servant, Jacob, of Israel, His chosen one. Apparently his audience had challenged, and perhaps even ridiculed this statement of the prophet; for manifestly they could not forget that but some fifty years earlier this same Yahweh, their national deity, had, so it seemed to them, been completely unable to protect them from the conquering Babylonians, and had thus demonstrated that He was altogether inferior in power and authority to the Babylonian gods, in whose land they were now quite happily settled. In vv. 9-13 the prophet rebukes, but in purely objective and argumentative manner, these Jewish exiles for their doubts and challenge of Yahweh's purpose in their behalf and His ability to enforce this. He asks (v. 11b), "Do you question Me concerning coming events with regard to My children, and with regard to the work of My hands would you give Me directions?" But apparently v. 15 records the sneering, and even contemptuous, evaluation of Yahweh by some outspoken member of the prophet's Jewish audience, a comment which the prophet immediately takes up, repeats verbatim, and makes the text of his scathing denunciation of disbelieving, faithless Israel in the remainder of Section II, vv. 20b, 16-17, of this address.

Then in Section III of the address, vv. 18-19; 44.28; vv. 20a, 21-23, the prophet represents Yahweh as announcing, in some, though by no means elaborate, detail, the third and final stage of His universal purpose, the restoration of Israel to its ancestral land and the rebuilding of Jerusalem and the Temple by Cyrus, and then the salvation of all mankind and the bringing of all men to recognize and acknowledge Him as the one, sole God of the entire universe, the one potential Savior, and to accord to Him, and to Him alone, all their homage. The passage implies very much that is basic to the prophet's message in its ultimate form. The eventual purpose of Yahweh, as the one universal world-God, is the salvation of all mankind, His creatures. This salvation will be achieved by the unification of all nations into one world-state, under the beneficent rule of a single world-king, chosen by Yahweh from all mankind to be the agent of His supreme world-purpose. As the practical result of this unification of all peoples into a single world-kingdom all warfare and its attendant destruction will cease forever, all men will dwell together in peace and unity, and the world will then indeed be inhabited by men, even as Yahweh, the world-God, had intended from the very moment of creation. And all men will then come to recognize Yahweh as their true, divine Savior and as the one and only world-God, and so will spontaneously render unto Him their grateful homage.

And all this will be achieved through the mediation of Israel,

Yahweh's particular people and His chosen servant or agent. Restored by Yahweh to its ancestral land, Israel will there resume a normal way of life, in full accord with Yahweh's purpose for it, and will worship Him truly and Him alone. For the proper worship of Yahweh the Temple in Jerusalem is indispensable. Accordingly, as an early stage in the fulfillment of that portion of Yahweh's purpose allotted to him, Cyrus will send exiled Israel back to its native land and will also restore Jerusalem and rebuild the Temple. And thus beholding redeemed Israel living once more in its native land and quietly and happily worshiping its own ancestral god and living the life which He had instituted for it, the nations will at last come to realize that He, and He alone, is the one true God and Savior, not only for Israel but also for all mankind, that in Him must they put their trust, unto Him must they render their homage in a positive manner, and from Him, at His sanctuary, must they learn the way of life which He would have all men live together, the way of life exemplified by restored and now faithful Israel.

Such was the salvation which, according to our prophet, Yahweh proposed for all mankind, His creatures; such was the way of life which from the very beginning He had intended that all men should live together; and such was the specific service which Israel, His people and His servant, was to perform, in order that Yahweh's ultimate, universal purpose might be brought to fulfillment.

Actually this entire message is not presented directly and positively in coordinated form in the prophet's own words in this or in any other subsequent address; but it is all certainly implicit in Section III of this address. And unquestionably it became the immediate inspiration of the Universalist party in the Jewish community of Palestine, with its active program of conversion of foreigners to Judaism, during the brief period of the second Temple, 516-485 B. C.¹ And it found graphic and effective expression, though, not at all surprisingly, with eschatological reinterpretation, in the message of a later, anonymous prophet, a message so vivid and so appealing that it came to be ascribed, in practically identical form, to two pre-exilic prophets, Isa. 2.1-4 and Mic. 4.1-4. Beyond all question in both passages, with the omission of the introductory, eschatological setting, we can hear the echo of Deutero-Isaiah's own message, ringing on through the ages unto eternity.

Such is the thought and such the organization of this closely unified, logically unfolding and manifestly powerful address.

But while this address is distinctly unified in thought, while the

¹ Cf. Morgenstern, "Jerusalem — 485 B. C.", *HUCA* XXVII (1956), 161 f.

theme of Section II flows directly out of that of Section I and that of Section III, in turn, directly out of that of Section II, it is questionable whether the prophet had contemplated this entire address, with its widely ranging message, in advance. Rather it seems altogether probable that, when he began to speak, he planned, or perhaps felt divinely inspired, to say no more to his audience of Jewish exiles than what is contained in Section I. However, the doubting, and even challenging, attitude of his hearers, or at least of a considerable portion of them, impelled him to utter the first portion of Section II, vv. 9-13, in which he mildly and patiently rebuked his audience for their manifest disbelief in the truth of the message which he had just proclaimed. And then, in turn, the sneering comment of one of his still disbelieving listeners, taken up by the prophet and repeated verbatim in v. 15, prompted, or even provoked, him to the much more scathing denunciation, in vv. 15, 20b, 16-17, of those faithless ones in his audience who had manifestly rejected Yahweh more or less completely and gone over to the worship of the Babylonian gods. And, so it seems, during the course of this brief but positive denunciation of faithless Israel a new vision and a new and larger message, hitherto not clearly conceived, suddenly opened up in his mind, a true manifestation of divine inspiration, the vision of the real nature and import of Yahweh's universality, of His being the sole Creator of the universe, the one world-God, the vision of the unity of all mankind under this one world-God, its only potential Savior, and the positive purpose of this one world-God to bring unto His creatures, unto all mankind, the salvation so long, so desperately and so vainly sought by them. And then, in recognition of His manifold beneficence unto them, all men would spontaneously seek Him and become united in positive worship of Him. Such seems to be the manner in which this monumental and decisive address of this inspired prophet, with its significant advance over the message previously proclaimed by him, evolved.

That this address was delivered after Cyrus' conquest of Babylon and his assumption of the Babylonian kingship is obvious both from the prophet's hailing him, in v. 1, as Yahweh's Messiah and also from the manifest dependence of the wording of the prophet's personal message to Cyrus, i. e. Section I, upon the latter's proclamation to the Babylonian people, issued undoubtedly very soon after his ascension of the Babylonian throne. Cyrus himself records¹ that he entered Babylon on the 3rd of Marcheshvan, some three and a half months

¹ Schrader, in *KB* III, part 2, pp. 134/5, ll. 18 f.

after the capture of the city by Gobryas, his lieutenant, and promptly issued his proclamation to the native population of the city. This was accordingly in October or November of 539 B. C. This address of the prophet could have been delivered not too long thereafter, in all likelihood, as has already been suggested, early in 538 B. C.

Perhaps we can date the address even more precisely. The references, in v. 5, to Yahweh's girding of Cyrus' and, in v. 4, to Yahweh's addressing Cyrus by a particular title,² probably the title, King of Babylon, or else perhaps "Mine Anointed" (v. 1) or "My Shepherd" (44.28a), suggest strongly that the particular occasion for this address was Cyrus' formal ascension of the Babylonian throne. This would have been during the closing days of the Akîtu Festival; for it was then that the Babylonian king, after, to some degree at least, enacting the role of the dying and resurrected sun-god, Marduk, formally assumed, or reassumed, the kingship and reascended the throne. That accordingly Cyrus formally and with appropriate ceremony became King of Babylon at the Akîtu Festival in 538 B. C., i. e. some five months after his entrance into the city, is reasonably certain. And that the celebration of this festival was the occasion for this address by the prophet; while not definitively evidenced, is at least strongly supported by these considerations, finds some corroboration in the scathing denunciation of the idol-carriers and worshipers in V. 20b; for, as we have already learned,³ the carrying of idols in the sacred procession was one of the distinctive ceremonies of the Akîtu Festival. Moreover, the celebration of this festival, with many Jewish exiles participating therein to varying extent, would have readily provided the prophet with the audience which he needed for this address. While therefore we may not affirm with absolute certainty that this address was delivered by the prophet towards the close of the Akîtu Festival in 538 B. C., it does seem reasonably probable that such was the case. And if so, then this address would have followed the address in Isa. 46 by exactly one year. It would have been for the prophet a momentous year indeed, one in which he would have witnessed the fulfillment of his earlier predictions to his Jewish fellow-exiles with regard to Cyrus, an experience which must naturally have contributed much to the crystalization of his distinctive prophetic doctrine and message, as it is set forth in this address.

The address, in the form in which we have reconstructed it, reads thus:

¹ Cf. the reference in v. 1 to Yahweh's ungirding of kings in Cyrus' favor.

² אֲנִיכִי; cf. the commentary upon the v.; below, pp. 43 f.

³ Above, pp. 25 ff.

- 3/3 1 כה־אמר יהוה למשיחו / לכורש אשר־החזקתי בימינו
 3/3 לרד לפניו גוים / ומתני מלכים אפתח
 3/3 לפתח לפניו דלתים / ושערים לא יסגרו
 3/3/3 5 אני־יהוה ואין עוד / זולתי אין אלהים / אאורך ולא ידעתי
 3/3 2 אני לפניך אלך / ודרכיך אישר
 3/3 דלתות נחושה אשבר / ובריחי ברזל אנדע
 3/3 3 ונתתי־לך אוצרות חשך / ומטמני מסתרים <אגלה>
 3/3 למען תדע כי־אני יהוה / הקורא בשמך אלהי ישראל
 4/4 4 למען־עבדי יעקב וישראל בחירי / אקרא־לך בשמך אכנך ולא־
 4/4 ידעתי
 6 למען ידעו ממזרח שמש / וממערבה כי־אפס בלעדי / אני יהוה
 4/4/4 ואין עוד
 7 יוצר אור ובורא חשך / עשה שלום ובורא רע / אני־יהוה עשה כל
 4/4/4 אלה
 9 הוי רב את־יצרו / קָרַשׁ את־קֶרֶשׁ אדמה
 3/3 היאמר חמר < > מה־תעשה / ופעלו אי־ידיים לך
 3/3 הוי־אמר לאב מה־תוליד / ולאם מה תחילין
 3/3 10 כה אמר יהוה / קדוש ישראל ויוצרו
 3/3 11 קִאתוֹת תשאלוני על־בני / ועל־פעל ידי תצוני
 3/3 12 אנכי עשיתי ארץ / ואדם עליה בראתי
 3/3 אני־ידי נטו שמים / וכל צבאם צויתי
 3/3 13 אנכי העירתיהו בצדק / וכל דרכיו אישר
 3/3 הוא יבנה עירי / וגלות <עמי> ישלח
 3/3 לא במחיר ולא־בשחר / אמר יהוה צבאות
 3/3 15 אכִן־אתה אל מסתתר / אלהי ישראל מושיע
 4/4 20b לא־ידעו הנשאים את־עץ פסלם/ומתפללים אל־אל לא יושיע
 4/4 16 בושו וגס־נכלמו כלם יחרו / הלכו בכלמה משרתי צלמים
 3/2 17 ישראל נושע ביהוה / תשועת עולמים
 3/2 לא תבשו ולא־תכלמו / עד־עולמי עד
 18 כי־כה אמר יהוה
 4/4 בורא השמים הוא האלהים / יצר הארץ < > הוא כוננה
 4/4 לא־יתהו בראה לשבת יצרה / אני יהוה ואין עוד
 3/2 19 לא בסתר דברתי / במקום < > חשך
 3/2 לא־אמרתי לזרע יעקב / בתהו בקשוני
 3/2 אני־יהוה דבר צדק / מגיד מישרים
 3/2 44.28 האמר לכורש רעי / וכל־חפצי ישרים
 3/2 האמר לירושלם תבנה / ולהיכל יוסד

3/3	הקבצו ובאו התנששו / יחדו פליטי הנוים	20a
3/3	הגישו <אלהיכם> והגידו / אף יועצו יחדו	21
3/2	מי השמיע־זאת מקדם / מאז הגידה	
3/2	הלא אני יהוה / ואין < > מבלעדי	
3/2	אל צדיק ומושיע / אין זולתי	
3/3/3	פנו אלי והושעו / כל אפסי ארץ / כי־אני אל ואין־עוד	22
4/4	בי נשבעתי יצא מפי / צדק הדבר ולא ישוב	23
4/4	כי־לי חכרע כל ברך / תשבע כל לשון < > ביהוה	

1. Thus saith Yahweh to His Anointed,
To Cyrus, whose right hand I have grasped,
In order to subdue nations before him,
And that the loins of kings I may ungird,
To open before him double-doors
And gates, which shall not be closed.
5. I, Yahweh, and none other,
Besides Me no god,
Engirdle thee, even though thou dost not know Me.
2. I go before thee
And thy ways I guide aright.
Doors of bronze I shatter,
And bars of iron I cut asunder.
3. And I give unto thee the treasure-stores of darkness,
Yea, the hidden hoards of secret places I lay bare,
So that thou mayest know that I am God,
That He who calleth out thy name is Israel's god.
4. For the sake of my servant, Jacob, yea, of Israel, Mine elect,
I call unto thee by thy name, I hail thee by title, even
though thou dost not know Me;
6. So that (men) may know from the place of sunrise,
And also from the place of its setting, that there is none
besides Me;
I am God, and there is none other;
7. Fashioner of light and Creator of darkness,
Maker of good and Former of evil,
I, Yahweh, am the Maker of all these.
9. Woe unto that which contends with its fashioner,
A sherd with him who works with earth!
Should the clay say: What wouldst thou make?
Or his handiwork: Hast thou not hands?
10. Alas for him who says to a father: What wouldst thou beget?
Or to a mother: With what art thou in travail?

11. Thus saith Yahweh,
The Holy One of Israel, yea, its Fashioner:
Do you ask of Me concerning My children coming events,
And with regard to Mine own handiwork would you give
me instructions?
12. Me, who have made the earth
And mankind upon it have created,
Me, whose hands spread out the heavens
And who regulates all their host?
13. I have incited him with a purpose,
And all his projects do I guide aright.
He shall rebuild My city,
And Mine exiled people shall He send back,
Neither for compensation nor for advantage,
Sayeth Yahweh of Hosts.
15. Verily Thou art a god who hideth himself!
The god of Israel is a savior?
- 20b. Those who carry their wooden idol do not comprehend,
So they pray to a god who can not save.
16. They are put to shame, yea, are humiliated, all of them
together;
They who minister unto images move along in disgrace.
17. Israel is saved by Yahweh,
Salvation everlasting;
Ye shall not be put to shame, neither shall ye be humiliated
Unto all eternity.
18. For thus saith Yahweh:
The Creator of the heavens, He is God;
The Fashioner of the earth, He has set it in operation.
Not as a void did He create it; to be inhabited did He fashion it,
I, Yahweh, and none other.
19. Not in concealment did I utter My decree,
In a place of darkness.
I did not say to the posterity of Jacob,
For no purpose seek me!
I, Yahweh, decree purposefully,
Announce things which are true,
- 44.28. Who say of Cyrus: My shepherd (is he),
And all My purpose will he fulfill;
And who say of Jerusalem: She shall be rebuilt,
And My sanctuary shall be established anew.
- 20a. Assemble and come hither, draw near,
Together, ye remnants of the nations;

21. Bring near your gods and let them predict;
 Let them even take counsel together.
 Who proclaimed this from of yore,
 From ancient times predicted it?
 Was it not I, Yahweh,
 Than whom there is none other?
 A god purposeful, yea, a deliverer,
 Besides Me there is none.
22. Turn unto Me and find salvation
 All ye ends of the earth,
 For I am God, and there is none other.
23. By Myself have I sworn; from My mouth hath it gone forth;
 Purposeful is the decree, and it shall not turn back;
 Verily unto Me shall every knee bend,
 Every tongue shall swear by Yahweh.

1. Certainly לָרֵךְ requires correction, and various commentators have proposed quite a wide range of emendations. Unquestionably of all these the simplest and readiest to hand is to read, with Hitzig, לָרֵךְ, the inf. const. qal of רָדַד (cf. Ps. 144.2; also Isa. 41.2, as we shall emend it). For דַּלְתִּים DSIa reads דַּלְתוֹת, while all the vss. translate simply "doors," without any indication that they had a dual form before them. However, inasmuch as the doors or gates within a city wall were regularly indicated by the dual form (cf. Deut. 3.5; I Sam. 23.7; II Chron. 8.5, *et passim*), it seems wise to retain the word here. In his afore-cited inscription (l. 12) Cyrus tells that Marduk both grasped his hand and pronounced his name, and likewise went at his side as a friend (l. 15; cf. v. 5 here) in connection with his conquest of Babylon and the appointment of him as ruler of the world (cf. McCurdy, *History, Prophecy and the Monuments*, III, 410, 423 f. for Deutero-Isaiah's citation of Cyrus' inscription, or at least of a public proclamation by him, in this passage). Certainly the v. implies that Cyrus' conquest of nations and walled cities and deposition of their kings lie in the past. The historic setting of this address is manifestly later than the settings of Isa. 46-48.

5. Where it stands now in MT v. 5 is obviously misplaced. This is evidenced by various considerations. In the first place, it disturbs the unity and the thought-sequence of vv. 3b-4, 6-7 (cf. below, pp. 44 f.). Furthermore, vv. 4b and 5c express practically the same thought, and that too with the last two words of each v. identical. These two words manifestly voice a thought of considerable importance, and their very identity might seem at first glance to establish a definite parallelism between the final stichoi of these two adjacent metrical units. Actually, however, the thought expressed by these two words, though important, is not primary in either stichos and therefore the impression of parallelism resulting from this identity would be misleading. And unquestionably the effect of the repetition of these two words in such close proximity to each other would be, from both a literary and a hortatory standpoint, decidedly unpleasant and disturbing. Still another consideration; vv. 3b-4, 6-7 have not only a positive thought unity but also, as is decidedly appropriate and effective, a distinct metrical unity in that together they consist of two 4/4 distichs followed by two 4/4/4 tristichs. Inserted midway in this metrical, as well as thought, unit, v. 5, a 3/3/3 tristich, disturbs the meter seriously.

On the other hand, inserted between vv. 1 and 2, v. 5 fits perfectly both as to metrical form and unity of thought. Vv. 1-3a are all 3/3 distichs, while v. 5 is a 3/3/3 tristich. Inserted immediately after v. 1, it comes exactly midway in this group of six 3/3 distichs, and thus, from a metrical standpoint, provides an effective balance for the strophe. Moreover, after Yahweh's direct and challenging declaration to Cyrus, in v. 1, that He is the god who has grasped Cyrus' right hand, has made him victorious over the nations of the world, and particularly over Babylonia, and has ungirded kings in his favor, we would expect a statement to follow almost immediately identifying this god for Cyrus; and precisely this is what v. 5 does. Certainly this introduction of Yahweh to Cyrus is far more appropriate and effective following immediately after v. 1 than it is in its present position, four vv. later. And certainly too the *אני* with which v. 2 begins, becomes far more meaningful and effective when following immediately upon Yahweh's introduction of Himself to Cyrus, in v. 5, than it would be without this identification of Yahweh in His relationship with Cyrus which v. 5, thus interpolated, provides.

One additional consideration confirms this insertion of v. 5 immediately after v. 1. V. 1b β tells that it was Yahweh who had ungirded kings, impliedly of course in Cyrus' favor. V. 5c completes this thought by its statement that Yahweh was the god who had girded Cyrus, and this even though Cyrus did not as yet know Him. The full import of this statement, following so closely upon that of v. 1b β , becomes clear when we realize that donning the royal girdle and sword seems to have been, along with mounting the throne and putting the crown upon the head, the distinctive ceremonial procedure by which a Persian king was formally installed in the royal office (cf. the *Shah Nahmeh* of Firdousi; French translation by Muhl, I, 55, 77, 105). Manifestly the prophet had immediate acquaintance with this ancient, Persian institution, probably because he had himself just witnessed it. And certainly the fact that v. 5c actually thus completes the thought of v. 1b β is almost definite proof that originally v. 5 followed immediately upon v. 1. Moreover, now separated by five distichs, the repetition of *וְלֹא יָדַעְתִּי* in v. 4b (where the two words must be read together as a single beat, i. e. not with the same emphasis as in v. 5c, where they must be read as two beats; cf. our metrical arrangement of the Hebrew text), after its initial use in v. 5c, becomes decidedly meaningful and effective.

2. As all the vss. indicate, *וְהָדָרִים* here is certainly a corruption. And inasmuch as in v. 13a the statement occurs, with Yahweh as the subject, *וְהָרַכְנוּ אִישׁ*, we may with reasonable assurance change *וְהָדָרִים* to *וְהָרַכְךָ*, certainly a fairly minimal emendation. For *וְהָרַכְנוּ*, "to make successful; to prosper," cf., in addition to v. 13, Ps. 5:9; Prov. 3:6; 11:5.

3. Supply *אֵלֶּה* at the end of the first distich, thus recovering the expected 3/3 meter and likewise providing an effective chiasmic parallelism between the two parts of the distich (cf. Morgenstern, "The Loss of Words etc.," *HUCA* XXV [1954], 67). It should be noted that in his above cited inscription (l. 12) Cyrus affirms that Marduk pronounced his name, thereby heralding him as his appointed ruler of the entire world.

4. Unlike in vv. 3b and 6, where it is a conjunction, and as such may be pronounced as a full beat, here *לְמַעַן* is a preposition, and so must be linked closely with its object, and so be read as a single beat. Certainly we must, with G, omit the *וְ* of *וְאָקְרָא*, in conformity with the rules of Hebrew syntax.

6. It is necessary to read *וּמַעֲרֵבָה*. Only *מַעֲרֵב*, and never *מַעֲרֵבָה*, is used as the antithesis of *מִזְרָח* (cf. Isa. 43:5; 59:19; I Chron. 12:15). The antecedent of the pronominal suffix of *וּמַעֲרֵבָה* is of course *שֶׁמֶשׁ*. While *שֶׁמֶשׁ* is usually a masc. noun, not infrequently, just as here, it is a fem. (cf. Deut. 24:15; II Sam. 2:24; II Kings 3:22;

Jonah 4.8, *et pass.*) must be read as two beats for the sake of the meter; this is easily possible, since it is a polysyllabic word with two prefixes and a pronominal suffix.

7. Since **כל** must obviously receive a full beat, it should of course be read **כל**; so also in vv. 13, 22, 23.

9. For **חרש** read, with Torrey, **חָרֵשׁ**, the construct of **חָרֵשׁ**; parallelism with the first stichos of the distich makes this reading imperative. The **חרש** was the skilled worker in stone (Ex. 28.11; II Sam. 5.11), iron (I Sam. 13.19; Isa. 44.12; II Chron. 24.12), wood (II Sam. 5.11; Isa. 44.13, *et pass.*), plaster (I Chron. 14.1); so here **חרש אדמה** with **יוצר** of the first stichos. In v. 9b there is one word too many for the meter; accordingly **ליצרו**, which in this context is altogether superfluous, should be omitted as an explanatory gloss. The manifest close parallelism between the two stichoi which constitute the distich of v. 9b demands that in the second stichos the two pronominal suffixes be inverted, so that for **ופעלך** we read, with the majority of the earlier commentators, **ופעלו** and for **לו** we read **לך**.

10. For **ולאש** read, with G, **ולאם**; this establishes a perfect parallelism with **לאב** of the first stichos of the distich. The subject of **אמר** can be only the as yet unborn babe. Thus understood, the parallelism of the distich which constitutes v. 10 with the double-distich of v. 9 is self-apparent. In fact vv. 9-10 together constitute a very effective triple-distich, which voices one single, general thought. And inasmuch as **הוי** in v. 9 received a full beat, this second **הוי**, with which the third distich begins, may be readily slurred over and so be read with **אמר** as a single beat, thus preserving the uniform 3/3 meter, not only of this triple-distich, but also of the entire strophe, vv. 9-13.

11. V. 11b certainly voices the challenge which disbelieving and faithless Israel levels at Yahweh, and which, so the prophet represents it, is here repeated by Him in the form of a question. Accordingly vocalize **האחיות** (**ה** interrogative), and for **שאלוני** read **חשאלוני** (the **ה** lost by haplography). This emendation establishes the expected parallelism with **תצוני** in the second stichos of the distich. V. 11b plainly refers back to vv. 9-10 and makes their import in this setting perfectly clear. Yahweh, here the **יוצר ישראל**, corresponds to the **יוצר** and the **חרש אדמה** of v. 9, and likewise to the father, and even to the mother, of v. 10; while Israel, and of course especially Israel in exile, is the creation of Yahweh, and specifically the broken sherd which challenges the potter, "Have you no hands (to make me aright, strong and unbreakable)?" In fact Israel, here likened to the broken sherd, is, beyond all question, that section of the Jewish nation which, carried off into exile some fifty years earlier, was indeed a sherd broken off from the vessel of which it was originally a part. (This interpretation was first proposed by my colleague, Professor Sheldon H. Blank, in the afore-mentioned seminar quite some years back.) Impliedly Israel in exile, hearing the prophet's message, spoken in the name of Yahweh, that Yahweh was the one, single, and therefore all-powerful world-God, who alone had elevated Cyrus to his present position as world-ruler, and that He had done this primarily for the sake of Israel, His servant, and Jacob, His chosen one, challenges the prophet's statement with the quite natural question, why, if Yahweh, Israel's god, is indeed all that the prophet claims Him to be, did He, a half-century earlier, permit His people to be conquered and carried away into exile, a sherd broken off, as it were, and cast away, far away indeed.

12. Inasmuch as **אני** merely anticipates the pronominal suffix of **ירי**, the two words may easily be read together as one beat; thereby the uniform 3/3 meter of this strophe is preserved. **צבאם** here designates, not the angels or other heavenly

creatures, those who normally constitute the heavenly host, but rather the heavenly bodies, the sun, moon and stars. Accordingly צִוִּיתִי here may well be translated, "I regulate; I control; I direct" (cf. Gen. 1.14 f.; Ps. 104.19).

13. For בָּצִדֵק (also in vv. 19, 23) connoting "with (divine) purpose," cf. Blank, *Prophetic Faith in Isaiah*, 152-156. For וְלֹחֵי we should certainly read, with *G*, וְלֹחֵי עָמִי, both for the sake of the meter, which requires a third word in the stichos, and also for clarity and forcefulness of expression. אִמֵּר יְהוָה צְבָאוֹת at the end of the v. indicates the conclusion of the strophe, consisting of vv. 9-13, and supports our conclusion that v. 14 is an intrusion here.

14. As has already been indicated, v. 14 can not possibly be integral in this address. The picture which it presents is totally unrelated to the theme of this address, while the sudden introduction of the 2nd, fem., sing. in the six pronominal suffixes in the sentence, with no possible antecedent whatsoever, would be inexplicable indeed. On the other hand, the v. fits perfectly in Isa. 60, following immediately after v. 11, both as to its thought and its use of the 2nd, fem., sing.

15. Klostermann and Duhm, compelled to regard v. 14 as an integral part of this address, since they knew not how otherwise to dispose of it, would emend אָתָּה to אֲתָּה. But the transposition of v. 14, as suggested above, enables us to retain v. 15 in its *MT* form. The precise import of the v. and also the grounds for transposing v. 20b to follow immediately after v. 15 have already been presented.

20b. A moment's thought must make clear that where it stands in *MT* v. 20b is definitely out of place, for it destroys completely the perfect thought-unity between vv. 20a and 21; note the succession of impv., 2nd plu., masc., all addressed to the idolatrous nations, in vv. 20a and 21. On the other hand, with v. 20b interpolated between vv. 15 and 16, note the significant antithetic parallelism between vv. 15b and 20bβ, and that in fact the statement of v. 20bβ, that these idol-bearers pray to a god who can not save, is the direct answer to the sneering question of v. 15b, "the god of Israel is a savior?" Similarly, though perhaps not quite as obviously, v. 20ba, with its statement that the bearers of idols do not comprehend the true nature, and therefore the absolute powerlessness, of these presumptive gods which they worship, is the close and effective parallel of v. 15a, with its sneering statement that Yahweh is a god who conceals himself, i. e. does not reveal himself completely nor make his true purpose fully clear and comprehensible to his worshipers. Accordingly not only is the total lack of unity of v. 20b with v. 20a thus convincingly established, but also and even more positively the close and complete thought-unity of v. 20b with v. 15.

16. With the interpolation of v. 20b between vv. 15 and 16 a subject is provided for the two verbs in v. 16a and an antecedent for the pronominal suffix of כָּלָם. Accordingly there is no necessity whatsoever to emend כָּלָם יַחֲדָה, and this too in rather drastic manner, as many of the earlier commentators felt compelled to do. Inasmuch as in vv. 20b-16 it is unquestionably not the professional idol-makers nor yet the Babylonian worshipers of the gods whom the idols represent, but rather the idol-worshipers among the Jewish exiles, who are denounced so scathingly, it is probably well for חָרַשׁ to read, with Targ., מְשָׁרֵי. While normally connotes professional, priestly ministry to a god, here, as also in Isa. 56.6, it may well mean "to worship devotedly." Accordingly the מְשָׁרֵי צִלְמִים in this v. would be identical with הַנְּשָׂאִים פְּסִלִם of v. 20b; and this is, in turn, further corroboration of our interpolation of v. 20b between vv. 15 and 16. And still further support of this new verse arrangement may be found in the fact that quite obviously vv. 20b and 16 together constitute a 4/4 double-distich. Inasmuch as it is doubtful whether in Biblical Hebrew there

was actually a word, ציר, with the connotation, "image," it is well, with Cheyne and Marti, to read צלמים for צירים.

17. If it be correct that in v. 16 it is those among the Jewish exiles in Babylonia who had been faithless to Yahweh and had gone over to the worship of the Babylonian gods who are denounced, then it follows almost necessarily that the Israel here referred to, for whom a safe and happy future is assured, can be no longer the entire nation or people of Israel, nor yet the entire body of Jewish exiles, but only a section of the latter body, a distinct minority no doubt, the true Israel, as it were, the Israel whom Yahweh had chosen as His servant, the agent of His universal purpose. The faithless ones among the former Israel are doomed to shame and humiliation. But the true Israel, so the prophet affirms, is destined by Yahweh for eternal salvation and dignified and happy existence. This is apparently the very first time that the prophet has drawn this distinction between the false and the true Israel and centered his interest in the latter. It is manifestly this true Israel, and it alone, which is destined to be saved by Yahweh, to be restored to its ancestral land, and to function as Yahweh's servant. The importance of this new stage in the gradual unfolding of the prophet's message can not be emphasized too strongly.

18. Inasmuch as the body of this v. is manifestly a 4/4 double-distich, the opening clause, בִּינִיכָה אָמַר יְהוָה, which, were it to be read metrically, would have only three beats, and so would disturb the meter greatly, should be regarded, as is not infrequently the case, as standing outside the meter and as uttered by the prophet in order to introduce the new, final and climactic strophe of this address. Plainly in v. 18a₂ there is one word too many for the meter; and inasmuch as וְעֵשָׂה is utterly superfluous, adds nothing to, and even weakens the expression of, the thought, it should be omitted, thus restoring the 4/4 meter of the distich.

19. This v. is quite obviously a 3/2 triple-distich. But granting this, then the second stichos of the first distich plainly contains one word too many; and this word can be only אָרֶץ. Actually the presence of this word here is disturbing, not only metrically but also in relation to the thought which the prophet obviously seeks to express. As Job 10.21 indicates, the אָרֶץ חֹשֶׁךְ, "the land of darkness," was the netherworld, the place of abode of the dead. Certainly the prophet did not mean to represent Yahweh as saying that He did not utter His decree in some place in the netherworld. Rather we expect some fitting parallelism to בִּסְתֵר in the first stichos; and by omitting אָרֶץ, with its altogether misleading import, and reading simply בְּמָקוֹם חֹשֶׁךְ, "in a place of darkness," we acquire a parallelism to בִּסְתֵר fitting and effective indeed. In v. 19b it seems necessary to read בָּחֹז for חָזוּ and to interpret it as meaning "for naught; for no purpose"; the ב' was undoubtedly lost by haplography.

44.28. Note that this v., which, where it stands in *MT*, is certainly out of place, fits in perfectly here both as to metrical form and thought, agreeing, as it does, with and supplementing the thought of v. 13b. In fact some such utterance as this with regard to Cyrus and the fulfillment by him, in his role as Yahweh's appointed world-administrator, of Yahweh's purpose, that Israel, the true Israel of course, be sent back to its ancestral land, Jerusalem be restored and the Temple be rebuilt, is almost indispensable here. Furthermore, the reference to Jerusalem and the Temple just here, in this particular place, clearly implies that in the prophet's concept of Israel as the servant of Yahweh, charged with the task of mediating the salvation of all the nations and bringing them to acknowledgment of Yahweh as the one and only world-God, the one, true Savior of mankind, and positive worship of Him, the resumption of dwelling by Israel in its ancestral land, and particularly in

Jerusalem, and of its own worship of Yahweh there in the Temple, His distinctive sanctuary, are absolutely essential. Certainly in this v. we must read the same word, either *האמר* or *לאמר*, at the beginning of each distich; and inasmuch as both *G* and *V* seem to have read *האמר* in both places, this reading seems preferable. Furthermore, since both Cyrus and Jerusalem are referred to in the 3rd person, the Temple should likewise be so referred to; accordingly emend *יוסר* to *יוסר* *הוא*; likewise for *והיכל* we should read, with *V*, *והיכל*.

21. With the disturbing v. 20b shifted to a different position, the very close unity between vv. 20a and 21a becomes immediately apparent. In both passages the "remnants of the nations," i. e. all the nations conquered by Cyrus and now incorporated into his vast empire, all those nations which had looked eagerly and vainly each to its own god or gods for salvation from conquest and subjection by the irresistible foe, are addressed in the 2nd pers., plu. So close is the relationship in both thought and metrical form between these two distichs that we naturally expect them to constitute a double-distich. Accordingly, since v. 20a is a 3/3 distich, we expect v. 21a to be the same. Actually, however, one word seems to be missing in what should constitute the first stichos of the distich of v. 21a. But remembering that *הניש* is a transitive verb and so must have an object, we realize immediately that this object is wanting here, and that it must be the missing word required to complete the expected three-beat first stichos of this distich. Moreover, it is associated with *הנידו*, "foretell, prognosticate"; and in Deutero-Isaiah these prognosticators have always been the gods, either of the foreign nations, who have prognosticated falsely or not at all, or Yahweh, the sole, true prognosticator. And inasmuch as the remainder of the v. indicates that once again, as so often in these addresses of our prophet, the theme is a contest between Yahweh and the gods of the foreign nations, in order to determine who alone among them foretold the conquest of the world by Cyrus and his benevolent intentions for exiled Israel, there can be no doubt whatsoever that the missing object of *הניש* must be *אלהים*. Moreover, since these gods must first be present, if they are to attempt to answer the challenge, the present order of the two verbs should be reversed (cf. Isa. 41.22). Accordingly the text should read: *הניש אלהים והנידו*; with of course *אלהים*, thus supplied, as the subj. of both *והנידו* and *ינעזו* in the second stichos of the distich. V. 21bcd obviously constitutes a triple-distich; and inasmuch as b and d are plainly in 3/2 meter, we naturally expect c to also be in the same meter. Unquestionably v. 21cβ is overloaded, has two words too many. However, the omission of the altogether superfluous *עוד אלהים* restores the expected meter and likewise establishes a perfect parallelism between cβ and dβ. Whether in dβ the Massoretic reading, *אלהים*, should be retained, no doubt for emphasis (cf. Hos. 13.4), or *אין* be read, as in cβ and as is customary, is an open question, but one of no import whatsoever insofar as the thought of the passage is concerned. For *מאז*, "from ancient times," cf. Isa. 48.3, 5, 7, 8; 44.8.

22. V. 22 is plainly a 3/3/3 tristich. The second stichos indicates that the prophet is no longer directing his message to only "the remnants of the nations," but to all mankind, even unto the very ends of the earth, and is bidding them, in Yahweh's name, to turn to Him, the sole, universal God, and through Him find that salvation which until now they had sought so long, so eagerly and so vainly. In the third stichos of the tristich *אל* is, in a way, a proper name, has the connotation, "God," the one, sole God of the universe (so also in 40.18; 43.12; 45.14; 46.9). It may well be that in this usage of *אל* there is, as has been suggested by various scholars, a faint reminiscence of the name and figure of 'El, the supreme deity

of the Ugaritic pantheon a thousand or more years before our prophet's time. But if so, we can hardly imagine that the prophet himself was at all conscious of this. But unquestionably, since the prophet is here addressing, not Israel specifically, but all the nations together, אֵל, rather than יְהוָה, or even than אֱלֹהִים, is the proper term by which to designate the one world-God. After this positive affirmation that Yahweh is God, and also after the equally positive statement of v. 21cβ and dβ, that there is no God other than He, וְאִין־עוֹד no longer possesses primary emphasis, and therefore it may be read as a single beat.

23. The v. is obviously a 4/4 double-distich, and so constitutes a dignified and effective, climactic conclusion to this very meaningful and theologically momentous address. Certainly the utterly incomprehensible דָּבַר צֶדֶק is the result of incorrect word-division; we should accordingly read צֶדֶק דָּבַר. For צֶדֶק with the connotation, "divine purpose," cf. the note to v. 13. Yahweh's דָּבַר is His decree which, through the divine purpose inherent in it, automatically, irresistibly and effectively brings to fulfillment the purpose for which He had uttered it; for a fuller and more explicit statement of this same thought cf. Isa. 55.11. It is readily apparent that the second stichos of the second distich is incomplete both as to thought and metrical form. Plainly a word is missing; and that word can be only the name of the god by whom the person in question swears; in this case Yahweh. And the expected בִּיהוָה we find, with G and also with Rom. 14.11, where this v. is quoted, as the second word of v. 24. There the word is absolutely meaningless and should be transposed, with the omission of the intervening אֵל, to the end of v. 23, where unquestionably it stood originally. There, as the final word of the second stichos of the distich, it completes an effective chiasmic parallelism with בִּי, the first word of the first stichos of the first distich of the v. The obvious implication of the passage is that, since Yahweh is the sole God of the entire world, only by Him, by the use of His name, and His name alone, can men swear. In fact, and quite obviously, would He Himself for any reason swear an oath, He too can swear only by Himself; therefore נִשְׁבַּעְתִּי בִּי at the beginning of this v. Moreover, inasmuch as Deutero-Isaiah was unquestionably the very first to affirm that Yahweh was the one, sole, existent God and that all other presumptive gods were non-existent unrealities, it follows with certainty that all passages in the Bible which speak of Yahweh as swearing by Himself must be later than Deutero-Isaiah (cf. Gen. 22.16; Isa. 62.8; Jer. 22.5b; 49.13; 51.14; Amos 4.2; 6.8aα; 8.7).

24. Just what v. 24a may mean, after the omission of אֵל and the transposition of בִּיהוָה to the end of v. 23, it is impossible to tell; nor do any of the vss. offer the slightest help here. The half-verse must be dismissed as hopelessly corrupt. V. 24b is translatable, especially if, with DSIa and practically all the vss., we emend יְהוָה to יְהוָה, recognizing that the final ו' must have been lost, either by transposition to precede the אֵל or by haplography with the ו' at the beginning of the next word. But who or what the antecedent of the pronominal suffixes of the two prepositions in v. 24b might be, whether Yahweh or Israel, it is impossible to determine. However, the half-verse has decided thought affinities with 41.11a. Under any condition the half-verse does not accord in any way with the theme of this address and is beyond all question an intrusion here, perhaps transposed in some manner from some other utterance of the prophet.

25. It seems altogether probable that אֵל, now standing at the beginning of v. 24, immediately preceding בִּיהוָה, stood originally at the beginning of v. 25, where it would still immediately precede בִּיהוָה. In all likelihood it was this immediate proximity which, through a not unnatural scribal error, brought about its transposi-

tion to its present place. Thus reconstructed, the v. becomes a 3/3 distich, either thus:

אך ביהוה יצדקו ויחללו כל־זרע ישראל

or thus:

אך־ביהוה יצדקו ויחללו/כל זרע ישראל

The issue between these two metrical arrangements is whether אך voices an emphatic thought, and so should be stressed and thus receive a full beat, or not. This it is impossible to determine; for it is difficult to believe that v. 25, thus reconstructed, could have followed originally after v. 23, and so have served as the conclusion of this exceedingly momentous address. V. 23, both through its thought and its metrical form, constitutes, as has already been said, a most effective, climactic ending of the prophet's message to both Israel and the nations at large. With v. 25 appended, the resultant sudden transfer of theme from the nations at large and their conversion to Yahweh and consequent salvation, to Israel and its vindication and praise would be, from the standpoints of both thought and metrical form, a decided bathos. Moreover, the Israel of this v. is "all the seed of Israel," i. e. the entire former Israelite, or at least Judahite, nation or people, whereas in v. 17 and throughout the latter portion of the address proper it is rather the true Israel, the minority section of the Babylonian Jewish community still faithful to Yahweh. Accordingly v. 25 is certainly not an integral part of this address. There is no reason whatever to question its Deutero-Isaianic authorship. But where it may have stood originally, in which address of the prophet, it is utterly impossible to determine. Not at all improbably it may have been a unit with v. 24, in the latter's original form, and both vv. together a part of some utterance by the prophet which unfortunately has not been preserved.

Isa. 42-44

These three chapters are interpreted by practically all scholars as containing a number of addresses by the prophet, three at least, or even more. We shall endeavor to show that these three chapters, with the elision of a few, brief passages which have quite plainly been interpolated, and likewise with considerable textual rearrangement, constitute a single, well integrated address, probably the most extensive single, prophetic address recorded in the Bible.

It has long been recognized by the vast majority of scholars that 42.1-4, 6-7 are a fragment of the Suffering Servant document. 42.10-13 are a psalmodic fragment,¹ probably inserted here for doxological purposes connected with the reading of selections from the prophets in the ritual of the Synagogue of the early post-Exilic period.² Also 42.21; 43.14; 44.23 are, or at least strongly seem to be, interpolations

¹ Cf. Morgenstern, "Isaiah 42.10-13," in *To Do and To Teach: Essays in Honor of Charles Lynn Pyatt* (1953), 27-38.

² Cf. Morgenstern, "The Origin of the Synagogue," in *Studi Orientalistici in onore di Giorgio Levi Della Vida* (1956), II, 200 ff.

of similar character. 42.14 and 19b seem likewise to be interpolations, totally unrelated to the overall theme of the address. And finally 44.28 we have transposed to come between 45.19 and 20a. In the same manner we shall transpose 44.26b-27 to the address in Isa. 41. With the elision of these passages, totalling fifteen vv. in all, what remains constitutes a single address, one of the most significant of all the extant addresses of this exalted prophet.

As we have reconstructed it in the oft-mentioned seminar, this address reads as follows:

3/3/3	כה־אמר האל יהוה / בורא השמים ונוֹשֶׁהם / רקע הארץ וצאצאיה	42.5
3/3	נתן נשמה לעם־עליה / ורוח להלכים בה	
3/3/3	אני־יהוה הוא שמי / וכבודי לאחר לא־אתן / וְתִהְיֶה לִּפְסִילִים	8
	הראשנות הנה באו / וחדשות אני מגיד / בטרם־תצמחנה אשמיִע	9
3/3/3	אתכם	
3/3	אחריב הרים וגבעות / וכל עשבם אוביש	15
3/3	ושמתי נהרות לָאֵיִם / ואנמי <מים> אוביש	
4/3	והולכתי עורים בדרך לא־ידעו / בנתיבות לא־ידעו אדריכם	16
4/3	אשים חשך לפניהם לאור / ומעקשים למישור <אתן>	
4/3	אלה הדברים אעשה <להם> / ולא אעזובם <לעד>	
3/3/3	הוצא עם עור / ועינים יש <ועורים> / וחרשים ואזנים למו	43.8
3/3	העורים הביטו לראות / והחרשים שָׁמְעוּ <להקשיב>	42.18
3/3	מי עור כעבדי / וחרש כמלאכי אשלה	19a
3/3	רְאוּת רבות ולא־ישמר / פָּקוּם אזנים ולא־ישמע	20
4/3/3	והוא עם כוזו ושסוי / הִפְּחוּ כחורים כלם / ובכתי כלאים החבאו	22
4/3	היו לבו ואין מציל / למשסה ואין־אמר השב	
4/3	מי נתן למשסה יעקב / וישראל לבזוים <אותו>	24
	הלוא יהוה זו חטא־וּלוֹ / ולא־אבו בדרכיו הָלוּךְ / ולא שמעו	
4/3/3	בתורתו	
4/4	וישפך עליו בחמה אפו / ועברתו כלהבה <עליו שלח>	25
4/4	ותלהטוהו מסביב ולא ידע / ותבער־בו ולא שם על־לב	
4/4	ועתה כה אמר יהוה / בראך יעקב ויצרך ישראל	43.1
4/4	אל תירא כִּי־גֹאֲלֶיךָ / קראתי בשמך לי אתה	
4/3	כִּי־תַעֲבֹר במוֹיִם אתך אני / ובנהרות לא ישטפוך	2
4/3	כִּי־תִלָּךְ במוֹיֵשׁ לא תכוה / ולהבה לא תבער־בך	
3/3	כִּי־אני יהוה אלהיך / קדוש ישראל מושיִׁיעַךְ	3a

- 4 מאשר יקרת בעיני / נכבדת ואני אהבתיך 3/3
- ואתן אדם תחתך / ולמים תחת נפשך 3/3
- 9b נתתי כפרך מצרים / כוש וסבא תחתך 3/3
- 5 אלתירא כִּי־אתך אני / ממזרח אביא זרעך / ומערב אקבצך 3/3/2
- 6 אמר לצפון תני / ולתימן אל תכלאי 3/3
- הביאי בני מרחוק / ובנותי מקצה הארץ 3/3
- 7 כל הנקרא בשמי / ולכבודי < > יצרתיו אף־עשיתיו 3/3
- 9 כל הגוים יקבצו / ויאספו אלהיהם < יחדו > 3/3
- מי בהם יגיד־זאת / וראשנות יִשְׁמִיעֵנו 3/3
- יתנו עדיהם ויצדקו / וישמעו ויאמרו אמת 3/3
- 44.10 מי יצר אל / ופסל < ומסכה > נסך / לבלתי הועיל 3/3/2
- 40.20 < > עץ לא־ירקב יבחר / חרש חכם יבקש־לו / להכין פסל לא־ימוט 3/3/3
- 19 הפסל נסך חרש / וצרף בזהב ירקענו / ונתוקות כסף יצרף 3/3/3
- 41.6 איש את־דעהו יעזר / ולאחיו יאמר חזק 3/3
- 7 ויחזק חרש את־צורף / מחליק < > את־הולם פטיש 3/3
- יאמר לדבק טוב־הוא / ויחזקו במסמרים לא־ימוט 3/3
- 44.9 יצרי פסל כלם תהו / וחמודיהם בל יועילו 4/3
- בל יראו ובל ידעו / ועדיהם המה < עשיהם > 4/3
- 11 הִכֵּל חֲבֵרָיו יבשו / וחרשיו המה מאדמים 3/3
- יתקבצו כלם יעמדו / יפחדו יבשו יחד 3/3
- 12 חרש ברזל יעצב / < > במִּפָּח ובמקבות יצרהו / ויפעלהו בזרוע כחו 3/3/3
- גס־רעב ואי־נִיכַח < לו > / לא־שתה מים וייעף 3/3
- 13 חרש עצים נטה קו / < > בשרד < > במקצעות ובמחונה יתארהו 4/4
- ויעשהו < בחרט > כתבנית איש / כתאר אדם לשבת בית 4/4
- 14 יכרת לו ארז / ויִקַּח תדהר ואלון 3/3
- וימצא לו עץ מיער / נטע אל וגשם יגדל 4/4
- 15 והיה לאדם לבער / ויִקַּדח < אש > וְנָחַם / ארישיק ואפה לחם 3/3/3
- אף־יפעל אל וישתחו / יעשה פסל ויסגד־לו 3/3
- 16 חציו שרף במראש / על־גחליו בשר < > יצלה / ויאכל < > צלי 3/3/3
- וישבע 3/3/3
- אף־יחם ויאמר האח / חמותי ראיתי אור 3/3
- 17 ושאריתו < > יעשה לפסל / ויסגוד לו וישתחו 3/3
- ויתפלל אליו ויאמר / הצילני כִּי־אלי אתה 3/3
- 18 לא יִדְעוּ ולא־יבינו / כִּי־שתחו מראות עיניהם / מהשכיל לבתם 3/3/3
- < כבדו >

- 3/3 ולא ישיב אל־לבו / ולא־דעת־לו ולא־תבונה לאמר 19a
- 3/3/3 חציו שרפתי במראש / ואפיתי על־נחליו לחם / אצלה בשר ואכל 19b+20aα
- 3/3/3 ויתרו לתועבה אעשה / לבול עץ אסגור / >אשתחוה ואליו אתפלל< 20aβb
- 3/3/3 לב הותל הטוה / ולא יציל את־נפשו / ולא־יאמר הלוא־שקר בימיני
- 4/4 נסגו אחור < > הבטחים כִּפְסל / האמרים למסכה אתה אלהינו 42.17
- 3/3 זכר אלה יעקב / וישראל כִּי־עבדי אתה 44.21
- 3/3 יצרת־ך עבד לי / אתה < > לא תטשני
- 3/3 כה אמר יהוה / גאלך ויצרך בבטן 24
- 3/3/3 אנכי־יהוה עשה כל / נטה שמים לבדי / רקע הארץ ואינ־אתי
- 3/3 מפר אתות קרים / וקִסְמִי־ם יהולל 25
- 3/3 משיב חכמים אחור / ודַעֲתָם יסכל
- 3/3 מקים דבר עבדו / ועצת מלאכיו ישרים 26a
- 3/3 אתם עדי נא־סִי־הוה / ועבדי אשר בחרתי 43.10
- 3/3 למען־תדעו ותאמינו לי / ותבינו כִּי־אני הוא
- 3/3 לפני לא־נוצר אל / ואחרי לא יהיה
- 3/3 אנכי אנכי יהוה / ואין מבלעדי מושיע 11
- 3/3 אנכי הגדתי והשמעתי והושעתי / ואין בכם <אל> זר / ואתם עדי 12
- 4/4/4 < > ואני אל
- 3/3/3 גִּסְמִי־ם אני הוא / ואין מידי מציל / אפעל ומי ישיבנה 13
- 3/3 אני יהוה קדושכם / בורא ישראל מלככם 15
- 3/3 מי בכם יאזין־זאת / יקשיב וישמע לאחור 42.23
- 3/3/3 כה אמר יהוה / הנתן בים דרך / ובמים עזים נתיבה 43.16
- 3/3 המוציא רכב וסוס / חיל נַעֲזוּ יחדו 17
- 3/3 ישכבו כל יקומו / דעכו כפשתה כבו
- 3/3 אל תזכרו ראשנות / וקדמניות אל תתבנו 18
- 3/3 הנני עשה חדשה / עתה תצמח אִף־תִּדְעוה 19
- 3/3 < > אשים במדבר דרך / בישימון נתיבות <אתן>
- 3/3 תכבדני חית השדה / תנים ובנות יענה 20
- 3/3 כִּי־אתן במדבר מים / נהרות בישימון <אשים>
- 3/3/2 20bβ+21 להשקות עמי בחירי / עֲסִיזו יצרתי לי / תהלתי יספרו
- 4/3 ולא אותי קראת יעקב / כִּי־יִנַּעַת בי ישראל 22
- 4/3 לא הבאת לי < > עלתיך / ובזבחיך לא כבדתי 23
- 4/3 לא העבדת־ך במנחה / ולא הוגעת־ך בלבונה
- 4/3 לא קנית לי < > קנה / וחלב זבחיך לא־הירויתני 24
- 4/3 אך העבדתי בחטאות־ך / הוגעתי בְּעוֹנֹתֶיךָ

3/3	הזכירני נשפטה יחד / ספר אתה למען תצדק	26
3/3	אביך הראשון חטא / ומלכך פשעו בי	27
3/3/2	ואחלל שרי הקדש / ואתן לחרפה יעקב / וישראל לגדופים	28
3/3/3	כה אמר יהוה / מלך ישראל וגאלו / יהוה צבאות <שמו>	44.6
3/3	אני ראשון ואני אחרון / ומבלעדי אין אלהים	
3/3	ומי כמוני יקרא / ויגידה ויערכה למו	7
3/3	משמיע מעולם אותיות / ואשר תבאנה יגיד <>	
3/3/3	אל תפחדו ואל תיראו / הלא מאז השמעת / והגדתי ואתם עדי	8
3/3	היש אלוה מבלעדי / ואין עוד זולתי	
3/3/3	אנכי אנכי הוא / מחה פשעך למעני / וחטאתך לא יאזכר עוד	43.25
3/3/3	מחיתי כעב פשעך / וכענן חטאתך <העברתי> / שובה אלי	44.22
3/3/3	כִּי־גַאלְתִּיךָ	
4/3	ועתה שמע יעקב עבדי / וישראל בחרתי בו	44.1
4/3	כה אמר יהוה עשך / ויצרך בבטן עזרך	2
4/3	אל תירא עבדי יעקב / וישרון בחרתי בו	
4/3	כאשר אצק מים על־צמאה / ונוחלים על־יבשה	3
4/3	<כן> אצק רוחי על־זרעך / וברכתי על־צאצאֶיךָ	
4/3	וצמחו בניך כחציר <על־הרים> / כערבים על־יבלי מים	4
4/3	זה יאמר ליהוה אני / וזה יקרא בשם יעקב	5
4/3	וזה יכתב בידו ליהוה / ובשם ישראל יִקְנֶה	

42.5	Thus sayeth God, Yahweh, He who created the heavens and stretched them out, He who spread out the earth and that which cometh forth from it, Who giveth breath to the people upon it And spirit to those who walk thereon,
8	I, Yahweh, the Existent One is My name, And My homage to any other I will not yield Nor My praise to idols.
9	The former things, behold, they have come to pass, And new events I foretell. Before they will spring forth I shall announce them.
15	I shall make desolate mountains and hills, And all their herbage I shall parch; And I shall turn rivers into islets, And pools of water I shall dry up;
16	And I shall make the blind to travel over a road they do not know,

- By paths unfamiliar to them I shall guide them;
 I shall turn darkness before them into light,
 And the uneven places I shall make level.
 These are the things which I shall do for them,
 Nor shall I forsake them ever.
- 43.8 Bring forth the people that is blind;
 Though they have eyes they are blind,
 And they are deaf though they have ears.
- 42.18 Ye blind ones, gaze about in order to see,
 Yea, ye deaf, listen in order to hear.
- 19a Who is blind like my servant
 And deaf like My messenger whom I send?
- 20 There is seeing of many things, but he does not observe;
 There is opening wide of ears, but he hears not.
- 22 For he was a people despoiled and ravaged;
 Ensnared in holes were they, all of them,
 And in prison-houses were they hidden away.
 They were for prey, with none to deliver,
 For ravagement, with none to say: Stop!
- 24 Who gave Jacob to ravagement
 And Israel to those who despoiled him?
 Was it not Yahweh, He against whom they had sinned,
 And in whose ways they were loath to walk,
 And to whose revealed law they would not hearken?
- 25 So in indignation He poured out His wrath upon him,
 And His anger He despatched like a cloud against him,
 So that it burned all about him, but he would not give heed,
 And it blazed against him, but he would not take
 notice.
- 43.1 But now thus saith Yahweh,
 Thy Creator, O Jacob, yea, thy Maker, O Israel;
 Fear not, for I am about to redeem thee;
 I have summoned thee, Mine art thou.
- 2 When thou passest through the sea, I am with thee,
 And through the rivers, they shall not overflow
 thee;
 When thou walkest through fire, thou shalt not be burned,
 And the flame shall not blaze against thee.
- 3a For I, Yahweh, am thy God,
 The Holy One of Israel is thy Savior.
- 4 Because thou wast precious in Mine eyes
 Thou hast acquired dignity and I have loved thee.

- So I gave up mankind in place of thee,
And peoples in thy stead.
- 3b I gave Egypt as thy ransom,
Ethiopia and Sabaea in exchange for thee.
- 5 Fear not, for I am with thee;
From the East I will bring thine offspring,
And from the West will I reassemble thee.
- 6 I will say to the North: Give up!
And to the South: Hold not back!
Bring My sons from afar,
Yea, My daughters from the end of the earth,
- 7 Every one who calls himself by My name,
Whom I have formed, yea, have made, for My
glory!
- 9 Let all the nations assemble,
And let their gods gather together!
Who among them might foretell this,
Or former things proclaim unto us?
Let them produce their witnesses, that they may be
vindicated,
Or let them listen and say: (It is the) truth.
- 44.10 Who hath fashioned a god
And an idol, yea, a molten image, has poured out,
To no purpose whatsoever?
- 40.20 A tree which will not decay he selects,
An expert artisan he seeks for himself,
In order to fashion an image which can not move
itself.
- 19 The artisan pours out the idol;
The smith plates it with gold
And joints of silver he moulds.
- 41.6 Each one helps the other,
And to his comrade he says: Be strong!
- 7 The artisan supports the smith,
The polisher him who wields the hammer.
He says of a joint: It is good.
And he fastens it with nails so that it may not slip.
- 44.9 The fashioners of idols are vanity, all of them,
And their precious objects are to no purpose.
They see not, neither do they comprehend;
And their witnesses are their makers themselves.
- 11 Behold all its fellow-associates are put to shame
And its artisans are made to blush.

- Let all of them assemble; let them stand up,
 Let them become worried, be put to shame together.
- 12 The worker in iron fashions an idol;
 With bellows and with hammers he shapes it,
 And he brings it to completion with his own strong
 arm;
 Also he becomes thirsty, so that he has no strength;
 He drinks no water, so that he becomes faint.
- 13 The worker in wood spreads a tape;
 With chalk, with scrapers and with compass he
 shapes it,
 And with graving-tool he makes it like the form of a man,
 Like a human being in shape, in order to dwell in a
 sanctuary.
- 14 He hews for himself a cedar,
 Or he takes a fir or an oak tree,
 Or he finds for himself a tree in the forest,
 Which a god has planted and the rain made grow.
- 15 And it serves the man for burning;
 So he kindles a fire and warms himself,
 Or he sets it ablaze and bakes bread.
 In addition he makes (from it) a god and renders homage;
 He makes an idol and prostrates himself to it.
- 16 Half of it he has burned as a fire,
 Upon the coals of which he roasts flesh;
 He eats roasted meat and becomes satiated.
 Also he warms himself and says: Ah!
 I have become warm, I see a light!
- 17 While of what remains of it he makes an idol,
 And prostrates himself to it and renders homage;
 And he prays unto it and says;
 Deliver me, for my god art thou!
- 18 They do not perceive, neither do they understand,
 For too glazed over are their eyes to see,
 Too heavy are their hearts to comprehend;
- 19a So that he does not take to heart,
 Nor has he perception or understanding that he
 should say:
 Half of it I burned as fire,
 And upon its coals I baked bread;
 I am roasting meat and am about to eat,
- 19b+20aa While the remainder of it I am making into an abom-
 ination;

- To a clod of wood I bow down;
 I prostrate myself and to it I pray.
- 20aβb A heart gone astray has misled him,
 So that he can not rescue himself;
 Nor yet would he say: Is not something false in
 my right hand?
- 42.17 They are turned around, those who put their trust in an
 idol,
 Who say unto a molten image: Thou art our god.
- 44.21 Remember all this, O Jacob,
 Yea, Israel, for My servant art thou.
 I have fashioned thee as a servant unto Me;
 Thou must never reject Me.
- 24 Thus sayeth Yahweh,
 Thy Redeemer, yea, thy Fashioner in the womb:
 I, Yahweh, am the Maker of everything,
 Who stretched out the heavens all alone,
 Who spread out the earth with no one with Me,
- 25 Who circumvents the portents of the seers,
 And their magical acts brings to naught,
 Who turns sages aback,
 And their technique changes to folly;
- 26a Who confirms the word of His servant,
 And the counsel of His messengers He fulfills.
- 43.10 Ye are My witnesses, sayeth Yahweh,
 Yea, My servant, whom I have chosen,
 To the end that ye may understand and have faith in Me,
 And may comprehend that I am the Existent One;
 Before Me no god was fashioned,
 And after Me none will (ever) be.
- 11 I, I am God,
 And besides Me there is no savior.
- 12 I foretell and I proclaim, and I work salvation;
 And among you there is no strange god;
 So ye are My witnesses, that I am God.
- 13 Moreover, from today on I am the Existent One,
 And there is none who can wrest from My hands;
 I act, and who can reverse it,
- 15 I, Yahweh, your particular possession,
 The Creator of Israel, your King?
- 42.23 Who among you will hearken unto this,
 Will give ear and hear of future events?

- 43.16 Thus sayeth Yahweh,
 He who sets a road through the sea,
 Yea, through the mighty waters a pathway,
 17 Who bringeth forth chariot and horse,
 Army and troop all together;
 They lie prostrate, they do not rise;
 They are extinguished, like a wick they are quenched.
 18 Recall not earlier events,
 And over former happenings do not ponder.
 19 Behold, I am about to do a new thing;
 Now will it become real; moreover, ye shall recognize it.
 I shall set a road through the desert,
 Through the wilderness will I fix paths.
 20 The beasts of the field shall pay homage to Me
 The jackals and the ostriches;
 For I shall put water in the desert,
 Streams will I set in the wilderness,
 20bβ-21 In order to provide drink for My people, My chosen one,
 This people which I have fashioned for Myself,
 That they may recite My praise.
 22 But upon Me thou didst not call, O Jacob,
 Verily thou didst grow weary of me, O Israel.
 23 Unto Me thou broughtest not thy burnt-offerings,
 And with thy sacrifices thou didst not do homage
 unto Me.
 I did not demand that thou worship Me with grain-offering;
 Neither did I burden thee with incense-offering.
 24 Thou didst not spend thy money for Me for cane,
 And with the fat of thy sacrifices thou didst not
 sate Me.
 Instead thou didst belabor Me with thy sins,
 With thine iniquities thou didst weary Me exceedingly.
 26 Recall to My memory; let us enter into judgment together;
 Speak up, thou, so that thou mayest find vindication.
 27 Thy very first ancestor sinned,
 And thy kings transgressed against Me.
 28 So I profaned the holy princes,
 And I gave Jacob over to reproach
 And Israel to insult.
 44.6 Thus sayeth Yahweh,

- Israel's King and its Redeemer,
 Whose name is Yahweh of Hosts;
 I am the first and I am the last,
 And besides Me there is no god.
 7 And who like Me makes proclamation
 And foretells something and carries it through for
 himself;
 Who proclaims long in advance things to come,
 And what will happen foretells?
 8 Fear not and be not afraid!
 Have I not proclaimed from earliest times
 And foretold; and ye are My witnesses?
 Is there a god besides Me,
 Or is there any other than I?
 43.25 I, I, the Existent One,
 Blot out thy transgressions for Mine own sake,
 And thy sins I remember no more.
 44.22 I have blotted out thy transgressions like a mist,
 And like a cloud I have caused thy sins to pass away;
 Turn again unto Me, for I have redeemed thee.
 44.1 So now hearken, O Jacob, My servant,
 Yea, Israel, whom I have chosen.
 2 Thus sayeth Yahweh, thy Maker,
 Yea, He who fashioned thee in the womb, thy Helper:
 Fear not, My servant, Jacob,
 Yea, Yeshurun, whom I have chosen.
 3 Even as I pour water upon the thirsty soil,
 Yea, streams of water upon the dry ground,
 So will I pour My spirit upon thine offspring
 And My blessing upon thy posterity.
 4 So that thy sons shall flourish as grass upon the mountains,
 As poplars beside the water-brooks.
 5 One shall say: I belong to Yahweh;
 And one shall call himself by the name of Jacob,
 And one shall write with his own hand: Yahweh's (possession),
 And by the name of Israel shall he entitle himself.

The metrical form of this address is of particular interest. Appreciation of this fact is of immediate service in the task of textual reconstruction and rearrangement. The address consists of one hundred and ten metrical units, of which fifty-four are 3/3's, twenty-two are 4/3's, eight are 4/4's, nineteen are 3/3/3's, four are 3/3/2's, two are 4/3/3's, and one is a 4/4/4. This is an unusually large proportion of tristichs

to distichs. The various meters are mingled quite indiscriminately, as might well be expected in a hortatory piece. Yet it is noteworthy how frequently a single tristich is followed by one, two or even three closely related distichs in the corresponding meter, $3/3$'s following a $3/3/3$ or one $3/3/2$ (43.5-7), and $4/3$'s following a $4/3/3$ (42.22, 24a), with in each instance the tristich making a specific affirmation and the distichs amplifying it, usually with positive, but occasionally (44.15, 16) with contrasted, thoughts or statements. This technique is exceedingly effective. Also it should be noted that the address ends in a strophe consisting of eight $4/3$'s, a metrical form which imparts dignity and climactic effect to the conclusion of the address.

42.5. הָאֵל, as a title, "the God," i. e. the one, universal God; cf. Ps. 85.9 and frequently in Deutero-Isaiah. For נוֹטִיָּה read, as a sing., נוֹטָה; cf. Hos. 7.6. וּצְמִיחָה designates all that springs forth from the earth, but particularly animals and men; it is in parallelism with לְהִלְכִים of the next distich. Cheyne, Duhm and Marti would supply יוֹצֵא after וּצְמִיחָה; but this would make this v. a $3/3/4$, a rare and here an impossible meter. Vv. 5 and 8 together state graphically and effectively the primary theme of this address, the absolute oneness and universality of Yahweh as the sole world-God and the utter unreality and futility of other, supposed gods and of the idols by which they are represented.

8. For הוּא as a name or title of Yahweh (so already Dillmann) coined by and characteristic of Deutero-Isaiah cf. 48.12b and the note to this v. The fact that DSIa reads וְשֵׁם indicates (a) that it, and no doubt the general public also, clearly understood הוּא as a name or title of Yahweh, and also (b) that the scribe had no appreciation of the metrical character of this type of Hebrew literature; for, linking וְשֵׁם to what follows, as the conjunction would necessitate, would have made of this a $3/4/3$ tristich, which is of course an unheard of meter. To achieve the $3/3/3$ meter it is necessary to read אֲנִי־הוּא, as is regularly the procedure with Deutero-Isaiah, and also לֹא־אֶחָד each as one beat, but, on the other hand, to read וְהִלְכִי, a four-syllabled noun with prefix and suffix, as two beats.

9. The unusual position of הוּא, as the second word in the stichos, makes it emphatic and necessitates its receiving a full beat. In contrast to הָרָאשׁוֹנוֹת, "the former things," which is naturally determined and so requires the article, וְהָרָשׁוֹת, with MT and contrary to DSIa, does not need the article since it is as yet indeterminate, "new things." These "new events" can not be Cyrus' capture of Babylon, as Dillmann and Marti interpret it, for that had already taken place. Rather these "new things" can be only Yahweh's clearly contemplated deliverance of Israel from exile and its restoration to its ancestral land, as the address, in the form in which we have reconstructed it, clearly predicts. Correspondingly הָרָאשׁוֹנוֹת can be only Yahweh's sending of Israel into exile in Babylonia some fifty years earlier, even as predicted by Yahweh through the mouths of earlier prophets. The v. implies clearly that Yahweh informs Israel of coming events before they transpire just because Israel is His servant, His agent, who, in order to function effectively in that role, must know in advance what Yahweh, as the divine source of all history, purposes to do and just when to expect it. Accordingly in this address Yahweh announces, or at least intimates, to Israel His purpose to deliver it from exile in Babylonia and to bring it safely through the desert back to the land of its fathers.

15. This v. is manifestly a $3/3$ double-distich; accordingly in the second stichos of the first distich read וְכֹל and give the word a full beat, and in the parallel position in the second distich for וְאֶמֶץ read וְאֶמֶץ מִים (cf. 14.23). The expression, אַחֲרֵיב הָרִים, here brings to mind the mountain, Horeb, "the Bare Mountain," devoid of vegetation; just this is the implication here, as the second stichos of this distich makes

clear. It is tempting to emend the second אֶשֶׁת לֹא יָדָעוּ אֹיְבֵי, a word quite similar in form and synonymous in meaning. However, as Torrey brings to our attention, in the two stichoi of the very next distich לא ידעו occurs twice in much closer juxtaposition than אֹיְבֵי in this distich; accordingly it is probably wise not to emend the word. Oort and Duhm would emend לֹא יָדָעוּ to לֹא יָדָעוּ on the basis of Ps. 105.41 and also on the basis of the contention that in Biblical Hebrew אֹיְבֵי never connotes a small islet in a river. However, the picture of a river drying up so much that patches of earth, which may well be termed אֵיִים, "islets," appear, is so graphic that it seems best to retain *MT* here. However, the vocalization, לֹא יָדָעוּ, is certainly preferable to that of *MT*. The picture which this v. inaugurates is of course that of Israel's return, under Yahweh's protection, from Babylon through the desert, with all its hardships and dangers, to its ancestral land.

16. This v. is manifestly a triple-distich, but obviously in considerable textual disorder. The first distich is a 4/3, while the second distich seems to be of the same meter, though with a word lost at the end of the line. This word can be only אֶתֶן, the word regularly used by Deutero-Isaiah in parallelism with אֶשֶׁם of the first stichos of the distich. The supplying of this word not only restores the meter and parallelism of the distich, but also recovers an effective chiasm of the two stichoi. Likewise it seems best, with Marti, to regard the מ' of מַחֲשֶׁךְ, "a dark place," as a dittograph of the מ' of אֶשֶׁם, immediately preceding, and for it to read חֹשֶׁךְ, "darkness," the natural antithesis to אֹרֶךְ, "light." The third distich of the v. presents many difficulties. In the first place, the two verbs in the perf., following the sequence of impfs. in the first two distichs, are very disturbing. Unquestionably, with both *G* and *Targ.*, we should read both of these verbs as impfs. also. Furthermore, following a hint from *V*, for the altogether impossible עֲשִׂיתָם, we should read אֶעֱשֶׂה לָהֶם; this reading restores the expected, but missing, fourth beat of the first stichos of the distich. In the second stichos, in addition to emending עֲנֹכָהִים, a word practically essential to the completion of the thought as well as to the meter is obviously missing; accordingly supply 'לָעַר' (cf. Morgenstern, "The Loss of Words, etc." *HUCA* XXV [1954], 56 f.). The "blind ones" are obviously the Jewish exiles in Babylon. The statement of the first distich, that Yahweh would cause them to go, impliedly upon their return journey to their ancestral land, by a road and by paths "which they do not know," implies further that this return will not be by the same route by which Nebuchadnezzar had brought them to Babylon, undoubtedly the northern route, but that their return would be by the southern route, identical with or paralleling that by which, but a few years earlier, Nabunaid, the last Babylonian monarch, and his retinue travelled regularly between Babylon and Teima, the royal residence in the western desert. It was altogether natural for Deutero-Isaiah, living when he did, and for other prophetic writers after him to envisage the return of exiled Israel to its ancestral land by this route (cf. Isa. 35; 40.3 f. and *passim*).

43.8. The reference to "the blind ones" is continued in vv. 18-20. But it is the theme also of 43.8, a v. which, where it stands in *MT*, manifestly disturbs the context and is out of place. On the other hand, 43.8 fits in perfectly here, between vv. 16 and 18-20, while equally plainly v. 17 disturbs the context here and must be transposed to a more suitable position; accordingly replace 42.17 by 43.8. This v. seems to be a 3/3/3 tristich, but the second stichos plainly requires an additional beat; accordingly, again with *G* and *Targ.*, and as the context requires, supply וְעֹרִים to follow שׁ; this not only restores the meter and completes the thought, but it also establishes a perfect parallelism between the second and third stichoi of the tristich. Also, with Marti, for הוֹצֵאת read the impv., הוֹצֵא.

42.18. There can be no question that, following Haupt and other scholars, in their present arrangement in *MT* the two stichoi reverse the expected thought sequence of first seeing and then hearing, and that they should be inverted. This conclusion is confirmed by the fact that the v. is manifestly a 3/3, but that the present first stichos in *MT* manifestly lacks a beat; when transposed to function as the second stichos in the distich, this missing word would come at the very end of the line, the place where, as we have learned, in Biblical poetry words have been most readily and frequently lost. The parallelism of the two stichoi tells us immediately that the missing word must have paralleled לראות and must have continued the thought of שמעו, just as לראות continues the thought of הביטו; accordingly supply להקשיב as the missing word. Naturally, while supplying this word, we must read the impv., שִׁמְעוּ.

19. In v. 19b the first עור should certainly be changed to חרש. Likewise כמשלם presents almost insurmountable difficulties. It is in all likelihood a corruption of an original כמשלח. But thus reconstructed, this second distich merely repeats in inverse order, and that too a bit awkwardly, the thought already set forth effectively in the first distich. It is undoubtedly the result of rather bungling textual expansion, and so should be omitted as a gloss. However, it does establish quite conclusively that for כיאם־עבדי we should read כעבדי, and thus establish a perfect parallelism between the two stichoi of the first distich.

20. As the final 'ח of ראות indicates, the word should be read רְאוּת, as an inf. const., used here as a verbal noun. Correspondingly we should vocalize פָּקוּחַ, also as an inf. const. Also the here altogether meaningless 2nd sing. masc., חשמר, should be emended to the 3rd sing. masc., ישמר, to correspond to its parallel word in the second stichos, ישמע. The subj. of the two verbs is of course the servant and messenger of v. 19a. A glance at the reconstructed text shows that vv. 18, 19a and 20 together constitute a very effective 3/3 triple-distich, with the single theme, the blindness and deafness of the servant. Appreciation of this fact confirms our omission of v. 19b as a disturbing gloss.

21. Just what this v. actually means, and particularly in this setting, it is impossible to determine. Moreover, whatever its meaning might be, it certainly disturbs the continuity of the thought here and should be omitted as a gloss. It may be noted also that this is the only passage in the entire Bible where חפץ is followed by למען and where also אדר is used in the *hif'il*. This sentence may well be a doxological refrain inserted at just this point at the close of the reading of this passage from the prophets in the Synagogue liturgy.

22. This v. together with vv. 24-25 continues the thought of the triple-distich immediately preceding and defines wherein the blindness and deafness of the servant, Israel, consisted, viz. in failing, or even refusing, to see and realize who was the true author of Israel's conquest by Nebuchadnezzar and its present exile, that, by implication, it was not at all the, falsely presumed, more powerful Babylonian gods, who, as the address will subsequently establish, were not gods at all, but Yahweh alone, their own ancestral god and the sole, universal God, against whom they had sinned rebelliously and in whose way they had refused to walk. The v., stating historical facts of such grave import, is cast in the dignified 4/3 measure, a 4/3/3 tristich plus a 4/3 distich. For הָפַח, which is certainly meaningless here, we should undoubtedly read, in close parallelism with ההבאו, הִפְחוּ. Also the altogether meaningless and, as all the vss. indicate, misleading בְּחִירִים, we should revocalize בְּחִירִים. Certainly also for מַשְׁחָה we should read, even as the recurrence of the word in v. 24

indicates, למשם. Inasmuch as the preceding word ends in a 'ל, the 'ל here was undoubtedly lost through haplography.

23. This v. seriously disturbs the thought-unity of this passage and has been displaced from its original position, probably between 43.15 and 16. We shall consider it in that position.

24. This v. is a 4/3, 4/3/3, and so is obviously the perfect, antithetical counterpart of v. 22, and with it constitutes a closely integrated thought-unit. Certainly in the second stichos of the initial distich a beat is lacking. Plainly once again a word has been lost at the end of a line; in this instance the missing word could have been only the object of לבוים; accordingly, with *G*, supply אותו. For חטאתו read, with *G*, and in agreement with the two 3rd plu. verbs which follow, חטאו, חטא. חטא is followed regularly by the inf. const., usually, though not invariably, introduced by 'ל; accordingly here read הלוך.

25. This v. abounds in difficulties, particularly in its first half. The v. is manifestly a double-distich, and the second distich is a 4/4. The first stichos of the first distich likewise has, or seems to have, four beats; therefore it is to be expected that the first distich is likewise a 4/4, and that accordingly its second stichos should also have four beats. But in *MT* only two words constitute the second stichos, and by themselves express no complete or translatable thought. Obviously something has been lost from this second stichos, in the extent of at least two words. It should be noted also that the second distich speaks of something burning and flaming, but the distich does not say what it was. But since both verbs are 3rd fem. sing. it follows that a fem. sing. noun, the subj. of the two verbs, must have stood in the second stichos of the first distich. It could scarcely have been מלחמה, for a word connoting "warfare" could hardly have served as the subj. of the two verbs in the second distich. Accordingly Klostermann, followed by Cheyne and Torrey, have emended וועונו מלחמה to וועונו כלהבה. Granting that מלחמה might very well have been a corruption of כלהבה, nonetheless וועונו, a masc. noun, can certainly not be the subj. of the two 3rd fem. sing. verbs which follow. Accordingly, in considerable measure a conjecture, we propose, as the probable, original reading of this second stichos of the first distich, וועברתו כלהבה עליו שלח, cf. Ps. 78.49. In the first stichos of the first distich חמה אפו is syntactically impossible; accordingly, with Isa. 66.15, read בחמה אפו. In the second stichos of the second distich, following a suggestion of *G* and to agree with the tense of ידע and with the general thought of the passage, for שם ישם read שם.

43.1. This v. is also quite obviously a 4/4. It inaugurates Yahweh's comforting reassurance to Israel that its discipline for its faithlessness is ended and that the moment of its deliverance from exile is nigh.

2. In order to provide an effective parallelism with ובנהרות and also with במראש in the corresponding position in the second distich, for במים read, with *S*, במרים; the prophet employs במי twice again in this address, in 44.16, 19.

3-4. Textually these two vv. are in perfect condition, but there seems to have been some disarrangement within them. V. 4 continues directly the thought of v. 3a, while v. 3b, in turn, fits perfectly after v. 4b. In fact vv. 3a and 4a together constitute one double-distich, while correspondingly vv. 4b and 3b constitute a second double-distich. Each double-distich voices a closely unified thought, with effective parallelism between its constituent distichs. Moreover, the second double-distich illustrates graphically the thought of the first by enumerating some of the peoples whom Yahweh gave up in order to take Israel as His own, chosen people, here specifically the peoples dwelling at the very ends of the then known world.

In v. 4b, just as in 45.12, אדם has the connotation, "mankind," and so is synonymous with לאמים, "peoples." The implication of this passage seems to be that from Creation on Yahweh, as the sole Creator of the entire universe, might well have functioned as the one and only universal world-God, recognized and worshiped as such by all peoples, and so might have stood in a single, uniform relation to all nations from the beginning of existence. However, from the very first He cherished an especial affection for Israel, and so took it as His particular people and centered His love and care upon it. But to do this He had to renounce His relations with and claims upon the other peoples and the rest of mankind as a whole. But the further thought is implicit here, that, even while retaining Israel in a special relationship to Himself, Yahweh is about to reassert His divine rule over the entire world and over all peoples within it. To do this He must first establish convincingly that the so-called gods of the other nations are impotent unrealities, nothings at all. And this only a few short sentences later He proceeds to do in highly effective manner. After this is accomplished there will follow the תשועה, the "salvation" of all the other nations and peoples, whom Yahweh had at first discarded, and their restoration to His just dominion and loving care, and with this true universalism. In this program, Israel, as the people beloved of Yahweh and knowing Him from of old, will have an especial role and will still be His chosen people, the agent of His universal purpose. Such is the theme of this entire address, of which in a way 43.3a+4+3b, supplemented by vv. 5-7 are the key.

5-6. The text of these two vv. is in perfect order and together they voice a closely unified thought. They picture Yahweh's reuniting all Israel, at present scattered in all directions. The exiles from the East are of course the group in Babylonia. Those from the West would then be those, such as Jeremiah, who, at the time of the fall of Jerusalem to the Babylonians in 586 B. C., had sought refuge in Egypt. Those from the South would be those who at the same time had fled into Arabia, certainly as far down the Red Sea coast as Medinah and Mecca, and perhaps even as far as Sheba. Those from the North would be the remnant of the exiles of the ten northern tribes, for the most part resident since 721 B. C. in Northern Mesopotamia. That in the early post-exilic period the hope of the restoration of these tribes and of the reunion thereby of Israel with Judah was ardently cherished is amply attested in the Biblical literature of that period (cf. Rosenau, "Ezek. 37.15-28: What Happened to the Ten Tribes," *HUCA Jubilee Volume* [1925], 79-88).

7. As it stands in *MT* this v. would have to be read as a 3/2/2 tristich, a scantily attested meter in Biblical Hebrew poetry. However, by the omission of one of the three synonymous verbs in the second stichos, preferably בראתיו, the v. becomes a normal 3/3 distich and likewise reads more smoothly and effectively than in its present form. In the first stichos in order to achieve the 3-beat measure כל must be given a full beat and so be regarded as emphatic. Also הוֹקֵרָא must be interpreted as a reflexive, "Every one who calls himself, etc."

9. V. 9 is obviously a 3/3 triple-distich. But the first distich plainly has one word too many in the first stichos and one too few in the second stichos. This difficulty, however, is easily resolved by transposing יחרו from the first to the end of the second stichos. לאמים is indeed a natural and effective parallel to הַגוֹיִם; but something is plainly out of order in the v.; for the antecedent of the pronominal suffix of בָּהֶם in the second distich and of עֲדֵיהֶם in the third distich can certainly not be the nations or peoples of the first distich, but can be only their gods. Obviously also the answer to the question in the second distich, "Who among them might foretell this?", can not be the nations, but must be their gods. Furthermore, just as

later in this address the prophet has Yahweh proclaim that Israel is His witness, who testifies to His reality and divinity, so here those who are challenged to produce their witnesses can be, not the nations at all, but only their gods. Accordingly for *אלהיהם לאמים* read *נאמם*, certainly a relatively simple and modest emendation. In the first distich for *נקבצו* read, with Torrey, as the context requires and in agreement with *ויאספו*. In the second distich, with Cheyne, vocalize as a sing. *ישמיענו*, to agree with *יניד*. Both verbs, it should be noted, are impfs., and so describe an action in either the present or the immediate future. In the first stichos of this second distich *זאח*, a monosyllabic word, must be linked with its governing verb, *יניד*, and the two words read as a single beat. Thus closely linked to the verb, *זאח* has the force of a pronominal suffix. Its antecedent must be some momentous event very soon to happen. This can be only, as the prophet, speaking in the name of Yahweh, develops in detail later in the address, Israel's deliverance from exile in Babylonia and its restoration to its ancestral land. Obviously the prophet is here once again resorting to his favorite, hortatory device, a supposititious court trial between the rival contestants, Yahweh and the foreign gods, to determine who is the one, true, universal God. And the test is once again, who of the gods, or of the supposed gods, can foretell future events. And of course, just as in every court trial, each side must have its witnesses to substantiate its case. The *ו* of both *וראשונות* and *וישמעו* connotes contrast, "or," rather than the customary "and." For *צדק* in the *qal*, "to show oneself to be in the right (through court-of-law processes)" cf. 43.26; 45.25. Ps. 143.2; Job 40.8, and *passim*.

At this point in the address 44.10, would be fittingly followed by 40.20, 19; 41.6-7; 44.9, 11 ff. These verses will be commented on in this order.

44.10. *ופסל* is here, just as again in 40.19, the object of *נסך*; therefore the two words can not be separated and assigned to different stichoi. Accordingly the v. at first glance seems to be a 3/2/2, certainly, as has already been stated, an awkward, uneuphonious meter and not convincingly attested. In all likelihood a word has been lost in the second stichos; and inasmuch as the natural object of *נסך* is *מסכה*, and since also the combined term, *פסל ומסכה*, occurs frequently as the designation of a single idol (cf. Deut. 27.15; Jud. 17.3, 4), particularly when just as, as seems to be the case here, the idol is made of wood overlaid with metal plating, we may very well supply *מסכה* here following *פסל*. The v. thus becomes a 3/3/2 tristich, quite a common meter. Certainly 40.19-20 do not fit in where they stand now in *MT*, for quite plainly they interrupt the continuity of thought between vv. 18 and 21, while they themselves have little or no connection with the thought of the address in 40.9-21. On the other hand, they fit in perfectly, both as to thought and metrical form, here, where we have inserted them in this address. However, the order of the two vv. should be inverted, since v. 19 clearly continues the thought effectively begun in v. 20, viz. the manner of making the idol. The two introductory words of 40.20, *המסכן חרומה*, are disturbing in many ways. They are absolutely untranslatable and likewise can not by any possible means be fitted into the meter. Both *G* and *S* omit the two words; and that must be our procedure likewise. With these two words omitted, the text acquires perfect order and the v. becomes a normal 3/3/3 tristich. The v. describes quite graphically the first step in the making of this idol, viz. the selection of a suitable tree to form its body or base. The subj. of *יבחר* and of *יבקש* is of course the man who is having the idol made for his use. *ימות* must of course be interpreted as reflexive in meaning.

40.19. Vocalize *ורחוקות*; cf. I Kings 6.21; Ezek. 7.23; coming from the stem, *רחק*, "to bind," the word can mean only "links, joints." The second *צורה* should

of course be emended to יצור, to accord with ירקעו. The subj. of both verbs is צורף in the second stichos of the tristich. The v. clearly implies that at least two skilled artisans participate in the fashioning of the idol, the wood-worker, the חרש (cf. v. 13), and the metal-worker, the צורף. The realization of this fact paves the way to the linking of 41.6-7 with 40.19-20, a procedure proposed already by Duhm and Cheyne.

41.6-7. These two vv., describing a single procedure, and all manifestly in the same meter, actually constitute a $3/3$ triple-distich. In v. 6 for יעורו read the sing., יעור, to agree with יאמר. The subj. of both verbs is of course איש. In the second stichos of the first distich of v. 7 there is plainly one word too many for the meter; likewise there is confusion in the thought. Certainly not פעם but פטיש must be the object of הולם; apparently פטיש was displaced from its original to its present position in the distich, and then the corruption, פעם, crept into its place. פעם is traditionally translated "anvil" (so V, S, Rashi and Kimchi), but inasmuch as the word would have this connotation in only this one place in the entire Bible, this interpretation may well be rejected. The v. seems to imply that not merely two, but rather four different artisans participate in the fabrication of this particular idol. It is noteworthy that in the first distich of v. 7 אח is used with two nouns which seem undetermined, since neither has the article. But one stylistic characteristic of this address is that it dispenses with the use of the article constantly, where in ordinary prose the article would be indispensable, and yet the noun is determined, quite as if the article were there (in addition to these two vv. cf. 44.12-13).

44.9. This v. is plainly a double-distich. The first distich is a $4/3$, and we would expect the second distich to be a $4/3$ likewise; but it is anything but this; in fact in its present form it has no recognizable meter whatever. The vss. too seem to have had trouble with this half-verse, and to have in consequence paraphrased the entire v. rather than translating it literally. It should be noted that both G and S link the last two words of this v. with v. 10, quite as if they were not integral in v. 9. Moreover in v. 11, which in our rearrangement of the text follows immediately upon v. 9, יבשו occurs in its proper place; accordingly we may regard the word here at the end of v. 9 as a dittograph, and we may also see in this fact further evidence that in the original text v. 11 did indeed follow immediately upon v. 9, just as we have rearranged them. Accordingly these last two words of v. 9 may be elided as not a part of the original text. But the elision of these two words by no means solves all the difficulties of this second distich. The presence of ויעידהם after ומה leads us to expect a nominal sentence here; but if so, the predicate, stating just who the witnesses to the vanity and impotence of these idols may be, is missing altogether. Furthermore, those who neither see nor know ought are certainly not these idol-makers, as the text in its present form seems to imply, but are rather the idols themselves. Unquestionably the clause, בלייראו ובלידעו, should be transferred to follow immediately after בליועילו; moreover, since the negative quality of these idols is strongly stressed here, each of these בל's is emphatic and so must receive a full beat. Accordingly this transferred clause consists of four emphatic words, and in its new position constitutes the four-beat first stichos of the second distich for which we are seeking. The חמודים of the idol-makers are of course the idols themselves, the products of their hands. And plainly this word is the antecedent of the pronominal suffix of ויעידהם. Who then are the witnesses of the impotence and vanity of the gods whom these idols represent, and whom these gods are challenged in v. 9 to produce? The answer to this question will provide the missing predicate of the nominal sentence to which we have referred. It can be only one possible word.

Both *G* and *S* mention "their makers" in their versions of the v.; accordingly supply עֲשִׂיהֶם to complete the nominal sentence. The very artisans who, with such pride, fashioned the idols of these gods are the very ones who must testify of them that they can neither see nor know aught, that they are utterly impotent and worthless. And this reconstruction furnishes for us the second 3-beat stichos of this 4/3 distich. As thus reconstructed the thought of the double-distich is compelling indeed, and is certainly essential to the effective presentation of the theme of this address.

11. For חֲבָרִיו read חֲבָרָיו (cf. Hos. 4.17). The antecedent of the suffix must be פָּסַל in v. 9. The word must connote here "its associates," those who are linked to it in any way, its priests and its worshipers. The context requires that for וְחָרְשֵׁים we read וְחָרְשֵׁיו, with the suffix, and also that for the completely meaningless מַאֲדָם we read מַאֲדָמִים, "are made to blush."

12. This v. too abounds in difficulties. For מַעֲצָר read, with Torrey, יַעֲצֵב, for עֲצֵב, "to shape or make with the hands," cf. Job 10.8; moreover, עֲצָבִים were frequently, if not normally, made of metal; cf. Hos. 8.4; Ps. 115.4; 135.15. The v. is obviously in the 3-beat meter. Accordingly in the second distich of the initial tristich of the v. there is one word too many; therefore omit וּפָעַל, a verb which occurs again in the very next stichos, and is here not only quite unnecessary, but is even disturbing. בִּפְחָם, "with glowing coal-fire," can hardly be the proper word here; in its stead, with only a rearrangement of the consonants, read בְּקַפְפָּה, "with bellows" (cf. Jer. 6.29), and thus recover a proper and natural parallel to מִמְּקֻבּוֹת. Certainly we should, with *G*, insert לוֹ after כֵּה; the word was probably lost through haplography, of either sound or form, with the next word. For וְיָעֵף read of course וְיִיעָף, from יָעַף, "to be weary." The 'athnah should be set at כֹּחַ instead of in its present position. This would make the v. a 3/3/3, 3/3. The tristich would then describe the various procedures of the goldsmith in the making of the idol, while the distich would record the physical distress which he experiences as the result of his eagerness to complete his supposedly consecrated task, and from which, impliedly, the idol, or the god whom it is meant to represent, is unable to relieve him.

13. The v. is manifestly a 4/4 double-distich. But in the second distich there are two words too many; plainly the first יִתְאָדָרוּ anticipates the second, at the end of the stichos and in its proper place, while similarly יַעֲשֶׂהוּ anticipates the same word at the beginning of the second distich; the omission of these two superfluous words makes the picture here presented clear and vivid and likewise recovers the meter of the distich. Correspondingly the first stichos of the second distich lacks one beat; also the mention of the name of a tool of some kind would be appropriate immediately after וְיַעֲשֶׂהוּ and would add something to the vividness of the picture here; accordingly supply בַּחֲרָט, "with graving-tool" (cf. Ex. 32.4). Finally it seems proper for כִּתְפָאָרָה to read כִּתְאָר, certainly an emendation of minor degree. For יֵשֶׁב בֵּית instead of יֵשֶׁב בְּבֵית cf. Gen. 4.20; 25.27; Jer. 36.22; Ps. 22.4.

14. Numerous difficulties are present in this v. also. For לִכְרָה read, with *V*, לִכְרָה, as the context suggests. Vocalize וְיִקַּח, as the context requires. Certainly the v. contemplates the selection and cutting down of only one tree; therefore for אֲרוֹס read אֶרֶז, to agree with the mention of the single tree, which follows. This is the only instance of the word, חֲרִיב, accordingly, with Grätz, Cheyne and Marti, emend to חֲרִיב (cf. Isa. 41.19; 60.13). The latter seems to have been, like the אֶרֶז and אֵלֶּן (cf. Gen. 35.8; II Kings 14.9; Hos. 4.13; Amos 2.9) a tree of large size and also suitable for sacred uses. Emend וְיִמְצָא to וְיִמְצָא, with merely a simple rearrangement of the consonants. As the text now reads, this verb has no object; accordingly for בְּעִיִּיעָר read, as indeed the context suggests, עָץ מִיעָר (cf. Jer. 10.3).

For the meaningless ארן, following a suggestion of *G*, read אל; for the ארזי אל cf. Ps. 80.11. The thought of the v. seems to be that only a tree of outstanding size and appearance, one which, so it seems, a god must have planted, and had planted for the express purpose that, when it reached its full growth, it might be made into an idol, an image of him, would be suitable for this purpose. This implies, in turn, that in the minds of the wood-carver and all concerned the tree possesses from the very first some quality of divinity. The v. is obviously a 3/3, 4/4.

15. This v. is a 3/3/3, 3/3, as are also vv. 12, 18-19a, 19bc. In all these passages the tristich comes first and expresses one idea, while the distich which follows expresses the contrasting idea. Here and again in v. 19bc the tristich describes the profane acts which the idol-maker performs, all for his own physical comfort, while the distich records his procedure in fulfilling his religious purpose. By describing the acts for physical comfort with three verbs and also by stating this first, while he describes the religious procedure with only two verbs and likewise puts it in second place, the prophet suggests, with biting satire, that considerations of physical comfort come first in the mind of the idol-maker. This is the implication again in v. 19bc. And a further implication of both passages is that in the life and thought of both idol-makers and idol-worshippers the shade of difference in the making of an idol between the sacred and the profane is infinitesimal and almost meaningless, and that the transition from the one to the other is easy, quick and of no import, further evidence that in the idol itself there is no real divinity or sanctity. מהם here is certainly misleading and not original; for it clearly implies by its plu. suffix that the idol-maker has in his possession quite a number of trees, whereas the context implies clearly that he possesses and works with only a single tree, a part of which he uses for the satisfaction of his physical needs and comfort and out of the remainder of which he makes the idol. מהם may well have sprung up here as a corrupt dittograph of ויהם. Instead of ויקח read, with Klostermann, ויקדח; and inasmuch as קח always has אש as its object, supply this word here in place of מהם; this completes the second stichos of the tristich. Following a hint from DSIa, which reads או for the second אף, read here או for the first אף. The second אף is practically indispensable since it, in its customary usage, introduces the contrasting thought. Vocalize ויקדח, ויהם, ויטחור, since all these verbs indicate action in the present or the immediate future. For עשהו read with *V*, יעשה. Inasmuch as it must be read with ויסד as a single beat, it is probably well to read for למו the shorter and normal form, לו.

16. Vv. 16-17 together constitute a single thought-unit after the now established pattern. V. 16, another 3/3/3, 3/3, describes the physical, profane procedure of the idol-maker, while v. 17, a 3/3 double-distich, describes, again in briefer form, his religious procedure. In v. 16 the second and third stichoi of the tristich are badly confused. For this second חצי read a hint from DSIa and *G*, with Klostermann and other scholars, נחלי. Furthermore, following another hint from *G* and also as the sense requires, it is necessary to invert the order of the two verbs, יאכל, and also, as the sense again requires and as DSIa and *G* again suggest, for יאכל to read יאכל. The final clause in the sentence may well be interpreted, with Dillmann, "I see a fire," and the very sight brings assurance, relaxation and comfort.

17. This v. is manifestly a 3/3 double-distich. The first stichos has one word too many for the meter; and since לאל is superfluous and even a bit disturbing, it may well be removed from the text. Also עשה should be emended to יעשה, to agree in tense and meaning with the verbs both preceding and following. Likewise the suffix, י, should be detached from לפסלו and prefixed, as a ו' connective, to the

following word, ויסגר. With these relatively simple emendations what was undoubtedly the original of the v. is recovered.

18. As has been already indicated, vv. 18-19a constitute a 3/3/3, 3/3 metrical unit, while v. 19bc constitutes a similar unit, in each of which the tristich presents a primary thought, which the distich supplements, frequently, as in v. 19bc, by presenting the contrasting thought. In v. 18 vocalize גרען again, so that this verb may agree in tense and meaning with the other verbs with which it is so closely linked. It is not altogether certain whether the subj. of the two plu. verbs in this sentence is the idols or the various idol-makers. But inasmuch as v. 19 speaks of the single idol-maker, it seems better to regard the idol-makers collectively as the subj. of the two verbs in v. 18. Moreover, while we might well speak of the idol's eyes, we could hardly speak of its heart or mind. For טח it is of course necessary to read טחו, since the subj. is plu. Also it is plain that a word is missing at the end of the third stichos of the tristich, clearly a verb in chiasmic parallelism with טחו at the beginning of the preceding stichos; accordingly supply either כבדו or חזקו, preferably the former (cf. Morgenstern, "The Loss of Words, etc.," *HUCA* XXV [1954], 68 f.).

19. The text of v. 19a is in order, but it is necessary of course to read ולאדעק and ולאיתבונק, each as a single beat. The prefixing of לא to a noun in this manner has much the same practical effect as the English negative prefix, "un-." In v. 19b β it seems wise to omit ואף as a dittograph of the first letters of ואפית. It seems best to interpret לבול in v. 19c in the same sense as the corresponding term of Talmudic Hebrew, probably vocalized בול, meaning "a clod; a waste, useless piece." The designation here by the idol-maker of his idol as a תועבה, "an abomination," is especially meaningful at this point in the prophet's development of his theme, for it is the idol-maker's acknowledgement that this idol is false and worthless, and it paves the way readily for the next ensuing thought. Attention was called in the seminar to the fact that in vv. 19c-20 we have in part the same succession of verbs, used to describe the procedure of the idol-maker in dealing with his idol, as in v. 17, viz. עשה, סגר, אמר and הציל. Two verbs, however, in v. 15b, are missing here, viz. שחח and פלל. The same sequence occurs also in part in v. 15b. Moreover, the verb, סגר, occurs in the entire Bible only four times, all in Deutero-Isaiah, three times in this one address (44.15, 17, 19) and again in 46.6. Furthermore, in all these four passages, with the single exception of 44.19, it is regularly followed by שחח. It was therefore suggested that the same complete sequence should be expected here, and that accordingly we should supply a third stichos to the v., reading ואשחחח ואלי ואחפלל. This would make v. 19c a 3/3/3 tristich. Furthermore, it does seem that the addition of these three words would complete the thought here expressed in most effective manner and likewise would strengthen considerably the import of the truth which the idol-maker must acknowledge, that this idol, to which he had not only bowed down in formal worship, but to which he had also prayed for actual deliverance from the evils which beset him personally, is only a תועבה, a vain and useless thing, totally unable to do aught for its devotees. Moreover, with this stichos added, this testimony of the idol-maker with regard to his god, would end in three 3/3/3 tristichs, certainly a most effective climax to the statement, which, as the witness for his god, he finds himself compelled to offer. Moreover, v. 20 commences with two words which are utterly meaningless and are also metrically disturbing where they stand. However, they might well represent a textual corruption of this missing, final stichos of v. 19c, misplaced to the beginning of the following v. And indeed, even though הו רעה no way suggests an original reading ואלי ואשחחח ואפר,

may very well have resulted from a corruption of אהפלל. All in all the emendation has very much to commend it and may accordingly be accepted, though with some reservation.

20. With the initial two words thus disposed of, the remainder of this v. is in perfect textual order. In the final stichos of the tristich ולא must be linked to אמר as a single beat; but inasmuch as the first לא, in the preceding stichos, has been stressed by receiving a full beat, this procedure with ולא is natural and customary.

42.17. This v. is definitely out of place in its present position in *MT*, since it seriously interrupts the close unity of vv. 16 and 18. On the other hand it fits perfectly here and, in effective, climactic manner, provides the definitive judgment upon all idol-worshippers. The v. is obviously a distich; and inasmuch as v. 17b consists of four words and so forms a 4-beat stichos, we would expect v. 17a to constitute a similar stichos, and the distich to thus be in the 4/4 meter, a proper and dignified meter for the formulation of a court judgment. But in this first stichos, as it stands, there are plainly two words too many; accordingly omit the altogether superfluous יבשו בשח. Also vocalize קפסל, to agree with למסכה and to accord with the generalizing import of the judgment here pronounced. Likewise, as the sing. antecedent of the pronoun, מסכה, and also the sing. pred., אלהיו, indicate, אהם should be emended to the sing., אהה.

44.21. Having now demonstrated the complete unreality and utter futility of idols and of the gods whom they represent, the prophet, speaking of course in the name of Yahweh, now definitively proved to be the only true God, the one world-God, turns directly to Israel and brings home to it the full import of this now established truth. The v. is a 3/3 double-distich. But in the second stichos of the second distich there is obviously one word too many. Accordingly omit the altogether superfluous and weakening ישראל תושני, a *nif'al* with an object, is of course impossible; accordingly read, with Klostermann, Cheyne and Marti, תושני (cf. Deut. 32.15).

22. The thought of this v. might seem to fit in well at this point; but it seems to fit in better after 43.25, near the end of this address; accordingly we have transposed it thither.

23. This v. is certainly not integral in this address. It has all the characteristics of a psalmodic interpolation, probably linked in some way with the reading of this section of this address in the Synagogue as a part of the liturgy.

24. Inasmuch as here מבטן can modify only ויצרך, it is necessary to read, with *S* and in accordance with the obvious import of the clause, בבטן. And for מי אהי it is necessary for the same reason to read, with *V*, ואין אהי, and likewise to read these two words together as one beat for the sake of the meter. Likewise יהוה אנכי must be interpreted as a variant form of the name of the Deity (cf. Morgenstern, "Deutero-Isaiah's Terminology for 'Universal God,'" *JBL* LXII [1943], 269-280), and so be read as a single beat.

25. *G*, *V* and *S* all interpret בדים as "diviners, soothsayers"; unquestionably they read here ברים, a Hebraization of the Babylonian *bārû*, "divining-priest"; this is certainly the correct reading here. Also, with *G* and *S*, for וקסמים read וקסמיהם, "their divinations; their magical acts." Both וקסמיהם and ודעתם, being nouns, each with a prefix and a pronominal suffix, should be read as two beats, and thus make this v. a 3/3 double-distich.

26. As has already been indicated (above, p. 51), v. 26b, which has no thought-unity whatever with v. 26a, and also vv. 27-28 have been assigned to different positions in Deutero-Isaiah. V. 26a alone is integral in this position. The text is in perfect order.

43.10. The trial scene continues, and whereas the witnesses of the false gods, who had to testify to their unreality and utter impotence, were the very makers of these gods, Yahweh now declares that Israel, the people, are His witnesses, whose duty it is, as His chosen servant, to testify of Him and of His true, eternal and universal character and power to all the world, that He is the Existent One, the one and only true world-God. But before Israel can perform this task adequately and convincingly, they must themselves first learn to know Him, to understand Him and to have complete faith in Him. This is the theme of v. 10ab, a 3/3 double distich. Actually v. 10c is a unit in thought with v. 11, and with it forms a second 3/3 double-distich, the theme of which is the absolute unity and eternity of Yahweh as the sole world-God. The full import of the declaration in v. 10c, that prior to Yahweh no god had ever been formed, nor will there be any god to succeed or replace Him, becomes clear when we remember that both the Eastern and the Western Semites cherished the myth that the world had in the course of time passed through three stages or eras, during each of which a different god was supreme over gods and men. Babylonian mythology, with which these Jewish exiles were undoubtedly familiar, told of the successive eras of Anu, Bel and Ea, while the Western Semites told of the eras of 'Elyon or 'Eloah, Ba'al Shamem or Shaddai and 'El (cf. Morgenstern, "The Divine Triad in Biblical Mythology," *JBL* LXIV [1945], 15-38). V. 10c affirms, in significant contrast to this tradition or belief, that Yahweh, and He alone, had been God, the only God, from the very beginning of time, and would continue so until its very end. Here in this v. and again in 44.21, in our reconstruction of this address preceding this utterance by only a few sentences, the prophet speaks of Israel as Yahweh's servant. Furthermore, he affirms that Israel's service is to be Yahweh's witness, to bear testimony of Him, not only in the court procedure which the prophet envisions in this address, but at all times and to all the peoples of the entire world. Plainly the character of Israel's "service" is beginning to take shape in the prophet's mind, although it still seems to be somewhat undefined. And before Israel can testify of Yahweh truly and effectively, it must itself first learn to know Him as He really is and must also come to believe in Him with constant and unshakable conviction. Only with such faith on its part can Israel testify of Yahweh unto the nations that He is the one and only God, and that besides Him there is, for the nations as well as for Israel, no other god and no other possible savior. Such is the thought set forth in the two 3/3 double-distichs in vv. 10-11.

11. יהוה here must be rendered "God" rather than as the name of the Deity (cf. Blank, "Studies in Deutero-Isaiah," *HUCA* XV [1940], 14-18). To translate it here merely "Yahweh" would make the passage utterly meaningless. The likelihood is that the prophet here and elsewhere interprets the name as a *qal* formation of היה, "to be," precisely as does the relatively late interpolation in Ex. 3.14, manifestly dependent upon Deutero-Isaiah (cf. Morgenstern, "The Elohist Narrative in Exodus 3.1-15," *AJSL* XXXVII [1921], 242-262). Thus interpreted, יהוה would mean "He Who Is" or "The One Who Is," and would be practically synonymous with the prophet's other, very frequent designation of the Deity by the pronoun, הוא, "He," i. e. "The One Who is; the Ever-Existent One."

12. V. 12 is manifestly a 4/4/4 tristich; but in each stichos there is some textual disarrangement. In the first stichos the thought sequence implicit in the present order of the three verbs is surprising and even disturbing. Repeatedly in the various addresses of the prophet יהוה is followed immediately by השמיע (41.22, 26; 42.9; 43.9; 48.3, 20) or the reverse (44.8; 45.21), without any other verb intervening. We expect the same sequence here. Undoubtedly והושעתי should be transposed to follow

והשמעתי; the displacement of the two verbs was due undoubtedly to their close similarity in their written form. As it stands now, the second stichos has only three beats; plainly a word is missing here. Moreover, the thought here expressed by the present wording, "And among you there is no stranger," is surprising and meaningless indeed. Accordingly before *ו* supply *אל* (cf. Ps. 81.10; also Ps. 44.21). This recovers the required fourth beat for the stichos. The third stichos has in its present form two words too many; accordingly, with *G*, omit the altogether superfluous and even somewhat disturbing *נאם יהוה* and thus recover the original 4-beat text of the stichos. It is altogether possible that the prophet pronounced *והשמעתי* with the accent upon the final syllable of the word. In such case the *ו* would be the *ו* consecutive, and we would have to translate the first stichos, "I have foretold, and I have proclaimed, and I shall work salvation." Either interpretation of the clause is possible, but of the two that which we here propose seems to us to be more probably the thought which the prophet intended to express.

13. For *מיום* with the connotation, "from today on," cf. 48.7 and its note. The implication of this *v.* seems to be that from this day of this court scene, in which Yahweh has definitely proved that the gods of the nations are non-existent, impotent unrealities and that He alone is God, the one God throughout the entire universe, it should be clear to all that there can be no opposition to His will and purpose from any source whatever, either human or divine.

14. This *v.* in its entirety is utterly meaningless and even untranslatable with any degree of certainty. Under no condition does it fit in either here or elsewhere in the address. It should accordingly be omitted as an altogether inexplicable intrusion.

15. Further and decisive evidence that *v.* 14 is an intrusion here is to be found in the fact that *v.* 15 continues directly the thought of *v.* 13. Actually the two *vv.* together constitute a single sentence, in which *אני* in the first stichos of *v.* 13 is the only subj. Metrically the sentence falls into two parts, in the first of which, the 3/3/3 tristich of *v.* 13, the universal character of Yahweh's divinity is stressed, while in the second part, the 3/3 distich of *v.* 15, His peculiar relationship to Israel, despite His universal character, is emphasized. From today on not only is He the one, sole God of the entire world and of all nations and all mankind therein, but He is also at the same time Israel's "peculiar possession," the primary connotation of *קדוש*, its Holy One and its King. *אני יהוה* in *v.* 15 must be interpreted as another instance of the prophet's characteristic use of this compound term as the name of the Deity. His designation of Yahweh by the title, Israel's King, undoubtedly indicates that he conceives of restored Israel, no longer as a political entity, a kingdom ruled over by a king of Davidic descent, but rather as a religious unit or community, whose true head and sole ruler and king is Yahweh. There is also the implication, as we have already pointed out, of his applying to Cyrus the title, *משיח יהוה*, "Yahweh's Anointed One," hitherto borne, with the single exceptions of Saul and Jehu, only by kings of Judah of Davidic descent. The complete sentence implies further that in its relationship to Yahweh as contrasted with that of the other nations and peoples to Him as the sole world-God, Israel, as Yahweh's chosen people, created by Him for an especial mission, as His servant, is closest to Him, closer by far than any other people.

42.23. Here we would insert 42.23, for we feel that it fits in here better than in its present position in *MT*. With 43.16 a new section of the address begins, which announces Yahweh's impending deliverance of Israel from exile in Babylonia and its return, through the intervening desert, with all its natural dangers and hardships

overcome by Yahweh's loving solicitude for His people, to its ancestral homeland. To this section, rich in promise, 42.23 is indeed a fitting introduction. **לאחור**, literally, "to what is behind," i. e. "behind the present moment (as it draws near)," to events of the future (cf. 41.23), just as its antithetical phrase, **לפנים**, means "events of the past." The events of the future here referred to are of course Israel's impending deliverance in all its details.

43.16. For **מים עזים** as a synonym for **ים** cf. Neh. 9.11. Vv. 16-17 refer quite plainly to the tradition of the crossing of the Red Sea with divine help and deliverance at the time of the exodus from Egypt. This is confirmed by the charge in vv. 18-19 not to recall the events of the past but rather to think of the new deliverance which Yahweh will effect for Israel, this time, however, not through the sea but rather through the desert.

17. **עוז** occurs elsewhere only in Ps. 24.8, where it has adjectival meaning, "strong; a strong being or person." This meaning hardly fits here; rather we expect a word which would parallel **חיל**, "might; army." Accordingly vocalize **וְעוֹז**, "strength" (cf. 42.5; Ps. 78.4; 145.6), and give it a connotation which parallels **חיל**, "army"; accordingly render it "troop." As both thought and meter demand, **יחדו** must be incorporated into the first distich, as the final word of the second stichos thereof. This makes v. 17 a 3/3 double distich.

18. The "former things" are of course the traditional deliverance from Egypt; the "new things" are then the promised and now narrowly impending deliverance from Babylonian exile and restoration to ancestral land. For a similar contrasting of the "former things" with the "new things," about to be announced by Yahweh through the medium of the prophet, cf. 42.9. The v. practically says that there is no need longer for Israel to look back to its distant past for instances and evidence of Yahweh's solicitude for it and power to protect and deliver it, for He is now about to do a new thing in its behalf, to work a new deliverance for it, besides which that from Egypt in ancient times will pale into insignificance.

19. It must be admitted that **הלוֹא**, preceding **תִּרְעוּהָ**, is a surprising and rather awkward particle. Quite significantly *G* omits it. Similarly **אֵף** at the beginning of the second distich, preceding **אֲשֵׁים**, is equally surprising and awkward; and, significantly again, *V* omits it. Apparently only one particle stood here, and that too in its proper position before **תִּרְעוּהָ**, and this could have been, as in fact all the vss. seem to have read, only **אֵף**. Apparently **אֵף** became displaced in some way from its original position, and then some editor, sensing the necessity of a particle in this position to introduce the new thought, supplied **הלוֹא**. The manifest implication of **עַתָּה** here is "now; in the immediate future." For **נִרְדּוּהוּ** read, following the suggestion of DSIa, (actually the manuscript is blurred at this point, but it seems to read **נִרְבּוּהוּ** rather than **נִרְבּוּם** as transcribed by Burrows, in his edition of the text with photographs of the manuscript). This emendation recovers the close parallelism between this v. and v. 16. Finally a word essential to the 3-beat meter of the v. is missing at the end of the second distich; accordingly supply **אֲתָן** and thus recover a close, chiastic parallelism between the two stichoi of this second distich of the v.

20. Inasmuch as the prophet is here announcing the actions which Yahweh is about to take in the immediate future in order to effect this new deliverance of His people, for **נַחֲתִי** read, with DSIa, **אֲתָן**. Also after **בִּישְׁמֹן** supply **אֲשֵׁים**, to provide the verb obviously missing at the end of the second stichos of the second distich and essential to completing the 3/3 meter and also to providing the expected chiastic parallelism between the two stichoi of the distich. As it stands now the v. is a 3/3, 3/3/3. But it seems better to prefix the final stichos of this v. to the next v., since

the thought-linkage is closer with this arrangement. That would make v. 21 a $3/3/2$, which is certainly in this setting a more effective meter than a mere $3/2$, as v. 21 would be otherwise without this rearrangement. Also this makes v. 20 a double $3/3$ distich. Moreover, with this rearrangement we can account for the loss of אֲשִׁים at the end of the second distich of the v., for it would then be another instance of the loss of a word at the end of a line of Biblical poetry.

21. Vv. 20-21 together voice a significant thought and pave the way to the section of the address which follows. They say that if the beasts of the desert honor Yahweh for providing water for them amply in their normally water-poor habitat, then how much the more should Israel praise and worship Yahweh for the marvellous deliverances and manifold other bounties which He has wrought for it throughout its long history, and this all the more so since He had actually brought Israel into being as His chosen people that it might recite His praise, and this too in the hearing of all the world, so that all nations and peoples might come to comprehend and believe in His oneness, His universal power and His saviorship, and might turn to Him in reverence. But, as the vv. immediately following relate in graphic manner, just this throughout its entire history, beginning with its very first progenitor, Israel had failed to do.

22. Note the unusual position and therefore the emphatic effect of כִּי אֱמִית here can be understood best as the כִּי of certainty, "verily." For יָעַב, "to grow weary of something," cf. Isa. 47.12; 63.8; Jer. 45.3; Ps. 6.7; 69.4.

23. This v., like vv. 22 and 24, all of which have a common theme, viz. Israel's disloyalty to Yahweh, is a $4/3$ double distich. However, in the first stichos of the first distich there is manifestly one word too many for the meter. Accordingly omit the altogether unnecessary and even awkward and somewhat disturbing שֶׁ; with this elision the parallelism between the two stichoi of the distich becomes much more manifest and effective. It should be noted that not only is אֱמִית in v. 22 emphatic, but this is true of all 1st pers. pronominal suffixes throughout the three vv. of this strophe. For Yishai read, with DSIa, וְיִבְחֵךְ, as indeed the context requires. In the first stichos of the second distich of the v. הֵעִבְדֵךְ must receive two beats; here this verb can mean only "I did not cause thee to worship" or "demand that thou worship."

24. Again in the first stichos of the first distich there is one word too many for the meter; accordingly omit the altogether superfluous and rather banal בְּכֶסֶף. With this omission the word-play of קִנֵּה קִנָּה becomes more vivid and effective. הִרְוִיתִי very properly takes a double-object; literally translated therefore, "and the fat of thy sacrifices thou didst not make me drink to satiety." אִךְ here, with the connotation, "instead," has a significant meaning and so must receive a full beat; with this and also by giving בְּחֶסֶד two beats, the expected 4-beat measure of the first stichos of the second distich is achieved. In the second stichos of this same distich בְּעֹתֶיךָ must likewise be given two beats. In vv. 22-24 the prophet does not represent Yahweh as charging Israel with not offering sacrifices. On the contrary, the vv. imply clearly that Israel, and of course the Israel in exile, did offer sacrifices, and this even in abundance; but they were not offered to Yahweh. Accordingly they must have been offered consciously and directly to other gods; and these other gods could have been only the Babylonian deities. This is the crowning instance and proof of Israel's faithlessness to Yahweh.

25. This v. is certainly out of place at this point in this address, midway in Yahweh's denunciation of Israel for its faithlessness to Him. It fits far better after 44.8, whither we have transposed it.

26. הוֹכִירֵנִי, literally "cause Me to remember," is tantamount to "challenge

Me." Yahweh magnanimously offers Israel the privilege of presenting its case first in the debate between them, in which Israel would presumably have the opportunity to vindicate itself of the charge of faithlessness to Him. But impliedly it can say nothing at all in defense of itself, and so, in the very next two vv., Yahweh resumes His denunciation of Israel and utters His final condemnation of it.

27. By "thy first father" the prophet certainly has in mind, as practically all scholars are agreed, Jacob, and not Abraham; note the frequency with which he speaks of Israel as the posterity of Jacob (44.5; 45.19; 48.1). No sin of Abraham is recorded in the Bible; but the sin of Jacob may well have been his supplanting of Esau (cf. Hos. 12.3-5). For *ומליכך* both *G* and *S* read either *ומלכך* or *ומשליך*. Inasmuch as the former of these two words represents the lesser textual corruption, we prefer to regard it as original here.

28. For syntactical reasons it is necessary to read *שרי הקדש*. For *ואתנה* read, with DSIa, *ואתן*; there is no reason whatever for the enclitic *ה'* here; it may well, however, be the result of the misplacement of the article of *הקדש*. Just who these "holy princes" might be is not clear, but the most probable hypothesis would be that they were the priests of the Temple, who, in pre-exilic Judah, may well have stood second in rank and authority only to the king. *לחרם* in parallelism with *לנרופים* is somewhat surprising; and inasmuch as the regular parallel to *נרופים* is *חרפה* (cf. Isa. 51.7; Ezek. 5.15; Zeph. 2.8), we should undoubtedly emend *לחרם* here to *לחרפה*.

44.6. Insert, with DSIa and *S*, *שמו* after *צבאות* (cf. 47.4; 48.2); the addition of this word restores the original 3-beat stichos. Here once again (cf. 41.21; 43.15) the prophet applies to Yahweh the title, "King of Israel." Outside of these three Deutero-Isaianic passages this designation of Yahweh occurs, in all the prophetic writings, only in Zeph. 3.15. The import of this title for Yahweh we have considered in our discussion of 43.15. By *יהוה צבאות*, "Yahweh of Hosts," originally the formal designation of the god of the ark at Shiloh and then, after the transfer of the ark to Jerusalem and its eventual setting up in the Temple, the regular designation of the Yahweh of the Temple (cf. Eissfeldt, *Yahweh Zebaoth* [1950]), Deutero-Isaiah can mean, both here and in 48.2, only "Yahweh of the Hosts (of men)," i. e. Yahweh, the universal God. When, in the second half of this v., the prophet affirms that Yahweh is both the first and the last and that besides Him there is no other god, he not only gives vigorous expression to the principle of the absolute eternity and universality of Yahweh but he also reverts to the idea implicit in 43.10, which we have already discussed. Inasmuch as in the first stichos of the distich the first *אני* has a full beat, *ואני*, which follows, can be slurred over and read as one beat with *אחרון*.

7. This v. abounds in textual difficulties, all of which, however, in practical agreement with Torrey, can be resolved quite readily. The v. undoubtedly continues the enumeration of the attributes of Yahweh. Accordingly for *יגידו* read the sing., *יגיד*, in agreement with the other verbs in the sentence and the general context. *לי* is certainly a corruption; for it DSIa reads *לוא*, which is equivalent to the customary *לו*. However, it seems well to transpose *לוא* from the end of the v., where it is both meaningless and metrically disturbing, to this spot in place of *לי* of *MT*. Inasmuch as in Deutero-Isaiah, as we have already noted, *הוהו* is regularly followed by *השמיע*, we miss the latter word here, and this really doubly so since *יגיד* occurs twice in the v.; accordingly for the altogether meaningless and confusing *משומי* *עסיעולם* read, with simple rearrangement of the letters, *משמיע עולם*. With these relatively minor emendations the textual order of the v. is completely restored, and it becomes a 3/3 double-distich.

8. This is the only instance in Biblical Hebrew of a verb, *רהה*; accordingly

read, with DSIa, supported by *V* and *S*, חִירוֹא. The pronominal suffix appended to הַשְּׁמַעְתִּיךָ is unnecessary and even somewhat surprising; and since the parallel verb, וְהוֹדַחְתִּי, has no suffix at all, and also since the following 2nd pers. pronoun, and likewise the predicate noun are both plu., it seems wise to omit this suffix and read, with Duhm and others, מִהַשְּׁמַעְתִּי. The final stichos of the v. is textually completely disorganized. For וְאִין read, with Gordis (cited by G. R. Driver in "Notes on Isaiah," in *Von Ugarit nach Qumran: Festschrift für Otto Eissfeldt* [1958], 47), the interrogative particle, וְאִין (cf. I Sam. 21.9; Ps. 139.4). Emend צור to, in form closely similar, עור, בְּלִירְעָתִי, absolutely meaningless in its present form, resembles closely מְבַלְעָדִי just preceding; moreover, the obvious parallelism between the two stichoi of the final distich of the v. requires a word here of similar meaning. In all likelihood that original parallel word was וְלֹחִי, for which some careless copyist wrote בְּלִירְעָדִי, which, in turn, was eventually corrupted to בְּלִירְעָתִי of *MT*. Here for the first time the prophet announces that Israel's task, as His servant, is to bear testimony of Him, to be His witnesses unto the peoples of the world. But he raises this thought here rather incidentally, quite as if it were only just beginning to take shape in his mind, and as if the wisdom or even the necessity of his defining just wherein Israel's service would lie had only now suggested itself to him.

43.25. הוּא, "the Ever Existent One," is in apposition with אֹנִי, which is, in turn, the subject of the sentence, as the pronominal suffix of לִמְעַנִּי indicates. The third stichos could easily be read with the required three beats by giving לֹא a full beat; however, it seems more in consonance with Hebrew linguistic procedure and also with DSIa to supply עור at the end of the stichos and of the tristich, and so to read לֹא־אֹנִי as one beat.

44.22. At this point, and following immediately upon 43.25, this v. fits in perfectly, and the two vv. combined, and in this connection it may be noted that together they constitute a 3/3/3 double-tristich, voice a significant thought, viz. the form which Ezekiel's doctrine of "for His name's sake," with which, as we have established, Deutero-Isaiah inaugurated his prophetic ministry, had come to assume after he had functioned as a prophet of Yahweh for a number of years, and after his message had assumed its own distinctive shape. Just as Ezekiel had predicted, Yahweh will restore Israel to its ancestral land; in fact, according to Deutero-Isaiah, the moment for this is narrowly impending. And in connection with this restoration, so Ezekiel proclaimed, Yahweh will give Israel a new heart, or, as Deutero-Isaiah now puts it, Yahweh will blot out all Israel's transgressions and its sins. He will remember no more, all this, in the thought of both prophets, so that henceforth Israel might be a sinless people, maintaining ever pure and faithful relations with Yahweh, its Holy One. According to Ezekiel, all this Yahweh will do לְמַעַן שְׁמוֹ, "for His name's sake," for the sake of His reputation, for the evaluation which the various nations will put upon Him in comparison with their own gods. But according to Deutero-Isaiah, at the present stage of the evolution of his message, Yahweh does this not at all for the sake of His reputation, for, as has just been demonstrated conclusively, there are no other gods who might be compared with Him. Instead Yahweh does all this לְמַעַן, "for Mine own sake," i. e. for the fulfillment of His universal purpose, and that purpose is the salvation of all mankind. For the fulfillment of this purpose Yahweh needs Israel as His servant, as the agent of His universal salvation. And for this purpose He purges Israel of all its past iniquities and removes its transgressions from His memory, no doubt with the added implication that henceforth, in its role as His servant, Israel will sin no more, will, so the prophet probably meant, even be incapable of sinning further. This is almost cer-

tainly the implication of Yahweh's appeal to Israel, "return to Me, for I have redeemed thee," i. e. "return to Me and be My people and My faithful, unerring servant forever!" From the significant use of this one word, *למעני*, it becomes clearly apparent how far Deutero-Isaiah has now advanced over his predecessor and prophetic mentor, Ezekiel, and over his own starting-point in his prophetic ministry, and has evolved his own distinctive message and enlarged his stature as a prophet of Yahweh. In the second stichos of the tristich a word, indispensable for the required 3-beat measure, is missing; accordingly supply *העברתי* at the end of the stichos, thus creating once again an effective chiasm with the preceding stichos.

44.1-5. These five vv. constitute the closing and, in a sense, the climactic strophe of this poetic address. They are cast throughout in the dignified and impressive 4/3 meter. Their theme is Yahweh's future, happy relations with Israel, His servant, now, or at least in the very near future to be, redeemed by Him and purged of all transgression and inclination to sin. They serve as a very effective conclusion to this long, closely unified and very powerful address.

44.1. *ועתה*, "so now," introduces very forcefully the application to Israel's future, as Yahweh's servant and chosen one, of the principle of divine forgiveness of its sins and His taking it to Himself once again as a cleansed people, set forth in 43.25 and 44.22, as we have reorganized this passage.

2. In the light of the use of the same expression, of which the prophet was apparently fond, in 44.24, in the text as we have reconstructed it, we should probably construe *מבטן* with *ויצרך* and emend it to *בבטן*. For *עיורך* it seems better, and in fact almost necessary, as the context requires, to read *עיורך*. The name here applied to Israel, *ישרון*, presents a problem. The name occurs in all Biblical writings only three other times, Deut. 32.15; 33.5, 26. In all of these passages the vss. interpret this word, not as a proper name, but rather as a descriptive term, an adjectival noun; nor is there agreement among them as to the meaning of the term. The thought is unavoidable, because of the similarity in form of the two words, that it is here a corruption of an original *ישראל*; but this same corruption would hardly have occurred in four different places. It is probably best then to retain the word as a secondary name or title of Israel. Plainly it is derived from the stem, *ישר*, "to be upright or straightforward," and designates Israel here as the "upright," or, as *V* renders it, "the most upright one." So interpreted, this title would be most appropriate for Israel at this point in this address, just after the prophet's pronouncement of Israel's purification by Yahweh from all its former sins and transgressions. In fact the use by the prophet of this new name for Israel at just this point suggests that by it he contemplates that new Israel, at which he had hinted previously, that new Israel, faithful and sinless, Yahweh's chosen servant. All this, because of lack of decisive evidence, must remain more or less hypothetical; but it certainly has much in its favor.

3. The v. is a double-distich, with plainly a close unity between the two distichs. And plainly too, even though *MT* does not bring this out adequately, a comparison is here set forth between the manner in which Yahweh provides abundant water for the thirsting soil and the manner in which He will now pour out His spirit upon Israel's offspring, His chosen servant. Accordingly insert, with *DSIa*, *כן* before the second *אצק* at the beginning of the second distich; moreover, this word is essential in order to complete the expected four beats of the first stichos of the second distich. And inasmuch as it must receive a full beat, it follows that the word voices an emphatic thought. But the appreciation of this vigorous comparison makes it imperative that the introductory word of the sentence, the word which must inau-

gurate this comparison, כִּי, at the beginning of the first distich, be emended to כְּאִשׁוּר. Furthermore, since the figure is the same in both stichoi of the first distich, viz. the pouring of streams of water upon the dry and thirsty soil, and since יִבְשֶׁה here as well as all other nouns connoting the earth or the soil are always fem., it is necessary for צִמָּה to read צִמָּה. In the respective distichs, עַל-יִבְשֶׁה and עַל-צִמָּה must each receive two beats.

4. As it stands now, v. 4 seems to be a 3/3; and even this would necessitate giving a full beat to the assuredly unemphatic בְּבִין. Also for בְּבִין, an altogether unparalleled union of two prepositions of like meaning, DSIa reads כְּבִין, which certainly accords far better with the figurative thought here being unfolded. Moreover, in the midst of this series of 4/3's we expect this v. to be a 4/3 also. Furthermore, in conjunction with זֶרַע and צִמָּה in the preceding distich, we miss here very decidedly the most common word for "offspring," viz. בְּנֵיךְ, "thy sons." And it is noteworthy that בְּנֵיךְ and כְּבִין have exactly the same letters; accordingly emend כְּבִין to בְּנֵיךְ and construe it as the subj. of זֶרַע. This necessitates the supplying of the preposition, כִּי, before חָצִיר, lost perhaps by haplography, coming, as it does, immediately after בְּנֵיךְ. This necessitates our supplying some phrase to follow חָצִיר, which would parallel עַל-יְבֵלֵי מִים and would suggest the place where grass grows most abundantly; accordingly, in the light of Ps. 147.8, supply עַל-הָרִים, or perhaps עַל-הָרִים. The parallelism between the two stichoi of the distich is thus made complete. And there can be no question that, with the v. thus reconstructed, the picture here set forth becomes far more vivid and both the literary and the hortatory effect are heightened greatly.

5. For יִקְרָא read, with a reflexive connotation, the *nif'al*, יִקְרָא (so Klostermann and others). Inasmuch as וַהּ at the beginning of the second stichos of the first distich is but the repetition of the וַהּ at the beginning of the first distich, it may be readily slurred over and read with יִקְרָא as a single beat. This recovers for the second stichos the expected three beats. For יָדוֹ read, as the context requires, בְּיָדוֹ; the בִּי was undoubtedly lost by haplography. For יִכְנֶה read the *pu'al*, יִכְנֶה; and inasmuch as in Biblical Hebrew the word occurs only in the *pi'el*, it is justifiable to give to this passive form a reflexive connotation, "he shall entitle himself."

Isa. 41

In the analysis and interpretation of the address contained in this chapter many problems of varying character present themselves, some of which can not be solved definitively for want of decisive evidence.

The theme of the address is the old one, so characteristic, it is now clear, of Deutero-Isaiah, a trial scene in court, or, perhaps better, a debate, between Yahweh and the gods of the nations, directed to the end of proving the total lack of reality and divinity of the latter and the sole, universal divinity and absolute power of Yahweh. The test is still the old one, which god is responsible for Cyrus' appearance upon the stage of history and for his conquest of the nations in such rapid succession, and who, as the primary author of Cyrus' world-plans and their successful execution, could and did predict all this in

advance as the expression of his own divine world-plan and purpose. The witnesses of this trial scene or debate are the nations and peoples of the world, all of whom are summoned to be present in order to have demonstrated to them, so that they in turn might acknowledge, the total impotence and unreality of their gods and their complete discomfiture in their contest with Yahweh, Israel's god, the champion and advocate of His people.

This address has close affinities, both of thought and of manner of expression, with the addresses in both Isa. 45 and 42-44. But inasmuch as the concept of the role of Israel as the servant of Yahweh is developed here far beyond the point it attained in the address in Isa. 45 and even beyond that achieved in Isa. 42-44, it follows that this address must be later than that in 45 and probably also than that in 42-44. The tenses of the verbs in vv. 2-3 suggest that Cyrus' conquests are still vividly recent. And certainly the picture of the trial in 42-44 is more realistic and the satire which the picture there expresses is more biting than is the case here. And here, in vv. 11-13, we hear the entirely new note of enemies of Israel who rage against it, of which none of the earlier addresses, granting that 45.24b β does not belong where it stands in *MT*, and so must be a misplaced fragment from some other address, probably now lost, has any intimation whatever. All in all then the weight of evidence, scanty and indecisive though it is, suggests that this address is the latest of all the addresses of the prophet which we have considered thus far.

Vv. 6-7 have long been recognized by scholars as not integral in this address; we have accordingly transposed them, together with 40.20 and 19, to the address in Isa. 42-44, inserting them after 44.10. But it is a question whether the remainder of Isa. 41 is a literary unit. Duhm, Marti and Cheyne omit v. 5 from the address; Duhm and Marti v. 24b also; and Marti vv. 11-16 likewise. Vv. 14-16 should under any condition be excluded from the address, for the picture which they offer of Israel's conquest and destruction of those hostile to it, whether nations, peoples or individuals, accords not at all with Deutero-Isaiah's dominant message of Yahweh's purposed salvation of all mankind, with Israel as His appointed agent thereof, nor yet with the prophet's picture of the world as a political unit, a single world-empire, under Cyrus, and presumably his dynasty after him, with Israel no longer a political entity, capable of waging a war of destruction. But it does accord closely with the hopes of the Nationalist party in Palestine in 520 B. C. and its program of world-conquest with Yahweh's aid and the establishment of a Jewish world-empire.¹

¹ Cf. Morgenstern, "Jerusalem — 485 B. C.," *HUCA* XXVII (1956), 101-179; XXVIII (1957), 15-47.

Certainly this program and the passage which sets it forth, 41.14-16, can not possibly be from Deutero-Isaiah.

Vv. 11-13 speak of enemies, whom Israel is bidden not to fear and against whom Yahweh promises His protection. Israel in Babylon could have had as enemies no nation or people whatsoever; and indeed vv. 11-13 speak of these enemies as individuals rather than as nations. So far as we know, Israel in Palestine in 520 B. C. had no national enemies of whom it had to fear. But in 486 B. C. the situation was altogether different. Then Israel in Palestine was immediately threatened by the nations adjacent to it and was eventually, and that too very quickly, completely crushed by them. Accordingly the possibility must not be excluded that vv. 11-13 may be a literary unit with vv. 14-16, even as Marti holds them to be, and the entire passage may represent an editorial gloss interpolated into this address by some editor in or soon after 486 B. C. But all in all vv. 11-16 do not seem to be a literary unit. The enemy destined to be overcome and crushed by Israel in vv. 14-16 does not seem to be the same as the enemies in vv. 11-13, whom Israel is bidden not to fear. Moreover, vv. 11-13 are, quite properly, in the $3/2$ elegiac meter, but, even though v. 14 is in this same meter, vv. 15-16 are in the customary $3/3$ meter. Furthermore, the language of vv. 11-13 smacks very strongly of Deutero-Isaiah, whereas the language of at least vv. 15-16, with the exception of the title of Yahweh, קדוש ישראל, "the Holy One of Israel," at the end of v. 16, is in no way reminiscent of our prophet. This evidence is of course far from decisive; but it is the sole evidence available. Accordingly I prefer to regard merely vv. 14-16 as the gloss and to retain vv. 11-13 for Deutero-Isaiah, as an integral part of this address. And the Israel of these vv. I regard, as has already been adumbrated,¹ as the faithful minority in the Jewish community of Babylon, who accepted the message of the prophet and reaffirmed their loyalty to Yahweh by their response to the prophet's message, the new Israel, as I have called it, and in the prophet's sight the true Israel, while the enemies of Israel in these vv., whom it is bidden not to fear, are the faithless members of the Jewish community of Babylon, those who have forsaken Yahweh and have gone over more or less completely to the worship of the Babylonian gods, and who are resenting more and more bitterly and aggressively, as time passes, the prophet's denunciation of them for their disloyalty to the god of their fathers, and who openly manifest their hostility to the prophet and his followers.

Also vv. 17-20, with their picture of Yahweh's loving solicitude for His people in distress, apparently while on its difficult journey

¹ Cf. *HUCA* XXIX (1958), 54-56, 62-67.

from Babylon through the desert back to its ancestral land, is distinctly reminiscent of Deutero-Isaiah. However, inasmuch as this address does not deal in any way with this journey through the desert, and there is no place for any reference to this experience in its theme and argument, it follows necessarily that these vv. must be a misplaced fragment of some other address by the prophet, the remainder of which has apparently been lost.

Largely, no doubt as the result of this quite considerable editorial expansion of the original address here recorded, the present *MT* text reflects a correspondingly extensive disarrangement of the words and sentences of the address as these were first uttered by the prophet. This condition we have endeavored to rectify as best we can by rearrangement of the text in such manner as to bring out a logical, effective and progressive development of the thought here set forth. However, at the very best such procedure is always conjectural and uncertain, and the possibility of some other textual rearrangement must always be borne in mind.

Finally, we have interpolated 44.26b into this address, and have thus salvaged this v. for Deutero-Isaiah.

3/3	יחדשו חיל איים / ולאמים יחליפו כח	I
3/3	יגשו או ידברו / יחרו למשפט נקרה	
3/3	מיהעיר ממזרח < כורש > / בצדק יקראהו לרגליו	2
3/3	יתן לפניו גוים / ומלכים יָרֵד < תחתיו >	
3/3	יתן כעפרת חרבותם / כקש נדף קשתותם	
3/3	ירדפם יעבר שלום / ארח ברנליו לאיבוס	3
3/3/3	ראו איים נִיִּיראו / קצות הארץ נִיִּחרדו / קרבו ויאתיון < יחדו >	5
3/3	ראשון לציון הנני / ולירושלם מבסר אתנרב	27
4/4	קרבו ריבכם יאמר יהוה / הגישו מועצותיכם יאמר מלך־יעקב	21
	הגישו < > לנו את־הקדמניות / הראשנות מדהנה הגידו / ונשימה	22
3/3/3	< > ונדעה אחריתן	
	או הבאות השמיענו / הגידו האתיות לאחור / ונדעה כי־אלהים	23
3/3/3	אתם	
3/3	אף תיטיבו ותרעו / ונשתעה ונראה יחדו	
4/3	ה־אתם אין ופעלכם אפס / תועה הבחר בכס	24
4/3	מי הגיד מראש ונדעָה / ומלפנים ונאמר צדק	26
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3/2	תִּבְקָשׁם וְלֹא תִמָּצֵאם / אֲנָשִׁי מִצָּתְךָ	12
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3/2	הֲאֲמַר־לְךָ אֵל תִּירָא / אֲנִי עֲזֹרְתִיךָ	
3/2	הֲאֲמַר לִירוּשָׁלַם תּוֹשֵׁב / וְחִרְבוּתֶיהָ אֶקְמָם	44.26b

1. Let the Isles replenish (their) might
And peoples renew (their) strength.
Let them draw near, let them converse;
Together let us draw near for judgment.
2. Who stirred up Cyrus from the east,
With sure purpose summons him to attendance upon
him;
Subdues nations before him
And kings reduces beneath him;
Makes their swords like lead,
Like driven chaff their bows?
3. He pursues them, he goes forward successfully
By a path which his feet do not tread down.
5. The Isles beheld and became afraid,
The ends of the earth, and they trembled;
They drew near and came (all) together.
27. First speaker for Zion, behold, I am,
And as advocate for Jerusalem I offer myself.
21. Present your case, sayeth Yahweh;
Marshal your arguments, sayeth Jacob's King.
22. Bring before us the earliest happenings,

- The first things, what they were, declare;
Yea, let us pay attention and let us know their outcome.
23. Or the events which are to come make us to hear;
Tell (us) the things about to happen in the future,
So that we may know that ye are gods.
Yea, ye may work good or work evil;
Let us observe and behold it together.
24. Behold, ye are nothing and your work is naught.
He goes astray who chooses you.
26. Who foretold aught from the very first so that we might know it,
Or from former times, that we might say: (It is) truth?
Yea, there is not one who foretells, yea, not one who proclaims,
Nor yet is there one who hears words of yours.
28. Yea, I looked, but there is not a single one,
And from among these there is none who can give counsel;
And when I ask them aught, do they give any answer?
29. Behold, all of them are nothing; naught are their works;
Wind and vanity are their molten images.
4. Who has fashioned and produced,
Who summoned the generations from the very first?
I, Yahweh am the very first,
And with the very last ones will I be the Existent One.
25. I stirred him up from the north, so that he came,
And from the place of sunrise I called him by his name,
So that he tramples down rulers as mortar,
Yea, even as the potter treads down the clay.
8. But thou, Israel, My servant,
Jacob, whom I have chosen,
Seed of Abraham, My friend,
9. Whom I have laid hold of from the ends of the earth,
Yea, from its very edges have called thee
And have said unto thee: My servant art thou;
I have chosen thee and not rejected thee;
10. Fear not, for I am with thee;
Be not dismayed, for I am thy God;
I strengthen thee, yea, I help thee,
Yea, I uphold thee with My trusty right hand.

11. Behold they shall be put to shame and shall be humiliated,
All those who inflame themselves against thee;
They shall become as nothing, yea, they shall perish,
The men who contend with thee.
12. Thou mayest seek them out, but thou shalt not find them,
The men who strive with thee;
They shall be as naught and vanity,
The men who war against thee.
13. Verily, I, Yahweh am thy God,
He who holds thee fast by thy right hand,
Who says unto thee: Fear not;
I am He who aideth thee;
- 44.26b Who says of Jerusalem: She shall be repopulated.
And her ruins will I restore.

1. For $\text{וַיִּחַדְשׁוּ אֵלַי}$ read, following a suggestion from G, $\text{וַיִּחַדְשׁוּ חֵיל}$; for חֵיל in a parallel usage cf. Ps. 103.5, and for חֵיל , "power," cf. I Sam. 2.4; II Sam. 22.40; Ps. 18.33, 40; 84.8. Thus emended, the parallelism between v. 12a and β becomes perfect. וַיִּקְרַבְהוּ , the 1st plu. includes both Yahweh and Israel on the one hand and the various peoples and nations on the other. For a parallel sudden shift from the 3rd or 2nd plu. to the 1st plu. cf. v. 22. לְמַשְׁפַּט here may mean "for judgment" or "to the place of judgment."

2. וַיִּקְרַבְהוּ as a transitive verb must have an object; most commentators, with considerable violence to the text, regard צֶדֶק as that object. But metrical considerations establish clearly that צֶדֶק belongs in the second stichos. Clearly then the object of וַיִּקְרַבְהוּ is missing; and certainly the one who was stirred up was Cyrus. The thought of this distich parallels closely that of 45.13 and 46.11. For the missing object some figurative term, such as עֵץ in 46.11, might be supplied; but all in all it seems best to supply, just as is implicit in 46.11, the name itself, כּוֹרֶשׁ . For צֶדֶק read, as in 45.13 בְּצֶדֶק ; this is another instance of צֶדֶק having the connotation, "sure purpose." This interpretation of בְּצֶדֶק gives to the v. a very powerful, double implication. The essential question is not merely what god brought Cyrus from the east and sent him upon his mission of world-conquest, but also was this done by that god idly or with a sure and worthy purpose, and if the latter, what may that purpose have been? And the implicit answer to the question is that Yahweh, Israel's god, is the deity who stirred up Cyrus, and that in so doing, just as, by further implication, in everything that He does, Yahweh is acting with sure, wise and beneficent purpose, and that in this particular instance, as this is set forth more clearly in other addresses of the prophet, Yahweh's purpose is to effect the restoration of His people to its ancestral land, there to function as His servant, the agent of His world-wide salvation for nations, peoples and all mankind. So interpreted, and particularly with this connotation attributed to בְּצֶדֶק , the sentence becomes meaningful indeed, in fact the key-sentence of the entire address. For לְיָגוּלֵי read, with G, לְיָגוּלֵי ; for this term connoting personal attendance upon some one cf. I Sam. 25.42. וַיִּרְדּוּ should certainly be vocalized וַיִּרְדּוּ , from רָדַד , "to subdue." Metrical considerations suggest very forcibly that a word has been lost at the end of the distich, another graphic instance of the loss of a word at the end of a line in Biblical poetry; accordingly supply וַיִּחַדְשׁוּ ; cf. Ps. 144.2. Certainly the comparison, in the third

distich of the v., of swords with dust is meaningless and ineffective; accordingly for כעפר read כעפרה; the figure of swords heavy as lead and therefore impossible of use, parallels effectively that of arrows flying aimlessly and uselessly through the air like chaff before the wind. For קשוו and חרבו read, with *G*, the plu., with plu. suffix, קשותו and חרבותו. Actually v. 2ab constitutes one 3/3 double-distich, while vv. 2c-3 constitute a second 3/3 double-distich.

3. This v. is here an adverbial accusative; cf. I Sam. 16.4; 25.6; II Sam. 17.3; there is accordingly no need to emend to בשלום, as in Isa. 55.12; Job. 15.21. For יבוא read יבוס; cf. below, v. 25; Zech. 10.5.

5. This v. ends the first strophe of the address and tells that the various nations and peoples obeyed the summons, addressed to them in v. 1, and that they came together for the contest of their gods with Yahweh; but this they did in fear and trembling, in manifest anticipation that in this contest they and their gods would be worsted. As ראו and also the two verbs in the third stichos indicate, the action here set forth is all in past time; accordingly it is necessary to read וייראו and ויחרדו. As it stands in *MT*, the v. is a 3/3/2 distich; however 3/3/3 would certainly be a preferred meter; accordingly, with *G* and *V*, supply יחרו after ויאתין; this is still another instance of the loss of a word at the end of a line of Biblical poetry.

27. This v. has always presented difficult problems, particularly in connection with the words ראשון and מבשר. G. R. Driver (in *Alttestamentliche Studien: Friederich Nötscher Festschrift*, [1950], 46 f.) has offered what seems to be the most plausible explanation of these terms. He holds that ראשון here connotes "the first speaker (in a trial by law or in a debate)." For מבשר he would read מבסר, on the basis of the Syriac בסב, "to refute; to rebuke," and would render it "refuter." Inasmuch as we are dealing in this address with a debate between the gods of the various nations on the one side, and Yahweh, Israel's god, on the other, with the various nations looking on and each eagerly yearning for the triumph of its own god, this interpretation of these two perplexing words, both apparently technical terms here, seems to be peculiarly appropriate. It is plain too that in this v. Yahweh is offering Himself as the spokesman for His people, Israel. Accordingly in the first stichos of the distich, where in *MT* there is manifestly one word too many for the obvious 3-beat meter, for the meaningless הוה הוה read הוה. In the second stichos און is meaningless and impossible; accordingly, and establishing a remarkably vigorous parallelism between the two stichoi, for און read אנתר, an instance of the loss of the final two letters of a word at the end of a line of Biblical poetry. The thought of the v., as thus reconstructed, suggests strongly that it must have stood originally in the early part of the address; we have accordingly transposed it to follow v. 5.

21. In this v. Yahweh is quite obviously the speaker. He addresses the gods of the nations and challenges them individually to present each the evidence of his divinity, and particularly to show who among them, if anyone, it was, who summoned Cyrus to his career of world-conquest and made him so uniformly successful in all his undertakings. Plainly this v. records the initial words of Yahweh in His role of "first speaker" in the debate. We have accordingly transposed this v. and the entire passage which it introduces, vv. 21-24, 26, 28-29, to follow immediately upon v. 27. Certainly עצמתיכם is meaningless here; accordingly, following a hint from *G* and *S*, with a simple shift of two letters, read מועצתיכם, "your evil counsel or argument"; for מועצה with the connotation, "evil, stubborn counsel (which leads only to destruction)" cf. Jer. 7.24; Micah 6.16; Ps. 81.13; Prov. 1.31. מלך-יעקב must be read as a compound term with a single beat, both because the meter demands this and also because it is in parallelism with יהוה in the corresponding position in

the first stichos. Very significantly the word, מֶלֶךְ, occurs only three times in Isa. 40-48 (41.21; 43.15; 44.6) and is always a designation of Yahweh. As we have already intimated, Deutero-Isaiah plainly conceived of Israel as no longer a political entity, ruled by its own king of flesh and blood, but as merely a province of the vast Persian Empire, and therefore subject to Cyrus, Yahweh's chosen "Anointed One." On the other hand, the prophet conceived of Israel as a religious community, a people whose supreme ruler and king was Yahweh, its god. Appreciation of this fact enables us to comprehend more clearly and precisely the role of Israel as Yahweh's עֶבֶר. Often the term עֶבֶר הַמֶּלֶךְ designates a high official of the court, even the one second in authority to the king, the king's lieutenant or agent (cf. II Sam. 15.34; I Kings 11.26; II Kings 22.12; Neh. 2.10, 19 *et passim*). It is actually with this connotation that we should interpret the designation of Israel as the עֶבֶר יְהוָה, so characteristic of Deutero-Isaiah, actually not merely "the servant of Yahweh" but rather "the agent of Yahweh," of Yahweh, its King, the agent charged with a specific and highly responsible task, the salvation of all mankind in the name of Yahweh, the one, universal God, the divine Sovereign of all nations. So understood, it becomes apparent that the title, עֶבֶר יְהוָה, as coined by Deutero-Isaiah, implies for Israel, not a position of abject humility, but rather one of high responsibility, dignity and authority in relation to Yahweh, its King, on the one hand and to all the other nations on the other hand.

22. As it stands in *MT* this v. is plainly overloaded. The verse-division between vv. 22 and 23 should be immediately after אֲחֵרֵיתָן, and the final three words of v. 22 should, as in *G*, constitute the opening portion of v. 23. Thus rearranged, vv. 22 and 23a constitute a 3/3/3 double-tristich, with remarkably effective parallelism between the two tristichs and also between the stichoi of each tristich. In the first stichos of v. 22 in place of the present 3rd plu. impf., וַיִּשְׁוּ וַיִּיָּדוּ, read, in conformity with all the other verbs immediately preceding and following, the impv. 2nd plu. Furthermore, there is here quite plainly one word too many for the meter; accordingly, since it occurs twice again, in the second stichos of this v. and also at the beginning of v. 23, omit וַיִּיָּדוּ here. Likewise, since the second stichos here speaks of events of the past, while the whole of v. 23 speaks of events of the future, we would certainly expect that the first tristich in its entirety should deal with the past. Viewed from this angle, אֲחֵרֵיתָן is certainly disturbing; accordingly, by a relatively simple emendation, for אֲחֵרֵיתָן read קְדָמֵיּוֹת "the former things"; cf. 43.18, where קְדָמֵיּוֹת is used in parallelism with רֵאשִׁיטוֹת. The reference here is not necessarily, and probably not at all, to the events of creation, but rather to more recent events in history, which these gods of the nations, any one of them, might claim to have planned and carried through. In the final stichos there is obviously one word too many for the meter; accordingly omit לֵב; for שִׁים, "to pay attention," with לֵב omitted but clearly understood, cf. Judg. 19.30.

23. As we have arranged the text, the three final words of v. 22 of *MT* should be linked to this v. V. 23a then is a 3/3/3 tristich, while v. 23b is a 3/3 distich. The text of the entire v. seems to be in perfect order. Both the tristich and the distich are introduced by conjunctions, וּ, אֶף, and אֵף, both of which, however, are emphatic and must therefore receive each a full beat. For אַחֲרָיו with the connotation, "the future," cf. 42.23 and the note to that v. V. 23b says, "Yea, ye may work either good or evil," but so long as it has divine character we will consider it evidence that ye are gods. Marti has very properly called attention to the biting sarcasm of this statement. Actually the sentence may well be directed at Persian Zoroastrianism; "ye may work good," i. e. like Ormuzd, or "work evil," i. e. like Ahriman.

24. For אֶפֶס מֵאֵין read אֵין מֵאֵין and for אֵין מֵאֵין read אֵין; in both cases the מ' is the result of

dittography; for אפס אין as used here cf. vv. 12, 29 and also 40.17. The second stichos emend, with Torrey, to read תועה הבחר בכם. It would seem that the prophet represents Yahweh as, after His challenge in vv. 21-23, waiting dramatically for the gods of the nations, or at least some one of them, to speak up and claim divinity and divine power. But the total silence of these so-called gods in response to this challenge leads necessarily to the conclusion, stated in this forceful manner, that these supposititious gods are, all of them without exception, absolute nothings, with the consequence that whoever accords worship to any of them certainly goes astray.

26. V. 25 plainly interrupts the manifest thought-unity between vv. 24 and 26 and is an intrusion here. We have accordingly transposed it to follow immediately after v. 4, with which it, in turn, comprises a perfect thought-unit. For וְנִדְעָה it seems better to vocalize וְנִדְעָה. For צִדִּיק read, with DSIa and G, צִדִּיק, "truth." The threefold repetition of אף here seems characteristic of Deutero-Isaiah's style; cf. 40.24; 44.15-16; 46.11.

28. V. 28 continues directly the thought of v. 26 and paves the way for the ultimate, general conclusion stated in v. 29. V. 27 is plainly a disturbing intrusion here and fits better in the position to which we have transposed it. For וְאֵל read, with DSIa, וְאֵל. The ו of the second וְאֵל must be omitted. The v. climaxes the debate and formulates the conclusion of the utter unreality and impotence of the gods of the other nations. They stand mute and impassive. Among them there is not a single individual who can act, nor any one who can serve as counsellor or pleader in this debate. In fact when questions are put to them no answer is forthcoming. They are unreal, non-existent, imaginary things, with neither being, life nor power. This this debate has demonstrated conclusively. For the expression, אֵין אִישׁ, "there is no one," cf. 63.3. When יען is used with a god as the subject it connotes "to make a decision; to decree," cf. 19.17; Jer. 49.20; 50.45.

29. For אֵין it is necessary to read, with DSIa and S and also as the parallelism with אפס indicates, אֵין. For נִסְכֵיהֶם with the connotation, "their idols," cf. 48.5; Jer. 10.14; 51.17.

4. V. 4, followed by v. 25, presents rather succinctly, it must be admitted, the positive side of Yahweh's argument, the affirmation that He has been, is and will be the one, sole God from the beginning to the end of the world, and that accordingly He it was, and none other, who stirred up Cyrus from the very first and prospered him upon all of his campaigns. The text seems to be in perfect shape.

25. הֵעִירוֹתִי, a transitive verb, must have an object; accordingly, as in 45.13, read הֵעִירוֹתִי. The v. represents Cyrus as coming, at Yahweh's summons, from the far east and also from the north, i. e. from the distant north-east, an effective description of the location of Persia with reference to Babylonia. Inasmuch as 45.4 states that Cyrus did not, or perhaps even does not, know Yahweh, the statement here that Cyrus calls upon Yahweh by name, i. e. accords Him homage and worship, certainly can not be correct; accordingly emend יִקְרָא בְשֵׁם to קִרְאֵהוּ בְשֵׁם. Thus v. 25a repeats the thought already expressed by the prophet in 45.4b and 13a. For וַיָּבֵא again, as in v. 3, read, with Kittel, וַיָּבֵא. Vocalize יִרְמֹס, giving both this word and טִט a full beat; the subj. of this verb is not Cyrus, but is יוֹצֵר, immediately preceding.

8. The text of vv. 8-11 seems to be in perfect order. The בַּחֲרִיתִּךָ preceding אֶתֶר must receive a full beat for the sake of the meter, whereas that preceding חֻקֶּיךָ in v. 9 must, for the same reason, be read with the verb as a single beat. For אֶהְבֶּה meaning "close friend" cf. I Kings 5.15. This title is applied to Abraham again in

II Chron. 20.7. Outside of this passage the name, Abraham, occurs in only six other passages in all the prophetic writings. Of these Isa. 51.2; 63.16 are Trito-Isaiah and so are certainly later than this. The mention of Abraham in Isa. 29.22 is clearly an interpolation into a passage itself probably late. Ezek. 33.24 comes at the very earliest from near the end of the Exile, has a definitely Palestinian setting and seems to voice the hopes of the Nationalist Party of regaining political independence and control of the land. The thought underlying both Jer. 33.26 and Micah 7.20 is that of Yahweh's covenant with David and His promise to the patriarchs as this latter is set forth in the J2 stratum of the Pentateuch. Manifestly all these passages must be linked with the program of the Nationalist Party in 520 B. C. or in 486 B. C. (cf. Morgenstern, "Jerusalem—485 B. C.," *HUCA* XXVII [1956], 155 ff.). Certainly then the reference to Abraham here is the earliest in all prophetic writings. Actually Deutero-Isaiah seems to have been the one who first conceived the idea that Yahweh chose Israel for the first time, not at Sinai, but rather when He called Abraham and with him made His initial covenant.

9. In this v. the prophet makes his most positive statement of the role of Israel as Yahweh's chosen servant. Moreover, this choice of Israel for this responsible role was not of recent occurrence, but was from the very time of Abraham, of Israel's origin as a people. This v. indicates plainly that by the time when this address was uttered the prophet had completely outgrown Ezekiel's doctrine of "for His name's sake," with which, as we have learned, he had inaugurated his prophetic ministry. *וְלֹא מֵאַחֲרַיִךְ* certainly refers to the interpretation put by other nations and peoples, and not impossibly even by some sections of the Jewish people also, upon the conquest of Judah by the Babylonians, loss of Judaic national existence and subsequent exile in Babylonia. Yahweh's choice of Israel at the very beginning of its existence as a people implied an eternal choice, with no possibility of these relations ever being terminated. For metrical reasons *וּמֵאַחֲרַיִךְ* must be read as two beats.

10. In the second stichos the first *אֶף* must receive a beat for the sake of the meter. The thought of vv. 8-9 is continued and reaches its climax in this v. The three verbs in the second stichos plainly imply the continuity of Yahweh's support of Israel in its service in His behalf from the moment when this service began in the distant past until the present moment, and with this the assurance of the continuance of this support on into the remote future.

Vv. 11-13 constitute a closely knit strophe announcing the certain and utter doom of the enemies of this new and faithful Israel and assuring it that it need not fear before them; accordingly it is very appropriately cast throughout in the elegiac 3/2 meter.

11. *כְּלִי-הַחַרְבִּים* must be read as a single beat for the sake of the meter.

12. This is the only instance of *מִצָּחָה* in the entire Bible; *מִצָּחָה*, however, occurs three times, and so is well attested; it is probably wise therefore to, with Kittel, vocalize *מִצָּחָהּ*.

13. *כִּי* here is the *כִּי* of certainty and so receives a full beat.

44.26b. This half-v., for which we can find no other suitable place in all of Deutero-Isaiah's addresses, fits in very well here both as to metrical form and as to thought. It gives to the new Israel the assurance, not merely of divine help in a general sense, but also in the specific direction of return to ancestral land and the rebuilding and restoration of Jerusalem to all its ancient glory.

Isa. 40. 6-8, 12-31

Isa. 40. 1-5, 9-10a we have already shown to be a unit with 52.1-12¹ and have treated these vv. in detail. 40.10b-11 seem to be a gloss amplifying vv. 9-10a, or they may perhaps be a fragment of some other unidentifiable Trito-Isaianic utterance. Under no condition can they be integrated with the address contained in the major portion of this chapter.

This address presents numerous problems. There is no cogent reason to question its Deutero-Isaianic authorship. Various factors, such as the language and literary technique, the dominant universalism, the role of Yahweh as Creator of the world, the insignificance and transitoriness of foreign monarchs, all these and other considerations, as well as the position of this address with relation to the other addresses of the prophet, speak strongly for its Deutero-Isaianic authorship.

On the other hand, we miss in this address many of the dominant thoughts and motifs which we have found repeated again and again in all the other addresses of the prophet which we have already considered. Thus there is in this address not a word of denunciation of Israel in exile for its faithlessness to Yahweh and its coquetting with the Babylonian gods; there is in fact not the slightest suggestion of such faithlessness. Neither is there any trace of the Ezekelian doctrine of "for His name's sake," nor yet any suggestion whatsoever of the divinely appointed role of Israel as the servant or agent of Yahweh in the mission of bringing salvation to all mankind. There is likewise no mention of Cyrus, no contest or debate with the gods of other nations, no suggestion of Israel's divinely destined return to its ancestral land. The complete silence of the address with regard to these various motifs, all so integral in Deutero-Isaiah's total message, is significant indeed.

Furthermore, the address seems to envisage as its audience, not at all the entire Jewish community exiled in Babylonia, but only a section thereof, and that too seemingly not an overly large section. This group of Jews has apparently become disheartened and their faith in Yahweh, their god, seems to be shaken. It is not at all that they are turning from Him in order to attach themselves more or less closely to the cult of other, foreign gods. It is merely that their faith in Yahweh's ability to help them and protect them from some seemingly impending danger or calamity and to fulfill all His promise to them

¹ Cf. Part I of this study, *HUCA* XXIX (1958), note 22, pp. 10 ff.

seems to be wavering. Perhaps some grave disappointment or misfortune has recently befallen them or seems about to befall them, and they are beset with grave doubts with regard to Yahweh's ability to care for them and save them. From this distrust of Yahweh's power and of His purpose with them the prophet seeks to free the audience he is here addressing and to restore their shaken confidence in Yahweh and to enhearten them with faith in their divinely assured future.

All this permits only one conclusion, viz. that this is our prophet's very latest address, and that quite some time, several years perhaps, had elapsed between the delivery of his most recent address and this address. These had been, so it seems, momentous years for the prophet. Apparently the line of demarcation between his faithful followers, those who reverently accepted his message, and the great mass of, at least so it impressed the prophet, disbelieving and even faithless Israel in exile, had grown acute. The prophet's message is now directed to only the small group of his own hesitant followers. Them he need no longer convince that Yahweh is the one, sole God of the universe and that the so-called foreign gods are all vain and empty nothings. This basic principle of the prophet's message is devoutly accepted by his present audience and he need dwell upon it no further. Apparently too, as has been said, some grave misfortune has recently befallen them or now threatens them. Accordingly this is not the time for the prophet to dwell upon the theme of Israel as the servant of Yahweh charged with the responsible task of mediating to the nations and peoples of the world that universal salvation which Yahweh has destined for them. In its present mood the prophet's audience is not responsive to this message. His task at the moment is not at all to denounce them for loss of faith, but is rather to enhearten them, to restore their faith in Yahweh and their confidence in themselves and in their way of life, to make them believe once again that Yahweh is with them, keeps faith with them, and that therefore their future is assured. And this he does with such power and conviction that he could hardly have failed to achieve his purpose.

What the calamity or what the threatening danger which had thus affected this particular group's attitude towards Yahweh and their trust in Him may have been we have of course no way of knowing. We can only conjecture. As has been said already, Israel, now exiled in Babylonia for over fifty years, had no reason to fear foreign enemies, nor yet, so it would seem, antagonism from the Babylonians among whom they were settled. Most probably therefore the hostility and attendant threat to the group whom the prophet is here addressing came from within the ranks of Israel, from the mass of fellow-Israelites

who in the process of integration with the culture of their Babylonian environment were repudiating Yāhweh in greater or less degree and adjusting themselves with more or less conviction to the worship of the Babylonian deities. We have already suggested that in the course of time this section of the Jewish exiles in Babylonia came to resent the prophet's oft-repeated denunciation of them. And this resentment may well have extended itself in time to the little body of the prophet's immediate followers. And this may well have expressed itself in the open persecution of this latter little group, persecution all the more bitter and depressing because it was at the hands of their own fellow-Jews. The existence of such a hostile group we have already suggested in our discussion of 41.11; and it is not at all improbable that with the passing years the animosity of this group had increased in intensity and had extended itself to include not only the prophet himself but also his immediate, faithful followers. We can readily picture to ourselves what the humiliation and fear of this little group must have been when confronted by the distrust of their own Jewish brethren and persecution at their hands, and how, in consequence thereof, their faith in Yāhweh and in His purpose with them may well have been shaken.

The theme of the address is clear and is closely unified. It is that Yāhweh's faithfulness is absolute and assured, whereas that of man is at the very best uncertain and more or less evanescent. This theme is set forth clearly in the opening words of the address. It begins most effectively and dramatically by the prophet's declaration to his audience that he hears a voice calling, calling of course directly to him. This voice can be only either that of Yāhweh Himself or of one of His heavenly messengers, speaking, however, in Yāhweh's name. More probably it is the latter, as the use of אֱלֹהֵינוּ, "our God," in v. 8b would seem to indicate. The voice charges the prophet to call out, to speak, to proclaim a divinely communicated message. And in answer to the prophet's question, "What shall I proclaim,"? the answer comes back, contained in vv. 6b-8, that in the message which he is bidden to deliver he should contrast the absolute faithfulness of Yāhweh in fulfilling His covenant obligations with the instability of mankind in so doing. There can be no question that the whole of v. 7 is a gloss which seriously interrupts and misdirects the course of thought. The entire v. is missing in the most reliable texts of G. Largely upon the basis of these considerations Gesenius, Hitzig and Oort regarded v. 7 as a gloss. This conclusion finds striking confirmation in the fact that the original manuscript of DSIa did not contain this v., but that it was inserted, written partly between the lines and

partly down the left-hand margin of the column, by some later scribe. That he was certainly a later scribe is convincingly attested by the fact that he no longer wrote out the name of the Deity, יהוה, but instead indicated it by four dots, thus With v. 7, with its vague and disturbing thought, omitted, v. 8 follows smoothly and clearly and with perfectly unified thought upon v. 6.

The key-word of the sentence, and with this of the entire address, is חסדו in v. 6. The precise import of the word in this passage seems not to have been grasped by translators and commentators alike. *G*, *V* and *S* rendered the word as if it either read or were a synonym of הדרו, "its glory." Influenced no doubt by the vss. the King James Bible and with it the Jewish Publication Society Bible have rendered the word "its goodness." Torrey, in turn, renders it, with no textual emendation, "its beauty." Duhm would emend the word to הדרו, "its splendor." Kittel too would emend it to either הדרו or else to חמרו, "its splendor." Cheyne, Perles and Marti would emend it to חסנו, "its strength." To comprehend the true meaning of the word in this place we must understand something of the evolution of the covenant concept in ancient Israel.

Originally a ברית, a "covenant," was a mutual agreement between two parties by which each obligated himself to perform faithfully for the other some eagerly needed or desired function or service. By the terms of the covenant between Yahweh and Israel Yahweh undertook to be Israel's god and its alone, to favor, protect and prosper it in every way conceivable and at all odds. And Israel, in turn, undertook to worship and serve Him, and Him alone, to have naught to do with other gods, to do His will and carry out all His commands faithfully and eagerly. Failure of either contracting party to fulfill his assumed obligations warranted the repudiation of the covenant by the other party. According to the pre-exilic prophets Israel had been faithless to its covenant obligations with Yahweh. Therefore Yahweh was about to repudiate His covenant with it, to cast it off, leave it thus a people without a god to protect it; and of course a people so situated could do naught but perish. However, Jeremiah in his later years, as the final utterance of his rich, prophetic message, proclaimed that Yahweh would not cast Israel off despite its undeniable violation of its most essential obligations to Him. Instead He would discipline it through the bitter experiences of exile in Babylonia and would thus purge it of its inclination to go astray from Him. And when at last, after seventy years, this work of purification and regeneration would have been completed, then Yahweh would terminate Israel's exile, restore it to its native land, make a

new covenant with it, take it again as His people and function anew, as He had actually never ceased to function, as its god.

Not at all surprisingly this message of the new covenant formed by Yahweh with Israel captivated the imagination of the Jewish people, both those who had remained in Palestine and those who had been carried to Babylonia. Quietly the belief became firmly rooted in the heart and mind of Israel that it was still bound to Yahweh, its god, but by a new covenant, one which Yahweh had Himself imposed upon it, a new and eternal covenant, one which would never be broken.

However, despite the trials and sufferings of the exile, Israel did not become regenerate in the true and full sense of the term, as Jeremiah had anticipated. Its covenant relations with Yahweh continued to be much as those of its ancestors had been, loose and irresponsible. But the belief was now firmly implanted that the covenant relationship between Yahweh and Israel was eternal, unbreakable. Ezekiel's message of "for His name's sake" enhanced this concept of the eternal covenant immeasurably by its implication that for the sake of His reputation as a true god, a world-god, among the nations Yahweh needed Israel quite as much as Israel needed Him. The concept of the new, eternal covenant between Yahweh and Israel was now firmly established in the thought and life of the Jewish people. Regardless of how Israel might live and act henceforth, this covenant never would, and actually could not, be repudiated by either contracting party.

But it is readily clear that such a covenant was not a true covenant in the old and proper sense of the word, that it was not a ברית, a two-sided, mutual obligation. Of course there could be no question whatever that Yahweh would always fulfill His every obligation to Israel, His people. But there was no assurance that Israel would always fulfill its every obligation to Yahweh. In fact history quickly demonstrated that Israel was remiss in many particulars. Israel in Babylonia, for example, as we have seen, forsook Yahweh in very considerable measure and went over more or less completely to recognition and even to positive worship of the Babylonian gods. And yet, viewed from Yahweh's standpoint, Israel was still His people and He needed it, whether, according to Ezekiel's doctrine, for the sake of His reputation as a god, or, according to Deutero-Isaiah's doctrine, as His servant, the agent of His universal purpose for the peoples of the world. Whatever Israel's conduct in relation to Yahweh, He could not cast it off, could not repudiate His eternal covenant with it.

But, as has been said, call it what one will, such a relationship between god and people is not a true covenant in the old meaning of the term. All the obligation was now on one side. Yahweh, as god, could not of course but fulfill His every obligation to His people; but there was no assurance that Israel would fulfill its every obligation to its god. In fact it was reasonably assured that it would fail to do so. Small wonder then that in the prophetic utterances and also in the general literature of the post-exilic period the word, ברית, came to be used with less and less frequency and another word supplanted it to describe this new covenant relationship. This new word was חסד. In fact the primary and basic meaning of חסד was "a two-sided, mutually binding obligation."¹ As the passive implication of the form of the noun indicates, a חסיד was one who had been admitted into חסד, "covenant relationship," with Yahweh, with full awareness of the obligation which this relationship imposed upon him (cf. Deut. 33.8; Ps. 50.5; 89.20). This חסד relationship described the covenant between Yahweh and Israel (cf. Isa. 54.10; 55.3). חסד thus became almost synonymous, on the one hand, with ברית, and, on the other hand, with אמונה, "faithfulness," and אמת, "truth" (cf. Ps. 89.2-4, 15). The חסדי יהוה were the "faithful acts of Yahweh," which He performed in fulfillment of His covenant obligations (cf. Ps. 89.50). Accordingly חסד in this period acquired the fundamental meaning, "faithfulness," faithfulness in fulfillment of covenant obligations; loyalty; integrity; responsibility."

Just this is the meaning which the word has in Isa. 40.6. The address affirms that man's חסד, "faithfulness," is ephemeral like the flowers of the field, whereas Yahweh's faithfulness is eternal and sure for all those who wait for Him and put their trust in Him. This is the dominant theme of this stirring address, with its very effective climax, the assurance to those "who wait for Yahweh" that they will in due time find their faith and their hopes fulfilled in overflowing measure.

3/3	קול אֶמֶר קרא / וְאֹמַר מִה אֶקְרָא	6
3/3	כָּל הַבֶּשֶׂר חָצִיר / וְכִלְחָסְדוֹ כַּצִּיץ הַשֹּׂדֶה	
4/4	יֶבֶשׁ חָצִיר נָבֵל צִיץ / וְדִבַּר אֱלֹהֵינוּ יָקוֹם לַעֲוֹלָם	8
4/3	מִי מִדָּד בִּשְׁעָלוֹ יָמִים / וּשְׂמִים בּוֹרְתּוֹ תִּכַּן	12

¹ Cf. Glueck, *Das Wort hesed im alttestamentlichen Sprachgebrauch als menschliche und göttliche gemeinschaftsgemässe Verhaltungsweise*, BZAW 47 (1927).

	וכל בשלש < > ארץ / ושקל בפלס הרים / וגבעות במאזנים <נטל>	
3/3/3		
4/3	מי תכן את־דורו יהוה / ו>מי< איש־עצתו ויודיענו	13
	את־מי נועץ ויבינהו / וילמדהו ארח משפט / < > ודרך תבונות הודיענו	14
3/3/3		
4/3	הן גוים כמר מדלי / וכשחק מאזנים נחשבו	15a
3/3/3	הַיָּאִים כְּרִיק יוֹטֵל / ולבנון אינ־די בער / וחיותו אינ־די עולה	15b-16
4/4	וכל הגוים כאין נגדו / כאפס ותהו נחשבו לו	17
3/3	ואל־מי תדמיון יהוה / ומה דמות תערכו־לו	18
	הלוא תדעו הלוא תשמעו / הלוא הגד לכם מראש / הלוא הבינותם מיסודת הארץ	21
4/4/4		
3/3	הישב על־חוג הארץ / וישביה כחגבים <לפניו>	22
3/3	הנוטה כרקיע שמים / וימתחם כאהל לשבתו	
3/3	הנותן רוזנים לאין / שפטי־ארץ כתהו עשה	23
4/4	אף־בל נטעו אף־בל זרעו / אף־בל שרש בארץ גזעם	24
3/3	וגם־נשף בהם ויבשו / וסערה כקש תשאם	
3/3	ואל־מי תדמיוני ואשוה / יאמר קדוש <ישראל>	25
4/4	שאו מרום עיניכם וראו / מי ברא <כל> אלה	26
3/3	המוציא במספר צבאם / לכלם בשם יקרא	
3/3	מרב אונים ואֶמְקִיכֻהוּ / איש לא נעדר	
3/3	למה תאמר יעקב / ותדבר ישראל <עמי>	27
3/3	נסתרה דרכי מיהוה / ומאלהי משפטי עבר	
3/3/3	הלוא ידעת אם־לא־שמעת / אלהי עולם יהוה / בורא קצות הארץ	28
3/3	לא ייעף ולא־ייגע / אין חקר לתבונתו	
3/3	נתן לִיעֵף כח / ולא־יִאֲוִינֵם עֲצֻמָּה יִרְבֶּה	29
3/3	וייעפו נערים ויגעו / ובחורים כשול יכשלו	30
4/3	וקוי יהוה יחליפו כח / יעלו אבר כנשרים	31
3/3	ירצו ולא ייגעו / ילכו ולא ייעפו	

6. A voice said: Proclaim!

And I said: What shall I proclaim?

All flesh is grass

And all its faithfulness is as the flower of the field.

8. The grass withers, the flower fades,

But the word of our God stands forever.

12. Who has measured the ocean in the hollow of his hand,

Or has marked off the heavens with his span,

Or contained the earth in a measure,

- Or has weighed the mountains in scales
Or the hills has suspended in a balance?
13. Who has compassed the spirit of Yahweh,
Or who was His adviser, who imparted knowledge
to Him?
14. With whom did He take counsel, so that he made Him to
comprehend,
And taught Him the course of justice,
And the way of discernment he caused Him to know?
- 15a. Behold, nations are as a drop from a bucket,
Even as a speck of dust on a scales are they reckoned.
- 15b-16 Behold the Isles are as something worthless cast away,
And Lebanon would not suffice for fuel,
Nor its animals for a burnt-offering.
17. Yea, all the nations are as nothing before Him;
As naught and vanity are they reckoned in comparison
with Him.
18. Then to whom would ye liken Yahweh,
Or what appearance would ye ascribe to Him?
21. Do ye not know; will ye not hear;
Hath it not been told to you from the very first;
Have ye not comprehended it from the founding of
the earth?
22. It is He who sitteth upon the circle of the earth,
And its inhabitants are as grasshoppers before Him,
Who stretcheth out the heavens as a spread,
And sets them up as a tent for His habitation;
23. Who bringeth princes to nothingness;
Who maketh the rulers of the earth (to be) as naught;
24. Yea, they are not planted, nor yet are they sown,
Nor yet does their stalk take root in the soil;
Moreover, when He breathes upon them they wither away,
And the tempest carries them off as chaff.
25. Then to whom would ye liken Me that I should be similar,
Sayeth the Holy One of Israel.
26. Raise your eyes aloft and see!
Who hath called all these into being,
Who bringeth forth the host of them in order,
Who summons each of them by name,
(So that) because of His abundant strength and mighty
power
Not a single one is missing?

27. Why sayest thou, O Jacob,
And declarest, O Israel, My people,
My way is hid from Yahweh,
And my cause hath passed away from my God?
28. Dost thou not know, or hast thou not heard?
God everlasting is Yahweh,
The Creator of the ends of the earth.
He groweth not weary nor doth He become exhausted;
There is no fathoming of His wisdom.
29. He giveth strength to the weary
And for him who is without power he multiplieth might.
30. Even youths may grow weary and become exhausted,
And young men may stumble completely.
31. But they who hope in Yahweh shall renew (their) strength;
They shall sprout forth wings as eagles.
They shall run but not grow weary,
They shall move onward but not grow faint.

6. For **וַאֲמַר** it is well, as indeed the context requires, to read, with *G* and possibly also with *DSIa*, **וַאֲמַר**, "and I said." But with this reading it seems wise instead of **וַאֲמַר** to read **אָמַר**, and thus set both verbs in the past tense. Vv. 6b-8 are the answer given by the Voice to the prophet's question; as already said, they state the dominant theme of the address which the prophet is bidden to deliver. Read **כָּל** for the sake of the meter and to bring out the full emphasis of the word.

12-17. These vv. constitute a closely knit strophe with a unique metrical form. The theme of the strophe is the absolute incomparability of Yahweh. The strophe consists of seven metrical units, three $4/3-3/3/3$'s plus a $4/4$, in which last the theme is summed up in climactic form. The effect is impressive indeed.

12. For **יָמִים** read, with Kittel, **יָמִים**, "the Ocean" (cf. Gen. 1.10; 49.13; Deut. 33.19 *et passim*). For **בֹּרֵא** read, with *DSIa*, the Syriac translation of *G*, and *S*, **בֹּרְחוֹ**. With the pronominal suffix thus appended the word balances completely **בְּשַׁעֲלוֹ** in the first stichos of v. 12a. As comparison with vv. 14 and 15b-16 indicates, v. 12b must be read as a $3/3/3$; accordingly in the first stichos there is one word too many; omit therefore, with Kittel, the altogether superfluous **עֵפֶר**; in fact with this word omitted, the parallelism between ocean, heaven and earth, the three integral parts of the world as then conceived, becomes complete. Also with Kittel, for **הָאָרֶץ** read **אָרֶץ** to conform to **יָמִים** and **שָׁמַיִם**, both nouns used here without the article. In the third stichos a word is missing, requisite for the expected three beats of the stichos; by inserting it at the end of the third stichos, a perfect, chiastic parallelism between the two stichoi is achieved; this is of course one more instance of the loss of a word at the end of a line of Biblical poetry. **שַׁעַל** is manifestly a unit of liquid measure, manifestly of small size (cf. I Kings 20.10). The **וֶרֶת** was a unit of longitudinal measure, "the span of a hand," also a relatively small measure. The **שֶׁלֶשׁ** was obviously a unit of dry measure; the stem, **שָׁלַשׁ**, suggests compellingly that it was one third of some larger, standard unit, presumably an ephah. The question here is obviously not merely who has measured ocean, heaven and earth, but rather who has measured

them so minutely and precisely by measurements each the smallest in its particular category.

13. Since vv. 13 and 14 constitute the second of the series of three successive 4/3—3/3/3's it is obvious that the second stichos of v. 13 contains one word too few, while the third stichos of v. 14 contains two words too many. In v. 13ב *איש עצתו*, since it is a somewhat conventional term expressing a single idea (cf. 46.11), should be read as a single beat. Accordingly, following *G*, *V* and *S*, insert *מי* at the beginning of the stichos and shift the *ו* connective from *ואיש* to it and read *ומי*. Also, following *G* and *V*, prefix a *ו* and read *וידענו*; this would give to this verb the force of a relative clause, "who has imparted knowledge to him"; this *ו* was undoubtedly lost by haplography. Very interestingly and significantly this seems to be the only passage in the entire Bible where the *רוח יהוה* is present in the Deity Himself; in every other passage it is an emanation from the Deity, which goes forth from Him and rests upon some distinguished person, a king (I Sam. 10.6, 10; 16.13), a prophet (I Kings 22.24; Ezek. 11.5) or some other leader of the people (Judg. 3.10; 11.29; 13.25) or one charged with an especial task (Ex. 31.3; 35.31). It always implies that the particular individual is filled with divine knowledge and power; and here too the concept of divine knowledge is implicit in the use of the term; the realization of this fact makes plain the thought-parallelism between the two stichoi of the v.

14. It seems wise to, with *G*, *V*, and *S*, omit the *ב'* of *בארך* and make the noun the second object of *וילמדו*. Likewise in the third stichos of the tristich there are plainly two beats too many. Moreover, the repetition of *וילמדו* in this stichos immediately after its use in the preceding stichos is stylistically inelegant and awkward; accordingly, with *G*, omit *וילמדו דע* as a gloss; this restores the expected three beats within the stichos. Also for *וידענו* in this third stichos it seems well to read *הודיענו*, to accord with the past tense expressed by the two verbs immediately preceding. Possibly *משפט* in the second stichos, instead of being translated "justice," its conventional connotation, might here be translated better "government," i. e. the administration of the world by Yahweh, its *שופט* or "ruler"; just this is the major theme of the remainder of this address.

Vv. 15-17 continue the picture of measuring and weighing, and, following immediately upon v. 14, say that whereas the spirit of God defies, is superior to, all weighing and measuring, nations, even entire nations, not only can be weighed and measured, but also, when so weighed and measured, in comparison with God are altogether insignificant, are but as a tiny drop from a full bucket or as a speck of dust upon a scale, utterly nothing, hardly meriting notice. This leads, in turn, very effectively to the question of v. 18, all this being so, how then can man liken God to anything, how can he seek to measure or depict or represent Him in human terms? How, above all, so the implication clearly is, can man continue to believe that an idol can resemble or portray God in any way? Vv. 21-24 then go on to describe God in the only manner comprehensible to man, by His creation and government of the universe and by His absolute, incomparable, irresistible power in comparison with which human beings are as grasshoppers, and even kings are as nothing; in fact He Himself has made them so, and His power, compared with theirs, is such that He carries them away as a breath. This leads properly and effectively to the repetition of the question in v. 25, "To what then would ye, insignificant human beings, liken God, Israel's own, peculiar, Holy One?" The emphatic affirmation here that He, the one, universal God, is in first degree Israel's own god, paves the way most effectively to the final assurance to anxious and troubled Israel that He has not forgotten it or His covenant (*חסד*, implicit here from v. 6) with it, and that He

will care for it and deliver it from its present unhappy situation. But first, the primary, logical answer to the question of v. 25, to whom may man properly liken God? How shall they comprehend Him, the first, indispensable task in making any such comparison? Only by observing the wonder of His creation, its magnitude and precision, as evidenced by all the heavenly bodies and the punctuality of their movement. Therefore, knowing His solicitude for it, His people, Israel should realize that there is no ground for its fear that He no longer concerns Himself with it. Let them but have faith in Him and in His faithfulness and incomparable power, and they can feel reassured and can gather new hope and strength. Such is the theme of this address and the course of its development.

15. The final stichos in v. 15b must be dissociated from the distich in v. 15a and linked with v. 16 to form the 3/3/3 tristich here expected; note that with this rearrangement both the distich and the tristich begin with $\eta\eta$, and also that thus $\eta\eta$ is the theme of both parts of the distich, whereas in the tristich each stichos has a different subject. In order to achieve the expected four beats in the first stichos of the 4/3 distich $\eta\eta$ here must be read with a full beat. The rather meaningless כדק יסול I would, following a suggestion of the Syriac translation of G and of A , emend to כריק יוסל .

17. Inasmuch as v. 17 continues directly the thought of vv. 15–16, it is well, with G , to prefix a connective ו' כל at the beginning of the v. and read וכל . For מאפס , a term which occurs nowhere else in the Bible, read, following G , with Kittel, נאפס . It seems well to read v. 17 as a 4/4, giving a full beat to יכל in the first stichos and again to לו in the second stichos and thus bringing out the emphatic import of both words.

18. For אל read, with G , יהוה ; certainly we expect here the proper name of the Deity rather than the title, אל , “the Supreme God,” and this despite the fact that Deutero-Isaiah frequently employs אל as a designation of Yahweh.

21. Each הלוה must receive a full beat in order that its emphatic import may be appreciated; this makes the v. a 4/4/4 tristich. In the second stichos it seems well to transpose מראש to follow לכם and thus to link the latter word more closely with הוד . For מוסדות read, with Kittel, מיסודות (cf. Ps. 87.1).

22. The חזן הרוץ is of course the encircling horizon of the earth. Inasmuch as the meter is plainly 3/3, a word is obviously missing in the second stichos of the first distich; accordingly supply לפניו , a word which is essential to the complete thought of the stichos; another instance of the loss of a word at the end of a line of Biblical poetry. For כדק , which is meaningless here and is plainly a corruption, V seems to have read כריק ; following the hint which V thus offers, for כדק read, with many commentators, ברקיע ; for רקע and נטה used in close association cf. Isa. 42.5; 44.24. For Yahweh's dwelling-place likened to a tent cf. Ps. 27.5.

23. For שפטיארץ cf. Ps. 2.10; 148.11; Prov. 8.16; here the two words are closely linked and must, as the meter requires, be read as a single beat. חזן is used with the article (I Sam. 12.21; Isa. 29.21; Job 6.18) as well as without it (cf. v. 17 above); accordingly retain the article here, with MT .

24. The v. consists of two distichs, one a 4/4 and the other a 3/3. Each of the ב'א-היכל is emphatic and so must receive a full beat. שָׁרֵשׁ must be regarded as a *po'el* perf. ויבשו should be written וייבשו , since it is a form of יבש , “to dry up;” the ו' should be construed as a ו' connective, so that the tense may agree with השאם .

25. The ו' ואל has the force of “then.” Inasmuch as the v. is manifestly a 3/3, the second stichos plainly has lost a word; accordingly supply ישראל after קדוש . The title ישראל , for Yahweh occurs nine times in Isa. 40–48, and so was obviously a favorite designation of the Deity by our prophet. This is of course yet another instance of the loss of a word at the end of a line of Biblical poetry.

26. It seems wise to insert, with *G*, *כל* before *אלה* since both context and meter suggest this; the first distich of the v. thus becomes a 4/4; since the reference here is obviously to the heavenly bodies, particularly the stars, the insertion of *כל* adds considerably to the effect of the passage. These words were undoubtedly accompanied by a sweeping gesture by the hand towards the heaven. Moreover, the passage suggests strongly that the prophet delivered this address at night, when the heavens were aglow with stars. And this suggests still further that upon this occasion the prophet's audience was small and assembled more or less secretly somewhere in the great outdoors. We can readily imagine the circumstances which, towards the end of the prophet's ministry, made an assembly under these circumstances advisable. "Who bringeth forth their host by number," i. e. in their assigned order. The sing., *בשם*, instead of the plu. *בשמות*, implies that each star is summoned in turn by its own name when the moment for it to become visible above the horizon arrives; this picture is graphic indeed. For *אמין* read, with *DSIa*, all the vss. and most commentators, *אמן* and, likewise with *DSIa* and all the vss. for *כה* read *כח*.

27. The v. is plainly a 3/3 double-distich; obviously then a word is missing in the second stichos of the first distich; accordingly supply *עמי* (cf. 43.20; 47.6) after *ישראל*; still another instance of the loss of a word at the end of a line of Biblical poetry; the insertion of this word adds very much to the effect of this passage. *משפטי*, "my case at law; my cause" (cf. Isa. 49.4; Micah 7.9; Ps. 35.23; Job 34.5, 6). The second distich here exhibits a very effective chiasm. With this v. the prophet shifts from the 2nd plu. to the 2nd sing. in addressing Israel; this tends to make the message of reassurance which follows more personal and enheartening. The prophet seeks now to inculcate his hearers with faith in God; and certainly in the final analysis faith is a personal, individual matter; accordingly this transition here to the 2nd sing. is particularly effective. For *עבר יעבור* read *עבר* in order to agree in tense with *נסתרה*; this textual corruption resulted from dittography of the ' of *משפטי*.

28. *עולם* had better be interpreted here as "the world" (cf. Ps. 66.7; Eccl. 3.11) rather than as "eternity," i. e. "the universal God" rather than "the eternal God," the universal God in the light of the fact, stated in the very next stichos, that He is the Creator of the earth unto its very ends. The v. states that neither the creation of this world nor anything else can weary or exhaust God, nor yet can there be, in man's efforts to comprehend the divine import of everything which befalls him, any adequate fathoming of God's all-wise plan and purpose. This thought paves the way for the message of faith set forth in vv. 29-31. *יעף* and *ינע* are not absolute synonyms; *ינע* means "to become weary or exhausted from extreme physical exertion," while *יעף* means "to become weary or faint from lack of food"; probably for this reason *G* renders every occurrence of *יעף* in this address by "hunger." It is plain from vv. 27-28 that the audience which the prophet is here addressing has become greatly disheartened by some, probably protracted catastrophe which had befallen it and that its faith in Yahweh, in His intentions towards it and in His ability to protect it has been severely strained. Instead of denouncing it for this loss of faith the prophet seeks to comfort his audience and restore its faith. Plainly the prophet is here addressing, not the entire Jewish community in Babylonia, as in his earlier addresses, but only a very small group thereof, one assembled at night and probably in some out of the way place, where it would not be disturbed by others, presumably, as we have suggested, the large mass of Israel in exile, now bitterly hostile to both the prophet and his faithful followers. And plainly too, this is a late address of the prophet, perhaps his very latest, as we have also suggested.

29. It seems well for *ליעף* of *MT* to read *ליעף*.

30. For *וינעו* and *וינעו* of *MT* read, as in v. 31, *וינעו* and *וינעו*.

31. "They shall sprout forth wings as eagles"; for this rendering of עלו, "to cause to grow," cf. Jer. 30.17; 33.6; Ezek. 19.3. The reference is unmistakably to the myth of the phoenix and its annual renewal of its youth. That this myth, with the phoenix regarded as an eagle, was well-known in ancient Israel is evidenced by Ps. 103.5. The stichos says that those who hope in Yahweh shall renew their youth, even as the phoenix-eagle does in the myth; thus interpreted this second stichos offers a very vivid and effective parallelism to the first stichos.

MONEY AND MERCHANTS IN UR III

JOHN B. CURTIS and WILLIAM W. HALLO

Hebrew Union College - Jewish Institute of Religion, Cincinnati

dam-gàr-re kug ta ba-an-tur

dù-ù še ta ba-an-tur

"How the merchant has reduced the (amount of) silver!

How the . . . (?) has reduced the (amount of) barley!"

Sumerian proverb; courtesy E. I. Gordon

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I

THE neo-Sumerian or Ur III period of Mesopotamian history is in spite of its early date¹ the most abundantly documented century in all cuneiform literature. Four great archives cover the duration of its economic life: that of Lagaš for the reigns of Ur-Nammu and Šulgi particularly; those of Umma and Puzriš-Dagan for the reigns of AMAR-Sin and Šu-Sin especially; and that of Ur for the reign of Ibbi-Sin above all. Other sites have contributed significant numbers of archival texts; the monuments of the five Ur III dynasts are found from one end of Mesopotamia to the other; and the Sumerian literary texts of the Old Babylonian period dwell by preference on the same rulers, canonizing their monumental inscriptions, the hymns in their honor, and even their correspondence.

Yet for all this abundant documentation, we are at a loss for primary evidence on the simple but elemental question: what made the neo-Sumerian society go? What was the driving power behind its super-active economy? Was the economy free, feudal, or statist? Was the dynamism of economic life provided by the market-place, the temple, or the palace? The vast majority of the sources are silent on this subject. They record innumerable business transactions without once divulging the motivating force behind them. It is only from a few isolated texts, or by reading between the lines of the mass of standard texts, that one may attempt to discover that motive, to determine whether it was private profit, religious service, political aggrandizement or yet another goal.

Such attempts have become more common in recent years. Polanyi and Oppenheim, arguing that early Babylonia and Assyria knew no

¹ c. 2114-2005 or 2214-2105 B. C.

markets in the classical sense, have found that their economies were, nevertheless, free in a sense peculiar to their time and place.² Falkenstein and Kraus have revived the notion of a religiously dominated society with a temple-centered economy based on the alliance between crown and priesthood.³ The great storage centers of the Ur III period have also been compared to state banks, and the — admittedly few — letter-orders of the time to checks or drafts on these banks drawn by the king or his authorized subordinates in favor of the bearer.⁴

Each of these explanations is influenced by the disconcertingly rare references to silver (money) in an economy so highly organized and so careful in its accounting procedures. This phenomenon is the more startling in view of the great and even ubiquitous role of silver as money in the Old Babylonian period that succeeded the neo-Sumerian period. There, silver served each of the three classical functions of money: as a medium of exchange, as a unit of account, and as a standard of value, and there was "a price on everything, from the skin of a gored ox to the privilege of a temple office."⁵

Indications of price are not, however, entirely absent from the Ur III texts either. The usual entry "x amount of commodity y" is occasionally amplified by the specification "its silver (-equivalent)⁶ is z." There are also not infrequent consignments of silver, and some of these, in turn, are priced in the opposite way, that is, by their equivalent in grain⁷ or certain other commodities. The questions raised by these occasional references to prices⁸ are these: what role

² Karl Polanyi, "Marketless trading in Hammurabi's time," *apud* Polanyi, Arensberg and Pearson, *Trade and market in the early empires: economies in history and theory* (1957), chap. 2.

A. L. Oppenheim, "A bird's-eye view of Mesopotamian economic history," *ibid.*, chap. 3. Cf. *idem*, "The seafaring merchants of Ur," *JAOS*, 74 (1954), 6-17, where, however, Tilmun (Bahrein) is described as a "'market place,' a neutral territory, in which the parties coming from various regions of the coastal area of the [Persian] gulf exchange or sell the products of their countries," (p. 7).

³ F. R. Kraus, "Le rôle des temples depuis la troisième dynastie d'Ur jusqu'à la première dynastie de Babylone," *Journal of World History*, 1 (1954), 518-545.

A. Falkenstein, "La cité-temple sumérienne," *ibid.*, 784-814.

⁴ W. Hallo, "Contributions to neo-Sumerian," *HUCA*, 29 (1958), pp. 72, 83, 98.

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 98. For one of the few Ur III texts recording sizeable payments in silver, cf. *TCL* 5:6166.

⁶ Sumerian *kù-bi*, Akkadian *kasapšu*.

⁷ Sumerian *še-bi*; cf. e. g. the account text *HSS* 4:24: 10 gín *kù-ba-b-bar* *še-bi* 10 gur etc.

⁸ Actually, "equivalencies"; cf. the explicit designation in Reisner, *TT* 102, an account where various foods are priced in "their grain of exchange," Sumerian *še-ba-la-bi*. For *še-ba-la* = *šupiltum*, see *MSL* 5:9, 60.

did silver play in the Ur III economy? Was it used as money in all its three functions? Was it the only kind of money in general use? To answer these questions, we have examined for price indications a specific category of texts, namely the so-called "balanced accounts."⁹ Subsequently, we hope to comb all Ur III texts for references to standards of value, and thereby to complete the price index derived from the balanced accounts.

A survey of the balanced accounts reveals some fifteen published ones which designate the silver equivalents of all the listed commodities.¹⁰ The new text published below, pp. 113-116, may now be added to this group. Nine of the published texts have already been studied by T. Fish and W. F. Leemans.¹¹ Another (*CT* 5:38:17752) was first studied in transliteration and translation by S. Langdon.¹² A. L. Oppenheim adduced one more (Chiera, *STA* 1) in a brief but suggestive note.¹³ Neo-Sumerian prices have been treated in more or less detail by Meissner, Schwenzner, Fish, Jacobsen, Forbes, Gelb, and Lutz.¹⁴

⁹ Sumerian *níg - ŠID*, *níg - ŠID - a k a*, Akkadian *nikkassu* (*epšu*), *MSL* 5:64.

¹⁰ See below, p. 117. The following texts, though closely related, do not fit this description sufficiently to be included there: *YOS* 4:295 (see on this text Fish, *BJRL* 22:172); *NBC* 228 (unpublished; closely related to the preceding); *NBC* 237, 244, 246 (unpublished; give silver equivalents of gold and gold objects); *BIN* 5:109 (related to the preceding); *ITT* 5:6935; *UET* 3:330 (contract for receipt of silver by a merchant); Reisner, *TT* 129 (cf. below, note 22); Pinches, *Amherst* 50 (cf. below, note 21). Other texts, though they apparently fit the description, are too fragmentary to be used; so e. g. Reisner, *TT* 131 (labelled *níg - ŠID - a k níg - šám - a D ù g - g a d a m - g à r*); *ibid.*, 137 (hire of workmen); *UET* 3:337 (balanced account of the merchant of the temple of Utu at Ur for AMAR-Sin 9; only the subscript preserved); *TCL* 5:6166.

¹¹ T. Fish, "Some Sumerian tablets of the Third Dynasty of Ur: II. Tablets recording operations of the *dam-qar*," *JRAS*, 1939, pp. 32-39.

Idem, "Aspects of Sumerian civilisation in the Third Dynasty of Ur: VII. The *dam-qar* (trader?) in ancient Mesopotamia," *BJRL*, 22 (1938), pp. 160-174.

W. F. Leemans, *The Old Babylonian merchant* . . . (1950), esp. pp. 40-48 ("The social position of the *tamkārūm* before the Old Babylonian period").

¹² *Babyloniaca* 6 (1912), 42-45.

¹³ Oppenheim, *AOS*, 32 (1948), 137 f.

¹⁴ B. Meissner, "Warenpreise in Babylonien," *Abhandlungen der Preussischen Akademie, Phil.-hist. Klasse* (1936)/1, supplemented by *Sitzungsberichte der Preussischen Akademie* 1937:5-7.

Idem, "Verkehr und Handel" in *Babylonien und Assyrien*, I (1920), 336-70.

W. Schwenzner, "Zum altbabylonischen Wirtschaftsleben," *MVAG* 19/3 (1915); *idem*, "Das geschäftliche Leben im alten Babylonien," *AO* 16/1 (1916).

H. F. Lutz, "Price fluctuations in ancient Babylonia," *Journal of Economic and Business History*, 4 (1932), 335-355 (of little value, as it cites no sources). I. J. Gelb, *MAD* 3 *passim* (cites prices for commodities in the Old Akkadian lexicon). R. J. Forbes, *Metallurgy in Antiquity* (1950) and *Studies in Ancient Technology*, 6 vv., *passim*. See also notes 35-37 below.

Our debt to the authors named is gratefully acknowledged. None of them has, however, called attention to the intimate and highly significant relationship which exists between money on the one hand and merchants on the other in the Ur III period, possibly because each of them was primarily concerned with only one or the other. Yet a glance at p. 117 below will confirm this relationship. The balanced accounts of priced commodities are all *merchants'* balanced accounts after Šulgi 40¹⁵; one of them even bears this designation.¹⁶ Our only example from before this time is associated with the ša b r a, the temple steward.¹⁷ The apparent exception to this rule is *TCL* 5:6045. Here the usual subscript is replaced by "balanced silver account of Ur-e'e."¹⁸ Ur-e'e is not specifically designated as merchant here, nor is he known as such from other texts.¹⁹ Yet this may well be an exception to prove the rule; it seems to imply that a balanced account could not be rendered in money terms by anyone other than a merchant, that a subscript "balanced money-account of the merchant NN" would in fact have been tautologous.²⁰

A similar pattern emerges from the consideration of texts other than balanced accounts in which silver equivalents are given.²¹ Either merchants figure prominently in such texts,²² or else, while the prin-

¹⁵ *I. e.*, starting with Reisner, *TT* 122. Although the subscript of this text is lost, its remaining portions fit the scheme of the balanced accounts, and make repeated mention of Lu-Utu the merchant.

¹⁶ In Sumerian: níg-ŠID-aka dam-gàr-ne Lú-kal-la (*TCL* 5:6037), i. e., "merchants' balanced account of Lukalla."

¹⁷ Reisner, *TT* 121.

¹⁸ In Sumerian: níg-ŠID-aka kug-ga [U]r-e-e-e.

¹⁹ Cf. Fish's list of merchants in *BJRL* 22:163 f., supplemented by Leemans, *op. cit.*, p. 48, n. 140.

²⁰ *HSS* 4:1, with the subscript níg-ŠID-aka kug KA-lá-a, does not seem to belong here.

²¹ Cf. e. g. those listed in n. 10 above. No note can here be taken of texts in which the kù-bi x ma-na formula is replaced by the less specific x ma-na-ta formula as, e. g., in Pinches, *Amherst* 50 iv, 14 ff: diríg 2 gú 31½ ma-na 3½ gín síg-gi 10 ma-na-ta, ì-giš-bi 181½ sila₃ 12 sila₃-ta, i. e., "151 pounds, 23½ shekel of gi-wool at 10 pounds (of wool per shekel of silver!) — its tree-oil equivalent is 181½ quarts at 12 quarts (of tree-oil per shekel of silver!)" It is true that this equation is correct, both in terms of the respective silver-equivalents (2725 grains of silver in each case) and in terms of the prices of these commodities (18 grains of silver per pound of gi-wool; 15 grains of silver per quart of tree-oil) as compared with the prices given below, pp. 120 and 127; but one cannot say that silver as such figured in the transaction or the calculation, and the absence of a merchant in this and similar texts is therefore not disconcerting to our theory.

²² Cf. e. g. Reisner, *TT* 129 vii: 1½ ma-na kug šà-bi-ta ki dam-gàr-TUR.NÍG. 'UM.GI.RA'-ke₄-ne-ta 15 gud 6-gín-ta kù-bi

cipals are not identified by profession, it must have been clear to the contemporary scribe that they were merchants, and in fact they are known as such from other texts.²³ As a working hypothesis, then, it is here suggested that silver as money was primarily used by the merchants in the neo-Sumerian period.²⁴

II

A tentative working description of the balanced accounts of the merchants is necessary here. Basically, each text falls into two major sections. The first section is a summary of the assets²⁵ of the merchant. Among these assets the most important item is regularly silver, this silver being from two basic sources — one, the balance on hand²⁶ at the beginning of the period covered by the tablet, and the other, the city-governor (*ensi*₂), other merchants, and unidentified individuals. While the "balance on hand" is usually expressed as silver, the other assets may also consist of commodities. The latter constitute an inventory of goods on hand, each with an evaluation in silver.²⁷ The most frequently mentioned products on hand are wool and dates; however, we may also find fish of all kinds, barley, leather products, and oils. The value of all the commodities is added to the silver to give the total of the assets.

The second major section of the merchants' accounts lists the debits or withdrawals from it²⁸ (i. e., from the total of assets). A commodity is listed; then follows its value in silver preceded by the formula *kù-bi*. These silver values are then totalled, and a final balance is arrived at by subtracting the total of the second section from the total of the first section. This balance may be either positive²⁹

1½ *ma-na* . . . *zi-ga*, i. e., "1½ pounds of silver, out of which 15 oxen at 6 shekel (per ox) whose silver equivalent is 1½ pounds was withdrawn from the merchant of the . . . s."

²³ E. g. Fish, *MCS* 2:69 (BM 105442) where various priced commodities are received from Ur-Dumuzi and receipted (*kišib*) by Lugal-gar-lagar, both of whom appear as merchants in Fish's above-cited list (note 19).

²⁴ Unexpected confirmation of our thesis comes from the Sumerian proverbs. No. 1, 165 in the edition of Edmund I. Gordon is described by him (*JCS* 12:64) as associating the *dam-gàr*, "merchant" with *ku-g*, "silver." It is quoted at the head of this article in Gordon's transliteration and translation.

²⁵ Sumerian *sag-gar-ga-ra-kam*, literally perhaps "it is the head (i. e. capital) of those things which have been deposited."

²⁶ Akkadian *si-ì-tum*, which is taken over into Sumerian as a loan word.

²⁷ Once, in *TCL* 5:6037, wheat (*gi-g*) on hand is evaluated in copper.

²⁸ Sumerian *šà-bi-ta* . . . *zi-ga-àm*.

²⁹ Sumerian *lá-ni*, literally perhaps "his credit," "his balance brought

or negative.³⁰ The tablet closes with the label "balanced account of NN the merchant" (see above, pp. 106 f., for the variants) and a date.

Thus all the balanced accounts of the merchants follow a definite pattern with few variations, and it is unnecessary to reproduce each one here separately. Instead, a hitherto unpublished example is offered by way of illustration. The text is the property of Dr. Elie Borowski (Toronto), and is published here with his kind permission. (See below, pp. 113-116).

In the tables which follow, all the prices available from these texts are given for reference. The texts are listed in chronological order from top to bottom of each table, and the commodities in approximate order of value from left to right. The tables are arranged in five groups according to the units used to measure the commodities, all prices having first been reduced to grains of silver³¹ per pound,³² quart³³ or unit. In this way, the relative prices of the different commodities can be compared at a glance.³⁴ Entries in heavy-face italics indicate that the evaluation comes from the first section of the tablet, the assets of the merchant. All other entries are from the second section of the tablets. If a commodity occurs more than once at the same price in a given tablet, then the number of occurrences is given in parentheses after the value.

From the data thus assembled, it will be seen that among the commodities usually kept on hand by the merchants and considered as assets, there is a rather definite fixity of prices during the forty-five years covered by our texts.³⁵ Dates, for example, seem to have a

forward." So in *CT* 5:38 f., *STA* 1, 22, and 23, *BM* 106064, and *TCL* 5:6052, 6056 and 6045.

³⁰ Sumerian *dir ig*, perhaps "overdraft." So in *TCL* 5:5680. In the text published below, where the "overdraft" is a mere 3 grains, the scribe has entered it as a negative credit, if we are correct in reading the relevant line as *l á - n i* (erasure) *O!* (written $\frac{1}{3}$) *gín la l - 3!* (wr. 30) - *še*. In the text *TCL* 5:6037, where there is a similarly insignificant "overdraft," the calculation is omitted entirely and in *TCL* 5:6162 it has been erased. Cf. below, p. 117.

³¹ Sumerian *še kù - ba b b a r*.

³² Sumerian *ma - na*; actually the Sumerian *ma - na* is approximately equivalent to 1.11 pounds or 505 grams; cf. Thureau-Dangin, *RA* 24 (1927), pp. 69-73.

³³ Sumerian *sil a₃*; actually the Sumerian *sil a₃* is approximately equivalent to 1.03 liquid quarts or .97 liters; cf. Thureau-Dangin, *RA* 34 (1937), p. 86. For a different view, see H. Lewy, *JAOS* 64 (1944), pp. 65-73.

³⁴ It would have been equally possible to have given the prices in terms of weight, volume, or units of the commodity per shekel of silver; this practice was followed by Meissner (above, n. 14). There are models for both practices in the Ur III texts themselves.

³⁵ Undoubtedly, however, they rose sharply during the last five years of this

rather set value of about .4 grains of silver per quart; this is not to say that every entry concerning dates lists this value, for the range of values is from about .3 to .6 grains of silver per quart of dates, but of the twelve distinct values, eight are exactly or approximately .4 grains of silver per quart of dates. (See below, p. 127).

The case is similar when one considers wool.³⁶ The standard price for wool seems to have been 20 grains of silver per pound, for this value occurs repeatedly in these texts. Nevertheless, wool in some entries has the value of 15 and 18 grains per pound. (See below, p. 120). Barley also seems to have had a rather fixed value of .6 grains of silver per quart, though again there are slight variations in some texts. (Page 126).

The many varieties of fish must be treated at greater length. First it should be noted that no type of fish is mentioned in more than three texts, and that all the fish entries occur in a period of two years, AMAR-Sin 4 and 5. With these limitations in mind, we can state that fish are generally measured by the unit or, more accurately, by the tens and sixties, not by weight or volume. Smoked fish (k u₆ - i z i) alone is sold by volume at a price of .3 grains of silver per quart. All other (i. e., dried?) fish except k u₆ - š à - b a r have a value of about .1 to .2 grains of silver apiece. The fish k u₆ - š à - b a r is relatively expensive, having some values as high as .5 grains of silver apiece. (Page 130).

When one turns from the commodities which the merchant kept on hand to those which he bought, one finds a comparatively wide variety of prices. Gypsum, for example, has values as low as .05 grains of silver per pound to as high as .3 grains of silver per pound. The variation in price for gypsum seems to be unrelated to the year in which the commodity was purchased. Bitumen has a seemingly more nearly fixed price, but its value can vary from slightly under 1.2 to 3 grains of silver per quart. There are many commodities in the category of herbs but these are not all sufficiently well attested to provide the basis for a judgment. Nevertheless, the item called simply š i m has values varying from 30 to 132.7 grains of silver per pound. Another herb, š i m - g a m - g a m - m a, has values from 1.67 to 6 grains of silver per quart. The item ŠE.LI, which occurs with the herbs in the account tablets, has values from about 23 to 90 grains of

period (Ibbi-Sin 3-7), as indicated by the sole preserved entry from UET 3:1165, which has been included on the tables for the sake of completeness. See in detail Jacobsen, "The reign of Ibbi-Suen," *JCS* 7 (1953), p. 42 and especially note 49.

³⁶ Cf. T. Fish, "Aspects of Sumerian civilization . . . II. About wool," *BJRL* 18 (1934), 314-24, and R. J. Forbes, *SAT* 4:6 for some further prices.

silver per quart. Reeds, on the other hand, seem to have a fixed price of 9 grains of silver per pound, with rare variations. Salt follows the regular pattern of the other commodities, for it has values from about 14 to about 22 grains of silver per pound. The alkalis (n a g a) have several descriptions but these give us nearly the same picture. The item n a g a itself has a basic value of .15 grains of silver per quart, but the three variations from this seemingly standard price are considerable. Sprouting alkali (n a g a - s i - è) has values from about .12 to about .23 grains of silver per quart though about .15 grains of silver per quart is the most frequent price.

A special word must be said about the various metals mentioned in these texts. Copper³⁷ has a value of about 120 grains of silver per pound, though the values range from 77.1 to 135 grains of silver per pound. The one reference to lead (a n - n a) gives a value of 360 grains (= 1/30 pound) of silver per pound of lead, that is, 30:1, a ratio considerably below the values of lead attested from Old Assyrian documents.³⁸ The thorny problem of the meaning of k ù - a n - n a is not helped by these texts, but that it has nothing to do with lead is clear from the vast difference in price. The fact that it is almost exactly 18 times as valuable as silver shows that k ù - a n - n a is an even more precious metal than gold, which is commonly eight times more valuable than silver.³⁹

From the data set forth here, a definite pattern emerges: the basic commodities which the merchant had on hand and evaluated as assets have a more or less fixed value, whereas the commodities which he purchased show rather wide variations in price. The former include, in addition to silver, such items as wool, barley, wheat, dates, fish-oil, dried fish and skins; they may be described as non-perishable staples.⁴⁰ The latter included a much larger variety of items, among them metals, lumber, resinous plants, bitumens, herbs, spices, wines, honey, and livestock. Many of them can be identified as luxury items, others as not native to Sumer.

One must hesitate to draw conclusions from inadequate data. Nevertheless, one may wonder whether the first group of commodities

³⁷ Cf. Fish, "Silver equivalents of copper," *MCS* I (1951), 49 for some further prices.

³⁸ Cf. e. g., *TCL* 14:14:15 which gives a value of 14 shekels of lead per shekel of silver.

³⁹ Cf. eg. *BIN* 5:109. See also R. J. Forbes, "Silver and lead in antiquity" in his *Metallurgy in Antiquity* (1950), esp. pp. 194 f.

⁴⁰ The presence of k u 6 - i z i in this group rules out the reading k u 6 - g i b i l, "fresh fish." Cf. Falkenstein, *Neusumerische Gerichtsurkunden* 2 (1956), 301, n. 1.

may not be described as "exchangeable goods" in the sense employed by Heichelheim.⁴¹ That is, they were "not easily perishable and could be used by everybody."⁴² According to Heichelheim, such "exchangeable goods" served as money in their time. They were subject to periodic attempts by the state to stabilize (not maximize!) their values with respect to each other.⁴³ The general uniformity of their values (relative to silver) in the Ur III period before Ibbi-Sin that we have noted in the balanced accounts of the merchants attests to a measure of success in this respect. At the same time it confirms Heichelheim in this basic distinction of commodities that "doubled" as money.

The following tentative conclusions are offered with due reserve. The "exchangeable commodities" of the neo-Sumerian period served as substitutes for money by the side of silver in a period which marked the gradual transition to the strictly monetary economy of the Old Babylonian period. They were subject to equivalences established by the Kings of Ur and were typically deposited with (or perhaps "for the account of") the merchant. It was this official who, because of his role as purchasing agent in areas beyond the control of the state, felt the inadequacy of trade in kind most keenly.⁴⁴

[Correction: Upon re-examination, Chiera, *STA* I iii 38 f. should be understood as 5 gín kug an-na / 1 ma^l-<na> 9 $\frac{5}{8}$ gín 25 še, "5 shekels of silver (for the purchase of) lead, (subtotal for the entire preceding column:) 69 shekels 175 grains." The figures on pp. 111 and 118 (col. i) were based on supplying <kù-bi> 1 $\frac{1}{3}$ <ma-na> in l. 39.]


⁴¹ Fritz Heichelheim, *An ancient economic history* (1958), p. 103-7.

⁴² *Ibid.*, p. 106.

⁴³ Somewhat similar conclusions were reached for later Egypt by J. Černý, "Prices and wages in Egypt in the Ramesside period," *Journal of World History* I (1954), pp. 903-921.

⁴⁴ For a different interpretation, cf. Leemans, *op. cit.*, pp. 44 f.

Obv.



column	ledger heading	quantity	commodity	value	"remarks"
(Obverse)	šu-nigin ₂ ša-bi-ta/	12½ gín 11 še 30 (gur)	kù-babbar/ še-gur/	kù-bi ½ ma-na/ (eras.) 1 gín ¹	a-rá-2-kam/ki Lú-kal-la-ta/
		⅔ ma-na 2½ gín 11 še/ 18,000	pa-mušen/ naga-si-è-gur/ sum-ḥa-din/	kù-bi 10 gín/ kù-bi ⅔ gín/ kù-bi igi-3-gál 15 še/ kù-bi igi-3-gál/	
		12½ sila ₃ 17 sila ₃	sum-sikil/ sum-gaz/ im-babbar _{bar} x/ esir ₂ -è-a/ gazi _x (GÁxZÌ) /	kù-bi igi-3-gál// kù-bi igi-4-gál/ kù-bi 20 še/ kù-bi 10 še/	
(Reverse)		4 gú 10 ma-na 10 (sila ₃) 20 (sila ₃)	kù-babbar		níg-dib ŠEŠ.AB.KI-ma/kišib Ur- dNin-mar KI/gir Lú-dŠara dumu Lú/-igi-šae-šae/ šamām kù-ḥuša/ PA.A-še/ Ur-dŠul-pa-è šu-ba-ti/ šamām UD.KA-bar/ Lú-kal-la šu-ba-ti/ kišib Ur-dŠul-pa-è/ níg-ŠID-ak Šeš-kal-la dam-gâr//
		5 gín	kug kug/ i-šah/		
		1½ gín 20 še ⅓ ma-na igi-3-gál 51 sila ₃ ⅔ ma-na 2½ gín 20 (eras.) 14 še/ 0! gín la ₃ -3!-še/ gu-za dEn-líl-lá	ba-dím///	kù-bi 4 gín la ₃ -6-še/	
(left edge)	šu-nigin ₂ lâ-ni mu				

ledger heading	quantity	commodity	value shekels	(k ũ - b i) grains	shekels (totals)	grains	remarks
	12½ shekel 11 grains	silver	(12	101)			(balance from the year AMAR-Sin 2)
	30 ("bushels")	barley by bushels	30	—			for the second time from Lukalla
	42 shekel 101 grains	(silver)			(42	101)	(capital which is on deposit)
	18,000	feathers	10	—			
	515 "quarts"	sprouted alkali by bushels	—	120			
	12½ "	<i>hadin</i> -onions	—	75			
	17 "	pure onions	—	60			"intake" of Ur,
	17 "	crushed onions	—	60			received by Ur-Ninmar, via Lu-Šara son of Lu-igi-šašag
	250 "pounds"	gypsum	—	45			
	10 ("quarts")	building bitumen	—	20			
	20 (")	cassia	—	10			
	5 shekel	silver	(5	—)			
	1 " shekel 20 grains	silver (k u g)	(1	20)			the price of red silver for eye-
	20 shekel 60 grains	silver (k u g)	(20	60)			paint (which) Ur-Šulpae received
	51 "quarts"	pigs'-fat	3	174			the price of bronze (and) Lukalla received received by Ur-Šulpae
	42 shekel 104 grains	(silver)			(42	104)	(was withdrawn)
	0 shekels minus 3 grains	(silver)				-3	balanced account of Šeš-kalla the merchant
sub-total out of which							
sub-total this credit							
year							

Place of Publication	Provenience	Date	šu-nigin ₂ x kù-babbar sag-gar-ga-ra-kam (shekels) (grains)	ša-bi-ta ... šu-nigin ₂ x kù-babbar zi-ga-àm	lā-ni x kù-babbar	dirig x kù-babbar	Subscript
Reisner, <i>Tempelurkunden aus Telloh</i> , No. 121	Lagaš	Šulgi 30	[				balanced account of Ur-šugalamma the ša b r a, Lu-andul (being) ensi
Reisner, <i>Tempelurkunden aus Telloh</i> , No. 122	Lagaš	Šulgi 40-41	[				[
CT 5:38 f. (BM 17752)	Lagaš	Šulgi 43-44	42	174	12	121	balanced account of Ig-andul the merchant
<i>Hebrew Union College Annual</i> 30: 113 f.	Umma	AMAR-Sin 3	42	101		-3	balanced account of Šeškalla the merchant
Chiera, <i>Selected Temple Accounts</i> , No. 22	Umma	AMAR-Sin 4	163	8	17	125½	balanced account of Ur- Dumuzida the merchant ^a
Genouillac, <i>TCL</i> 5:6162	Umma	AMAR-Sin 4	50	—		(erased)	balanced account of Sag-kud the merchant
Genouillac, <i>TCL</i> 5:6046	Umma	AMAR-Sin 4	846	28			capital on deposit of the merchants
Genouillac, <i>TCL</i> 5:6052	Umma	AMAR-Sin 5	208	58	120	152	balanced account of Inmanizi the merchant
Genouillac, <i>TCL</i> 5:6056	Umma	AMAR-Sin 5	201	76	61	32	balanced account of Šeškalla the merchant
BM 106064 (Fish, <i>BJRL</i> 22:167-9 and JRAS 1939: 32 f.)	Umma	AMAR-Sin 6	196	132	69	70½	balanced account of Šeškalla the merchant
Chiera, <i>Selected Temple Accounts</i> , No. 23	Umma	AMAR-Sin 6	271	22	147	152	balanced account of Padda the merchant
Chiera, <i>Selected Temple Accounts</i> , No. 1	Umma	AMAR-Sin 8	302	120 + x	144	114	balanced account of Ur-Dumuzida the merchant
Genouillac, <i>TCL</i> 5:6045	Umma	AMAR-Sin 8	167	10	11	110	balanced silver-account of Ur-e'e the merchant
Genouillac, <i>TCL</i> 5:5680	Umma	Šu-Sin 2	335	114½			balanced account of Ur-Dumuzida the merchant
Genouillac, <i>TCL</i> 5:6037	Umma	Šu-Sin 6	1173	21½		14.163	merchants' balanced account of Lukalla
Legrain, <i>UET</i> 3:1165	Ur	Ibbi-Sin 7/X	7200 [	urudu			balanced account of Šeškalla [the merchant?]

^a Cf. with this text BM 105442 (Fish, *MCS* 2:69) which duplicates it in part.

I. COMMODITIES EVALUATED BY WEIGHT¹

A. Metals			B. Salt		C. Reed	
	kù-an-na	an-na	urdu	a-garṣ-urudu	mun	gi
Reisner 121/ S 30			90			
Reisner 122/ S 40 f.			c 77.1 c 77.1			
CT 5:38 f./ S 43 f.						
HUCA 30:113 f./ AS 3			109.2			9
STA 22/ AS 4						10.5
TCL 5:6162/ AS 4						
TCL 5:6046/ AS 4			120 ^a			
TCL 5:6052/ AS 5			120			
TCL 5:6056/ AS 5						
B.M. 106064/ AS 6						9
STA 23/ AS 6						9 (2)
STA 1/ AS 8	194,340		c 98. 19		c 22.09 18	
TCL 5:6045/ AS 8			135		15	9
TCL 5:5680/ SS 2					13.58(?)	5.4(?)
TCL 5:6037/ SS 6		360		20		6
UET 3:1165/ IS 7						

¹ Entries are in še of silver per ma-na of the commodity.^a Reading 2 $\frac{5}{8}$ gin 26 še of silver for 2 $\frac{5}{8}$ gin 25 še in the autograph.

1. COMMODITIES EVALUATED BY WEIGHT (*Continued*)

D. Cord	E. Resinous plants				F. Wax		
	û-ninnis	ni-gi4-tum		za-ba-lum	šu-ûr-me	ar-ga-nám	lám-se-lum
Reisner 121/ Š 30							eš-ku-ru-um
Reisner 122/ Š 40 f.							
CT 5:38 f./ Š 43 f.							
HUCA 30:113 f./ AS 3							
STA 22/ AS 4							
TCL 5:6162/ AS 4			18				
TCL 5:6046/ AS 4							
TCL 5:6052/ AS 5							
TCL 5:6056/ AS 5							
B.M. 106064/ AS 6							
STA 23/ AS 6							
STA 1/ AS 8		30	18(2)	18	15(2) ^a	c 6.63	6 90 ^b
TCL 5:6045/ AS 8							
TCL 5:5680/ ŠS 2		22.5	20(2) 18	15	18	6(2)	4.5
TCL 5:6037/ ŠS 6	.3 .25		27 22.5	22.5 20	c 19.34		c 6.5(?) 90
UET 3:1165/ IS 7							

^a written šu-ûr-LÁ in i 22^b written eš-LÁL.HUR!

I. COMMODITIES EVALUATED BY WEIGHT (*Continued*)

H. Miscellaneous								
G. Wool		sig	sig-engar	SÜ.HÉ	SU.HÉ	NÍG.SAR	EN.HUR	gu-é-ba-lum
Reisner 121/ S 30				270				36
Reisner 122/ S 40 f.				c 360				
CT 5:38 f./ S 43 f.				c 360				
HUCA 30:113 f./ AS 3					90			
STA 22/ AS 4								
TCL 5:6162/ AS 4								
TCL 5:6046/ AS 4		20						
TCL 5:6052/ AS 5		20						
TCL 5:6056/ AS 5		20						
B.M. 106064/ AS 6		20 (AS 5) 18						
STA 23/ AS 6		20 (AS 5) 18						.1
STA 1/ AS 8		20 15			180		3	
TCL 5:6045/ AS 8		(?)						
TCL 5:5680/ SS 2		15			90		3	
TCL 5:6037/ SS 6		15	4.5(2)			60		
UET 3:1165/ IS 7								

B. Bitumens

A. Clays

	im-babbar ¹	im-babbar-kum ²	im-kù-gi ²	esir ₂ -é-a ²	esir ₂ -babbar	igi-esir ₂ ¹	esir ₂ a-ba-a ¹
Reisner 121/ S 30				3	.3 ¹	1.5	
Reisner 122/ S 40 f.				2.4			
CT 5:38 f./ S 43 f.	.3			2.4			
HUCA 30:113 f./ AS 3	.18			2			
STA 22/ AS 4	.2 c .167 .05 .72			c 2.19 2			
TCL 5:6162/ AS 4				1.5			
TCL 5:6046/ AS 4							
TCL 5:6052/ AS 5							
TCL 5:6056/ AS 5							
B.M. 106064/ AS 6	.3 .1(2)			1.2(3)			
STA 23/ AS 6	.1(3)	.2		1.2(5) c 1.195	.294 ¹	c .737	
STA 1/ AS 8	.096						
TCL 5:6045/ AS 8				1.2	.3 ¹		
TCL 5:5680/ SS 2	.15(3)			1.28 1.54 1.3 1.77 1.2(4) 1.19 1.219	.3 ¹ .3 ¹ .2992		
TCL 5:6037/ SS 6	.15 c .1497 .15 + c .117	.3	c 1.67 1.5	1.5(2) 2.25 c 1.79 1.8 2.22	.25 ² .275 ¹		.375
UET 3:1165/ IS 7							

¹ Entries are in še of silver per ma-na of the commodity.² Entries are in še of silver per silas of the commodity.

2. COMMODITIES EVALUATED BY WEIGHT AND VOLUME (Continued)

C. Herbs

	šim ¹	šim-1M ¹	šim-düg ¹	šim bab[bar] ¹	šim-gán ²	šim-gig ²	šim-gam- gam-ma ²	(šim) ga4-ku-ru ²	šim-bas-ku- hum ¹	šim-g[ig] ²
Reisner 121/ Š 30	90						4.5	3.6 3	15 18	20
Reisner 122/ Š 40 f.										
CT 5:38 f./ Š 43 f.										
HUCA 30:113 f./ AS 3										
STA 22/ AS 4	30	9		9	12		3.6	3		
TCL 5:6162/ AS 4	36				18		2.67	3		
TCL 5:6046/ AS 4										
TCL 5:6052/ AS 5										
TCL 5:6056/ AS 5										
B.M. 106064/ AS 6										
STA 23/ AS 6							6	3		
STA 1/ AS 8	60	9! 9	9	9	12(2)		4.5	1.8 1.78		
TCL 5:6045/ AS 8										
TCL 5:5680/ Š 2	90	9	9		24		3	3		
TCL 5:6037/ Š 6	c 132.7	9!	9!			9	1.67	3		
UET 3:1165/ IS 7										

¹ Entries are in še of silver per ma-na of the commodity.² Entries are in še of silver per silag of the commodity.

3. COMMODITIES EVALUATED BY VOLUME¹

A. Tanning materials			B. Alkali			C. Onions		
	<i>ni-ik-tum</i>	<i>ni-ik-tum</i> <i>al-la-ka-ru</i>	<i>al-la-ka-ru</i>	<i>naga-si-è</i>	<i>naga-gaz</i>	<i>naga</i>	<i>sum ka-din</i>	<i>ZA ka-din</i> <i>igi-sig₉</i>
Reisner 121/ S 30								
Reisner 122/ S 40 f.								
CT 5:38 f./ S 43 f.				c .23			6	
HUCA 30:113 f./ AS 3								
STA 22/ AS 4								
TCL 5:6162/ AS 4								
TCL 5:6046/ AS 4							12	
TCL 5:6052/ AS 5								
TCL 5:6056/ AS 5								
B.M. 106064/ AS 6				.2		.15		
STA 23/ AS 6			9	.15 (3)		.15		
STA 1/ AS 8						.15 (2)		
TCL 5:6045/ AS 8	15		12 (2)	.12 (2)			4.5	
TCL 5:5680/ SS 2				.12— .125				
TCL 5:6037/ SS 6	15	15	9	.15— .15 (3) .18 + .2 (2)				c 12
UET 3:1165/ IS 7								

¹ Entries are in še of silver per silas.

3. COMMODITIES EVALUATED BY VOLUME (Continued)

(C. continued)

D. Cassia

	sum ZA ḫa-din igi-nu-sig ₅	sum gaz	sum sikil	numun sum sikil	sum sikil igi sig ₅	sag sum sikil igi-nu-sig ₅	sum sikil igi-nu-sig ₅	gazi
Reisner 121/ Š 30								
Reisner 122/ Š 40 f								
CT 5:38 f./ Š 43 f.								
HUCA 30:113 f. AS 3		c 3.53	c 3.53					.5
STA 22/ AS 4								
TCL 5:6162/ AS 4								
TCL 5:6046/ AS 4								
TCL 5:6052/ AS 5								
TCL 5:6056/ AS 5								
B.M. 106064/ AS 6								
STA 23/ AS 6								
STA 1/ AS 8								
TCL 5:6045/ AS 8				2.25				
TCL 5:5680/ ŠS 2	6			2.4		1.2		
TCL 5:6037/ ŠS 6				1.5	c 1.5		.6	
UET 3:1165/ IS 7				2.4				

3. COMMODITIES EVALUATED BY VOLUME (Continued)

E. Grains			F. Legumes				
	še-LÚ	še	še-i-šaḥ	giḡ	gú-gal	gú-tur	zi-gú-gal
Reisner 121/ S 30							
Reisner 122/ S 40 f.							
CT 5:38 f./ S 43 f.		.6					
HUCA 30:113 f./ AS 3							
STA 22/ AS 4							
TCL 5:6162/ AS 4							
TCL 5:6046/ AS 4		c .409	.5				
TCL 5:6052/ AS 5		.6					
TCL 5:6056/ AS 5		.67			1.5		
B.M. 106064/ AS 6		.6					c 1.8
STA 23/ AS 6							
STA 1/ AS 8		(?)					
TCL 5:6045/ AS 8	1.2	.527			1.8		
TCL 5:5680/ SS 2		.596					
TCL 5:6037/ SS 6	1.2-	c .429	c .43	c 1 ^a		c 1.27	
UET 3:1165/ IS 7							

^a Text has 60 (+1 erased) gig-gur urudu-bi 2 gú, i. e. 72 še-urudu per sila₃ gig, (or c 70.8 if the erasure stands). The silver value quoted assumes a copper: silver ratio of $\frac{1}{2}72:1$, based on the ratio 79:1 in Šu-Sin 2 (cf. p. 118 above.)

3. COMMODITIES EVALUATED BY VOLUME (Continued)

G. Dates	H. Wine	I. Oils	ì-saḥ	ì-kue	ì-dùg-nun-na	ì-saḥ ¹²
Reisner 121/ Š 30						
Reisner 122/ Š 40 f.						12
CT 5:38 f./ Š 43 f.		20 20(2)	18			
HUCA 30:113 f./ AS 3			14			
STA 22/ AS 4	c 5.023		14			
TCL 5:6162/ AS 4	3			6		
TCL 5:6046/ AS 4		13.5				
TCL 5:6052/ AS 5		13.5		6		
TCL 5:6056/ AS 5	3.75		9			
B.M. 106064/ AS 6	5	15	9(2)			
STA 23/ AS 6			9			
STA 1/ AS 8					180	
TCL 5:6045/ AS 8	(2)	18	15			
TCL 5:5680/ ŠŠ 2					180(3)	
TCL 5:6037/ ŠŠ 6	4.5	13.84 13.8 12 72	12(2) 10 9		180(2)	
UET 3:1165/ IS 7						

4. COMMODITIES EVALUATED BY VOLUME AND UNIT

A. Fruit trees

gis-ma-babbar ¹	gis-ma-še-it-gu ²	gis-ḥašhur-babbar ¹	gis-ḥašhur-še-ir-gu ²	gis-ḥašhur-3-kūš-ta ³	gis-ḥašhur-tur ²	gis-ÚR x EŠ ₃ ¹	gis-nag-numun ²	gis-ḥašhur
Reisner 121/ Š 30					3			
Reisner 122/ Š 40 f.								
CT 5:38 f./ Š 43 f								
HUCA 30:113 f./ AS 3								
STA 22/ AS 4			c 43.33					
TCL 5:6162/ AS 4	15							
TCL 5:6046/ AS 4								
TCL 5:6052/ AS 5								
TCL 5:6056/ AS 5							18	
B.M. 106064/ AS 6		.6						
STA 23/ AS 6	15 (3)	c .33 (2)		5		.5	10?	
STA 1/ AS 8								(?)
TCL 5:6045/ AS 8								
TCL 5:5680/ Š 2								
TCL 5:6037/ Š 6	12							
UET 3:1162/ IS 7								

¹ Entries are in še of silver per sila₃ of the commodity.² Entries are in še of silver per unit of the commodity.³ Text actually has: 115 sila₃ giš-ma-babbar giš-ma-še-ir-gu-bi 38 $\frac{1}{3}$.

4. COMMODITIES EVALUATED BY VOLUME AND UNIT (Continued)

B. Fish

	kué-izi ¹	kué-sà-bar ²	kué-sà-bar-erín ²	kué-gír-uš ²	kué-sag-kúr ²	kué-sag-kur-erín ²	kué-gam-gam ²	kué- ¹ ba ¹ ²
Reisner 121/ S 30								
Reisner 122/ S 40 f								
CT 5:38 f/ S 43 f								
HUCA 30:113 f./ AS 3	.3							
STA 22/ AS 4								
TCL 5:6162/ AS 4								
TCL 5:6046/ AS 4	.3	.4 c .119 .5 .2		c .24 c .15 c .23 c .23	.2 c .109(?) .2		.2 .2	.2
TCL 5:6052/ AS 5	c .3	c .45 .5	.115	c .233	.2(2)	c .115		
TCL 5:6056/ AS 5								
B.M. 106064/ AS 6								
STA 23/ AS 6								
STA 1/ AS 8								
TCL 5:6045/ AS 8								
TCL 5:5680/ SS 2								
TCL 5:6037/ SS 6								
UET 3:1165/ IS 7								

¹ Entries are in še of silver per sila₃ of the commodity.² Entries are in še of silver per unit of the commodity.

5. COMMODITIES EVALUATED BY UNIT¹

	A. Tool for making brick	B. Bundles of reeds	C. Lumber					
	sig-ba	sa-gi-ra	sa-gi-(i)zi	giš-ù-ku mi-ri-za	giš-ù-ku mi-ri-za má-30-gur	giš-ù-ku mi-ri-za má-40-gur	giš-ù-ku mi-ri-za má-60-gur	giš-ù-ku mi-ri-za má-120-gur
Reisner 121/ Š 30								
Reisner 122/ Š 40 f		.6	.375					
CT 5:38 f/ Š 43 f								
HUCA 30:113 f./ AS 3								
STA 22/ AS 4								
TCL 5:6162/ AS 4								
TCL 5:6046/ AS 4								
TCL 5:6052/ AS 5								
TCL 5:6056/ AS 5								
B.M. 106064/ AS 6								
STA 23/ AS 6								
STA 1/ AS 8								
TCL 5:6045/ AS 8								
TCL 5:5680/ ŠS 2	9			c 1.39				
TCL 5:6037/ ŠS 6		c .36			3	4.5 3	3.6	18
UET 3:1165/ IS 7								

¹ Entries are in še of silver per unit of the commodity.

5. COMMODITIES EVALUATED BY UNIT (Continued)

(C. continued)

	giš-ù-ku šù-dím má-20-gur	giš-ù-ku šù-dím má-30-gur	giš-ù-ku šù-dím má-60-gur	giš-ù-ku šù-dím má-120-gur	giš-ù-ku apin-ù-SAR giš-ig giš- ḫar-ra	giš-ù-ku apin-ù-SAR ig-é	giš-ù-ku gal	giš-ù-ku BAR.DA.AŠ. NIGIN ₂ .NA	giš-ù-ku gi-muš	giš-ù-ku uš
Reisner 121/ Š 30	24 ^a									22.5
Reisner 122/ Š 40 f										
CT 5:38 f/ Š 43 f										
HUCA 30:113 f./ AS 3										
STA 22/ AS 4										
TCL 5:6162/ AS 4										
TCL 5:6046/ AS 4										
TCL 5:6052/ AS 5										
TCL 5:6056/ AS 5										
B.M. 106064/ AS 6										
STA 23/ AS 6	12	c 11.8	60	120	60	45	48	6	6	
STA 1/ AS 8										
TCL 5:6045/ AS 8										
TCL 5:5680/ SS 2										
TCL 5:6037/ SS 6										
UET 3:1165/ IS 7										

^a Text has giš-ù-ku giš-šù-dím má-šc.

5. COMMODITIES EVALUATED BY UNIT (*Continued*)

D. Skins

	kuš-šaj	kuš-udu	kuš-udu ba-uš	kuš a- BAHAR ₂ -LÁ	kuš-a-GÁ.LÁ <i>máš-ŋ-am</i>	kuš-a-GÁ	kuš-dug- gan	kuš-e-sír é-ba-an-gin	kuš-e-sír šu. LI.LA é-ba-an	kuš-e-sír
Reisner 121/ S 30	6									
Reisner 122/ S 40 f										
CT 5:38 f/ S 43 f										
HUCA 30:113 f./ AS 3										
STA 22/ AS 4										
TCL 5:6162/ AS 4										
TCL 5:6046/ AS 4		3		18		4.5		c 11.8	9	
TCL 5:6052/ AS 5			2	10	5			11.67		
TCL 5:6056/ AS 5				10 ¹						16 ¹
B.M. 106064/ AS 6										
STA 23/ AS 6										
STA 1/ AS 8							171.4 ^a			
TCL 5:6045/ AS 8										
TCL 5:5680/ SS 2										
TCL 5:6037/ SS 6										
UET 3:1165/ IS 7										

^a In šc of silver per mina.

5. COMMODITIES EVALUATED BY UNIT (Continued)

[illegible]

VI

The following glossary of commodities is based on the latest lexical and cultural studies, but lays no claim to originality. The great majority of its entries may be found in one or another tablet of HAR-ra = *hubullu*. An effort has therefore been made to cite published editions of its tablets wherever possible. Unpublished portions of this series, and its commentary HAR - g u d = *imrû* = *ballu* were examined through the great courtesy of Professor B. Landsberger. A tentative observation may be permitted in this connection.

Just as *ana ittišu* I-VI seems intended for, or derived from, the contract literature of neo-Sumerian and Early Old Babylonian times, so HAR - ra = *hubullu*, though it appears today like a veritable cuneiform encyclopedia, may have originally been intended for or derived from the numerically vaster account literature of the same periods. The character of the first two tablets of HAR - ra is not out of keeping with this interpretation; instead of the names of products, places, and professions, these introductory "chapters" seem to explain the standard "ledger entries" of the account texts.

á - d à r = <i>adru</i> ; <i>ŠL</i> 2:334:59	V F
a - g a r ₅ urudu = <i>abaru erû</i> , lead (and?) copper; <i>ŠL</i> 2:579:336	I A
al-la-ḫa-ru, a plant; <i>MAD</i> 3:28	III A
a n - n a = <i>anāku</i> , lead or tin; <i>ŠL</i> 2:13:39	I A
ar-ga-nūm, a resinous plant; <i>MAD</i> 3:63	I E
e s i r ₂ = <i>naḫṫu</i> , bitumen; <i>SAT</i> I Table I	
e s i r ₂ - a - b a - a l, crude rock asphalt; <i>SAT</i> I:19	II B
e s i r ₂ - b a b b a r = <i>ittû</i> , natural asphalt; <i>SAT</i> I:18	II B
e s i r ₂ - é - a, bituminous mastic; <i>SAT</i> I:20	II B
eš-ku-ru-um = l à l - ḫ u r, wax; <i>Welt des Orients</i> 1:371-373	I F
ešLĀL!ḪUR!; see eš-ku-ru-um	I F
g a n a m ₄ , ewe; <i>JNES</i> 4:164	V E
g a z i = <i>kasû</i> , cassia; <i>AOS</i> 32 p. 7	III D
g e š t i n - ḫ á d - <a> = <i>mu(n)ziqû</i> , white wine or dried grape, raisin; <i>MSL</i> 5:93	III H
g i = <i>qanû</i> , reed, cane; <i>ŠL</i> 2:85:63	I C
g i - d ù g - g a = <i>passu, qanû ṭābu</i> , planed or aromatic cane; <i>ŠL</i> 2:85:392	I C
g i g = <i>qibtu</i> , wheat; <i>ŠL</i> 2:446:2	III E
g i š - a - t u - g a b - l i š = <i>šarbatu</i> , mulberry; <i>MSL</i> 5:129	V C
g i š - (é) - d i m = <i>timmu</i> , post; <i>St. Or.</i> 8/4:126	V C
(g i š) - é - (m á) = <i>ḫinnu</i> , ship's cabin, midship; <i>CAD</i> 6:194 f.	V C
g i š - ḫ a š ḫ u r = <i>ḫašḫuru</i> , apple tree; <i>CAD</i> 6:139 f.	IV A
g i š - K U - m á - ?; cf. <i>St. Or.</i> 8/4:131	V A
g i š - m a - n u = <i>ēru</i> , variety of cherry tree; cf. <i>CAD</i> 4:320	I H
g i š - m a - š e - i r - g u = <i>širkum</i> , fig tree; <i>MSL</i> 5:96	IV A
g i š - m e - d i m = <i>mašar eleppi</i> , gunwale (?); <i>St. Or.</i> 8/4:91 f.	V C

g i š - ŠE.DÜG, a kind of wood; <i>St. Or.</i> 8/4:142	V C
g i š - š i n i g - (ħ i - a) = <i>bīnu</i> , <i>gumālu</i> , <i>kipuālu</i> , (assorted) tamarisks; CAD 5:133	V C
g i š - ù - k u = <i>ašūhu</i> , cedar; <i>MSL</i> 5:99	V C
g i š - ù - k u BAR.DA.AŠ - ?; <i>St. Or.</i> 8/4: 95; <i>MSL</i> 5:127, 6:100, III	V C
g i š - (ù - k u) g i - m u š = <i>gimuššu</i> , <i>pārisu</i> , rudder, punting-pole; <i>CAD</i> 5:78, 99 f.	V C
g i š - ù - k u m i - r í - z a, inside door or joiner-planks of ship; <i>St. Or.</i> 8/3:17; <i>MSL</i> 5:172:254, 6:24:237 (= <i>parissu</i>)	V C
g i š - ù - k u š u - d í m, building wood for boats; <i>St. Or.</i> 8/4:139 f.	V C
g i š - ù - m á - t u r, side planking for a small ship; <i>St. Or.</i> 8/4:90 f.	V C
g i š - ù r = <i>gušuru</i> , beam; <i>CAD</i> 5:144	V C
<i>gu-zé-ba-tum</i> , cakes (?); <i>MAD</i> 3:153	I H
g ú - g a l = <i>ħalluru</i> , chick peas; <i>CAD</i> 6:47 f.	III F
g ú - t u r = <i>kak(k)û</i> , lentils; <i>CAD</i> 6:47 f.	III F
ì - d ù g - n u n - n a = <i>ħimētu</i> , (sweet?) butter; <i>CAD</i> 6:189	III I
ì - g i š = <i>ellu</i> , sesame oil; <i>CAD</i> 4:106	III I
ì - k u ₆ = <i>šaman nūni</i> , fish oil	III I
i - š a ħ = <i>šaman šaĥi</i> , <i>nūhu</i> , pig's fat, lard; cf. <i>ŠL</i> 2:231:200	III I
i g i - e s i r ₂ , a type of rock asphalt; <i>SAT</i> 1:19	II B
i m - b a b b a r - (k u m) = <i>gaššu</i> , (crushed) gypsum; <i>CAD</i> 5:54 f.	II A
i m - k ù - g i = <i>šeršerru</i> , <i>illur pāni</i> , ochre; <i>AOS</i> 32:109, <i>SAT</i> 3:215	II A
k u ₆ = <i>nūnu</i> , fish; <i>ŠL</i> 2:589:8	IV B
k u ₆ - i z i = <i>nūnu išati</i> , smoked fish	IV B
k u š - a - BAĤAR ₂ .LÁ = <i>nādu</i> , water-skin, canteen; <i>JNES</i> 13:185 note 69	V D
k u š - a - GÁ.<LÁ> = <i>naruqu</i> , a hanging container; <i>JNES</i> 13:185 note 69	V D
k u š - d ù g - g a n = <i>tukkannu</i> , bag; <i>ŠL</i> 2:7:151	V D
k u š - e - s í r = <i>šenu</i> , shoe; <i>ŠL</i> 2:7:115	V D
k u š - e - s í r é - b a - a n g í n, pair of shoes, ordinary quality	V D
k u š - š a ħ = <i>mašak šaĥi</i> , pigskin	V D
k u š - u d u = <i>mašak immeri</i> , sheepskin	V D
l à l = <i>dišpu</i> , honey; <i>ŠL</i> 2:109:3	III J
l à l - s i g ₃ , fine (?) honey	III J
m á š - n i t a = <i>taššu</i> , he-goat; <i>JNES</i> 4:166	V E
m u n = <i>ħabtu</i> , salt	I B
n a g a - (g a z) = <i>uḫūlu</i> , (crushed) alkali; cf. <i>AOS</i> 32:5 f.	III B
n a g a - s i - è, sprouted alkali; cf. <i>AOS</i> 32:5 f.	III B
<i>nī-gi-tum</i> , a resinous plant; <i>MAD</i> 3:199	I E
<i>nī-ik-tum</i> , a plant; <i>MAD</i> 3:205	III A
NÍG. SAR = <i>širpu</i> , dyed cloth, or <i>kissu</i> , <i>išqarrurtu</i> , spade; <i>ŠL</i> 2:597:175 f.	I H
n u m u n - s u m - s i k i l, seed of sikil-onion; cf. <i>AOS</i> 32:139	III C
p a - m u š e n = <i>kappû iššuri</i> , birds' wings; <i>ŠL</i> 2:295:24	V F
s a - g i - (i) z i = <i>kīsu</i> , bundles of x-cane; <i>St. Or.</i> 8/4:144	V B
s a - g i - r a, reed bundles; cf. <i>AOS</i> 32:45 f.	V B
s a g - s u m - s i k i l i g i - n u - s i g ₃ ; cf. <i>AOS</i> 32:139 note 129	III C
s í g = <i>šipātu</i> , wool; <i>ŠL</i> 2:539:3	III K
s í g - e n g a r, peasants' (?) wool	III K
s i g ₄ - b a, tool for making bricks; <i>AOS</i> 32:127	V A
s i l a ₂ - (b a r - g á l) = <i>puḫādu</i> , lamb; <i>JNES</i> 4:168	V E

SÜ.HÉ, SU.HÉ = <i>tuškú</i> , a metal (?); <i>MA</i> 287	I H
sum - (g a z), (crushed) onions; <i>AOS</i> 32:139	III C
sum - ḥ a - d i n, sum - s i k i l, sum - s i k i l i g i - (n u) - s i g ₅ , sum - Z A - ḥ a - d i n i g i - (n u) - s i g ₅ , types of onions; <i>AOS</i> 32:139	III C
še = <i>še'u</i> , barley; <i>ŠL</i> 2:367:14	III E
ŠE.LI, fruit of the pine, pine cone (?); cf. P A . L I = <i>aru buraši</i> , pine needle (?); cf. <i>MSL</i> 1:209	III K
še - L Ū, an edible plant or spice; <i>AOS</i> 32:26 f.	III E
š i m = <i>rīqu</i> , perfume; <i>ŠL</i> 2:215:3	II C
š i m - b a ₅ - l u - ḥ u - u m, a resinous plant; <i>MAD</i> 3:95	II C
š i m - g a m - g a m - m a = <i>kukru</i> , perfume of terebinth (?); <i>SAT</i> 3:11; <i>AOS</i> 32:138 f.	II C
š i m - g i, ?; cf. <i>ŠL</i> 2:215:110	II C
š i m - g u ₅ - k u - r u, a resinous plant or spice; <i>MAD</i> 3:143; <i>AOS</i> 32:137	II C
š i m - ḥ i - a = <i>urū</i> , <i>rīqu</i> mixed ointments, perfumes; <i>MSL</i> 5:102, 141	II C
š i m - I M, ?; <i>ŠL</i> 2:215:104	II C
š i m - ^d N I N . I B - t u m = <i>nikiptum</i> , a resinous plant; <i>MAD</i> 3:201	II C
š u - n i r = <i>šurin(n)u</i> , (divine) emblem; <i>ŠL</i> 2:354:286	V F
š u - ú r - m e = <i>šurminu</i> , cypress; <i>MSL</i> 5:111	I E
<i>tām-še-lum</i> , a resinous plant; <i>MAD</i> 3:186	I E
ú - n i n n i ₅ = <i>ašlum</i> , <i>urbatum</i> , etc., raffia	I D
u d u = <i>immeru</i> , sheep; <i>JNES</i> 4:156	V E
u d u - n i t a b a r - g á l = <i>zikaru bargallu</i> , shorn (?) ram; <i>JNES</i> 4:156, 160	V E
u r u d u = <i>erū</i> , copper; <i>CAD</i> 4:321	I A
u z a, she-goat	V E
z a - b a - l u m (<i>supālum</i>), a resinous tree; <i>MAD</i> 3:240, <i>MSL</i> 5:111	I E
z ì - g ú - g a l, pea flour (?)	III F
X, ?; Schneider, <i>Orientalia</i> n. s. 4:178-183 and <i>Analecta Orientalia</i> 12:289-293	III K

VII

AO = *Der alte Orient*

AOS 32 = A. L. Oppenheim, *American Oriental Series*, vol. 32 (1948)

BASOR = *Bulletin of the American Schools of Oriental Research*

BIN 5 = G. G. Hackman, *Babylonian Inscriptions in the Collection of J. B. Nies*,
vol. 5 (1937)

BJRL = *Bulletin of the John Rylands Library*

BM = British Museum

CAD = I. J. Gelb et al., *The Chicago Assyrian Dictionary*

Chiera, *STA* = E. Chiera, *Selected Temple Accounts from Telloh* etc. (1922)

CT = British Museum, *Cuneiform Texts from Babylonian Tablets* etc.

Forbes, *MA* = R. J. Forbes, *Metallurgy in Antiquity* (1950)

Forbes, *SAT* = R. J. Forbes, *Studies in Ancient Technology*, 6 vv. (1955 ff.)

HSS 4 = M. I. Hussey, *Harvard Semitic Series*, vol. 4 (1915)

HUCA = *Hebrew Union College Annual*

ITT 5 = H. de Genouillac, *Inventaire des Tablettes de Telloh*, vol. 5 (1921)

JAOS = *Journal of the American Oriental Society*

JCS = *Journal of Cuneiform Studies*

JNES = *Journal of Near Eastern Studies*

JRAS = *Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society*

MA — see Forbes

MAD 3 = I. J. Gelb, *Materials for the Assyrian Dictionary*, vol. 3 (1957)

MCS = *Manchester Cuneiform Studies*

MSL = B. Landsberger, *Materialien zum sumerischen Lexikon*, 6 vv. (1937 ff.)

MVAG = *Mitteilungen der Vorderasiatisch-Aegyptischen Gesellschaft*

NBC = Nies Babylonian Collection (Yale)

RA = *Révue d'Assyriologie* etc.

SAT — see Forbes

ŠL = A. Deimel, *Šumerisches Lexikon*, part 2 (1928–1933)

St. Or. 8/3 = A. Salonen, *Studia Orientalia* (Helsinki), vol. 8, part 3 (1938)

St. Or. 8/4 = A. Salonen, *Studia Orientalia* (Helsinki), vol. 8, part 4 (1939)

TCL 5 = H. de Genouillac, *Textes Cunéiformes . . . Louvre*, vol. 5 (1922)

TCL 14 = F. Thureau-Dangin, *Textes Cunéiformes . . . Louvre*, vol. 14 (1929)

TT = G. Reisner, *Tempelurkunden aus Telloh* (1901)

UET 3 = L. Legrain, *Ur Excavation Texts*, vol. 3

YOS 4 = C. E. Keiser, *Yale Oriental Series (Babylonian Texts)*, vol. 4 (1919)

LEXICOGRAPHICAL NOTES II

JONAS C. GREENFIELD

University of California at Los Angeles

IX THE ROOT שמה

F. Perles was the first modern scholar,¹ it would seem, who recognized that BH שמה cannot always be successfully translated "to rejoice, be happy, etc." In his discussion of Isa. 9.16: על-כן על-בחריו ירחם על-כן על-בחריו לא-ישמח ה' ואת-יחמיו ואת-אלמנותיו לא ירחם of parallelism ישמח must be close in meaning to ירחם. He was able to point to Arabic سح "to be generous, forgive, forbear" which filled the needs of the passage and obviated the necessity for any emendations.² Perles' proposal has been accepted³ and has recently received remarkable confirmation in the reading of IQ Is a. (Pl. IX ll. 5-6) על כן על בחוריו לוא יחמול⁴ ה' ואת יחמיו ואת אלמנותיו לא ירחם. The replacement of MT's ישמח with יחמול is undoubtedly an interpretative simplification on the part of the scribe of IQ Is a, or one of his forerunners, since the reading ישמח is that of all the versions, and is otherwise primary.⁵ I. L. Seeligmann, who recently discussed this text, pointed out that there existed an old exegetic tradition, attested to by both IQ Is a and various interpretations preserved in the Midrashim, that equated שמה with רחם in some Biblical verses.⁶ Isa. 9.16 is the only

¹ REJ 35 (1897), 63-64. This was included by Perles in his *Analekten zur Textkritik des Alten Testaments*, N. F. (Leipzig, 1922), 41, 120.

² Lane 4, 1422-3; *Lisān al'Arab* 2, 488-490; *Tāj al'Arūs* 2, 166. Both Dozy (I, 681) and Barthélemy (p. 356) report "pardonner" and "absoudre" as nuances of *smh*. Perles proposed reading ישמח with a *shin* to fit the equivalence of Arabic س to Hebrew ש. However, since there are no indications to the contrary, this ש may equal ס, graphically assimilated to the more frequent שמה.

³ E. g. BH³ *ad loc.* or Koehler *Lexicon* 986 s. v. שמה (!).

⁴ Actually יחמול with ו higher than the other letters. Interestingly enough Graetz had proposed emending ישמח to יחמל.

⁵ For this sort of simplification in IQ Is a cf. my remarks in *HUCA*, XXIX (1958) 226-8.

⁶ *Tarbiz* XXV (1956), 130-131. Seeligmann sees this misunderstood שמה as being the source of the difficulty in Ben Sira 13.12 and 36.17. Also the LXX of Isa. 59.2 קשמוע = τοῦ μὴ ἐλεῆσαι. may be explained according to him as קשמוע

instance of שׁמ as "to have pity" which a modern exegete can positively discern.

Beside this exceptional usage of שׁמ it may be noted that scholars have noted certain verses in which "to be high, great" seems more appropriate than "to be happy" as the translation for forms of שׁמ.⁷ There has also existed a certain degree of confusion about the cognates of שׁמ. Certainly cognate is Arabic شَمَخ "to be high, lofty, haughty"⁸ but only a few occurrences of שׁמ have been discovered to date to share this nuance. Akkadian *šamāhu* as "to grow, flourish" has, since Haupt,⁹ been associated with שׁמ. But some lexicons list *šamāhu* as cognate to both שׁמ and צמ. This raises the question of the applicability of *šamāhu* as a cognate to either שׁמ or צמ or perhaps to both, assuming a relationship to exist between both roots. The Aramaic dialects do not have שׁמ. In its place forms of הִדַּי "to rejoice" are found.¹⁰ It may, therefore, prove useful to examine closely some of these cognates before passing on to the Biblical verses themselves.

1. *Arabic.* In Arabic, as stated above, شَمَخ means "to be high, lofty (mountain)." It can also be used of a person who acts in a proud manner and considers himself better than his fellows. This last idea is expressed particularly in the idiom شَمَخَ أَنْفَهُ. Classical Arabic شَمَخ does not have the nuance of "growth" found in other Semitic languages for this root, but according to Frayha this usage is not unknown to spoken Arabic.^{10a}

2. *Ugaritic.* In Ugaritic, *šmḥ* usually has the same meaning as Hebrew שׁמ. And as in Hebrew שׁמ and יל occur in parallelism in Ugaritic:

replacing מִשְׁמַח (prob. מִשְׁמַח). At best this indicates the existence of the root שׁמ "to forbear, have pity" rather than its occurrence in this verse.

⁷ Seeligmann, *loc. cit.*, n. 46 referred to Prov. 13.9 and Ps. 89.43, for both of which see below. M. Tsevat, *HUCA*, XXIV (1952-53), 114, referred to Prov. 10.28; 12.25; 13.9. For Prov. 12.25 see below.

⁸ Cf. the lexica s. v. שׁמ. For شَمَخ cf. Lane 4, 1595; *Lisān al'Arab*, 3, 30; *Tāj al'Arūs* 2, 264.

⁹ *AJSL* XIX (1903), 199.

¹⁰ The relationship of Syriac שׁח "germinavit, floruit" (Brockelmann, *Lexicon*², 762) to *šamāhu* is not clear. Zimmern (*Fremdwörter* 70) considered it a loan-word from *šamāhu* with the change of medial *m* to *w*. But to judge from other instances of this change in verbal forms, reduction to ' would be expected (cf. von Soden, *GAG* [An. Or. 33] § 31, d).

^{10a} Cf. A. Frayha, *A Dictionary of Non-Classical Vocables in the Spoken Arabic of Lebanon* (Beirut, 1947), 99. This usage is also recorded in the *Muḥāṭ*.

bhyk [a]bn nšmh

blmtk nglñ

(II KRT ii 36-37).¹¹

In thy life, our father, we rejoiced
Exulted in thy not dying.

šmh also occurs together with certain Ugaritic clichés for expressing joy:

šmh lṭpn el dped

p'nh lḥdm yṭpd

yprq lšb wyšhq

yšū gh wyšh

(III AB iii 14-17).¹²

The kindly One El Benign's glad
His feet on the footstool he sets,
And parts his *jaws* and laughs,
He lifts up his voice and cries.

Also in the description of Anat's delight with her gory victories we read:

tḡdd kbdh bšhq

ymlu lbh bšmht

(V AB ii 25-26).¹³

"Her liver swells with laughter,
Her heart fills with joy,"

In these verses *šhq* and *šmht* are parallel. Further, *šmh* with the meaning 'to rejoice' is found in one of the recently published private letters in a non-literary context:

umy' ld' ky 'rbt ṣlpn špš

wpn špš nr ṣby med

wum ṣšmh med (I)

(PRU II 15.6-11).

This may best be translated: "May my mother know that I have

¹¹ The translation followed is that of H. L. Ginsberg in *ANET*².

¹² The expression *yprq lšb* was best elucidated by Ullendorff in *Orientalia* N. S., 20 (1951) 271-2. This rather than the wooden "to break formality" which was most recently defended by Izz-al-Din Al-Yasin (*The Lexical Relation Between Ugaritic and Arabic* [N. Y. 1952] 149) makes good sense. Cf. the expression פָּצַח רִנָּה "to break forth in joy." Ugaritic *šb*, Heb. צַח is to be kept separate from Akk. *šāhu* "to laugh" for which cf. Landsberger, *ZA* 40 (1931), 297-8.

¹³ This instance of *šhq* || *šmht* is emphasized here since the most recent translator of these lines, G. R. Driver (*Canaanite Myths and Legends* [Edinburgh, 1956], 85) has chosen to separate *šmht* from this line and to read it with the following sentence: *tḡdd kbdh / bšhq ymlu lbh / bšmht kbd 'nl tšyt*. From the two fine parallels that Cassuto (*המלה ענת* [Jerusalem, 1951] 78) drew to our text — Ps. 16.9 and Ps. 126.2 — it is clear that laughter (שִׂחָה — *šhq*) in Canaanite usage fills the mouth but joy the heart. The next line reads simply *kbd 'nl tšyt* and whether one understands *tšyt* as a verb (so Ginsberg) or as a noun (Virolleaud, Gaster, Cassuto) it is clearly the last line of this sentence.

entered before the 'Sun' and the face of the 'Sun' shone upon me greatly and may (my) mother rejoice greatly."¹⁴

But there is one occurrence of *šmh*, first elucidated by H. L. Ginsberg,¹⁵ in which *šmh* has a slightly different nuance:

bdne[l] pnm tšmh w'l yšhl pe[t]
(II Aqht ii 8-9).

which following Ginsberg one may translate: "Daniel's face lights up, while above his forehead shines."¹⁶ This Ugaritic occurrence in which *šmh* means "to shine" shall be of use in clarifying some uses of שִׁמַּח. The parallelism of *šmh* / *šhl* is also important, since beside the obvious מִשְׁחָן (Ps. 104.15) there are other Biblical passages in which שִׁמַּח and a shining face occur together.

3. *Akkadian*. In Akkadian, *šamāhu* means "to grow, flourish, prosper."¹⁷ The instances of the primary concrete meaning "to grow abundantly" are not infrequent, examples being:

- a. *ša iṣṣi šurussu lub[tuq]ma la išammuh pirišu*
"I will cut off the root of the tree; its shoot will not grow."
(Irra IV, 125).¹⁸

¹⁴ This differs from the translation given by Virolleaud (p. 31) "Que ma mère sache que je suis entré devant la Soleil, et que la face du Soleil a été (comme une) lumière (qui s'est repondue) sur moi largement, et que ma mère se réjouisse de (mon) père."

In l. 9 *nr* is a verb: *nârû* 3 pl. pft. The root *nwr* "to shine" is found in Arabic, Syriac, etc. Hebrew נָר and מְנוֹרָה are from this root, but in the Hebrew the byform נֹהַר has taken over the verbal functions of נֹר. The idiom in these lines is *pn X nr bY* "the face of X shone upon Y," i. e. "was favorable to." In Hebrew the *hifil* of אָרַר is used in the same idiom: פָּנֵיךָ הָאָרַר בְּעַבְדְּךָ (Ps. 119.135). Beside this use with prepositional ב, which matches the Ugaritic idiom, in Hebrew הָאָרַר פָּנִים is also used with עַל (Ps. 31.17), אֶל (Num. 6.25) and אַח (Ps. 67.2).

l. 11 In place of the reading *m a b* of the *editio princeps*, which yields no good sense, as Virolleaud's translation shows, I read *meldl*. Ugaritic *d* is graphically close to *b*. The scribes of Ugarit in general do not seem to have been overly meticulous in their craft. Virolleaud remarks that his reading *mab* 'de (mon) père' would provide the first instance of Ugaritic *m(n)* 'from.' My emendation supports the supposition that this *m(n)* is unattested in Ugaritic. Both *b* and *l* served this function. In the official documents published by Virolleaud in *PRU* II the equivalent of Akkadian *ištu ūmi annī* is *lym hnd* whereas Hebrew used מִן הַיּוֹם הַזֶּה. [See Postscript].

¹⁵ *BASOR* 98 (1945) 15, n. 20. Cf. too Driver, *op. cit.*, p. 51.

¹⁶ *ANET*² p. 150. The skill of the Ugaritic poet — or his inability to escape from habit, if you so wish — may be seen in his following this rare use of *šmh* with the usual *cliché* (ll. 10-12): *yprq lšb wyšhq / p'n lhdn ytpd / yšu gh wyšh*.

¹⁷ Delitzsch, *HWB*, 669; *Muss-Arnolt* 1057-58.

¹⁸ P. F. Gossmann, *Das Era-Epos* (Wurzburg, n. d.), 33.

- b. *šippāti šummuḥa inbu būlu šutēšir ina tālitti*
 "orchards are producing fruit abundantly, the cattle thrive with offspring."
 (Assurbanipal: V R I 50).¹⁹
- c. *karāna gimir inbi sirdu riqqê danniš išmuḥu surmēnu misma-kanna naḫḫar iše išīḫuma*
 "the vine, every fruit-bearing tree, the olive tree and herbs flourished luxuriously; the cypress and *m.* tree, all kinds of trees grew large"
 (Sennacherib: OIP 2, 115, viii, 51-54).²⁰

This concrete meaning is applied metaphorically in the greeting in a Neo-Assyrian letter:

šuršuka lišmuḥu lirappišu
 "may your root flourish, may it spread"
 (ABL 358, 14).²¹

Metaphorically *šamāḥu* may be applied to a well developed shape or figure. Marduk at his birth is described as:

šamḫat nabnītsu šarir nišī ēnišu
 "His figure was luxuriant, sparkling the glance of his eyes."
 (En. El. I 87).²²

Other gods are similarly described:

ša ina apsī išmuḥu gattuš
 "whose form took its beautiful shape in the Abyss"
 (OIP 2, 149,2).²³

¹⁹ The translation follows that of CAD "E" 362b.

²⁰ In this passage *šamāḥu* and *šāḫu* (Heb. שִׁיחַ) are parallel. In CT. 15, 34, 20; (W. G. Lambert, *Babylonian Wisdom Literature* [Oxford, 1959] 177): *mirīti būlim ušammiḫa appata ušaḫšab* "be made rich the pasture for the cattle, made dense (the foliage of) the branches" (CAD "H" p. 129, s. v. *ḫašābu*) *šamāḥu* is parallel with *ḫašābu* (Arab. حَصَب "to be fruitful").

²¹ Cf. Isa. 11.1: יִצְחָק חֹטֵר מִנֶּעַר וְנֹצֵר מִנֶּעַר מִנֶּעַר יִשִּׁי וְנֹצֵר מִנֶּעַר יִשִּׁי.

²² This translation follows A. L. Oppenheim, in *Orientalia*, N. S., 16 (1947), 214. E. A. Speiser's 'Alluring was his figure' (*ANET*², p. 62) supplies a nuance to *šamāḥu* for which there is, it would seem to me, no justification. If, on the other hand, *šamāḥu* shares with its cognates the idea of 'to shine' *šamḫat nabnītsu* could be translated "his figure was brilliant" and the two parts of the verse would complement each other.

²³ Cf. CAD "G" 58b. Cf. too Borger, *Die Inschriften Asarhaddons Königs von Assyrien* [AfO Beiheft 9] (Graz, 1956), p. 88 to l. 13 for further occurrences. The relationship of *šamḫat* / *šamkat*, a type of prostitute, with *šamāḥu* is not at all clear. Perhaps the idea of "luxuriance" associated with *šamāḥu* has some relevance in this

šamāhu is also used of prosperity and well-being in a general sense. An epithet of Ishtar is *mušammiḫat nišē*, and both Assurbanipal and Nebukadnezzar called themselves *mušammiḫu nišēšu*.²⁴ In Gilgamesh it is the *šamḫāti nišē* who are to mourn for Enkidu.²⁵ In the historical inscriptions, we find the people of conquered areas described as *nišē šamḫāti*.²⁶ In these texts "prosperous people" is the proper translation. Finally, in the Old Babylonian version of Gilgamesh' description of his dream, he says, "*šamḫākuma attanallak ina birīt eḫlūtim*," "I proudly walked up and down among the people." (YOR IV-3, 62, 4-5).²⁷

If the development of the verb *šamāhu* outlined above is correct, then the semantic development is "to grow" > "to flourish" > "to prosper" > "to be proud." Other Akkadian verbs, now amply documented in *CAD*, show similar development: *ḥabāšu* "to swell" > "to flourish (fields)" > "to be exuberant" > "to shine abundantly" > "to be elated" > "to acclaim";²⁸ *ḥanābu* "to grow abundantly" > "to revel" > "to be radiant";²⁹ *elēšu* "to swell" > "to rejoice."³⁰ The above

case, cf. the sexual connotation of *kuzbu*. To translate *šamḫat* as "fille-de-joie" (Dhorme) or "Freudenmädchen" (Jensen) relying on the relationship of *šamāhu* and Hebrew נחם is to fall prey to the perils of etymologizing. For *šamḫat* cf. most recently Schott, *ZA* 42 (1934), 99-100. (Contrast E. A. Speiser, *ANET*², p. 74, n. 23).

²⁴ For Assurbanipal cf. Johns, *ADD* 646, 3; for Nebukadnezzar cf. *Muss-Arnolt*, s. v. and also cf. *māta uštešir niši uštammiḫ* "I set aright the country, and made the people prosper" (*VAB* iv, 112, i, 16; *CAD* "E" 359 b).

²⁵ The Nineveh version VII, iii, 46 (ed. Thompson pl. 28); VIII, iii, 5 (pl. 32). The point behind the *šamḫāti nišē* mourning for Enkidu is not that the usually happy people of Uruk mourn for Enkidu, but rather, in line with the rest of the stanza, that attention is paid to Enkidu by the important people. The *nišē šamḫāti* deported by the Assyrian kings was usually the upper classes of the country, "the prosperous people" as opposed to the נחם left behind. Note that in the Babylonian Theodicy l. 253 *šamḫu* is paired with *šarū* "rich" (Landsberger, *ZA* 43 [1936], 67; Lambert, *op. cit.*, 86).

²⁶ Cf. Asarhaddon: *kima šēni abuka nišēšun šamḫāti* "I led away like sheep his prosperous people" (Borger, *op. cit.*, p. 58, l. 9 and note *ad loc.*).

²⁷ Here too the translation offered by Oppenheim (*The Interpretation of Dreams in the Ancient Near East* [Philadelphia, 1956] 147) seems most appropriate. Semantically "to be proud" follows "to grow, be high," cf. the range of Hebrew נחם. The description in this stanza is of the Gilgamesh who walked proudly without equal, until the portent of the coming of Enkidu appeared.

The exact position of *šamāhu* as used in the Old-Assyrian tablets from Kültepe is not clear. Julius Lewy (*Eisler-Lewy* I, 149 note e) understood it to mean "vertragswidrig handeln" and outlined the following semantic development: üppig werden > sich überheben > rebellieren > vertragswidrig handeln.

²⁸ *CAD* "H" p. 8.

²⁹ *CAD* "H" pp. 75-6.

³⁰ *CAD* "E" pp. 87-8.

outline will serve to show the intricate relationship of *šamāhu* to both שִׁמַּח and צִמַּח. To צִמַּח it is related fundamentally in its aspect of "to grow," to שִׁמַּח, in its aspect of "to flourish, prosper, be proud."

One of the clearest instances of "to rejoice" not fitting the needs of שִׁמַּח is Prov. 13.9: אֹר-צַדִּיקִים יִשְׂמַח וְנֵר רְשָׁעִים יִדָּעַךְ. The most recent English translation (RSV) is "the light of the righteous rejoices, but the lamp of the wicked will be put out." This is patently poor on more than one count: a) what is a "rejoicing light"? b) if "rejoices" is to be taken as a transitive, the reading cannot be יִשְׂמַח, but יִשְׁמַח; c) the verb יִדָּעַךְ does not mean "will be put out" but rather "will go out, will be extinguished (intransitive)." A more radical solution is the old emendation יִרַח enshrined in the notes to *Biblia Hebraica*³¹ and accepted by Koehler in his *Lexicon*.³² However, the clear Ugaritic parallel from the Aqhat text quoted above shows that שִׁמַּח here means "to be high, to shine brightly."³² This interpretation is supported by *šmh* in Akkadian and Arabic and by Syriac צִמַּח "to shine" (see below).

It is possible that other passages also contain this meaning of שִׁמַּח. The Psalmist (34.6) says of the righteous וַיִּבְטְחוּ וַיִּהְיוּ רַדִּימִים וְפָנֵיהֶם אֵלָיו וַיִּהְיוּ רַדִּימִים "they looked at him and were radiant and their faces were not ashamed."³³ This idea of the radiance of the face of one who "looks at God" is also found in Isa. 60.5a אֲנִי תִרְאֶה וַיִּהְיוּ רַדִּימִים "then you will see and be radiant." Taking this into consideration, one may propose for Ps. 107.42 יִרְאוּ וַיִּשְׂמְחוּ "the upright will see and be radiant" and for Ps. 119.74 יִרְאוּךָ יְיָ וַיִּשְׂמְחוּ "those who fear You will see me and be radiant" as possible translations. In Ps. 97.11 אֹר וְרַע לְצַדִּיק וְלִישָׁרִי לֵב || שִׁמְחָה, the common noun שִׁמְחָה || אֹר might be taken simply as "bright light."

In the Ugaritic passage quoted above, *šmh* and *šhl* occur in parallelism. H. L. Ginsberg pointed out the remarkable coincidence in Ps. 104.15: וַיִּזְן יִשְׂמַח לִבְבִּי-אֲנוֹשׁ לְהַצְהִיל פָּנִים מִשָּׁמֶן. This passage raises the question as to the meaning of שִׁמַּח in the many verses in which it occurred in conjunction with לֵב (לִבָּב) or נֶפֶשׁ. It would seem to the writer that שִׁמַּח

³¹ P. 924 s. v. שִׁמַּח. First hand knowledge of the Ugaritic texts rather than reliance upon "glossaries" of Ugaritic would have raised the level of the *Lexicon*. Important Ugaritic cognates have been overlooked and those referred to must always be checked.

³² Cf. Ginsberg in the article cited above (n. 20) to whom we are indebted for the precise clarification of this verse. Seeligmann and Tsevat are more general in their reliance on *šmh* "to be high."

³³ Both etymologically and functionally חָפַר means "to be ashamed." Yet in a passage such as this one may wonder if "their faces were not pale" is not a superior translation. Cf. Isa. 29.22 c-d: וְלֹא עָתָה פָּנָיו יִחְדְּרוּ: חָפַר / בּוֹשׁ where, in place of the usual בּוֹשׁ חָפַר / חָפַר פָּנִים / בּוֹשׁ "to be pale. It is not impossible that in Ps. 34.6 חָפַר פָּנִים = חָפַר פָּנִים.

לב means "to broaden, make larger the heart," that is the opposite of the constrained heart that stands for anguish and pain in Biblical usage. In Ps. 104.15 it is wine that "enlarges the heart and makes the face shine" (cf. too Zach. 10.7). That the effect of a לב שמח is a radiant face is noted by other passages: (Prov. 15.13) לב שמח יטב פנים ובעצבת לב; (Prov. 17.22) לב שמח יטב נהה ורוח נכאה תיבש; (Prov. 19.9) לב שמח יטב נהה ורוח נכאה תיבש. Among the objects that "broaden the heart," are the Lord's commandments. Of interest is Ps. 19.9: ה' ישרים משמחיל לב מצות ה' ברה קאירת עינים where we find in parallelism לב משמח and מאירת עינים.

There are also passages in which שמח in the *piel* or *hifil* is clearly dependent on the *qal* meaning "to be high." In the following two verses this is supported by the parallel portion of the verse:

a) Lam. 2.17 d-e: וישמח עליך אויב הרים קרן צריך

b) Ps. 89.43: הרימות ימין צרתי השמחת כל-אויבי

In both these verses שמח (*piel* or *hifil*) is in parallelism with הרים (קרן or ימין) and means "to raise, elevate." This *piel* usage is evident in: Ps. 30.2: וישמחתי כי ירם את ימין; Ps. 90.15: שמתנו כימות עניתנו; 2 Chron. 20.27: כי שמחה ה' מאויביהם. The *qal* might be discerned in Micah 7.8: וישמחתי כי ירם את ימין; Ps. 35.19, 24, 27: and in Ps. 38.17: וישמחתי כי ירם את ימין. In this latter verse וישמחתי is parallel to עלי הגדילו. This same parallelism is evident in Ps. 35.26: וישמחתי כי ירם את ימין. Two disputed verses might be clarified in the light of this use of שמח. The first is Prov. 12.25: דאגה בלב איש ישתנה ודבר טוב ישתנה. This verse stands clearly in need of emendation and has been variously emended. Without doing overly great violence to the MT one may amend ישתנה to תשתנה to fit the feminine noun דאגה³⁴ and read the suffixes attached to both verbs as either ישתנה³⁵ and תשתנה³⁶ or ישתנה³⁷ and תשתנה³⁸ we may then translate: "worry in a man's heart will bend him low, but a good word (or event) will raise him up."³⁸ The second is Hos. 7.3: וישמחתי כי ירם את ימין.

³⁴ In the light of the previous note it is possible that an added "ambiguity" (to use the terminology of modern literary criticism) is set up by the contrast of שמח and חפר in the first half of the verse.

³⁵ G. R. Driver in "Hebrew Studies" (JRAS, 1948, 164-76) has collected many instances of the non-agreement of verb and noun as to gender and cites this passage (p. 176) as being needlessly emended. This is indeed possible, but in this case one feels that the graphic similarity of ישתנה to ישתנה was influential in the corruption of the latter.

³⁶ Cf. Driver, *loc. cit.*, p. 176, n. 1.

³⁷ The *he* as a *mater lectionis* to indicate final *h* is not unusual.

³⁸ The interpretation offered by Tsevat for this verse (HUCA XXIV [1953], 114) is not acceptable to me for ישתנה cannot mean "let him suppress it" nor can ישתנה mean "let him strengthen it."

ובכחשיהם שרים. The verb ישמחו is often emended to יקשחו to fit the context. The following translation may, however, be ventured: "In their evil they elevate kings and with their lies princes."

There are yet other passages where some other nuances than "to rejoice" might be chosen for שמח. One of these may be found in Deut. 33.18 שמח זבולן בצאתך which is to be translated "Prosper Zebulun in your enterprises."³⁹ Yet another nuance of שמח possibly lies behind the שמחים of I Kings 1.40: ושמחים בחללים ושמחים גדולה . . . והעם מחללים בחללים ושמחים גדולה. Here "making a loud noise" rather than "rejoicing" suggests itself.⁴⁰ Similar observations can be made about other verses but the temptation to replace the usual meaning of שמח by fitting these verses into a new Procrustean bed must be resisted.

Of interest to this study is the relationship between שמח and צמח. First the usage of צמח and its cognates must be clearly seen. In Hebrew צמח is normally "to grow." The use of the *hifil* as "to raise up" in the expression הצמיח קרן (Ps. 132.17; Ezek. 29.21) might be purely figurative.⁴¹ Arabic and Akkadian do not offer phonetically exact cognates. In the Aramaic dialects צמח means both "to grow" and "to shine." The latter meaning is rare in the Palestinian dialects but is the usual one in Syriac.⁴² Thus the root צמח is a) in Hebrew and Aramaic "to grow" and cognate to Akk. *šamāhu*⁴³ and b) in Syriac primarily "to shine" and shares this meaning with some vestigial uses of Hebrew שמח and Ugaritic *šmḥ*. From the point of view of Hebrew alone one must say that a phonic distinction based on meaning has taken place within the root complex שמח — צמח. Etymologically —

³⁹ In this verse, as elsewhere in BH צאת has the same meaning as Akk. *ḥarrānu* "business trip or venture."

⁴⁰ Cf. Job 21.12.

⁴¹ Since הצמיח קרן and הרים קרן are both found, it might be supposed that the two expressions are interchangeable. Close examination of the occurrences has shown that הצמיח קרן has exclusively Messianic meaning, while הרים קרן, רום קרן is broader in implication. The Peshitta, influenced by the primary meaning of צמח in Syriac translated הצמיח קרן in both Ezek. 29.21 and Ps. 132.17 by ארנה קרנא "make shine a ray." In Ps. 132.17: לשמיחי נר ערבתני לך לך אצמיח קרן the second part of the verse could very well have convinced the Syriac translator of the aptness of his translation. For Jer. 33.15 see the next note.

⁴² Cf. *Payne-Smith* 3415-18; *Brockelmann, Lex. Syr.*², 631. The occurrences of Syr. צמח as "germinavit" are influenced by Hebrew usage. It may be noted that the phrase צמח צדק translated in the Peshitta by צמחא דדיקוּתא (Jer. 23.5; 33.15) is not uniquely Hebrew. It is to be found in Phoenician in Larnax Lapethos 2, ll. 9-11 (Cooke, *North Semitic Inscriptions*, no. 29; Slouschz, *הפניקיות*, *אוצר הכתובות*, no. 96). It is possible that this Canaanite expression passed over to the Aramaeans and became a religious cliché for them too.

⁴³ The equivalence of Akkadian *š*, when representing proto-Semitic *šin*, to Hebrew/Aramaic *š* although rare, is not exceptional.

considering Arabic شَمَخ and Akkadian *šamāḫū* — the *š* (*śin*) is primary. While שָׁמַח bears the meaning “to be high, to glow, to rejoice,” צָמַח has been differentiated and means primarily “to grow.” In Aramaic where שָׁמַח has disappeared entirely, צָמַח has variously assumed both “to grow” and “to glow.”

To support the general argument that “to grow” and “to shine” (and their further semantic development) belong together, the following testimony may be quoted: a) Hebrew and Aramaic זָהַר “to shine” — Aramaic “to grow”; Arabic زَهَرَ “to shine (moon), to glow (fire, face), to blossom (plant);”⁴⁴ b) Hebrew נָצַץ “to blossom, sparkle”; c) Akkadian *nabātu* “to shine” — Aramaic נָבַט “to grow”; Arabic نَبَت “to grow, sprout.”⁴⁵ This is a common semantic feature of the Semitic languages.

[When this article was already in print, I received the July, 1959 issue of *Vetus Testamentum* (IX/3) in which Dr. L. Kopf has an article entitled “Arabische Etymologien und Parallelen” (pp. 247–87). In the course of his study, he deals with שָׁמַח in relationship to Arabic شَمَخ three times: § 2(249–50); § 15(259–60); § 30(276–7). Kopf treats quite a few of the Biblical verses mentioned in the course of my study and we are in essential agreement except for the nuances of our translations since the comparative material offered by Akkadian and Ugaritic in addition to Arabic allows for a fuller appreciation of Heb. שָׁמַח. Kopf adduces Arabic جَلَّ “gross, hoch, erhaben sein” (so Kopf p. 249) as cognate to Heb. גִּיל. This provides a fine semantic parallel to שָׁמַח, the almost constant companion of גִּיל. However, it is worth noting that, despite their semantic mobility, in the passages in which they occur together שָׁמַח and גִּיל mean only “to rejoice.”]

⁴⁴ Lane 3, 1261–2; *Tāj al'Arūs* 3, 248–250; *Lisān al'Arab* 4, 331–333. The development of *zhr*, especially in its Arabic usage, shows the multifaceted possibilities of a Semitic root. This development of *zhr* is similar, as can be readily seen, to that of *šmh*.

⁴⁵ In this case the Arabic cognate has *t* instead of the *ṭ* of Akkadian and Aramaic. Barth (*Etymologische Studien* [Leipzig, 1893], 35–37) has given some examples of this phenomenon based primarily on Arabic-Hebrew comparisons. Many more can now be added from Akkadian. Undoubtedly, Hebrew נָבַט occurring primarily in the *hifil* as “to perceive, look at” is part of this root complex.

APPENDIX

The following chart is offered to show the distribution of *šmh* (*śmh*)⁴⁶ and *šmh* among the Semitic languages. This chart assumes the correctness of the interpretations proffered in the text and notes. Frequency of occurrence is not indicated and is not at all ascertainable for certain languages. It may be noted that *šmh* "to rejoice" is peculiar to "Canaanite" (Ugaritic and Hebrew) and that *šmh* is found only in "North West Semitic" (Hebrew and Aramaic).

	to grow	to be high ^b	to glow	to be proud	to be happy
ARABIC	šmh ^a	šmh		šmh	
AKKADIAN	šmh	šmh		šmh	
UGARITIC			šmh		šmh
PHOENICIAN	šmh				
HEBREW	šmh ^c	śmh	śmh		śmh
ARAMAIC	šmh		šmh ^d		
SYRIAC			šmh		

^a colloquial

^b also "to flourish" and "to prosper."

^c on the basis of the assumed relationship with *חמח* — *šmh*, the *ח* of *חמח* is equated with *h*.

^d very rare.

⁴⁶ The Hebrew and Arabic show that in proto-Semitic the root was **śmh* (with *śin*). For convenience we have used *šmh* in the chart for Arabic and Akkadian.

Postscript to Note 14 (p. 144): For scribal errors in Ugaritic texts cf. now St. Segert, "Die Schreibfehler in den ugaritischen literarischen Keilschrifttexten" in *Von Ugarit nach Qumran* [ZAW Beiheft 77] (Berlin, 1958), 193-212 and "Die Schreibfehler in den ugaritischen nicht-literarischen Keilschrifttexten," ZAW 71 (1959), 23-33.

STUDIES IN THE SEPTUAGINT OF THE BOOK OF JOB*

HARRY M. ORLINSKY

Hebrew Union College - Jewish Institute of Religion, New York

CHAPTER III

ON THE MATTER OF ANTHROPOMORPHISMS, ANTHROPOPATHISMS, AND EUPHEMISMS

LARGELY, if not primarily, because the LXX of Job is about one-sixth shorter than the masoretic text and scholars generally almost automatically "blamed" the translator for this disparity,¹ the translator came to be accused also of theological bias and anti-anthropomorphism when some aspect of "normative" religious belief or of God — a "hand" or His "rage" or His alleged brutality, etc. — was not carried over literally from the Hebrew into the Greek. Permitting the Greek renderings to speak for themselves, especially in the light of the knowledge gained in the preceding chapter, this chapter will deal in five Sections with: A. Anthropomorphisms; B. Anthropopathisms; C. Alleged concept of an afterlife; D. Charges, and the like, involving God; E. Miscellaneous.

A. ANTHROPOMORPHISMS

The manner in which God and His actions are described in the text of the Bible was a familiar problem to the Jewish and Christian sages of old. H. A. Wolfson² reminds us (pp. 127-8) that "... in Greek religion, the objections to anthropomorphisms on philosophic grounds led either to a rejection of the popular deities altogether or to a transformation, by the allegorical method, of the popular deities in philo-

* Chapter I, "An Analytical Survey of Previous Studies," appeared in this *Annual*, 28 (1957), 53-74; and Chapter II, "The Character of the Septuagint Translation of the Book of Job," in 29 (1958), 229-271.

¹ See Chap. I, 53 ff. and the notes *ibid*.

² *Philo. Foundations of Religious Philosophy in Judaism, Christianity, and Islam* (Cambridge, Mass., 1947), Vol. II, Chap. XI, 97 ff. Cf. also his *Philosophy of the Church Fathers*. Vol. I, *Faith, Trinity, Incarnation* (Cambridge, Mass., 1956), 288 f.

sophic entities or concepts. In native Judaism, the objection to anthropomorphisms on the ground of the scriptural doctrine of the unlikeness of God merely led to the general explanation that anthropomorphic expressions are not to be taken literally, and that they are used in Scripture only as a practical pedagogical device to instruct the people in the knowledge of the ways of God in the world . . ." Such rabbinic statements as רברה תורה בלשון בני אדם ("the Torah speaks in the language of human beings")³ and גדול כחן של נביאים שמדמים צורה ליוצרה ("great is the courage (power) of the prophets who compare creatures to their Creator," viz., by using the same language for both)⁴ were used freely by exegete and philosopher alike.⁵

This view is basically that of the Church Fathers later on, who had the benefit of earlier Rabbinic Judaism, Greek philosophy, and Philo. Thus Origen, *Contra Celsum* (Book IV, Chaps. 71, 73), "But as, in what follows Celsus, not understanding that the language of Scripture regarding God is adapted to an anthropopathic point of view, ridicules those passages which speak of words of anger addressed to the ungodly . . . And as a sequel to his [viz., Celsus'] non-understanding of the statements regarding the 'wrath' of God . . ."⁶ Again, in his *De Principiis* (Book II, Chap. VIII, "On the Soul," § 5), "That as with respect to everything corporeal which is spoken of God, such as fingers, or hands, or arms, or eyes, or feet, or mouth, we say that these are not to be understood as human members, but that certain of his powers are indicated by these names of members of the body; so also

³ Babylonian Talmud, Berakot 31b; and elsewhere. Xenophanes ("the first philosophic theologian"; 6th cent. B. C.) put it this way (cf. Wolfson, *op. cit.*, 288 and n. 9), "... if oxen and horses . . . could paint . . . horses would paint the forms of the gods like horses, and oxen like oxen."

⁴ Genesis Rabba 27, 1; and elsewhere.

⁵ E. g., Moses Maimonides (1135-1204) in his *Moreh Nebukim* (cf. Wolfson, *Philo*, I, 135 and nn. 34, 36). On Targum Jonathan's attitude toward anthropomorphism and the like, see P. Churgin, *Targum Jonathan to the Prophets* (New Haven, 1927), Chap. IV, "General Peculiarities" (pp. 111 ff., "... the targumist made it a principle to differentiate between the holy and the profane . . ." — more so, it may be noted here, than in the case of anthropomorphism; on pp. 44 and 45, at three passages in Jeremiah [e. g., 16.11; 31.27], evidence is cited for the view that "later usage eliminated some anthropomorphic substitutes from the T[argum]"); and *The Targum to Hagiographa* (in Hebrew; New York, 1945), e. g., 19 ff. (on Psalms), 63 ff. (Proverbs), 91 ff. (Job), 237 ff. (Chronicles).

⁶ *Ante-Nicene Christian Library*, ed. A. Roberts - J. Donaldson, Vol. XXIII (Edinburgh, 1872), pp. 236, 239. In *Origenis Opera Omnia*, ed. C. H. E. Lommatszsch, Vol. XIX (Berolini, 1846), pp. 107 f., 111: 'Ἐπεὶ δὲ μετὰ ταῦτα μὴ νοήσας τὰς περὶ θεοῦ ὡς ἀνθρωποπαθοῦς ἐν ταῖς γραφαῖς λέξεις διασύρει ὁ κέλσος, ἐν αἷς ὀργῆς λέγονται κατὰ τῶν ἀσεβῶν φωναί . . . Ἀκολουθῶν δὲ τῷ μὴ νευοκέναι τὰ περὶ ὀργῆς ἀναγεγραμμένα θεοῦ . . .

we are to suppose that it is something which is pointed out by this title — soul of God . . .”⁷

It may be noted in this connection that the Church Fathers were influenced at this point also by the Septuagint. If this version, which had replaced the Hebrew original as their Bible, had practiced anti-anthropomorphism, the problem would for all practical purposes have been resolved. But when God’s “wrath” and “human members” were reproduced literally in the LXX, then Celsus had a point, and Origen had to reply to his philosophical polemic against Christianity.⁸

According to G. Gerleman,⁹ “. . . The expression ‘the hand of God’ often has a purely symbolical significance, which does not convey any concrete associations whatsoever of an anthropomorphic nature. In such cases the translator, of course, has naturally retained the expression unchanged, *e. g.* in 12.10 . . . Likewise in 13.31 . . . Sometimes the translator himself actually introduces such a faded metaphor into the text without any equivalent in the original, *e. g.* in 2.10 . . . Analogous with this is the translator’s rendering of ‘the face of God.’ A passage such as 13.24 . . . is evidently regarded by the translator as too concretely realistic, and he paraphrases it . . . On the other hand he is not at all shocked by the symbolically understood אֵלֵּיָּהּ / εἰ μὴν εἰς πρόσωπόν σε εὐλογήσει, 1.11, *cf.* 2.5 . . . The examples adduced,” the author concludes, “may suffice to show the difference between the Hebrew poet’s unreflectingly anthropomorphic view of God and the translator’s scrupulous aversion to describing God in human terms.”

This sort of “reasoning” is described in some, non-academic, circles as: Heads I win, tails you lose. In other words, when the translator reproduces literally the “face” of God, it is only because it is only “symbolically understood,” whereas when he does not do so it is because it is “too concretely realistic.” Had our author gone on to

⁷ *The Writings of Origen*, translated by F. Crombie (Edinburgh, 1895), p. 125. In ed. Lommatzsch, Vol. XXI (1847), ΠΕΡΙ ΑΡΧΩΝ, p. 213: Quia sicut omnia, quae corporaliter de Deo dicuntur, id est vel digiti, vel manus, vel brachia, vel oculi, vel pes, vel os, dicimus non haec humana membra, sed virtutes ejus quasdam in his corporeorum membrorum appellationibus indicari: ita et esse aliquid aliud putandum est, quod appellatione hac, quae anima Dei dicitur, indicatur.

⁸ Cf., *e. g.*, John Patrick, *The Apology of Origen in reply to Celsus* (Edinburgh and London, 1892), Part II, Chap. II, § 3 (pp. 132–6), “Origen agrees to a certain extent with Celsus in regard to the limitations of man’s knowledge of God . . .” Our own problem may be seen from a broader view in William A. Banner, “Origen and the Tradition of Natural Law Concepts,” pp. 51–82 in *Dumbarton Oaks Papers*, Vol. VIII (Cambridge, Mass., 1954), especially, pp. 71 ff.

⁹ *Studies in the Septuagint. I. Book of Job* (Lund, 1946), 59. On this work see Chap. I, p. 70; and my detailed review in *JBL*, 67 (1948), 381–90.

cite such a passage as 14.20 he would have made it clear to his readers, and perhaps to himself also, that our translator was not bothered at all by anthropomorphism: masoretic (וַיִּשָּׂא פָנָיו וַיִּבְרָח) was rendered ἐπέστησας¹⁰ αὐτῷ τὸ πρόσωπον (καὶ ἐξαπέστειλας) "Thou hast set Thy face (= פָּנָיו; see Chap. V below) against him." Or cf. 42.5 (see under § 8 below). Again, what is one to say about such "reasoning" when the very concrete usage of "hand" of God in 2.5 (cf. 1.11), . . . (וַיִּבְרָא אֱלֹהִים אֶת הָאָדָם בְּצַל אֱלֹהִים) / (οὐ μὴν δὲ ἀλλὰ) ἀποστείλας τὴν χεῖρά σου ἄψαι (τῶν ὄστων αὐτοῦ καὶ τῶν σορκῶν αὐτοῦ . . .), has to be dismissed by our author (p. 59) as a "less concrete context"! Or when 26.13 (וַיִּבְרָא אֱלֹהִים אֶת הָאָדָם בְּצַל אֱלֹהִים) is described by Gerleman (p. 58) as an "Unduly anthropomorphic expression" because the LXX rendered it by προστάγματι (δὲ ἐθανάτωσεν δράκοντα ἀποστάτην); but what is less "unduly anthropomorphic" than God's "hand" in 10.8 (וַיִּבְרָא אֱלֹהִים אֶת הָאָדָם בְּצַל אֱלֹהִים) / αἱ χεῖρές σου ἐπλασαν με καὶ ἐποίησαν με — a passage not mentioned by our author — which our translator did reproduce without "dogmatic misgivings"? In the same vein: in its single occurrence in Job, the "lips" of God must have had "an unduly anthropomorphic ring," since the translator rendered it by ἔνταλμα "command," whereas the "mouth" of God must have been a "less concrete expression" because it was reproduced literally, στόμα "mouth." But on what basis is the "mouth" of God "less concrete" than His "lips"? How does one determine when the "hand" of God "does not convey any concrete associations" and when it does; or when God's "face" is "too concretely realistic" on the one hand, and only "symbolically understood" on the other? Why are the "eyes" of God, paraphrased in 11.4 and 34.21, more "symbolically understood" or less "a faded metaphor" than the "face" or the "hand" of God? I suppose when one takes for granted and operates with, as though already demonstrated, a Q. E. D.

Since we shall deal immediately with each anthropomorphism in detail, it will suffice here to state that, contrary to scientific method, our author began with the assumption that the LXX translator had a "scrupulous aversion to describing God in human terms" and when he was confronted by the plain facts of the Greek translation he proceeded to create, *ad hoc*, psychological, literary, and theological concepts and motivations for the translator — when he should simply

¹⁰ According to Schleusner, *Novus Thesaurus Philologico-Criticus sive Lexicon in LXX*, etc. (on this fine work, see Chap. I, p. 71), s. ἐπίστημι (Vol. II, 588), "Legendum sine dubio est ἀπέστησας. Vulg. immutabis. Itala: mutasti." (And for Ⓜ^A ἐπεστάθησαν in 26.11 [Ⓜ^B ἐπετάθησαν is actually Theodotonic], "Fortasse legendum ἀπεστάθησαν"; see p. 587 bottom, s. 777.)

have given up the gratuitous assumption altogether as a working hypothesis that failed to work.

This fatal error in method holds true also for the section on "The Removal of References to Parts of the Human Body or their Functions" (pp. 32-36) in the chapter (II) on "Anti-Anthropomorphisms" in D. H. Gard's work on Job.¹¹ He, too, "explains" or ignores the numerous and obvious anthropomorphisms in the LXX of our Book so as to reach the conclusion — which happens to coincide with the original assumption — that "the translator reject(ed) any depiction of God in human form with reference to parts of the body . . ." (p. 36).¹² But let us get on with the data themselves, directly.

1. The "hand" (יָד) of God is mentioned nine times in our Book, and in eight of them it is reproduced literally (ἡ χεῖρ): 5.18 יָדָיו (יָמָיו) (תְּרַפֶּיָּה) / (ἐπαισεν) καὶ αἱ χεῖρες αὐτοῦ (ἰάσαντο); 10.7 מִיָּדָה (וַאֲיוֹן) (מִצִּיל) (ἀλλὰ τίς ἐστὶν ὁ) ἐκ τῶν χειρῶν σου (ἐξαιρούμενος; On וַאֲיוֹן / ἀλλὰ τίς ἐστὶν, see Chap. II, § 3, *ad loc.*); 10.8 יָדֶיךָ עֲצָבֹנִי (וַעֲשׂוֹנִי) / αἱ χεῖρές σου; 14.15 יָדֶיךָ (תְּכַסֶּה) (לְמַעַשָׂה) / (τὰ δὲ ἔργα) τῶν χειρῶν σου (μὴ ἀποποιεῖς). On μὴ α. see Chap. II, § A 1, *ad loc.*); 19.21 בִּי יִדְאָלוּהָ (וַנִּעֲשֶׂה בִּי) / χεῖρ γὰρ κυρίου (ἡ ἀψαμένη μου ἐστὶν); 23.2 יָדִי (בְּבֶרֶה עַל־אֲנָחְתִּי) / ἡ χεῖρ αὐτοῦ (*viz.*, God's hand, reading יָדִי, a reading preferred by many scholars; cf. G. Beer, *Der Text des Buches Hiob*, *ad loc.*); 27.11 בְּיָדָאֵל (אוֹרֶה אֶתְקַבֵּם) / ἐν χειρὶ κυρίου; 30.21 יָדְךָ (תִּשְׁטַמְנִי) בְּעֵצִים / χειρὶ κραταιᾷ.

So little was our translator bothered by anthropomorphism that in 2.10 he rendered מַאֲחַת הָאֱלֹהִים (וְגַם אֶת־הַטּוֹב נִקְבַּל) by ἐκ χειρὸς κυρίου. In this instance it would appear that the LXX did not render מִיָּד (cf. Beer, "§ . . . B *de manu* מִיָּד; ob Hörfehler für מַאֲחַת?"; but Schleusner, V, 512, "Num [LXX] legerunt מִיָּד?"), but employed a simple Hebraism. This seems to be the case also in 15.22 — where the wicked person (v. 20, רָשָׁע / ἀσεβής), not God, is the subject: אֱלֹהֵי־הָרֶב (וְצַפְנִי הוּא) /

¹¹ *The Exegetical Method of the Greek Translator of the Book of Job* (Philadelphia, 1952). See my review in *JBL*, 73 (1954), 251-3; and Chap. I, pp. 70 f. and n. 63.

¹² One is reminded of a similar work, on *The Anti-Anthropomorphisms of the Greek Pentateuch*, by C. T. Fritsch (Princeton, 1943), where all but two of the numerous instances of the "hand" of God are admittedly rendered literally in the LXX, but where the two solitary instances to the contrary are "explained" as due to anti-anthropomorphism; or where *harah* and *qsp* "be angry" are always reproduced literally in connection with God except once each, but where the many anthropomorphisms are brushed aside and the single instance to the contrary is made the evidence for anti-anthropomorphism. See my review in *Crozer Quarterly*, 21 (1944), 156-60. In Job, God's "hand; arm; palm" is reproduced literally in the LXX eleven out of twelve times!

εἰς χεῖρας σιδήρου; cf. 5.20 מִיַּד חָרֵב / ἐκ χειρὸς σιδήρου. (Driver-) Gray, *ICC on Job*, Part II, "Philological Notes," *ad loc.*, put it well: "אֱלִי (אֱלִי חָרֵב) Ⓜ Me(rx) Bi(ckell) Be(er) ^{Kit}. Bu(dde) יַד־חָרֵב (or אֱלִי חָרֵב). Idiomatic (5²⁰, Jer. 18²¹, Ezk. 35⁵, Ps. 63¹¹), but not necessary." Dhorme would explain χεῖρας in 15.22 as "une réminiscence de V.20."

In the light of the above (and cf. below, *inter alia*, on the כַּף and וְזֵרוֹ of God), it is but an *ad hoc* assumption that LXX προστάγματι δὲ ἐθανάτωσε for (נָחַשׁ בָּרִיחַ) יְדֹו חָלָלָה (26.13) is due to the translator's alleged anti-anthropomorphic tendency (so, e. g., Bickell,¹³ Dhorme, Gerleman 58-9); rather is Ziegler on the right track when he accounts for יַד / προσταγμα as follows:¹⁴ "Die freie Wiedergabe findet sich in der Job-LXX sehr häufig. Öfters sind Konkreta durch Abstrakta wiedergegeben, namentlich bei Körperteilen¹⁵ . . . vgl. Lev. 24,12; Num. 9,18.20.23 u. ö.: διὰ προστάγματος K. = על־פִּי יְהוָה. Ebenso heisst es Job 39,27 ἐπὶ δὲ ὧφ προστάγματι = עַל־פִּיךָ,¹⁶ auch נֶשְׁמָה ist 4,9 mit πρὸσταγμα wiedergegeben und 26,13 יַד . . ."¹⁷ On the other hand, it may be that προσταγμα for יַד in our context is due to the fact that the translator knew of a tradition that God had created the world and overcome the monsters not by direct physical action but by fiat; on the "Words" and "Acts" versions of creation and related cosmogonic struggles, see H. G. May, *JBL*, 68 (1939), 203 ff. (with bibliography).¹⁸

¹³ *De Indole ac Ratione Versionis Alexandrinae in Interpretando Libro Jobi* (Marburg, 1862), pp. 6, 42. On this work, see Chap. I, 58-60.

¹⁴ "Der textkritische Wert der Septuaginta des Buches Job," *Miscellaneis Biblicis*, II (Rome, 1934), 28.

¹⁵ So Schleusner (IV, 498), "פֶּה, os, et metonymice ore prolatum. Lev. XXIV, 12 . . ."

¹⁶ *Viz.*, Job's mouth.

¹⁷ As Schleusner put it (IV, 498), "... יַד h. l. *potentiam divinam* notat, quae etiam innuitur in SS., si Deo *loquela* tribuitur."

¹⁸ Two passages in Job, in which יַד was not reproduced in the LXX, do not — fortunately — involve God. Both are difficult. In 6.23 (וּמַלְטָנִי [v. 22, . . . הִבֵּי־אֶמְרָתִי] (וּמִיַּד עֲרִיצִים תִּפְדֹּנִי) (וּמִיַּד עֲרִיצִים תִּפְדֹּנִי) was rendered (ὥστε ὠῶσαι με) ἐξ ἐχθρῶν (ἡ ἐκ χειρὸς δυναστῶν ῥύσασθαι με); I am inclined to regard the preserved Greek as a corruption of original ἐκ χειρὸς ἐχθρῶν (a scribe's eye went from ἐκχ to ἐχ) — already the Old Latin (see Chap. II, n. 7) reads *ab inimicis* — in the light of (a) יַד / χεῖρ generally, and (b) the parallel מִיַּד עֲרִיצִים / ἐκ χειρὸς δυναστῶν. Ⓜ^A ἐκ χειρὸς κακῶν is probably but a later correction to conform to the Hebrew; ἐχθρος = צָר also in 19.11 and 22.25 (where ἀπὸ ἐχθρῶν stands for a form of מִצָּר, for masoretic בְּצָרֶיךָ). And in 20.22, where (תְּבַאֲנִי) כָּל־יְדֵי עָמָל is represented by πᾶσα δὲ ἀνάγκη [= עָמָל] (ἐπ' αὐτὸν ἐπελεύσεται), it may well be that יַד is not original; note that many translations, even the more literal ones, have to paraphrase the Hebrew: *et omnis dolor* (Vulg., following the LXX); "Tous les coups du 'malheur'" (Dhorme); "Every form of trouble" (Kissane, p. 150, "Every form lit. 'every hand' . . ."); "all the force of misery" (RSV; cf. *La Sainte Bible de Jérusalem*, "la misère, de toute sa force").

2. The "arm" (זרוע) of God occurs but once in our Book, and it is reproduced literally, in a typically vigorous Jobian passage (40.9):
 לך / ואם זרוע באל | לך / ἡ βραχίον σου ἐστὶν κατὰ τοῦ κυρίου;

3. The "palm; hand" (כף) of God finds expression twice in Job, and both times it is carried over literally by our translator (10:3):
 כפך / (הטוב לך בִּיתְעֶשֶׂק בִּיתְמָאס וְיֵע) / (ἡ καλὸν σοι ἐὰν ἀδικήσω, ὅτι ἀπείπω ἔργα) χειρῶν σου; 13.21: (מְעַלִּי הָרַקַּר וְאֶמְתָּךְ אֶל־תִּבְעֵתִי) / כִּפְךָ / תִּהְיֶה חֵירָא (אֶפ' עִמּוֹד אֶפְעָחוּ, כַּל־וֹפּוֹס שׁוּךְ מִי כַּת־אֶלְפִּישֵׁסֶטְו) — where both the context in *a* and *o* φοβος σου in *b* point clearly to "Thy" understood in *a*).

4. God's "face" (פנים) was translated literally three times out of six:
 1.11 // 2.5 אֶל־פָּנֶיךָ יְבָרְכֶךָ / אֶם־לֹא עַל / εἰ μὴν εἰς πρόσωπόν σε εὐλογῇσαι; 14.20 (וּתְשַׁלְּחֵהוּ) מִשְׁנֵה פָנָיו / (תִּתְקַפְּהוּ לְנֹצַח וְהִלֵּךְ) / ἐπέστησας αὐτῷ τὸ πρόσωπον [= פָּנֶיךָ "God's face" (καὶ ἐξαπέστειλας), "Thou hast set Thy face." In the fourth instance, 13.20, אִן (אֶל־תִּתְעַשׂ עִמָּדִי) אֶסְתַּר מִפְּנֵיךָ לֹא אֶסְתַּר was not preserved in the LXX. According to Beer, "§ hat 20² aus religiösem Bedenken weggelassen." In 13.24, לִמְהֵפָנֶיךָ (וּתְהַשְׁבֵּנִי לְאוֹיֵב לְךָ) תִּסְתַּר was translated διὰ τί ἀπ' ἐμοῦ κρύπτῃ "Why dost Thou hide from me?" According to Beer (followed by Dhorme), "§ ist von § aus dogm. Bedenken unübersetzt gelassen vgl. § 20²." And, finally, there is 33.26, where בְּתִרוּעָה פָּנָיו וְנִרָא was rendered εἰσελεύσεται δὲ προσώπῳ καθαρῷ σὺν ἐξηγορίᾳ.

It is clear from 1.11 // 2.5 and 14.20 that our translator had no qualms about reproducing literally the "face" of God any more than His "hand" or "arm"; note, e. g., the anthropomorphism and rather curt line that follows immediately on 13.20: כִּפְךָ מְעַלִּי הָרַקַּק — literally reproduced (תִּהְיֶה חֵירָא אֶפ' עִמּוֹד אֶפְעָחוּ). Furthermore, it is but a baseless assumption that he deleted an entire line (13.20b) because of God's "face": (1) No one has demonstrated that this line was present in the translator's Hebrew *Vorlage* and that it was deliberately left out by him; (2) It so happens that the second half also of the verse preceding (19b), כִּי־עָתָה אֶתְּרִישׁ וְאֶנּוּעַ (מִי־הוּא יָרִיב עִמָּדִי), has not been preserved in the LXX; nothing anthropomorphic or otherwise allegedly "offensive" was involved here; (3) Our translator could easily have rendered מִפְּנֵיךָ prepositionally, by something like "before Thee" (note, e. g., ἐναντίον αὐτοῦ / לְפָנָיו / אֵל "before Him" only a few verses back [vv. 15 and 16]); (4) Indeed, our 20b finds its sequel only four verses farther on (13.24a) in לִמְהֵפָנֶיךָ תִּסְתַּר where, far from deleting the line, our translator rendered διὰ τί ἀπ' ἐμοῦ κρύπτῃ. So that whatever the reason(s) for the absence of vv. 19b and 20b in the preserved LXX, anthropomorphism was not one of them.

As to 13.24a, it should be kept in mind that פנים "face; surface; presence; before (temporal and spatial); because of," etc., is the sort of term that lends itself readily to non-literal, idiomatic reproduction in another language. Thus, in instances where God was not involved, פנים (ורבצת ואין מקריר) in 11.19 — Zophar to Job — was rendered idiomatically (ἡσυχάσεις γάρ, καὶ οὐκ ἔσται ὁ πολεμῶν σε,) μεταβαλόμενοι δὲ πολλοὶ σου δεηθήσονται. Again, in 32.21 שיש פניא איש was turned into ἄνθρωπον γὰρ οὐ μὴ αἰσχυνοῦμαι "for I shall not stand in awe of (lit., feel shame before) man."¹⁹ Yet in the very next verse (22) he resorted to idiomatic (οὐ γὰρ ἐπίσταμαι) θαυμάσαι πρόσωπον for אכנה (כי לא ידעתי).²⁰ It is clear, then, that it is style, context, and the like — in short, "The Character of the Septuagint Translation of the Book of Job" (Chap. II) — not anthropomorphism, that determined for our translator the literal or non-literal reproduction of פנים, whether for God or for man. And if a clinching argument should still be desired for this view, it may be found in 42.5, where Job says to God: ועתה עיני ראתה (דשמע און שמעתיך), and where our translator did not flinch in rendering it (ἀκοήν μὲν ὥτως ἤκουόν σου τὸ πρότερον,) νυνὶ δὲ ὁ ὀφθαλμός μοι ἑώρακέν σε, "but now my eye has seen Thee" — in gross contradiction, e. g., to Ex. 33.20, וְחִי וְיִאֱמַר [יהוה] לֹא תוכל לִרְאוֹת אֶת-פָּנַי כִּי לֹא-יִרְאוּ אֶת-הָאֱלֹהִים וְחִי (reproduced there literally in the LXX).²¹

There is, finally, 33.26, where פניו בתרועה (וְיִאֱמַר אֶל-אֱלֹהִים וְיִרְצֶהוּ) (וְיִשָּׁב לְאֵנוּשׁ צָדִיקוֹ) is represented in the LXX by (εὐξάμενός δὲ πρὸς κύριον, καὶ δεκτὰ αὐτῷ ἔσται,) εἰσελεύσεται δὲ προσώπῳ καθαρῷ σὺν ἐξηγορίᾳ (ἀποδώσει δὲ ἀνθρώποις δικαιοσύνην). While it is not impossible that εἰσελεύσεται derives from a reading ויבא (so, e. g., Beer) in place of masoretic וירא — and leaving פני unaccounted for — I believe that our translator — correctly — understood פני ראה (lit., "see His face") in the sense of "appear before Him for worship" (so commentators generally); cf., e. g., Schleusner, s. καθαρὸς (III, 138; see also s. εἰσερχομαι / ראה, II, 262), "ἐν προσώπῳ καθαρῷ,

¹⁹ Schleusner would regard αἰσχυνομαι here as being = *revereor, respicio*; see his discussion, s. v. (I, 98 f.) and s. αἰσχύνη, end (I, 97); under οὐκ αἰσχυνομαι, *non revereor* (I, 99) he discusses Prov. 28.21, where טוב לא הכר פנים was rendered ὅς οὐκ αἰσχύνεται πρόσωπα δικαίων, οὐκ ἀγαθός. He equated פני איש with ἄνθρωπος (I, 280 bottom), when — as it seems to me — he should have equated פנים with αἰσχυνομαι. The Old Latin rendered our 32.21 by *neque enim erubescam faciem viri*.

²⁰ On the expression θαυμάζειν πρόσωπον / נשא פנים, see my chapter "On the Textual Criticism of the Old Testament" in the W. F. Albright volume.

²¹ An acute study of "see the face of God" in the LXX of Psalms may be found in Arthur Soffer, "The Treatment of Anthropomorphisms and Anthropopathisms in the Septuagint of Psalms," *HUCA*, 28 (1957), 86–92.

h. e. *ἰλαρῶ*: ubi *καθαρῶ* est merum additamentum, quod ideo necessarium erat, quia antecedens *רָחַץ* de templum adeuntibus et sacrificia offerentibus explicaverat. *καθαρὸς* ibi respondet latino *serenus*, q. d. *purus ab omni tristitia ac metu*." This is precisely the interpretation of the 13th century Jewish commentator — who knew not the LXX — Zerahiah ben Isaac ben Shealtiel of Barcelona (see Chap. II, § A 1 and n. 9), *וירא פניו בחרועה שיעמוד לפני האל בבית תפלתו בשמחה ובתרועה*, לשבחו ולרוממו; or as (Driver-)Gray put it, "... he. . . sees His face, *i. e.* visits the temple (cp. 22^{27b}) and makes an offering for his recovery . . ." ²² To Dhorme, "... La formule 'voir la face' de Dieu entraîne avec elle l'idée de se présenter devant Dieu comme un serviteur devant son maître . . ."

It is of interest to devote a few lines to the manner in which some "anti-anthropomorphists" handled 13.24, 14.20, and 33.26. Gerleman (p. 59) lists 13.24 "as too concretely realistic" for our translator, whereas "he is not at all shocked by the symbolically understood" 1.11 and 2.5; 14.20 and 33.26 are nowhere mentioned. Gard (p. 78) suppresses all mention of the anthropomorphisms in 1.11, 2.5, and 14.20 (he discusses 14.17–20a on the same page, but did not include 20b), and is content to note — following Beer, Dhorme, etc., but without mentioning them — that "⚙ . . . removes the anthropomorphic expression [in 13.20b] by leaving out line 2 entirely." He might, at the very least, have raised the question as to why it was necessary to leave out an entire line when it could have been rendered "innocuously" as but four verses farther on (13.24); or by resorting to prepositional *ἐναντίον*, or the like, for *מִפְנֵי*²³; or why *כַּפָּךְ* in the very next verse (13.21) was literally rendered. (On Gard's treatment of 13.20a, see my Chap. II, § 2, *ad loc.*) As to 33.26b, Gard believes (p. 57) that the translator "omits the ending ו of *פָּנָיו* 'his (God's) face' to avoid the idea that any man may see the face of God. ⚙, therefore, by a trick of the translator, interprets *יָרָא* as *יָבוֹא* and renders *εἰσελεύσεται* . . ." On this alleged "trick," frequently attributed to our translator, which I have characterized as but "playful

²² According to some scholars (e. g., Dhorme, following Beer "P וִירָא"), "Syr. considère *יָרָא* come un *nif'al* 'et il apparaîtra devant lui.'" This is hardly so (note that the Hebrew would have had to read *לִפְנֵי*), and certainly unnecessarily so; the Syriac, *וִירָא פָּנָיו קְרַמְוִה*, simply interpreted masoretic *וִירָא פָּנָיו*, just as the LXX and others did, as "appear before Him."

²³ I have not bothered in this study with the prepositional instances of *לִפְנֵי*; cf. my comments on prepositional *בְּעֵינַי* and *לִפְנֵי* in *Crozer Quarterly*, 21 (1944), 158. An excellent study of these, for the book of Psalms, may be found in Soffer, *op. cit.*, pp. 92 f., 95.

nonsense," see my Chap. I, 70 f. and n. 63; *JBL*, 73 (1954), 252 f. and n. 1.

5. The "mouth" (פֶּה) of the Lord occurs twice in our Book. In 22.22 (תורה) פֶּה (מִן־קֶרֶן) was reproduced literally: (ἐκλαβε δὲ) ἐκ στόματος αὐτοῦ (ἐξηγορίαν). In 25.12, however, our translator turned מִן־פִּי אֱלֹהִים (מִן־פִּי מֶלֶךְ מִן־קֶרֶן) into (ἀπὸ ἐνταλάτων αὐτοῦ καὶ οὐ μὴ παρέλθω, ἐν δὲ κόλπῳ μου [= מִן־קֶרֶן; see Chap. V] ἔκρυψα) ῥήματα αὐτοῦ. Bickell (p. 42), Beer, Dhorme, and of course Gard (p. 35; but he suppresses mention of פֶּה / στόμα in 22.22),²⁴ blame this on the translator's anti-anthropomorphism. But not only was פֶּה sometimes rendered — correctly — by πρόσταγμα (see, e. g., 39.27, where Job, not God, was involved; see end of § 1 above, on יָד) or ῥήμα,²⁵ "command; word," but in our passage "the words of His mouth" means nothing more than "His words," just as the parallel in *a*, "the commandments of His lips" is equivalent to "His commandments";²⁶ or cf. 29.11 (10) where כִּי אֵין שָׁמָּה (וְהָאֱלֹהִים) (God is not involved here) was rendered idiomatically οἱ δὲ ἀκούσαντες (ἐμακάρισάν με) — contrast Theodotion ὅτι οὗς ἤκουσεν (καὶ ἐμακάρισέν με). In fine, unlike פֶּה / στόμα in 22.22, our translator rendered מִן־פִּי in 23.21 as he did only because of stylistic reasons.

6. Biblical לֵב / לִבָּ is sometimes an elusive term: "inner man, mind, will, heart" is how Brown-Driver-Briggs (*Hebrew Lexicon*, 523a, 524a) defines it; for what is the "mind" (διάνοια; νοῦς) to the Greeks and Western civilization generally was the "heart" (לֵב) to the Israelite and his fellow Semites.²⁷ Thus in 7.17 (Job to God), מִן־אֵינוֹשׁ כִּי תִגְדָּלֵנִי (מִן־לֵב) was rendered (. . . ἢ ὅτι προσέχεις) τὸν νοῦν²⁸ (εἰς

²⁴ Gerleman (p. 59), strangely, overlooks פִּי in 23.12b. He "explains" פִּי in 22.22 as a "less concrete expression" than the "unduly anthropomorphic ring" of שִׁפְתָּיו in 23.12a.

²⁵ Cf. Schleusner, s. v. (IV, 552), for such passages as Num. 33.2 and Deut. 34.5 (וְהָאֱלֹהִים יָדָה / וְהָאֱלֹהִים יָדָה), Deut. 1.26 and 9.23 (וְהָאֱלֹהִים יָדָה / וְהָאֱלֹהִים יָדָה), where everyone recognizes in פֶּה the meaning "word; command."

²⁶ LXX ἀπὸ ἐνταλάτων αὐτοῦ. On ἐνταλάμα, see Schleusner, II, 372–3; and note that our word represents God's מִן־פִּי in our 23.12 no less than man's in Isa. 29.13.

²⁷ Cf. in general, P. Dhorme, *L'emploi métaphorique des Noms de Parties du Corps en Hébreu et en Akkadien* (Paris, 1923); *le coeur* on pp. 109–128.

²⁸ Schleusner, s. προσέχω / הִשִּׁיחַ (IV, 480), comments, "... Nota, quod hic addant τὸν νοῦν, quod alias, cum idem verbum eadem notione usurpant, omittunt. Sic etiam profani. *Aristoph.* . . . *Lucianus* . . ."

ὁ νοῦς stands for לֵב / לִבָּ — of man, not of God — in Josh. 14.7 (Moses in the LXX; Kaleb in MT); Ex. 7.23 (Pharaoh); Isa. 10.7 (Assyria), 12 (Assyria's king); 41.22 (God's adversaries).

αὐτόν). In 9.4 (Job about God) our translator reproduced לָבָב (אֱמִיץ בָּהֶם) by σόφος γάρ ἐστι διανοία (κραταῖος τε καὶ μέγας). In 10.13 — Job to God — (בְּלִבְךָ יְדַעְתִּי כִּי־אֵת עֲמֶךָ) (וְאֵלֶּה צַפִּיָּה) was translated (ταῦτα ἔχων) ἐν σεαυτῷ (οἶδα ὅτι πάντα δύνασαι). And, finally, 34.14 (Elihu about God in relation to man) אִם־יִשְׁמַע אֱלֹהֵי לְבוֹ (וְרוּחוֹ וְנִשְׁמָתוֹ אֵלֶיּוֹ אֶסְמָךְ) was rendered by εἰ γὰρ βούλοιτο συνέχειν (καὶ τὸ πνεῦμα παρ' αὐτῷ κατασχεῖν).

At 10.13 Bickell (p. 43) and Beer ("... ist dogmatische Übersetzung") contend that the translator's ἐν σεαυτῷ for בְּלִבְךָ was due to his anti-anthropomorphism. Unfortunately for this view, one has but to call to mind 27.6, where Job's statement, (בְּצַדִּיקִי הַחַסְדִּים וְלֹא אֶרְפָּה) (בְּצַדִּיקִי הַחַסְדִּים) was reproduced by οὐ γὰρ σύννοια ἐμαυτῷ ἄτοπα πράξας. Two additional passages in the Bible, where the wicked and Haman, not God, are involved, may be cited here as analogous to our 10.13 and 27.6: Ps. 36 (35).2, (וְאִם־שֹׁשֶׁבֶת לְרֶשֶׁעַ בְּקֶרֶב לְבִי) / (φησὶν ὁ παράνομος τοῦ ἀμαρτάνειν) ἐν ἑαυτῷ [= לבו]²⁹; Esther 6.6, בְּלִבּוֹ (וְאִם־רָקַח) / (εἶπεν δὲ) ἐν ἑαυτῷ (Αμαν).

While לב / לָבָב was ordinarily rendered in our Book by καρδιά³⁰ — where God was not involved — yet the following passages are instructive for our 7.17 and 9.4: 1.5 (Job about his sons), (אֲוִלִּי חָטְאוּ בְּנֵי יִבְרָכָה) (וְלֹא אֶמִישׁ חֲקִי צִנְתִּי אֶמְרֵי־פִיו) was rendered (. . . καὶ οὐ μὴ ἐκκλίνω) ἀπὸ ἐνταλμάτων αὐτοῦ (. . . ῥήματα αὐτοῦ), (עַל / אֶל־עַבְדִּי אִי־בֶ) / (וְהִשְׁמַתָּ לְבָבְךָ) / προσέσχες τῇ διανοίᾳ σου (κατὰ τοῦ παιδός μου Ιωβ (but προσέσχες³¹ οὐν³² τῷ θεράποντί μου Ιωβ in 2.3).

7. The "lips" (שִׁפְתַּיִם) of God occur but once in our Book, at 23.12, where (וְדַבְּרוּ שִׁפְתָּי וְלֹא־אֶטֶּה) (וְלֹא אֶמִישׁ חֲקִי צִנְתִּי אֶמְרֵי־פִיו) was rendered (. . . καὶ οὐ μὴ ἐκκλίνω) ἀπὸ ἐνταλμάτων αὐτοῦ (. . . ῥήματα αὐτοῦ), "(. . . nor will I turn aside) from His precepts." According to Bickell (p. 42), Beer, Dhorme, Gerleman (p. 59), and Gard (p. 35),

²⁹ On this passage in Psalms, as well as לב / καρδιά of God in the LXX of Psalms, see Soffer, *op. cit.*, 99 f.

³⁰ On καρδιά, διάνοια, and the like, see E. Hatch, *Essays in Biblical Greek* (Oxford, 1889), Essay III ("On Psychological Terms in Biblical Greek [and Philo]"), 94-131 (e. g., the interchange of καρδιά and διάνοια, 98 f., 102 f. Add, e. g., Josh. 14.8, the data compiled in M. L. Margolis, *The Book of Joshua in Greek* [Paris, 1931], Part III, *ad loc.*). It is a pity that Hatch could not analyze also νοῦς in the LXX. See also F. Baumgärtel - J. Behm's article on καρδιά in *Theologisches Wörterbuch zum Neuen Testament*, III, 609-616.

³¹ Cf. n. 26 above, and Liddell-Scott-Jones, *A Greek-English Lexicon*⁹, s. προσέχω.

³² In view of 7.17 (προσέχω τὸν νοῦν) and the variations between 1.8 and 2.3 (προσέσχες τῇ διανοίᾳ // προσέσχες οὐν; κατὰ τοῦ παιδός // τῷ θεράποντι), I wonder whether (προσέσχες) οὐν (τῷ . . .) in 2.5 does not harbor a corruption of οὐν τὸ νοῦν; it is easy to see how such a corruption could occur here.

§ suppressed the שפתיים of God for anthropomorphic reasons. It is clear from our analysis above (§ 5) of the parallel אמרי פיו that our translator was not bothered by anthropomorphism in this connection: for stylistic reasons alone he turned literal “the precepts of His lips . . . the words of His mouth” into “His precepts . . . His words.” This matter of style, likewise involving “lips” — but Job’s, not God’s — is evident also in 11.2, where (Zophar to Job) (אִישׁ שִׁפְתָּיִם וְאֵינָהּ וְאֵינָהּ) (הָרֵב דְּבָרִים לֹא יֵצֵא וְאֵינָהּ), traditionally “a man full of talk,” was reproduced neatly by (. . . ἡ καὶ) ὁ εὐλαλος (οἶεται εἶναι δίκαιος); see Schleusner, *s. v.* (II, 558). One may compare here Prov. 16.21, where וְהָקָה וְהָקָה (לְהַכְמִי לֵב יִשְׂרָאֵל) was rendered οἱ δὲ γλυκεῖς ἐν λόγῳ.

8. The “eye(s)” (עין) of the Lord illustrates very well the style of our translator. In 14.3 (וְאֵתִי הָבִיא בְּמִשְׁפָּט עֵינִי) (אֵתִי-עַל-יְהוָה) was translated (οὐχὶ καὶ τοῦτου) λόγον ἐποίησω (καὶ τοῦτου ἐποίησας εἰσελθεῖν ἐν κρίματι ἐνώπιόν σου); “Hast Thou not taken account (even of him)?”; and in 34.21 (וְיָרָא וְכָל-צָרָיו אִישׁ וְכָל-צָרָיו) was rendered αὐτὸς γὰρ ὁράτης ἐστὶν ἔργων ἀνθρώπων, λέληθεν δὲ αὐτὸν οὐδὲν ὧν πράσσουσιν, “For He is a beholder of the deeds of men, and nothing of what they do has escaped Him.” In both these passages, Bickell (pp. 42, 43) and Dhorme (Beer only in 14.3) would see cases of anthropomorphism. Bickell, with his one-track mind (see our Chap. I, pp. 58–60), saw this factor operating also in 11.4 (וְכִי-רַךְ בְּעֵינָי / . . . εἰμι . . .) καὶ ἄμεμπτος ἐναντίον αὐτοῦ [= בעיניו], “and [I am] blameless before Him”) and 25.5 (וְכֹכְבִּים לֹא-זָכוּ בְּעֵינָי / ἄστρα δὲ οὐ καθαρὰ ἐναντίον αὐτοῦ, “and the stars are not pure before Him”), to which he might have added 15.15 (וְשָׁמַיִם לֹא-זָכוּ בְּעֵינָי / οὐρανὸς δὲ οὐ καθαρὸς ἐναντίον αὐτοῦ).³³

First of all, so far as such passages as 11.4, 15.15, and 25.5 are concerned, it is a pity indeed that the “anti-anthropomorphists” failed not only to recognize or keep in mind the common prepositional function of בְּעֵינִי (as of לְפָנַי; cf. note 21 above) but also to associate these “God” passages with such “human” passages as 18.3 (Bildad to Job: בְּעֵינֵיכֶם [נִסְמָנִים] בְּהִמָּה נִשְׁכָּנוּ / ἐναντίον σου;) and 19.15 (Job about his erstwhile friends: [נִכְרִי הָיִיתִי] בְּעֵינֵיהֶם / ἐναντίον αὐτָו).³⁴

³³ Gerleman (p. 59): “The expression ‘the eyes of God’ is always paraphrased by the translator in one way or another. By way of example . . . 11, 4 . . . 34, 12 . . .” Gard (p. 34): “Although the tendency of the translator to avoid expressing the action of God in human terms is especially noticeable in connection with the word עֵין . . .”

³⁴ For a similar treatment of בְּעֵינִי in the LXX of Psalms, see Soffer, *op. cit.*, § 7, p. 95; for Isaiah generally, see my discussion in the same *Annual* (27 [1956]),

As for עִינִי in 14.3, our translator simply reproduced the correct idea of the Hebrew by λόγον ἐποιήσω, "Thou hast taken account." This is exactly the idiom used by him in 22.4, where (יְבוֹא עִמָּךְ בַּמִּשְׁפָּט) — note the virtually identical expressions in 14.3b and 22.4b — was rendered ἡ λόγον σου ποιούμενος ἐλέγξει σε (καὶ συνεισελεύσεται σοι εἰς κρίσιν;). Ziegler (pp. 286–7) has drawn attention to the "Wiederaufnahme desselben Wortes oder derselben Wendung . . . Im Buche Job sind solche Wiederholungen sehr häufig . . ." — where style and not anthropomorphism is involved; our own 14.3 and 22.4 — not listed by Ziegler — constitute a typical case in point. The translator captured well the meaning of 14.3, cf., e. g., Rashi לְרַקֵּד בַּחֲסֵאיוֹ, "to observe / examine closely his sins"; Buttenwieser (cf. pp. 66–7 of our Chap. II), "Thou keepest constant watch." Furthermore, as noted, e. g., by (Driver-)Gray, Peters, and Kissane, our verse is to be compared with 7.17; cf. 17b בִּי אָנוּשׁ (מָה אָנוּשׁ בִּי 17b), the LXX of which, ἡ ὅτι προσέχεις τὸν νοῦν εἰς αὐτόν, finds a fitting sequence in the rendering of 14.3a, λόγον ἐποιήσω. Dhorme would compare with 9.32–33 אֶעֱנֶה בְּמִנִּי אֶעֱנֶה (בִּי-לֹא-אֵשׁ בְּמִנִּי אֶעֱנֶה . . . וְיָדָה בַּמִּשְׁפָּט).

In the case of 34.21 (בִּי עִינִי עַל- / αὐτὸς γὰρ ὁράτης), even Bickell admitted (p. 43), "attractionis quoque elegantia notari potest." This willingness to sacrifice a literal reproduction of עֵי for the sake of elegant composition can be seen in another passage, where God was not involved, 28.21: וְנֶעְלָמָה מִעֵינֵי בְּלִחִי (. . . וְהִקְבָּחָהּ) / (ἡ δὲ σοφία . . .) λέληθεν πάντα ἄνθρωπον, "(and wisdom . . .) has escaped the notice of every man."

In 28.10 עֵינוּ (בְּצִוְרוֹת יָאִרִים בִּקְעָה וּבְלִיקָר רָאִתָּה) is preserved in the LXX generally as (. . . πᾶν δὲ ἐντιμον) εἶδέν μου ὁ ὀφθαλμός [= עֵי]. While there is some LXX and Old Latin evidence for αὐτου ("His") instead of μου ("mine"),³⁵ there can be little doubt that our translator had עֵי in his *Vorlage* and that μου is the original reading, αὐτου being but a later scribal concession to MT.³⁶

§ 15, p. 197; this holds true even in Isa. 36–39, cf. Marshall S. Hurwitz, "The Septuagint of Isaiah 36–39 in relation to that of 1–35, 40–66," *HUCA*, 28 (1957), 75–83, § I A, p. 76 (with reference to M. Johannesson's study).

³⁵ R. Homes - J. Parsons, *Vetus Testamentum Graecum cum Variis Lectionibus*, 5 vols. (Oxford, 1798–1827), records here (Job in Vol. III [1823]) αὐτοῦ ὁ ὀφθαλμός in 6^A and *oculus ejus* in an Old Latin manuscript.

³⁶ It is not necessary to take seriously the notion that "The translator [read עֵי but] . . . employed a simple trick of translation, reading י as ם to obtain 'mine eye' . . ." (Gard, 34). If the anthropomorphism had bothered our translator, he did not need to pervert what was to him Holy Writ; he could readily have resorted to various kinds of paraphrase. As for the alleged "simple trick," see end of § 4 above.

dogmatische Übersetzung, weil Gott bei dem alexandrinischen Juden keine נשמה haben darf" (pace 32.8 and 33.4 in our Book, and the LXX elsewhere in the Bible!); cf. Dhorme, "⚙ . . . pour éviter l'anthropomorphisme." Actually Schleusner explained the LXX a long time ago (s. v., IV, 498), "Non legerunt מצות, ut nonnullis placuit, sed rem expresserunt non vocis proprietatem. Nam flatus iste Dei est eius *imperium*." Ziegler (p. 280) lists our נשמה / *προσταγμα* as one of a number of instances in which our translator "Konkreta durch Abstrakta wiedergegeben"; and cf. *προσταγμα* for God's יד in § 1 above.

11. The הוה of the Lord is referred to three times in our Book, and twice it is translated literally: 27.3, (באפי) ורוח אלוק (בי) / (ἡ μὴν ἔτι τῆς πνοῆς μου ἐνούσης) πνεῦμα δὲ θεῖον (τὸ περιῶν μοι ἐν ῥισίν); and 33.4, (עשהני ונשמת שדי תחני) רוח-אל / πνεῦμα θεῖον (τὸ ποιήσαν με, πνοή δὲ παντοκράτορος . . .).

In 26.13, however, ברוחו (שמים שפּרה חללה ידו נחש ברית) was rendered κλείθρα (δὲ οὐρανοῦ δεδoίκασιν αὐτόν . . .), "the bars (of heaven fear Him . . .)." In the light of 27.3 and 33.4 (where the parallel נשמה was likewise reproduced literally; see immediately above), it was but gratuitous on the part of Bickell to accuse our translator of rendering ברוחו by κλείθρα in order to avoid the anthropomorphism (p. 10, n. 13, "ברוחו, LXX κλείθρα = בריחי ad eliminandum afflatum Dei"). Clearly the LXX-*Vorlage* read בריחי (so most commentators, e. g., Schleusner, s. v., III, 324; [Driver-]Gray; Dhorme); whether בריחי is — or harbors something of — the original reading, will be taken up later. Note that κλείθρα was used also in 38.10 for ברית.

(to be continued)

MARK 11.15-19: BRIGANDS IN THE TEMPLE

GEORGE WESLEY BUCHANAN¹

Hebrew Union College - Jewish Institute of Religion, Cincinnati

THE Cleansing of the Temple account given in Mark 11.15-19 has attracted the interest of several generations of scholars from different points of view. Because the word, *ληστής*, is used in Mark 11.17, this study will examine the meaning of the two words, *κλέπτης* and *ληστής*, to discover the significance of each word as it is used in the Old Testament, New Testament, Apocrypha, and Josephus, *Wars of the Jews*. Information gained from this inquiry will then be employed to find a correct translation for Mark 11.17: *καὶ ἐδίδασκε, καὶ ἔλεγεν αὐτοῖς Οὐ γέγραπται ὅτι Ὁ οἶκος μου οἶκος προσευχῆς κληθήσεται πᾶσι τοῖς ἔθνεσιν; ὑμεῖς δὲ πεποιήκατε αὐτὸν σπήλαιον ληστῶν.*

*κλέπτης*² is used seventeen times in the Septuagint and sixteen times in the New Testament. In none of these instances is *κλέπτης* used in such a way as to describe a brigand or marauder. According to the Old Testament a *κλέπτης* is one who breaks in [Ex. 22.2(1); Zech. 5.4], who comes in the night (Job 24.14), and enters through windows (Joel 2.9). New Testament Christians are warned not to lay up for themselves treasures on earth where *κλέπται* break in and steal (Matt. 6.19-20; Luke 12.33). Seven times Christians are warned to stay awake because the Son of Man, Jesus, or the Day of the Lord will come like a *κλέπτης*.³

¹ Louis J. and Mary E. Horowitz fellow.

² In the Septuagint *בז* is the only Hebrew word rendered by *κλέπτης*.

³ Various verbal forms of *κλέπτειν* carry the same force. Among its 28 uses in the Old Testament and four uses in the Apocrypha, some are the following: Rachel *ἔκλεψε* her father's household gods (Gen. 31.30-32). Joseph was stolen (*ἐκλάπη*) out of the land of the Hebrews (Gen. 40.15). He asked his brothers why they had stolen (*ἐκλέψατε*) his silver cup (Gen. 44.5). The eighth commandment, wherever found either in the Old Testament or the New Testament, is *Οὐ κλέψεις* [Ex. 20.14 (15); Lev. 19.11; Deut. 5.19 (17); Matt. 19.18; Mark 10.19; Luke 18.20; Rom. 13.9]. Legislation provides punishment for the Israelite who steals an ox, a sheep [Ex. 22.1 (22.37)], or one of his brethren, the people of Israel [Ex. 21.17 (16); Deut. 24.7]. Accounts relate that men have stolen devoted things (Josh. 7.11), King David [II Sam. 19.41 (43)], the king's son (II Kings 11.2; II Chron. 22.11), food (Prov.

In the *Wars of the Jews*, Josephus never uses the noun, κλέπτης, and he uses the verbal form, κλέπτειν, only enough to assure us that he was familiar with the term and could have used it more frequently if it had been descriptive of the type of activity he wished to relate. The only clear use of the verb was to describe the character of Albinus when he ruled the Jews. Josephus says, "He regularly stole (ἐκλεπτεν) and seized (διήρπαζεν) the substance of everyone" [II(273)].* Later, Josephus said, "The crimes of Albinus were, for the most part, perpetrated in secret and with dissimulation" [II(277)]. κλοπῆς, a word closely related to κλέπτειν, was also used once. In training soldiers in Galilee, Josephus told them "he should test their military discipline, even before they went into action, by noting whether they abstained

6.30), and some prophets steal the words of the Lord from one another (Jer. 23.30). Isaiah said, "Your princes are rebels and companions of thieves (κλεπτῶν)" (1.23).

The New Testament uses some form of κλέπτειν 11 times. It describes the activity of κλέπται who steal treasures on earth (Matt. 6.19-20). Guards were placed at the tomb of Jesus "lest his disciples go and steal him away" (Matt. 27.64; 28.13). Paul warned against stealing along with other personal immoral acts (Rom. 2.21; 13.9). When Judas said the ointment should have been sold for 300 denarii and given to the poor, John comments that Judas didn't care for the poor but was interested in the value because he was a κλέπτης (John 12.6).

In the following passages κλέπτης and ληστής are used together: Hos. 7.1: "The κλέπτης breaks in, and the ληστής raids without." Obad. 1.5: "If κλέπται come to you, if λησταί at night. . ." I Esdras 4.23: "Yea, a man taketh his sword, and goeth forth to make outroads, and ληστεύειν and κλέπτειν." Ep. Jer. 57: "Neither are those gods of wood, and overlaid with silver and gold, able to escape either from κλέπται or λησταί." John 10.8: "All who came before me are κλέπται and λησταί." I Cor. 6.10: "Nor κλέπτει. . . nor λησταί will inherit the kingdom of God."

In most of these instances, the two words are clearly distinguished — the κλέπτης breaks in but the ληστής raids along the way (Hos. 7.1). If one both robs and steals, it means he functions both inside and outside. One who is both a thief and a brigand, both pilfers and pillages. The only example in which these two words may be combined in their meanings is in John 10.8 which groups all who came before as "κλέπται and λησταί." In John 10.10 the same collective sense may be meant when only κλέπτης is used: "The κλέπτης comes only to steal and kill and destroy." Killing and destroying are everywhere else in the Bible classed as the activity of a ληστής rather than a κλέπτης. κλέπτης here seems to be an abbreviated expression for both κλέπτης and ληστής referred to just two verses earlier. If this were not true, then John 10.10 would be the only instance in the Bible where violence is ascribed to a κλέπτης.

* Quotations marked (*) are my own translations. All other quotations from Josephus are from H. St. J. Thackeray's translation in "The Loeb Classical Library." Quotations from Strabo are from Horace L. Jones's translation in "The Loeb Classical Library." Except where marked (*), Talmudic and Midrashic quotations are from the Soncino translation, and Mishnaic references are from Danby's translation.

from their habitual malpractices, theft (*κλοπῆς*), robbery (*ληστείας*), and rapine (*ἀρπαγῆς*) and ceased to defraud (*ἐξαπατᾶν*) their countrymen . . ." [II(581)]. Albinus apparently stole by employing fraudulent methods in his political activities. Four malpractices were listed by Josephus because they are different types of criminal activity in which soldiers sometimes engage.

Of the two words examined for this paper, our attention has been given to *κλέπτῃς* up to this point. This has been done to make certain that the Greeks had a good word for thievery and that it was used in the Old Testament, Apocrypha, Josephus, and the New Testament. We will now turn our attention to the second word, *ληστής*, which is much more important than *κλέπτῃς* for this study.

In the Septuagint, *ληστής*⁴ is used nine times and *ληστεύειν* once. Sirach asks, "Who trusteth an armed band (*εὐζώνῳ ληστῇ*) that rusheth from city to city (31.26)?" "Yea, a man taketh his sword, and goeth forth to make outroads, and to rob (*ληστεύειν*)" (I Esdras 4.23). In describing the impotence of heathen gods, their priesthood, and followers, the Epistle of Jeremy says: "He hath also a dagger in his right hand and an ax: but he cannot deliver himself from war and *λησταί*" (15). "The priests make fast their temples with doors, with locks, and bars, lest they be carried off by *λησταί*" (18).

Josephus uses some form of *ληστής* 42 times,⁵ *ληστροικός* 18 times,⁶ *ληστείας* 5 times,⁷ *ληστήριος* twice,⁸ and *ληστεύειν* once⁹ in the *Wars of the Jews*. In most of these instances Josephus is describing a group of nationalistic plunderers who are organized into bands for guerrilla warfare. Hezekiah [I(204); II(56)] and Eleazar [II(253)] are both classified as *ἀρχιλησταί*. One of the *λησταί* was Simon [II(57)] who "assumed the diadem. Perambulating the cavalry with the *λησταί* he had collected, he burnt down the royal palace at Jericho . . ." Simon was an important leader in the revolt against Rome who was led captive in the Roman victory procession and was

⁴ In the Septuagint גִּדּוּד, פִּרְיָ, and שָׁדַד are the only Hebrew words rendered by *ληστής*.

⁵ I(204); I(204); I(304); I(398); I(399); II(56); II(57); II(299); II(253); II(253); II(254); II(255); II(271); II(275); II(425); II(431); II(434); II(441); II(541); II(593); II(593); II(653); IV(135); IV(138); IV(199); IV(242); IV(244); IV(409); IV(504); IV(510); IV(555); V(30); V(421); V(448); V(515); V(524); V(546); VI(123); VI(129); VI(195); VI(324); VI(363).

⁶ I(11); I(305); II(228); II(235); II(264); II(511); III(169); III(177); III(450); IV(84); IV(97); IV(202); IV(261); IV(406); V(53); V(183); VI(363); VI(370).

⁷ I(347); I(349); II(238); II(273); II(581).

⁸ I(398); IV(408).

⁹ II(278).

executed at the temple of Jupiter Capitolinus [VII(153-154)]. In his introduction Josephus asks the indulgence of the reader for his "strictures upon the tyrants or their bands of marauders (ληστρικόν) or for my lamentations over my country's misfortunes" [I(11)]. It is quite clear that Josephus blames the bands of marauders who revolted against Rome for his country's misfortunes. When Herod was first made King of the Jews, his immediate task was "a campaign against the cave dwelling brigands (ἐπὶ τοὺς ἐν τοῖς σπηλαίοις ὄρμητο ληστές) who were infesting a wide area and inflicting on the inhabitants evils no less than those of war" [I(304)]. These λησταί were difficult to conquer because they lurked in caves in the mountains where their guerrilla methods were most effective, and they would accept suicide rather than submission to Herod. Herod finally mastered the caves (τὰ σπήλαια) by sending soldiers in baskets hung by ropes from the tops of the cliffs to the caves in the sides of the mountains where they fought the brigands with weapons or smoked them out with firebrands [I(309-11)]. Because he was successful in this venture Herod was later presented Trachonitis by Caesar "to prevent it from again being used by λησταί as a base for raids upon Damascus" [I(309)]. Later a certain "Judas, son of Ezekias, the brigand chief (ἀρχιληστής) who in former days infested the country and was subdued by King Herod, raised a considerable body of followers, broke open the royal arsenals, and, having armed his companions, attacked the other aspirants to power" [II(56)]. If this weren't enough to describe the violent activity of these nationalistic λησταί, Josephus tells us further that some of the λησταί were called σικάριοι [I(254); I(441)]. The *Wars of the Jews* IV. iii describes the activity of these zealots when they took control of the temple. Josephus comments first that "In the end, to such abject prostration and terror were the people reduced and to such heights of madness rose these brigands, that they actually took upon themselves the election to the high priesthood" [IV(147)]. Those who objected to this action were supported by "Jesus, son of Gamalas, and Ananus, son of Ananus, who at their meetings vehemently upbraided the people for their apathy and incited them against the zealots (ζηλωταί); for so these miscreants called themselves . . ." [IV(160-61)]. As the friction became more intense between the zealots and those of the city, Josephus says that those from the city were "persuaded that the city would be uninhabitable by them unless the λησταί were eradicated. The ζηλωταί on the other hand, thought that unless *they* were victorious no form of punishment would be spared them" [IV(199)].* In this manner Josephus continues to use λησταί and ζηλωταί interchangeably. This

means that Josephus described both the *ζηλωταί* and the *σικάριοι* as *λησται* or *ληστρικοί*. They are organized troops whose leaders Josephus calls *ἀρχιλησται* and who were in control of the temple in the First Revolt of the Jews against Rome.

In the documents studied for this paper we have learned that *κλέπτης* is used to describe a stealthy person who, without violence, deprives another person of his property. In the Old Testament and Apocrypha, a *ληστής* is always a brigand, a marauder, a member of a gang whose activity takes place out of doors. He belongs to a troop that attacks caravans or settlements with weapons and robs them of their goods. In the *Wars of the Jews*, Josephus uses the term, *ληστής*, in a specialized sense. The *λησται* described by Josephus are almost always those who are engaged in guerrilla warfare against Rome prior to the fall of Jerusalem. Both brigands and guerrilla warriors attack in bands with weapons and rob the victims of their goods. If anyone wanted to describe certain guerrilla warriors in a derogatory manner, he might well call them "brigands" as Josephus did. Furthermore Josephus was not the only one to describe warriors as *λησται*. Before the time of Josephus, Strabo summarized the early history of Israel by saying that for some time after Moses there were righteous leaders, "but afterwards, in the first place, superstitious men were appointed to the priesthood, and then tyrannical people . . . and from the tyrannies arose bands of robbers (*τὰ ληστήρια*) for some revolted and harassed the country, both their own country and that of their neighbours, whereas others, co-operating with the rulers seized the property of others and subdued much of Syria and Phoenicia" (VII. 16.2.37). This is not ordinary brigandage, but rather part of the military program of the rulers to police the country and extend its borders. Strabo continues to make perfectly clear the exact regime he describes unfavorably: "At any rate, when now Judaea was under the rule of tyrants, Alexander was first to declare himself king instead of priest; and both Hyrcanus and Aristobulus were sons of his; and when they were at variance about the empire, Pompey went over and overthrew them. . . Pompey seized the city, it is said, after watching for the day of feasting, when the Judaeans were abstaining from all work; he filled up the trench and threw ladders across it; moreover, he gave orders to raze all the walls and, so far as he could, destroyed the haunts of the robbers (*τὰ ληστήρια*)" (VII. 16.2.40). When Josephus described those who fought against the Romans prior to the Fall of Jerusalem as *λησται*, he had a good precedent. Strabo had used the same terminology to describe the activity of the Hasmoneans prior to the intervention of Pompey in

63 B. C. References in Rabbinic literature may also reflect the same specialized meaning for *λῃσταί*.¹⁰

Once confronted with the fact that *λῃστής* was used in the Roman period to describe guerrilla warriors, four questions come to our attention: *The first question is*: "Did the New Testament writers ever use the term *λῃστής* to mean the zealots who fought against Rome in the revolt that led up to the fall of Jerusalem in 70 A. D.?" To answer this question, the following passages should be considered:

¹⁰ "Rabbi Meir said: A parable was stated, To what is this matter comparable? To two twin brothers [who lived] in one city; one was appointed king, and the other took to highway robbery (ליסטיה). At the king's command they hanged him. But all who saw him exclaimed, 'The king is hanged!' whereupon the king issued a command, and he was taken down" (Sanhedrin 46b).

"R. Judah b. R. Simon said: 'This may be illustrated by a robber chief (ארכיליסטוס) who revolted against the king, and the king announced, 'I will give preferment to any man who captures him.' " (Midrash, Genesis R. XLVIII. 6). *λῃσταί* who revolt against kings, especially when the king is his own brother may be more than ordinary *λῃσταί*. They may be pretenders to the throne.

"Take leaders with you who know how to argue, good speakers, like Levi bar Sisi and his companions. [The following event describes the ability of] Levi bar Sisi: Troops (גייסות) entered his city. He then took a book of Torah and ascended to the roof and said before God, 'Master of the Universe, if you abolish one word from this book, let the brigands (לסטים) enter here. But if not, let them go.' Immediately afterwards, they were sought and were not found" (P'sikta 165).*

The parallel usage of גייסות and לסטים suggests that the לסטים referred to here may have been soldiers.

"It once happened to some disciples of R. Akiba that while journeying to Chezib they were overtaken by robbers (ליסטים) who asked them whither they were going. They replied, 'To Acco.' On reaching Chezib they stopped. The robbers then said to them, 'Whose disciples are you?' And they replied, 'The disciples of R. Akiba.' Said they, 'Happy are R. Akiba and his disciples for no evil man has ever encountered them' " (Abodah Zarah 25b).

In its present context, the report of this event seems to imply that R. Akiba's disciples were too clever for the brigands. There is another possible meaning for the original statement, however, if it were considered apart from its context. These ליסטים may have been Bar Cochba's soldiers who participated in the Second Revolt of the Jews against Rome, with R. Akiba's support (see P. Ta'anith 68d). If this were the case, it should not be surprising that Bar Cochba's soldiers avoided injuring R. Akiba's disciples.

Baba Batra 92b, Ketuboth 58a, and Kiddushin 11a list armed robbers (לסטים מוויין) together with those sentenced to death by the government. Baba Kamma 114a points out that there are two kinds of robbers: (הרי גווי נולן), the armed highwaymen (לסטים מוויין) and the customs collectors (מרכסיין). Abodah Zarah 26a distinguishes between the thieves of Babylon (גנבי בבלי) and the robbers of Palestine (לסטיין דארץ ישראל).

These references in Rabbinic literature are not strong enough to decide the case by themselves. They do not conflict with the evidence shown by Josephus and Strabo, however.

Jesus at Gethsemane asked the Romans, "Have you come out as against a *ληστής* with swords and clubs to capture me?" (Matt. 26.55; see also Mark 14.48; Luke 22.52). Jesus was crucified with two *λησται* (Matt. 27.38-44; Mark 15.27). The man who went from Jerusalem to Jericho fell among *λησται* who violently attacked him (Luke 10.30-36). John 18.40 reports that Barabbas was a *ληστής*. Mark 15.7 adds further that he had been involved in a bloody insurrection. Among the hazards Paul claims to have endured are "dangers from *λησται*" (II Cor. 11.26).

This paper attempts to explain only one New Testament passage, Mark 11.15-19, which will be examined in detail. According to this account, Jesus overturned the tables of the money changers in the temple and then said, "Is it not written, 'My house shall be called a house of prayer for all the nations'? But you have made it a den of robbers" (Mark 11.17; see also Matt. 21.13; Luke 19.46). The phrase that is of greatest interest for this study is *σπήλαιον ληστῶν*, rendered "robbers' cave" by Goodspeed, "den of robbers" by Moffatt and RSV, and "den of thieves" by the Authorized Version. If *ληστής* here were given the same meaning found in the Septuagint and Apocrypha, it should be translated, "cave of brigands." If it receives the specialized meaning given by Josephus and Strabo, it would be rendered "cave of zealots." *ληστής* does not adequately describe the role of the priests in the story of the cleansing of the temple, unless this term be understood metaphorically. Others have found difficulty with the word in this context: Taylor¹¹ says *ληστής* means "'brigand,' as distinct from *κλέπτης* 'a thief,' " but he makes no attempt to explain what this means. Gould¹² suggests that Jesus called the traffic in the temple robbery because this traffic was in opposition to the golden rule in principle. Branscomb,¹³ quoting many Jewish sources describing greed shown in the conduct of the temple markets, concludes, "Jesus' words about the 'den of robbers' do not sound so extreme in the light of these words of leading scribes." *The second question* raised is not whether *ληστής* is strong or extreme, but "Does it describe graft, greed, fraudulent, or unfair commercial practices?" Our study shows that there is no linguistic basis which enables us to take such a use of *ληστής* for granted. A *ληστής*, as Josephus has

¹¹ Vincent Taylor, *The Gospel According to St. Mark*. London: Macmillan & Co. Ltd., 1955, p. 464.

¹² Ezra P. Gould, *A Critical and Exegetical Commentary on the Gospel According to St. Mark*. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1903, p. 213.

¹³ B. Harvie Branscomb, *The Gospel of Mark*. New York: Harper & Brothers Publishers, p. 205.

clearly shown, may be a military hero who will willingly die for his country's liberty or even take his life by his own hand rather than submit to slavery. Josephus uses the word *σπήλαιον* to mean the caves in which zealots hid during the First Revolt. If *σπήλαιον ληστῶν* were given the same force in Mark, the accusation that God's house had become a *σπήλαιον ληστῶν* in the first century A. D. would mean that it had become a zealot stronghold. *The third question* is, "When was the temple a zealot stronghold?" In Mark 15.7 Barabbas is described as one who participated in an insurrection. Luke (13.1-2) reports that Pilate had mingled the blood of the Galileans with their sacrifices. Commentators have previously suggested that this slaughter took place in the temple area. So long as this is considered, the period of Jesus' ministry must be left as a possible candidate for the *Sitz im Leben* for Mark 11.17, even though we have no direct evidence that the zealots controlled the temple at this time. A more likely period, however, is the First Revolt of the Jews in 68-70 A. D. This is the earliest date at which the temple was unquestionably a zealot stronghold. By considering 68-70 A. D. as the *Sitz im Leben* for Mark 11.17 we are suggesting that these are not the *ipsissima verba Jesu* but an existential interpretation of Jer. 7.11 and Isa. 56.7 by the early Christian church after the fall of Jerusalem.

One difficulty with which we must deal is the fact that in Mark 11.17 and its parallels in Matthew and Luke, this accusation is made in association with money changers who are in this context identified with *λησταί*. In order to translate *λησταί* here as "brigands" or "zealots" we must ask *the fourth question*: "Can Mark 11.17 be separated from the rest of the pericope?" This is possible. The whole pericope, Mark 11.15-19 is composite in nature. Verse 16, "and he would not allow anyone to carry anything through the temple," is an isolated halachic recollection, quite unlike the ordinary Gospel material and perhaps inserted later.¹⁴ It was either unknown to or omitted by both Matthew and Luke as well as John. Verse 18 is made up of editorial terminology that is also found elsewhere in the Gospel of Mark (see 1.22; 3.6; 6.2; 7.37; 10.26). "And the chief priests and scribes heard it and sought a way to destroy him; for they feared him, because all the multitude was astonished at his teaching." The Fourth Gospel (2.13-17) preserves a story of the cleansing of the temple which does not conclude with a reference to a *σπήλαιον ληστῶν*. It may be that John preserves the earlier tradition to which Mark

¹⁴ Compare with Berakoth 10.5: "He may not enter into the Temple Mount with his staff or his sandal or his wallet, or with the dust upon his feet, nor may he make of it a short by-path; still less may he spit there."

appended this later tradition. The further fact that Luke gives this passage a separate introduction may indicate that it was at one time independent from the rest of the pericope.

Once we consider Mark 11.17 as a separate tradition, it is not difficult to see how it might have arisen after the fall of Jerusalem. Jeremiah (7.11) had asked much earlier, "Has this house, which is called by my name, become a *σπήλαιον ληστῶν*?" Isaiah (56.7) had prophesied: "For my house shall be called a house of prayer for all peoples." It would not be strange for a Gentile branch of the Christian church to have believed that the temple should be a house of prayer for all peoples. First century Christians certainly must have known about the *λησταί* who hid in *σπήλαια* during the Jewish resistance movement against the Romans. They had also seen within the generation when Mark was written, that the temple had really become a *σπήλαιον ληστῶν*. It is not surprising that they noted the difference between the prophecy of Isaiah and the affirmative answer given in their own day to the question asked by Jeremiah.

From the evidence previously given it is clear that *ληστής* in the Old Testament and Apocrypha always refers to a brigand engaged in violent, outdoors activity. In other literature *ληστής* refers to one engaged in guerrilla warfare. In the *Wars of the Jews*, Josephus describes the zealots who revolted against the Romans as *λησταί* who lurked in *σπήλαια*. In light of the composite nature of Mark 11.15-19, it is not necessary to interpret Mark 11.17 metaphorically. It is possible to understand *λησταί* in this passage to mean those Jews who fought against Rome before the fall of Jerusalem. In any case:

1) There is no linguistic evidence to support the translation "den of thieves" of the Authorized Version.

2) "Den of robbers" of the R.S.V. is an improvement, but

3) "Cave of brigands" is the best supported translation. If one must interpret the literal translation, then

4) "A zealot stronghold" should be considered as doing the greatest justice to the historical circumstances without doing any violence to the linguistic evidence.

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I. CLASSIFICATION OF "APOSTATES"

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who separate themselves from the ways of the community; (viii) he who, like Jehoiakim, blatantly commits a transgression in public; (ix) the informers; (x) those who instil fear in the community not for a religious cause; (xi) the murderers; (xii) the slanderers; and (xiii) he who draws forward his prepuce (to hide the sign of the covenant).

In our present study we are concerned with Maimonides' fifth category, that of the *mumarim* which, as can be seen, forms a class distinct from the other twelve. Maimonides defines the *mumarim* as follows:⁴

"There are two types of Jewish *mumarim*: the '*mumar* in regard to one transgression,' and the '*mumar* in regard to the whole Torah.' A '*mumar* in regard to one transgression' is he who persists in committing that particular transgression wittingly, and who has become accustomed to it and well-known for it, even if it concerns only one of the lighter commandments. For example, he persists in wearing *sha'atnez*, or in shaving the corner of his beard; — with the result that, as far as he is concerned, this particular *mizvah* is made to appear as if it had been abolished from the world. Such a one, then, is a *mumar* in regard to that particular matter; — that is, if he does so in a spirit of defiance (*lehakh'is*). 'A *mumar* in regard to the whole Torah' describes him who goes over to the idolatrous religions at a time of forced conversions (*besha'ah shegozerin gezerah*), and cleaves unto them, and says: 'What profit do I have in cleaving unto Israel, seeing that they are lowly and persecuted? It were better for me to cleave unto those whose power is greater.'⁵ Such a one is a '*mumar* in regard to the whole Torah.' "

By making reference to the element of defiance (*lehakh'is*) in describing the *mumar*, Maimonides makes it clear that he is dealing with only one of the two major types of *mumar* known to Tradition; the other, the *mumar lete'abhon*, which will be discussed below, being apparently deemed a somewhat less evil type. It should also be remembered that Maimonides' task in the *Mishneh Torah* was that

⁴ *Yad, Hilkhoth Teshubhah* 3:9.

⁵ Rabad criticizes Maimonides for having chosen this illustration of the '*mumar* in regard to the whole Torah,' since the case described is that of a *min*. Joseph Caro (*Keseph Mishneh, ad loc.*) defends Maimonides by distinguishing among non-Jewish religions between idolatrous and non-idolatrous ones, and also by emphasizing the ulterior motives of the *mumar* who, unlike the *min*, does not convert to another faith for reasons of conviction, but merely in order to be with the strong rather than with the weak. Maimonides' own use of the phrase "and cleaves unto them" does, in fact, suggest the continuous attachment to the pagan religion even after the *gezerah* has been removed.

of a systematizer. In rabbinic literature as a whole the definition of *mumar* is not always so clear-cut, and may even, on occasion,⁶ include Maimonides' thirteenth category — that of the man who draws forward his prepulse — in the definition of what constitutes a *mumar*. It is, in fact, the very uncertainty which prevails in rabbinic literature with regard to the precise definition of the *mumar* which we have made the subject of this present study, — which latter is designed not so much to determine the precise locale of the *mumar*'s ultimate destiny, or even to reach *halakhic* conclusions, but to shed light on the psychological understanding of the Rabbis in their awareness of various types of sinners.

II. THE NAME *MUMAR*

The word מוֹמֵר is a Hoph'al participle of the verb מָוַר,⁷ which, in the Hiph'il, means "to change, to alter, to exchange."⁸ In the light of Jer. 2.11 it is easy to see how the verb could have assumed the meaning of "changing one's religion, becoming an apostate." But such a meaning would more naturally have been attached to the Hiph'il of this verb. We would thus expect the form מְמִיר, rather than מוֹמֵר.⁹ The Hoph'al form would seem to indicate that the individual concerned has "become changed," rather than that he actively performed a change. This is all the more of significance in view of the fact that a *mumar*, as we have already seen in Maimonides' brief description, need not at all be a complete apostate; that, in fact, the mere persistence in disobeying even one of the lighter commandments could stamp a man as a *mumar*. Our further investigation will show that, with but few exceptions, the *mumar* is recognized as a *bona fide* Jew, and is even trusted with the performance of ritual acts. It would perhaps be closer to the original meaning of the word to see in the concept of *mumar* something resembling our modern concept of "alienation." The *mumar* has become alienated either from the totality of Jewish observance, or from one or more aspects thereof. The real character of the *mumar* will become clearer once we have looked at some of the concrete instances mentioned in rabbinic literature.

⁶ *Tosefta Horayoth* 1:5, (ed. Zuckerman, p. 474), and, in the light of b. *Horayoth* 11a, reading Zuckerman's variant מוֹמֵר instead of the text's מְשוּמֵר.

⁷ Cf. Kohut, *Aruch Completum*, Vol. V, p. 165.

⁸ Cf. *B. D. B.*, p. 558, s. v. מָוַר.

⁹ The form מְמִיר does occur, in *Yalqut Shime'oni*, Genesis, ch. 136 — where, however, it has the sense of "I shall make you change your religion."

III. WHAT LAWS DOES THE *MUMAR* TRANSGRESS?

While rabbinic literature knows of the '*mumar* in regard to the whole Torah,'¹⁰ it is more often concerned with the '*mumar* in regard to one particular law.'¹¹ Theoretically, of course, the latter category would take in any one of the 613 commandments. But it is instructive to see, first of all, what transgressions are *not* mentioned in those instances where the rabbinic literature gets down to concrete cases. Thus we note a total absence of references to sexual transgressions, for example, or to infringements of civil law. The concrete cases, as a whole, seem to be primarily those connected with idolatry, the non-observance of the Sabbath and, above all, with forbidden foods. The following *mumarim* are specified:—

- (i) *mumar* in regard to idolatry;¹²
- (ii) *mumar* in regard to circumcision,¹³ who seems to be distinguished from
- (iii) the man who draws forward his prepuce;¹⁴
- (iv) the desecrator of the Sabbath,¹⁵ who exists in two varieties:
- (v) the (Sabbath desecrating) *mumar* who observes the Sabbath in public,¹⁶ and
- (vi) the man who desecrates the Sabbath in public;¹⁷
- (vii) the man who wears *kil'ayim*;¹⁸
- (viii) the man who eats forbidden fat;¹⁹
- (ix) the man who eats carrion and meat of animals not ritually slaughtered;²⁰
- (x) the man who eats forbidden animals and reptiles;²¹
- (xi) the man who eats a flea or a gnat;²²
- (xii) the man who eats pork;²³

¹⁰ B. *Hullin* 4b: כולה התורה כולה. מומר לכל התורה כולה.

¹¹ *Ibid.*: לדבר אחד.

¹² B. *Hullin* 4b; b. '*Erubhin* 69a: מומר לעבודת כוכבים. Cf. Sh. A. *Yoré De'ah* 2:5.

¹³ B. *Hullin* 4b: לערלו. Cf. Sh. A., Y. D. 2:7.

¹⁴ *Tosefta Horayoth* 1:5 (ed. Zuckermann, p. 474): המשיך.

¹⁵ *Tosefta*, loc. cit.: המחלל את השבת.

¹⁶ B. '*Erubhin* 69b: מומר שמער שבתו בשוק.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*: המחלל שבתו בפרהסיא. Cf. Sh. A., Y. D., 2:5.

¹⁸ *Tosefta*, loc. cit. and b. *Horayoth* 11a: הלוש כלאים.

¹⁹ B. *Horayoth* 11a: אכל חלב.

²⁰ *Tosefta*, loc. cit. and b. *Horayoth*, loc. cit.: אכל נבילות וטריפות.

²¹ *Ibid.*: שקצים ורמשים (אכל).

²² B. '*Abhodah Zarah* 26b: אכל פרעוש אחד או יתוש אחד.

²³ *Tosefta*, loc. cit.: האוכל בשר חזיר.

- (xiii) the *mumar* in regard to (idolatrous) libation;²⁴
- (xiv) the man who drinks Gentile wine;²⁵ and
- (xv) the man who does something wrong which even his *yezer* does not crave.²⁶

IV. MOTIVATION

The instances mentioned above create the impression that the *mumar* is above all a man who is unable to control his appetites when they come into collision with the restrictive provisions of the law. We hear, indeed, specifically about the man who eats carrion for reasons of appetite.²⁷ But rabbinic literature also reckons, as we have already seen in the description given by Maimonides, with the man who is a *mumar* out of a spirit of defiance²⁸ or, as the Hebrew has it, *lehakh'is*, 'to provoke (sc. God).' A man, through his blatant non-observance of a given provision of the law, may thereby demonstrate his disbelief in the divine authorship of that particular provision or, in the case of the '*mumar* in regard to the whole Torah,' of the Law as such.

Since the overt acts of both *mumarim* are likely to be identical, the question of motivation is one to the discussion of which the ancient Rabbis were compelled to address themselves. Characteristic in this context is a discussion between Rab Aha and Rabina.²⁹ The one wants to preëempt the term *mumar* exclusively for the case in which a man breaks the law for reasons of appetite. Where a man breaks the law out of a spirit of defiance, he is no longer a *mumar*, but a *min*. The other, *per contra*, recognizes the category of *mumar lehakh'is*, and wants to see the term *min* applied in the case of the idol-worshipper only.

At this point of the discussion a teaching is introduced which would clearly indicate that there is in fact such a category as '*mumar* out of a spirit of defiance': "If a man ate a flea or a gnat, he is a *mumar*." Now, as Rashi rightly remarks,³⁰ this is not the kind of food

²⁴ B. 'Erubhin 69b: מומר לנסך.

²⁵ Tosefta, loc. cit., b. Horayoth, loc. cit., b. 'Erubhin, loc. cit: שחח יין נסך. It is possible that this latter meaning is to be given also to the מומר לנסך mentioned in the previous note, since actual participation in pagan libation rites would more likely result in the appellation of '*mumar* in regard to idolatry.'

²⁶ Tosefta, loc. cit.: העושה דבר שאין היצר תאב לו.

²⁷ B. Hullin 4a, b. Sanhedrin 27a: מומר אוכל וביולות לחיאבון. Cf. Sh. A., Y. D. 2:2.

²⁸ B. Sanhedrin 27a: מומר להכעיס . . . מומר לחיאבון.

²⁹ B. 'Abhodah Zarah 26b; parallel in b. Horayoth 11a.

³⁰ Ad loc. Perhaps this is the sort of thing the Tosefta meant, as quoted in Note 26, above.

which anybody's appetite craves. The eating of fleas and gnats is clearly a demonstration of defiance!

But the interlocutor in this discussion, who rejects the concept of *mumar lehakh'is*, tries to reconcile this teaching with *his* view as well: The man who eats fleas and gnats may still only do so because he has a craving for a taste which no Jew has tasted before. And so, his eating of even only one flea and one gnat is not a case of defiance at all, but of what we today would call a "taste thrill"; and the category of *mumar lehakh'is* remains excluded!

Tradition has decided otherwise, and recognizes the existence of "appetitive" *mumar* and "defiant" *mumar* side by side.

V. EVALUATION OF THE TWO TYPES

There was no reason for the Rabbis to state their preference for the one rather than for the other type of *mumar*, though *prima facie* the exclusion by Maimonides of the *mumar lete'abhon* from those destined to lose their share in the World-to-Come might lead us to believe that breaking the law for reasons of appetite was a lesser evil than breaking the law in a spirit of defiance. The matter is, however, somewhat more complicated.

In the talmudic discussion about unsuitable witnesses at legal proceedings,³¹ we hear the unanimous opinion that the *mumar* who eats carrion (*nebheloṭh*) for reasons of appetite is disqualified as a witness. However, as far as the *mumar lehakh'is* is concerned, the opinions diverge. Abaye considers him to be disqualified, but Raba would accept him as suitable. Abaye bases his view on an identification of *mumar* with *rasha'*, and paraphrases Ex. 23.1 as "Do not appoint the *rasha'* as a witness." Raba, on the other hand, stresses the word "malice" (*ḥamas*, — which, in rabbinic parlance, has overtones of shady financial transactions) in that same verse, and maintains that the only *rasha'* to be disqualified in this context is the one guilty of *ḥamas*.³²

It is immaterial to our purpose that the *Halakhah* decided in favor of Abaye, and against Raba.³³ The fact remains that, at the time when the *Halakhah* was still in the making, and the concepts were as yet fluid, a man of the stature of a Raba could see his way to evaluating

³¹ B. *Sanhedrin* 27a.

³² רשע דחמס בעינן. Cf. the further definitions of חמס in b. *Sanhedrin* 27a.

³³ Cf. Maimonides, *Yad, Hilkhoth 'Eduth* 10:3; 11:10; and Sh. A., *Hoshen Mishpat* 34:2.

the "defiant" *mumar* as more trustworthy in aspects of the law not related to his "defiance" than the "appetitive" *mumar*.

Also interesting in this connection are the motivations which later commentators adduce for the unanimous rejection of the *mumar lete'abhon*. Rabbenu Hananel (11th cent.)³⁴ feels that the man who lets his desires run away with him in the case of forbidden meat is likely to have no more scruples when it comes to the desire for money; and he may thus not stop at perjury. Rashi³⁵ introduces an economic element into the discussion. According to him, even the eating of *nebheloṭh*—'for reasons of appetite' is due to a greed for money, since this forbidden meat is cheaper to obtain than the permitted one. Thus the *mumar okhel nebheloṭh lete'abhon* is *a priori* like a *rasha' deḥamas*, and therefore disqualified as a witness.

An interesting parallel to the two types of *mumar* recognized in rabbinic literature is found in Aristotle's discussion, in the Seventh Book of his *Nicomachean Ethics*³⁶, as to whether "a man, who does or pursues what is pleasurable as the result of conviction and because he deliberately chooses that course, might be regarded as a better man than he who acts in the same way, not because he has reasoned himself into doing this, but because he cannot master his love of pleasure."³⁷ Aristotle's man who pursues what is pleasurable "as the result of conviction" is the counterpart of the *mumar lehakh'is*, while the man who "cannot master his love of pleasure" would surely be recognized by the Rabbis as an apt description of the *mumar lete'abhon*. The latter likewise corresponds to Aristotle's picture of the "incontinent" man, so that *mutatis mutandis* his description of the "intemperate" man would fit the *mumar lehakh'is*.³⁸

Aristotle is at first inclined to let that pass for a plausible argument which prefers the pleasure-seeker "as a result of conviction" to the one "who cannot master his love of pleasure." After all, the deliberate voluptuary is a reasonable creature, and he is more likely to be cured, since there is a chance of persuading him to alter his point of view; whereas the incontinent man has already had "all the conviction he can get down. Otherwise a change in the conviction that he was right might have stopped him. As it is, he is convinced that he ought to do one thing, and he does another all the time."³⁹ If Raba, in the

³⁴ Ad b. *Sanhedrin* 27a.

³⁵ *Ibid.*

³⁶ All our references are to *The Ethics of Aristotle*, translated by J. A. K. Thomson. Harmondsworth, Penguin Books, 1955.

³⁷ *Ethics*, Book Seven, ch. II (p. 197).

³⁸ *Op. cit.*, Book Seven, *passim*.

³⁹ *Op. cit.*, Book Seven, ch. II (p. 197).

discussion we have considered above, could have formulated his lenient view of the *mumar lehakh'is* in terms of Greek thought, he might have subscribed to this (preliminary) formulation of Aristotle's.

But, on further reflection, Aristotle comes to the conclusion that the "incontinent" man is to be preferred to the "intemperate" one, after all. The incontinent man is always capable of remorse, whereas the intemperate man turns out to be incurable.⁴⁰ Vice is a chronic; incontinence, an intermittent, ill. "The intemperate man deliberately chooses to follow in the train of his lusts from a belief that he ought always to pursue the pleasure of the moment. The incontinent man pursues it, too, but has no such belief."⁴¹

In Rabbinic Judaism, this preference for the "incontinent" over the "intemperate" man finds its legal repercussion in the laws governing the lengths to which one has to go in order to save human life. This introduces us to the categories of those one need not help to save (*moridin welo ma'alim*).⁴² In codifying the conclusions, Maimonides dooms the persistent sinner, but he specifically excludes from this harsh decision "the sinful Israelite who does not continuously persist in his wickedness, but commits transgressions for his own enjoyment, such as the one who eats *nebhelo*th for reasons of appetite. He must be saved."⁴³ The *mumar lete'abhon*, in other words, like Aristotle's "incontinent man," is deemed to be "curable," — which may also account for Maimonides' reckoning only the *mumar lehakh'is* among those who have no share in the World-to-Come.

VI. CONSISTENCY

We have already noted⁴⁴ that Rabbinic Law distinguishes between the '*mumar* in regard to the whole Torah' and the '*mumar* in regard to one particular law.' We have also seen the view expressed in the discussion between Rab Aḥa and Rabina, and also voiced by Rabbah bar bar Ḥanah in the name of Rabbi Yoḥanan,⁴⁵ that a *mumar lehakh'is* really corresponds to a *min*. But the *mumarim* we mostly encounter in

⁴⁰ *Op. cit.*, Book Seven, ch. VIII (p. 212).

⁴¹ *Op. cit.*, Book Seven, ch. III (p. 198).

⁴² Cf. the discussion in b. 'Abhodah Zarah 26a, b.

⁴³ *Yad, Hilkhoth Roze'ah* 4:11, 12; and cf. Sh. A., Y. D. 158:1, where the phrase *ומ'מ אם בא לשוב לא מחמירין עליו* is reminiscent of Aristotle's view that the "incontinent" man is "curable."

⁴⁴ See above, Notes 10 and 11.

⁴⁵ See above, Note 29. The צדוקי in b. *Horayoth* 11a should, of course, be מין with the Venice ed. and the parallel passage in b. 'Abhodah Zarah 26b.

halakhic discussions do not create the impression that they either completely stand outside of the Jewish community, or that they have become alienated from *all* the provisions of the Torah. By and large, they seem to be of the type which, within a total Jewish structure, and together with a general observance of the Torah, disregards the one or the other provision, — particularly in the area of the dietary laws.

The question of such a *mumar*'s trustworthiness as a witness has already been discussed, and we have seen that the *Halakhah* rules against him.⁴⁶ But his untrustworthiness as a witness does not yet imply a like untrustworthiness in other areas of Jewish Law. But *can* he be trusted?

The view is expressed⁴⁷ that a '*mumar* in regard to one particular law' is *not* a '*mumar* in regard to the whole Torah.' This indicates how far from justified we are when we translate *mumar* simply as "apostate"! There is even a view to the effect that the '*mumar* in regard to idolatry' is *not* to be considered as a '*mumar* in regard to the whole Torah'.⁴⁸ And none other than the famous Amora Samuel is quoted by Rab 'Anan as the authority for the statement that "one is permitted to eat of the meat of an animal slaughtered by a '*mumar* in regard to idolatry'".⁴⁹ It is true that the Talmud ultimately rejects the view which denies the identity of idolatry and the rejection of the whole Torah, so that Rab 'Anan stands refuted.⁵⁰ But that the view should have been represented in the Babylonian academies in the first place is worth bearing in mind.

It might indicate, on the one hand, that, in 3rd century Babylonia, the idea of a Jew's flirting with idolatry was remote, and only a matter of academic debate. It might show us, on the other, that a Jewish '*mumar* in regard to idolatry' was not a *min* or real apostate, but merely someone who externally, and for an ulterior motive, conformed

⁴⁶ At the Second *Israelitische Synode* in Augsburg (1871) the case was reported of a rabbi in a Hungarian village who insisted on marrying a couple a second time, after he had been told that one of the witnesses at the first ceremony was not too particular about observing the Sabbath law. (Cf. *Verhandlungen der zweiten israelitischen Synode zu Augsburg*. Berlin, 1873, p. 65.) The Synod, not surprisingly, duly passed a resolution that "Niemand kann bei Trauungen und Ehescheidungen wegen Nichtbeachtung eines Ritualgesetzes als Zeuge beanstandet werden." (*op. cit.*, p. 256.)

⁴⁷ B. *Hullin* 4b: מומר לדבר אחר לא הוי מומר לכל התורה כולה.

⁴⁸ *Ibid.*: מומר לעבודת כוכבים לא הוי מומר לכל התורה כולה.

⁴⁹ *Ibid.*: אמר רב ענן אמר שמואל ישראל מומר לעבודת כוכבים מותר לאכול משחיטתו.

⁵⁰ B. *Hullin* 5a: אלמא מומר לעבודת כוכבים הוי מומר לכל התורה כולה וחיובתא דרב ענן. חיובתא. On this whole discussion cf. Israel Porath, *Mebho haTalmud leMasekheth Hullin*. New York, Feldheim, 1955, pp. 14-24.

to some or more idolatrous rites, — thus justifying Maimonides against Rabad's criticism.⁵¹ But it also shows us that, according to the psychological notions of the Rabbis, a departmentalization of religious loyalties was held to be possible. A man could otherwise be quite pious, but habitually fall short in one or the other religious requirement. And even though the extreme view about the reliability of the '*mumar* in regard to idolatry' was rejected, the view that a '*mumar* in regard to one particular law' is *not* a '*mumar* in regard to the whole Torah' became the established norm, as some of our illustrations below will show. It became the established norm in spite of an attempt to apply to our case the rigorous view which Rabbi Meir had expressed in the case of an '*am ha'arez* wishing to gain acceptance as a *habher*.⁵²

In that latter case, Rabbi Meir had insisted that, if this former '*am ha'arez* be suspected of disregarding one single requirement, he be regarded as suspect in the matter of observing the entire Torah.⁵³ Though disagreeing with Rabbi Meir on that score, and holding the former '*am ha'arez* to be suspect in that particular respect only, the Sages do adopt a similar position with respect to the proselyte who becomes suspect of not fulfilling one particular law. This would indeed make him suspect of not fulfilling the entire Torah, and they add, incidentally, that this suspicion would place the proselyte on the same footing as a Jewish *mumar*. From which premise, however, the conclusion likewise follows that both the suspect proselyte and the Jewish *mumar* can contract valid Jewish marriages.⁵⁴

We find, then, that the native Jew — be he '*am ha'arez* turned *habher* and becoming suspect of disregarding a ruling, or a Jew turned *mumar* in regard to one provision of the Law — is credited by the Rabbis with a religious reliability which is not imputed to the Gentile who converts to Judaism.

But if a '*mumar* in regard to one particular law' does not rest under the suspicion of being faithless to the entire Torah, the question still remains of how trustworthy such a *mumar* is regarded to be

⁵¹ See above, Note 5. The whole tractate of '*Abhodah Zarah* — in *Mishnah*, *Tosefta* and *Gemara* — shows on what slight pretexts a Jew could be held guilty of infringing the laws of prohibited "idolatrous" rites. A religious "commitment" to a non-Jewish faith and its dogmas had nothing to do with it. This is certainly true of the later Rabbinic period, whether or not Ezekiel Kaufman is right in making the same claim already for the biblical period. See his *Toledoth haEmunah haYisre'elith*, Part I. Tel-Aviv 1937, Vol. I, *passim*.

⁵² Cf. b. '*Erubhin* 69a, b.

⁵³ B. *Berakhoth* 30b.

⁵⁴ *Ibid.*, and cf. Rashi *ad loc.*

when it comes to the performance of the particular law in regard to which he has shown himself to be a *mumar* (*mumar le'otho dabhar*). This is being discussed at great length in the talmudic discussion of ritual slaughter (*shehitah*), the *locus classicus* for the whole concept of *mumar*.

Raba states⁵⁵ that one may eat of the meat of an animal slaughtered by a *mumar* who eats *nebhelo* for reasons of appetite, provided that one first examines the knife one gives to him. The reason justifying this permission is that, without any additional trouble to himself, the *mumar* could have permitted meat just as well as he could have forbidden meat. It stands to reason that he would not pass up this opportunity of having permitted meat in order to eat forbidden meat instead. We have here the same regard for the basic decency and religious integrity of the *mumar* which we have noted before, a tendency to judge him "in the scale of merit." And this provision has become *Halakhah*, and has been incorporated into the *Shulhan Arukh*.⁵⁶ The same code exemplifies this tendency still further by stating: "If a *mumar lete'abhon* slaughters by himself, and he has in his possession an approved knife and a non-approved knife; and he says that he has slaughtered with the approved knife, he is believed."⁵⁷

VII. CONCLUSIONS

The *mumar*, far from being an apostate from Judaism like the *min* or the *apikoros*, represents a type of sinner living completely within the structure of Jewish community life and, on the whole, abiding by the provisions of the Torah. The only *mumar* whose links to Jewish life are extremely tenuous, if not altogether broken, is the 'mumar in regard to the entire Torah' or the 'mumar in regard to idolatry' (these two tend to be identified), on which level the 'mumar out of a spirit of defiance' is likewise placed.

On the whole, the *mumar* is seen as a Jew guilty of incontinence, whose transgressions primarily lie in the conative realm where appetites come into conflict with the restrictive provisions of the Torah. Since the *mumar* thus evinces a lack of self-control, he forfeits his trustworthiness in legal proceedings, and may not be called upon as a witness. In this connection it is interesting to note that the Amora Raba was willing to make an exception in the case of the 'mumar

⁵⁵ B. *Hullin* 4a: אמר רבא ישראל מומר אוכל גבילות לתיאבון בודק סכין ונותן לו ומותר לאכול.
משחיתתו מאי טעמא כיון דאיכא התירא ואיסורא לא שביק התירא ואכיל ואיסורא.

⁵⁶ *Yoreh De'ah* 2:2.

⁵⁷ *Ibid.*: 2:4.

out of a spirit of defiance,' apparently ascribing greater moral stamina to him than to his weaker namesake of the *te'abhon* variety. Aristotle, too, describes such an appraisal of the "intemperate" (as opposed to the "incontinent") man as "plausible," but later rejects it, deeming the "intemperate" man to be incurable;— just as the *Halakhah* was decided contrary to the view of Raba.

Perhaps the name *mumar* indicates no more than a partial "alienation" from the provisions of Jewish law, an "alienation" from which rabbinical literature regards the *mumar* to be curable, and which it does not believe to affect areas other than those of which the *mumar* is already guilty. The 'mumar for reasons of appetite' is therefore not included among those who have forfeited their share in the World-to-Come. His life must be saved when in danger; and, if suitable precautions are being taken, he may even be entrusted with the performance (for others!) of those very provisions of the law, in regard to which he has been known to be a *mumar*.⁵⁸

⁵⁸ That this, however, is not universally applied, that, for instance, the line may be drawn when it comes to the sanctity of Holy Writ, is seen in the statement of Rab Hamnuna, son of Raba, interdicting the use of Torah scrolls, phylacteries and *mezuzoth* written by a *mumar* (b. Gittin 45b). Yet the reasoning here is purely formal; only those may perform the "writing" of Deut. 6.9 who also obey the "binding" of Deut. 6.8. The *mumar* thus shares this disability not only with the idolater and the "informer," but also with the perfectly blameless "servant, woman, and minor!"

EMPATHY IN MODERN PSYCHOTHERAPY AND IN THE AGGADA

ROBERT L. KATZ

Hebrew Union College - Jewish Institute of Religion, Cincinnati

THE NATURE OF EMPATHY

EMPATHY is a psychological process by which the modern psychotherapist tries to understand the problems, the situation, and the feeling of his patient. Psychological science and therapy have drawn on a universal human experience and have made it a central feature of the study of human relationships. Jewish tradition was by no means unaware of the phenomenon of empathy. Rabbinic *Aggada*, the area on which this part of our study will be focussed in the main, provides numerous illustrations of this kind of communication and understanding. It is in modern psychotherapy that the process of empathy has been more profoundly comprehended and described more explicitly. An important contribution of the science of modern psychology has been the distinction between empathy and sympathy.¹ A comparative examination of empathy in science and in religion not only clarifies certain areas of common concern but also suggests direction and guidance for the rabbinic counselor. The present study is mainly concerned with theory rather than with inferences regarding the counseling activities of the religious leader.

This is then a study in the psychology of religion; our frame of reference is psychological. Many of the sources to be cited from Biblical and Rabbinic literature have been classified under more conventionally theological rubrics such as "Immanence and Transcendence," "God and Man," "Love, Human and Divine," "Mercy and Charity," "Grace," and "Religious Duties." Our chief concern is with the emotional, personal, and psychological implications of materials, many of which are already familiar to the theologian and

¹ Charles D. Aring, "Sympathy and Empathy," *Journal of the Am. Medical Ass'n.*, Vol. 167, May 24, 1958; David A. Stewart, *Preface to Empathy*, N. Y., Philosophical Library, 1956; Max Scheler, *The Nature of Empathy*, (German original 1913), tr. by Peter Heath, New Haven, Yale Univ. Press, 1954; Theodor Reik, *Listening with the Third Ear*, N. Y., Farrar Straus, 1949. Scheler dealt with the ethics and Reik with the psychology of empathy.

historian of Judaism.² Seeking to understand certain aspects of Jewish tradition in terms of psychological categories, we propose to examine the processes of empathy, its ethics, its prerequisites, and its limits.

I. THE PROCESS OF EMPATHY

As currently understood in psychotherapy, empathy designates the process by which the psychologist "feels himself into" the inner world of another person with whom he has established a therapeutic relationship. The goal is to communicate with another person in terms of his unique point of view and to appreciate a human dilemma as it is sensed and experienced by the other person. Although empathy as a concept was familiar to classic European writers and figured in the writings of ethical theorists, its use as a term in psychology is dated back to 1897 when T. Lipps described a process in aesthetics by which one projects himself into a pattern and feels himself into the materials of visual art.³ Alfred Adler believed that empathy was best characterized by these words of an anonymous English author:

..... to see with the eyes of another, to hear with the ears of another, to feel with the heart of another.⁴

Einfühlung is the term for empathy in German. It is closely associated with "intuition" and with "insight." The psychological process of identification is usually linked with empathy. In Freud's words, "it is the earliest expression of an emotional tie with another person."⁵ Harry Stack Sullivan believed that empathy was a kind of "emotional

² A number of the Rabbinic references we interpret in terms of their psychological symbolism are used in the exposition of Jewish philosophy and theology. Note Henry Slonimsky's essay, "The Philosophy Implicit in the Midrash," *HUCA*, Vol. XXVII, 1956, pp. 258-259 and his exposition of "the weeping stricken God."

³ Gardner Murphy, *Historical Introduction to Modern Psychology*, Rev. Ed., N. Y., Harcourt Brace, 1949, p. 167.

⁴ *The Individual Psychology of Alfred Adler* (edited by H. L. Ansbacher and R. R. Ansbacher), N. Y., Basic Books, 1956, p. 135. Jacob L. Moreno described something similar referring to a process of *Zweifühlung* rather than *Einfühlung*: "A meeting of two: eye to eye, face to face. And when you are near I will tear (sic) your eyes out and use them instead of mine, and you will tear my eyes out and use them instead of yours, then I will look at you with your eyes and you will look at me with mine." Moreno wrote this originally in Vienna in 1914 and quoted it on p. 27 of *Progress in Psychotherapy*, Vol. I, (edited by Frieda Fromm-Reichmann and J. L. Moreno), N. Y., Grune & Stratton, 1956.

⁵ Complete Works, Vol. XVIII, London, Hogarth Press, 1950, p. 105 in the article on "Identification."

contagion"⁶ and like Max Scheler⁷ suspected that the capacity for such emotional sensitivity suffers atrophy as the growing child takes his place in society and as civilization itself "progresses." Theodor Reik lucidly characterized the process of empathy and identification in his *Listening with the Third Ear*. It is a kind of communication from "one unconscious to another." A therapist can understand his patient only by a roundabout way of inner perception, as Reik noted:

In order to comprehend the unconscious of another person, we must, at least for a moment, change ourselves into and become that person. We only comprehend the spirit whom we resemble.⁸

Students of human development have commented on the normal process of identification of the child with the parent.⁹ In psychotherapy the counselor makes a kind of "trial identification" with the patient and often the patient tends to emulate the therapist. Psychoanalytic treatment actually involves a kind of relationship that is analogous to a parent-child union. The psychologist Carl R. Rogers offers a non-technical paraphrase of the related processes of empathy and identification:

The counselor says in effect, "To be of assistance to you I will put aside myself — the self of ordinary interaction — and enter into your world of perception as completely as I am able."¹⁰

It is clear that the psychotherapist tries to make himself like the patient and achieves this kind of identification by sharing the quality and mood of the feelings of that person. But this kind of sharing is something less than a complete participation in the plight of another; it is provisional; it stops short of the feeling often described as "sympathy" which involves becoming encumbered by the problems of the patient and personally caught up in his feelings. Identification, as used in psychoanalytic psychology, is therefore a "trial" or a temporary mode in which the therapist does not completely lose his individuality. Max Scheler believed that men are endowed with an autonomous capacity for empathy but at the same time are often prone to a kind of "dissolution of the self."¹¹ Scheler described a kind

⁶ Cf. D. R. Blitsen, *The Social Theories of H. S. Sullivan*, N. Y., William Frederic, 1953, p. 79.

⁷ Cf. note 1.

⁸ Reik, *op. cit.*, p. 361.

⁹ Maurice Levine, *Psychotherapy in General Medical Practice*, N. Y., Macmillan, 1942, p. 106.

¹⁰ C. Rogers in *Journal of Consulting Psychology*, Vol. XIII, No. 2, 1949, p. 17.

¹¹ M. Scheler, *op. cit.*, p. 55.

of "genuine pity" and a "true fellow feeling" in which one man can understand and appreciate the feelings of another without becoming an actual participant in those feelings. According to Robert Fliess, the source of the psychologist's skill lies

... essentially on his ability to put himself in the latter's place, to step into his shoes, and to obtain in this way an inside knowledge that is almost first-hand. The common name for such a procedure is 'empathy'; and we, as a suitable term for it in our own nomenclature, should like to suggest calling it *trial identification*.¹²

The essential elements of empathy, in sum, involve a sharing of feelings and of ideas, a process of making oneself "like" another ("identification"), a mode of intimate and sensitive communication.

In our Jewish sources we do not find these concepts and processes described so explicitly. We must infer the traditional understanding of empathy from a very great variety of aphorisms concerning human relations and anthropomorphic figures which portray the quality of God's concern for man and the ways in which God identifies with the human situation. Illustrations of God's anthropopathy form the basis of our inferences. The psychology of religion cannot make judgments concerning theology; its proper concern is the understanding of the human motivation which prompted the description of God's ways. The ascription of empathy to God therefore signifies the placing of a high value on empathy in human beings.

Before examining a number of anthropomorphisms which describe phenomena closely related to "fellow feeling" and "identification" as these concepts are understood in modern psychotherapy, we note a number of references in the tradition to empathy between man and man. Most familiar is of course the statement in *Aboth* 2.5: "Do not judge thy fellow man until you have come unto his place." A paraphrase in modern ethical and theological language is Leo Baeck's statement:

To place oneself in the position of our neighbor, to understand his hope and his yearning, to grasp the need of his heart, is the presupposition of all neighborly love, the outcome of our "knowledge" of his soul.¹³

¹² R. Fliess, "The Metapsychology of the Analyst," *The Psychoanalytic Quarterly*, Vol. XI, No. 2, 1942, pp. 212-213. Cf. also, O. Fenichel, *The Psychoanalytic Theory of Neurosis*, N. Y., W. W. Norton, 1945, p. 511 where the steps in the process of making a "trial identification" are enumerated.

¹³ *The Essence of Judaism* (Irving Howe's rendition), N. Y., Schocken, 1948, pp. 211-212.

Empathy is associated with the relationship between genuine friends. The Rabbis comment on the value of a true companion with whom one can share a variety of experiences and in whom one can confide without reservation.¹⁴ In *Aboth* 5.16 we are reminded that a disinterested concern is the characteristic of true friendship; the mutuality of relationship between David and Jonathan is held to be exemplary. Job was hardly impressed with the empathic understanding of his friends and rejected their ministrations. They were מנחמי עמל, "futile counselors."¹⁵ The Rabbis, however, endowed Job's friends with the attribute of empathy. When absent from their friend, they sought to divine his mood and maintain a form of communication with him. This they accomplished by carrying with them at all times two symbols or indices of Job's emotional state: a plant (flower?) whose condition or appearance was attuned to Job's feelings and a crown containing a portrait of their friend which altered simultaneously with any alteration in Job's condition.¹⁶ King David's identification with the slain Absalom is movingly portrayed in the Biblical text.¹⁷

The value of empathy is also demonstrated in the relationship of Moses to his people. Commenting on the text "he looked upon their burdens" the Rabbis noted that Moses participated in the sufferings of his brothers.¹⁸ Like David, Moses wanted to die for those whom he loved. The messiah, we are informed, identifies himself with the unfortunate, for while waiting in Rome for the redemption, he sits among the poor and the suffering.¹⁹ The two men who went about the marketplace bringing cheer to the despondent were promised eternal life by Elijah in recognition of their empathic feelings.²⁰ The Rabbis observed that fellow feeling is common to those who can identify with each other because of some similarity of fate or of experience; a loving relationship prevails among strangers, slaves, and ravens — all of whom suffer from ostracism.²¹ Their marginality makes them sensitive to one another. It is also noted that an identification of feeling and of destiny is shared by members of well-knit and intimate groups. When a single member of a group is distressed,

¹⁴ *Aboth d' Rabbi Nathan*, Ch. 8: וינלה לו כל סחריו סחרי חורה וסחרי דרך ארץ.

¹⁵ Job 16.2.

¹⁶ *Baba Bathra* 16b: וכיון דכמשי הווי ידעי.

¹⁷ II Sam. 19.33: "Would God I had died for thee, O Absalom, my son, my son."

¹⁸ *Midrash Rabba* on Ex. 2.11. Reference given by my colleague, Dr. Eugene Mihaly. I am indebted also to Drs. S. S. Cohon and J. J. Petuchowski.

¹⁹ *Sanhedrin* 98a: יחייב ביני עניי סובלי חלאים.

²⁰ *Taanit* 22a.

²¹ *Pesachim* 113b: שלשה אהבין זה את זה.

the entire group is affected like the arch which collapses when a single capstone is removed.²² The interdependence of the Jews is a theme reiterated by the masters of the *Aggada*. When one Jew sins, the consequences are immediately felt by all his brothers.²³ An analogy is drawn with the sheep; pain in one limb is felt by the other limbs. So it is with Israel; when one Jew suffers other Jews are correspondingly affected.²⁴

Another reference points to the sensitive feeling and care which should characterize the attitude of one who performs the commandment of visiting the sick; one is admonished to love his friend as deeply as he loves himself.²⁵ In reference to Prov. 12.25, one Rabbi concludes that it is well to speak of one's sorrow and communicate it to others who presumably will respond with understanding.²⁶ Intimations of empathy are conveyed in the numerous sources treating the commandments of visiting the sick, comforting the bereaved, giving hospitality to strangers, and interacting sympathetically with members of one's family.

It is in the many descriptions of God's relation to Israel and to man that we find the most noteworthy analogies to empathy and identification as used in modern psychotherapy. The context and the language are anything but psychological in form and style. The human reality and the emotional states that can be deduced from anthropomorphic passages in the Bible and in the *Aggada* parallel the data of human relationships that have recently been studied by modern psychologists. It is of course our psychological understanding of the authors of this literature that may be illumined rather than our conception of the Deity.

When the Rabbis used the term *השוה* ("He made himself like or equal to"), they had in mind the psychological process designated by "identification." They may not have used the term with any conscious awareness of the structure of the psychological relationship, for they were not concerned with the reflective examination of such inner processes. In using this and similar terms they were expressing human needs and aspirations; the reality of the emotional life of man is of a piece even though the worlds of the Rabbis and of the secular psychologists of our day are so fundamentally different.

The word *שוה* in the Biblical Hebrew often designates a state of

²² *Genesis Rabba*, Ch. 100: אחד נוטל ממנה אבן אחת וכולה מתרועעת.

²³ *Exodus Rabba*, Ch. 27.

²⁴ *Leviticus Rabba*, Ch. 4.

²⁵ *Ibid.*, Ch. 34.

²⁶ *Yoma* 75a.

similarity or identity. A not uncommon usage of the term by the Rabbis of the *Aggada* is הָשֹׁהִי הַקְדוֹשׁ בְּרוּךְ הוּא עֲצָמוֹ עִם ("the Lord Blessed be He identified Himself or made Himself similar to . . .").²⁷ The term is also used to designate the process of arriving at a state of concord (הוֹמוּנִיָּה).²⁸ In any case the Rabbis employed the concept of שֹׁה as they ascribed human emotions to God and projected human needs on a cosmic scale. They often took care to add כְּבִיכּוֹל ("as though it were possible") to temper the boldness of such anthropomorphic language.²⁹ The Rabbis reflected the aspirations of their contemporaries for a feeling of intimacy and security in their relationship to God and in His immanent presence. The people sought consolation in the assurance that their fate was keenly appreciated by the Divine Spirit. They believed that God had fellow-feeling for His people; they even imagined that God participated directly in their suffering.

In his study of the *Immanence of God*, J. Abelson described the phenomenon to which we propose to apply certain psychological categories of interpretation:

Thus, the Rabbinic Jew said that God was his ever constant and never failing redeemer — and he said it because he felt it; he felt that there was a Presence about him which overflowed with unmeasured love for him and his people. It was some such rooted conviction as this, which made him declare that the *Shechinah* accompanied his people in all their pilgrimages, that the *Shechinah* sustains the sick, that an injury done to a fellow Israelite is an injury done to the *Shechinah*, that the *Shechinah* abides in Israel even in the latter's impurity.³⁰

Samuel S. Cohon has dealt at length with the literature concerning God's love.³¹ Somewhat closer to our theme is Sheldon H. Blank's discussion, based on a study of Hosea, Isaiah, and Jeremiah, of the prophetic conception of God's "entanglement in the human situation." Blank writes somewhat tentatively:

²⁷ *Tanchuma* (Buber) 42b, וִירָא. Here the association is with the humble, עִם לִבְבוֹת הַנְּנוּחִים.

²⁸ *Mechilta* on *Yithro*, section I. Also, *Lamentations Rabba*, Ch. 29: נַעֲשֵׂה הוֹמוּנִיָּה אִחָה.

²⁹ Cf. A. Marmorstein, *The Old Rabbinic Doctrine of God*, Jews' College Publications, no. 14, Oxford Univ. Press, 1937; J. Abelson, *The Immanence of God in Rabbinical Literature*, London, Macmillan, 1912. Also A. Marmorstein, *Studies in Jewish Theology* (edited by J. Rabbinowitz and M. S. Levi), Oxford Univ. Press, 1950.

³⁰ J. Abelson, *ibid.*, p. 283.

³¹ S. S. Cohon, "Love, Human and Divine," *CCAR Yearbook*, Vol. XXVII, 1917, pp. 244-300.

As a matter of fact, from several bits of related material, a kind of pattern emerges and it seems possible, quite within the area of Old Testament religion, to speak of a theme of human self-pity matched by divine suffering.³²

God's involvement with man is described in Blank's words as "the high tragedy of God's own hurt." Moritz Lazarus quite directly and without qualification noted the persistence of a related theme in the post-Biblical literature:

According to Rabbinical interpretations, the poet entertained the bold conception that God desires to be united with man in his suffering, desires to suffer with him.³³

To document some of the Rabbinic conceptions of empathy we turn to the comments made in the sources on a number of Biblical passages. We must place ourselves in the Rabbinic frame of reference. Diverse insights and psychological observations are suggested by their associations to two verses in particular, to Psalms 91.15, "I will be with him in trouble" and to Isaiah 63.9, "In all their afflictions He was afflicted." These verses were popular with the Rabbis in their homilies on the theme of God's identification with His children. This is poetry rather than forthright, "scientific" psychology; the phenomena of the emotional life nevertheless form the data for the associations of the Rabbis and provide us with the most likely material for our comparative analysis of Judaism and dynamic psychology.

A major theme is the "Divine Spirit in Exile." Also present was the idea that God participated in the fate of Israel to the extent of joining them when they were to be found in a state of defilement and degradation. So strong was the conviction that God both understood human suffering and shared in it that He was portrayed as a "partner in sorrow." God is described as speaking to Moses in the midst of the uncomfortable thorn bush, a symbol of pain. Of His relationship to Israel, God says: "I am, as it were, a partner in their sorrow."³⁴ The Divine Spirit is enslaved whenever Israel is enslaved, and only when Israel returns from exile will the Divine Spirit be liberated.³⁵ God accompanies Israel in every dispersion in order that He may be

³² S. H. Blank, "Doest Thou Well To Be Angry? A Study in Self-Pity," *HUCA*, Vol. XXVI, 1955, p. 38.

³³ M. Lazarus, *The Ethics of Judaism*, (tr. by H. Szold), JPS, 1901, Part II, p. 103.

³⁴ *Exodus Rabba*, Ch. 2. כביכול אני שותף בצערן.

³⁵ *Sifre*, Numbers, Ch. 84.

their constant protector.³⁶ He is at their side when they go down to Egypt as well as when they are exiled to Elam, to Babylon, and to Edom.³⁷ God feels personally distressed when the Temple is destroyed; the *Shechinah* embraces the walls and the pillars of the temple and cries out in anguish.³⁸ So many images are given to dramatize the profound involvement of God with His people. He is the husband, the father, and the mother and the sorrow of His family is His own sorrow.³⁹ The Rabbis repeat the Isaianic theme of God as the maternal comforter.⁴⁰ The relationship is no less intimate than that of twins; when one suffers, the other feels pain at the same moment.⁴¹ The *aggadic* materials we are considering led Solomon Schechter to use the phrase *imitatio hominis* to epitomize Rabbinic ascriptions of human emotions to God. God was held to be more accessible to man being endowed with the quality of empathy.⁴² Another evidence of the tendency to humanize God was the metaphor of the Deity weeping for His people. The Divine Spirit sheds tears over the destruction of the Temple,⁴³ for the captivity of Israel,⁴⁴ and for their lost glory.⁴⁵ Whenever He thinks of His suffering children, "He clasps His hands together and groans with anguish."⁴⁶ A most explicit form of identification is described by Rabbi Meir. A psychosomatic symptom (heaviness of limbs) is attributed to the Deity at the moment when He identifies with the man who is destined for suffering.⁴⁷ He has a private chamber to which He retires when overcome with grief for His children.⁴⁸

It is notable that according to the Rabbinic conception of God's empathy, the evil-doers and the enemies of Israel were not excluded

³⁶ *Megillah* 29a.

³⁷ *Ibid.*

³⁸ *Ibid.*

³⁹ S. S. Cohon, *op. cit.*, p. 252: "As a father, God is with man in suffering. In the parables of the Midrash and the Talmud, He frequently figures as the royal father of an only son or daughter, carrying the sorrows of His child in His heart." Cf. also I. Konowitz, מאמר האלהות, N. Y., 1908, (no publisher listed) and S. A. Horodetsky, יהדות השכל ויהדות הרוש, Part I, Tel Aviv, Twersky, 1946, pp. 81-85.

⁴⁰ Isa. 66.13: "As one whom his mother comforteth, so will I comfort you."

⁴¹ *Exodus Rabba*, Ch. 2.

⁴² S. Schechter, *Some Aspects of Rabbinic Theology*, N. Y., Behrman House, 1936, p. 37.

⁴³ *Hagigah* 5b.

⁴⁴ *Berachoth* 59a.

⁴⁵ *Hagigah* 5b.

⁴⁶ *Berachoth* 59a.

⁴⁷ *Sanhedrin* 46a: אמר ר' מאיר בשעה שאדם מצטער שכינה מה לשון אומרת קלני מראשי קלני מזרועי.

⁴⁸ *Hagigah* 5b.

from God's solicitude.⁴⁹ He mourns for seven days for the world. He is soon to destroy with the great flood.⁵⁰ Weeping is frequently ascribed to God and to the angels.⁵¹ The Divine Spirit does not hesitate to accompany Israel even in their defilement, say the Rabbis in commenting on Lev. 16.16.⁵² When the heavenly angels are reluctant to perform the commandment of visiting the sick in the case of Abraham who was convalescing following his circumcision, God rebukes them for their aloofness and precedes them into a place of blood and impurity.⁵³ When there is no one minded to comfort the *mamzer* seemingly destined for ostracism, God takes it to be His duty to console him.⁵⁴ God is consistently identified with the persecuted, even when the tables are turned and the evil-doers are pursued by the righteous.⁵⁵ He does not hesitate to dwell among the rebellious ones.⁵⁶ He delights even in the creatures whom man rejects.⁵⁷ The persecuted and the harassed fowl are acceptable on God's altar.⁵⁸ He has a special concern for helpless children whom He accompanies into exile.⁵⁹ He is so attached to the cause of the poor that He stands by their side.⁶⁰ From the very first day of creation, God was animated by a passion to dwell with His creatures on earth.⁶¹ When the angels remonstrated with God for what seemed to be a degradation of divine dignity, God replies: "See how deeply I love the creatures below; I shall descend and dwell beneath the hair of a goat (in man's goatskin tents)."⁶² God does not keep His distance from His people but marches directly in front of them in a manner unlike earthly princes who require their attendants to precede them as a protection against danger to themselves.⁶³ God is more concerned with the honor of

⁴⁹ *Sanhedrin* 39b. The reference is to the Divine chastening of the angels who were rejoicing at the defeat of the Egyptians.

⁵⁰ *Genesis Rabba*, Ch. 14.

⁵¹ Cf. J. Abelson, *op. cit.*, pp. 226-232. Tears from the eyes of the angels fell on the knife of Abraham being prepared for the sacrifice of Isaac — *Genesis Rabba*, Ch. 56 and Ch. 65. In *Hullin* 92a it is observed that the angel who was Jacob's antagonist wept in sympathy for him.

⁵² *Megillah* 29a and *Yoma* 57a.

⁵³ *Tanchuma*, וירא (letter B).

⁵⁴ *Leviticus Rabba*, Ch. 32.

⁵⁵ *Tanchuma*, אמר.

⁵⁶ *Exodus Rabba*, Ch. 33.

⁵⁷ *Leviticus Rabba*, Ch. 32.

⁵⁸ *Baba Kama* 93a.

⁵⁹ *Lamentations Rabba* on Lam. 1.6: וכיון שגלו חינוקות שכינה עמם.

⁶⁰ *Leviticus Rabba*, Ch. 34.

⁶¹ *Numbers Rabba*, Ch. 13: בתאוה לדור עם בריותיו בתחתונים.

⁶² *Tanchuma*, *Terumah*.

⁶³ Cf. J. D. Eisenstein, אוצר המדרשים, p. 154. The analogy is also made between

the righteous than He is with His own honor.⁶⁴ God's empathy is not inhibited or restricted in any way. He calls Israel "His intimates" even though they had the status of Egyptian slaves; unlike men who are loath to acknowledge kin who have been jailed, God does not abandon His own.⁶⁵ God's humility is conveyed by the act of descending to dwell on the lowly and modest mountain of Sinai. He is ready to serve as a Porter for Israel. He will carry their burdens if they will but unload the weight of their sins upon Him.⁶⁶

While God's omnipotence was not questioned, He was described as being indecisive and almost ambivalent because of His identification with man. God struggled to overcome a conflict within Himself, as it were, for He prayed that one of His attributes would prove more persuasive than the other; He wanted His attribute of mercy to triumph over His wrath.⁶⁷ To the Rabbis it was not entirely fantastic to conceive of God as struggling to achieve and maintain an empathic relationship with His creatures. To say that God prays in order to become more merciful is to place the highest value on the quality of empathy in human relationships. God is portrayed as engaged in entreating Himself to make it possible for His own will to be fulfilled: "May it be My will that My children accomplish My will."⁶⁸ God reveals to man the very order and text of the prayers which are likely to move Him to forgiveness.⁶⁹ So impatient is He to meet the needs of man that He answers prayers even before they are pronounced.⁷⁰

The very sources which support the conception of an identity of feeling between God and Israel also suggest that God's own salvation is contingent upon the salvation of Israel. There was no question of God's omnipotence. It was more a matter of emphasizing by so radical and bold a conception that God was intimately involved in the fate of man and would never disassociate Himself from his destiny. Such a conception of God brought home to the Rabbis and their contemporaries the infinite confidence that they would never be abandoned. God would not permit Himself to be redeemed without redeeming His people at the same time. The Rabbis therefore expounded the idea that God awaits the hour of redemption so that

God's love and that of the self-sacrificing eagle which places itself between danger and its offspring (*Mechilta, Yithro.*).

⁶⁴ *Pesikta d'Rab Kahana*, חצא: חס הקב"ה על כבודם של צדיקים יותר מכבודו: חצא.

⁶⁵ Midrash on Ps. 148.14.

⁶⁶ Midrash on Ps. 22.8: ואלו עונותיכם ואנא טעין.

⁶⁷ *Berachot* 7a.

⁶⁸ Midrash to Psalm 76.

⁶⁹ *Rosh Hashanah* 17b.

⁷⁰ *Exodus Rabba*, Ch. 21. Cf. Isa. 65.24, "before they call, I will answer."

He may return, with Israel, from the dispersion.⁷¹ When He redeems His children, He will redeem His own right hand.⁷² God proclaims that when certain conditions are fulfilled (study of Torah, practice of lovingkindness, public worship) the reward will be as great as though one had redeemed Him and His children from among the nations of the world.⁷³ Among the words used in connection with the redemption of the Divine Spirit are *נאל*, *פרה*, and *ישע*. Until such time as God may redeem Israel and Himself, He begs Israel to comfort Him.⁷⁴ The God who redeems is also the God who suffers. It is clear that in the Rabbinic concept of empathy, fellow feeling involves participation in suffering.

II. THE ETHICS OF EMPATHY

What are the moral, ethical, and religious principles invoked to establish empathy as a value in human relations from the standpoints of Judaism and of modern psychotherapy? Modern psychotherapy tends to take for granted the function of empathy in the given task of healing the sick. Judaism is more concerned with the fuller range of the relations of man to man and empathy is seen as part of the Divine plan for the very structure of the social order. What is of pivotal importance in our concern with the comparative ethics of empathy in Judaism and psychology is the value placed on the individual and his needs. In one instance both the religious tradition and the modern psychotherapist speak of the concept of helping the individual emerge as if he were being assisted in his very birth as a man. The Rabbis spoke of the merit of one who teaches the individual as much as one chapter of the Torah or who brings one soul under the influence of Judaism; it is as though he, the teacher, had been the very creator of that individual.⁷⁵ Although the concept of Rollo May, a contemporary psychotherapist, is not altogether identical, it is similar and the figure of speech he uses is close to the style of the Rabbis:

The therapist is what Socrates named the 'midwife' — completely real in being there but being there with the specific purpose

⁷¹ *Megillah* 29b.

⁷² *Pesikta d'Rab Kahana* (Buber) 131b: לקץ הימים או לקץ אותו הימים שהיתה משעברת: נאלחי בני נאלחי ימיני.

⁷³ *Berachot* 8a: מעלה אני עליו כאילו פרדני לי ולבני מבין אומות העולם.

⁷⁴ *Pesikta d'Rab Kahana* 116a: מי צריך להנחם לא אני.

⁷⁵ *Yalkut Eliezer* (Pressburg, תרכ"ד), section "Master and Pupil." The refrain in each of the two statements is: כאלו יצרו וריקמו והביאו לעולם.

of helping the other person bring to birth something within himself.⁷⁶

Psychotherapy is an expression in the main of modern medical science and derives its ethics from the professional code of the medical practitioner, which is almost entirely secular even though its roots might be traced back to a classic concern for the individual. Our study would be unduly extended were we to comment on the aspects of the history of psychoanalysis which exhibits characteristics of a "church" as well as a "political movement" with its "congresses" and its succession of leaders.⁷⁷ Empathy as a mode of communication and as a vital process in therapy came into psychological usage in the course of scientific experimentation. It was a functional instrument and was esteemed because of its usefulness in enhancing the healing process. Nearly all of the leading theorists and psychologists were secular scientists; their ethics derived from a love of science and from considerations loosely classified as humanitarian. Because of the obvious inadequacy of traditional methods of psychotherapy which involved the use of drugs and the manipulation of the environment, the therapist was moved to experiment with a new kind of relationship to the patient in which empathy was discovered to be a most significant ingredient. The so-called "talking cure" involved a meeting and an encounter between two personalities, the healer and the patient. In the course of the refinement of the psychotherapeutic process, Freud and his followers were led to the most sensitive exploration on both the conscious and unconscious levels of the modes of communication between two people. This new line of psychological investigation tended to close the era of mechanistic and manipulative medicine with its emphasis on the treatment of the body or of one of the organs of the body. Now that the physician was concerned with the psyche of man and with the diverse relationships which evolve

⁷⁶ This statement by Rollo May is found on p. 84 of *Existence, A New Dimension in Psychiatry and Psychology*, (Edited by Rollo May, Ernest Angel, and Henri F. Ellenberger), N. Y., Basic Books, 1958.

⁷⁷ One characterization of the Freudian School as a kind of church with an almost hierarchical organization is briefly suggested by Max Graf in his article "Reminiscences of Professor Sigmund Freud," *The Psychoanalytic Quarterly*, Vol. XI, No. 2, 1942. E. Fromm makes the point in his biographical study *Sigmund Freud's Mission*, N. Y., Harpers, 1959. He uses the term "quasi-religious movement" and devotes a chapter to the "quasi-political character of the psychoanalytic movement." According to Fromm, Freud had a sense of "mission" even though he repressed his wish to have psychoanalysis serve as a "new philosophical-scientific religion." However, Fromm adds, "The content of this faith remained always implicit" (p. 92).

in the meeting of the personalities of healer and patient, he was led into a relatively new field of medical interest, one which brought him closer to problems of human relations that had long concerned those who were teachers and cultivators of the religious tradition. Empathy is therefore a concept that links psychotherapy and religion. It is rare, however, to note among the psychologists of the psychoanalytic school any expression of ethical principles couched in language similar to the symbols and principles associated with the religious tradition. A therapeutic philosophy like that of the psychoanalyst, Izette de Forest who directly refers to Lev. 19.18 is unusual. One of the leading exponents of psychoanalysis was Sandor Ferenczi who was noted for differing from his master, Freud, in emphasizing an active love for the patient.⁷⁸ But Ferenczi, like Freud, derived his ethic and his practice from a process of experimentation rather than from a philosophic or ethical code with a transcendental rationale. Interesting for our comparative study is the view of Alfred Adler on the ethics of empathy. He concluded that the physician could proceed on the basis of the useful fiction, following the "as-if" philosophy of Hans Vaihinger.⁷⁹ It was Fromm who wrote most explicitly about the ethics of empathy. In his system empathy is derived from man's innate care and responsibility for his fellow man, from respect for one's brother and from dedication to a concept of reality and truth which reflects the inner character of man.⁸⁰ Fromm uses the term "love" rather than "empathy" and stresses the principle that the psychotherapist must relate himself

⁷⁸ This is a prominent theme in *The Leaven of Love, A Development of the Psychoanalytic Theory and Technique of Sandor Ferenczi* by Izette de Forest, N. Y., Harpers, 1954. According to this point of view the psychotherapist must sometimes take the role of a parental substitute. "This demands an embracing atmosphere of 'lovingkindness.'" (p. 123). There is movement from empathic examination to "the final 'give and take' with the patient, as a person of equal emotional vigor."

⁷⁹ Alfred Adler, *op. cit.*, Ch. Three, "Fictionalism and Finalism." Speaking of his "school" of Individual Psychology, Adler wrote: "It will be satisfied in the practical application of its science to protect and further the sacred good of brotherly love where the religions have lost their influence" (p. 463). Another statement is of interest in line with note 77 and the idea of ethical "movements" in psychology: "I have always endeavored to show that Individual Psychology is the heir to all great movements whose aim is the welfare of mankind" (p. 463).

⁸⁰ E. Fromm, *The Art of Loving*, N. Y., Harpers, 1956. Space does not permit the delineation of some of the newer concepts in psychotherapy of the therapist-patient relationship with the emphasis on the reality of the encounter. I hope other installments in this study will permit the discussion of the ideas outlined in "Healing as Participation" by Hanna Colm, *Psychiatry*, Vol. 16, pp. 199-211, 1953. Dr. Colm deals with the implications of Tillich's theology for psychotherapy.

to the patient as a real person, as one who cares, who is alive and sensitive, and who is committed to the purpose of helping one's fellow realize his potentialities. Knowledge of one's fellow ultimately depends on the capacity for love:

The only way of full knowledge lies in the act of love: this act transcends thought, it transcends words.⁸¹

Because of an orientation to psychotherapy that diverged somewhat from that held by the so-called "classic Freudians," Fromm criticized a certain reluctance of therapists to move beyond the earlier conception of detached, scientific observation of the patient and his unconscious with a minimum investment of feeling and concern: "He must not look on the patient as an object, or even be only a 'participant observer.'"⁸²

What may we infer about Freud's conception of the ethics of empathy? He viewed the psychotherapeutic relationship as a means of "securing the best possible psychological conditions for the functioning of the ego: when this has been done, analysis has accomplished its task."⁸³ There was a minimum of mutuality in the relationship because the psychoanalyst was deliberately to restrict his involvement and to inhibit the development of a personal relationship with the patient. Analysis, according to Freud, should be marked by a kind of privation or a state of abstinence in which a minimum of support or affection should be conveyed to the patient.⁸⁴ He had in mind less a relationship of mutuality between two persons than a precise mode of treatment by which the "scientist-expert" established communication with the source of the illness, the patient's unconscious.⁸⁵ What is of more significance for our investigation of the ethics of empathy was the concern of Freud and the psychoanalysts with the principle of truth in the counseling relationship and the requirement of scrupulous soul-searching on the part of the psychotherapist himself. Both patient and physician were to be rigorously committed to a love of truth. According to Freud:

⁸¹ Fromm, *ibid.*, p. 80.

⁸² E. Fromm, "The Limitations of Psychoanalysis" in *The Saturday Review*, March 16, 1957, p. 11. The analyst "must overcome his own alienation, be capable of relating himself to the patient from core to core . . .".

⁸³ S. Freud, *op. cit.*, Vol. V, p. 354.

⁸⁴ S. Freud, *op. cit.*, Vol. XVII, p. 162.

⁸⁵ S. Freud, *op. cit.*, Vol. V, p. 112. Freud recommends a state of "easy and impartial attention," etc., "to catch the drift of the patient's unconscious with his own unconscious."

we must not forget that the relationship between analyst and patient is based on a love of truth, that is, on the acknowledgement of reality, and that it precludes any kind of sham or deception.⁸⁶

In order to qualify for his delicate responsibility, the psychoanalyst must strive to eliminate or control those forces within himself that might blind him to certain sides of reality and block his most effective communication with the patient. The process of gaining self-insight is called "training analysis" and while entirely secular in form and far from identical with conventional religious modes of "soul-searching" or confessional, it is nevertheless grounded on a thorough-going respect for truth and entails an openness of relationship that is reminiscent of a form of spiritual apprenticeship. Ferenczi described analysis as a process of gaining ethical insight as a prerequisite for entering into profound and empathic relationships with another person:

... the analyst himself, on whom the fate of so many other people depends, must know and be in control of even the most recondite weaknesses of his own character ...⁸⁷

Related to our theme also is the concept of "moral courage," an ethical quality which Theodor Reik considered essential if the patient and the counselor were to persevere in their mutual search for elusive and disquieting knowledge.⁸⁸ As the following statement by Izette de Forest indicates, the ethics of empathy depends not only on the commitments of the therapist but more importantly on the kind of person he is:

Whatever the psychotherapist may accomplish with his patient, he accomplishes because of *who and what he is*. His skill, his empathic capacity, his originality of theory and practice, are the expressions of his integrated, self-controlled, and ripened personality.⁸⁹

In Judaism the sources for the ethics of empathy are to be derived

⁸⁶ S. Freud, *op. cit.*, Vol. V, pp. 351-352.

⁸⁷ S. Ferenczi, *Final Contributions to the Problems and Methods of Psycho-Analysis*, Edited by M. Balint, N. Y., Basic Books, 1955, p. 84.

⁸⁸ T. Reik, *Listening with the Third Ear*, *op. cit.*, p. 500. Interesting for the student of religion and psychology is his statement: "In order to bring the hidden truth of the unconscious to the light of day, we need not only science but also conscience."

⁸⁹ Izette De Forest, *The Leaven of Love*, p. 188.

largely from the conception of *imitatio Dei*. Empathy may be seen as a moral and practical quality which is demanded of the individual in his human relations by an omnipotent God. We shall take note also of the high value which the Jewish sources ascribe to the quality of moral truth and ethical consistency. In its long history the Jewish tradition developed a vast ethical literature, much of which can be said to deal with the category of empathy. Our treatment will be illustrative rather than comprehensive, since our concern is the demonstration of certain linkages between Judaism and psychology rather than a discursion on Jewish ethics in general.

The view of empathy as a mandate from a loving but omnipotent God is basic to Judaism. The primary source is the classic statement in Lev. 19.2. It is suggested also by the Divinely ordained stipulation concerning fraternal responsibility.⁹⁰ The Biblical view is of course recapitulated in Hillel's Golden Rule.⁹¹ Man is called upon to emulate God who concerns Himself with the welfare of the individual and serves his needs. Empathy is an attribute of God and hence a *desideratum* for man who is expected to identify himself with God and His ways.⁹² Concern for the individual, an expression of empathy, is demonstrated as a moral value when men are reminded of God's infinite attention to certain responsibilities which attend the well-being of man. God is present at weddings where He blesses the groom and helps adorn the bride; He performs the commandments of visiting the sick and burying the dead.⁹³ The Rabbis specify the implications of the commandment "to follow the *Shechinah*" — it means to follow in its ways, i. e. to imitate the characteristics and practices of the Holy One Blessed be He, i. e. clothe the naked, visit the sick, console the bereaved and bury the dead.⁹⁴ A most explicit illustration of the rationale and ethics of empathy in Judaism is the principle of *gemiluth hasadim*, the performance of which is the profession or *métier* of God; Abraham, endowed in Rabbinic *Aggada* with the virtues of love and fraternal responsibility, is said to have embraced the Divine profession.⁹⁵ Those who were called "workers of good deeds," גומלי חסדים, were described as cleaving to the covenant of "Abraham our father."⁹⁶

⁹⁰ Gen. 4.9, and 9.5b.

⁹¹ *Shabbat* 31a.

⁹² *Shabbat* 133b. Commenting on Ex. 15.2 וזה אלי ואנוהו Abba Saul said: ואנוהו הוי דומה לו מה הוא חנון ורחום אף אהא היה חנון ורחום.

⁹³ *Genesis Rabba*, Ch. 8.

⁹⁴ *Sotah* 14a.

⁹⁵ *Genesis Rabba*, Ch. 58: א"ל אני אומנותי גומל חסדים תפסת אומנותי.

⁹⁶ *Ketubot* 8b. The section is relevant to counseling and empathy. The passages dealing with the counseling of the bereaved are most sensitive.

The ethics of Rabbinic counseling reflected the basic theme of *גמילות חסדים*. Commenting on Ex. 18.20 the Rabbis interpreted the phrase *את הדרך* as *גמילות חסדים* and held that the phrase *ילכו* should be taken as a reference to visiting the sick.⁹⁷ One's responsibility to his fellow man was not limited to financial support. The practice of *גמילות חסדים* was considered more meritorious than *צדקה* because it involved not only a giving of material things but a giving of oneself, of one's care and loving concern. Rashi interpreted the giving of oneself as referring specifically to such helpful acts as mourning for the dead and burying them, rejoicing with the groom, and accompanying one's friend on his journey.⁹⁸ The same thought is echoed in the Rabbinic teaching that one who has nothing material to give his needy friend should console him with sympathetic words.⁹⁹ Moreover, the counsel and support one gives to his friend should be characterized by invocation of God's word and His spirit; counsel illumined by the Divine Spirit would have abiding worth.¹⁰⁰ The greeting and encounter which takes place between man and man has the highest ethical significance, for when one welcomes a fellow-man, it is accounted to one's merit as though he had welcomed (or beheld) the face of the *Shechinah*.¹⁰¹ Recalling that empathy entails a concern for the welfare of the individual and a concern for understanding him in his uniqueness and individuality, it is interesting to note the stress which is laid on the worth of a single life. In the well-known Mishnaic statement, it is said that to him who saves a single life it is accounted as though he had saved the totality of mankind.¹⁰² The devotion to a single individual and the unusual concentration of effort on his emotional rehabilitation has been an outstanding characteristic of psychoanalytic practice. Fromm had ethical considerations in mind in paying tribute to Freud's ascription of such merit to the task of helping one individual for what is often so arduous and prolonged a course of therapy:

I believe that there is perhaps no greater evidence of Freud's genius than his counsel to take the time even if it should require many years to help one person to achieve freedom and happiness.¹⁰³

⁹⁷ *Baba Mezia* 30b.

⁹⁸ *Sukkot* 49b. *בממונו גמילות חסדים בין בגופו בין בממונו*.

⁹⁹ *Leviticus Rabba*, Ch. 34.

¹⁰⁰ *Sanhedrin* 26b: *עצה שיש בה דבר ה' היא חקום לעולם*.

¹⁰¹ *Mechilta*, Lauterbach, Vol. II, p. 178: *שכל המקבל פני חברו כאלו מקבל פני שכינה*.

¹⁰² *Sanhedrin* 4.5.

¹⁰³ E. Fromm, *Psychoanalysis and Religion*, New Haven, Yale Univ. Press, 1950, p. 98.

Such "counsel" implies a stubborn and often self-sacrificing concern which rests on the belief in the infinite worth of a single human being and is analogous to the spirit of the Rabbinic ethic.

Relevant to the ethics of empathy in Judaism would be the numerous admonitions regarding the commandment of visiting the sick and the assertion that one's love for his ailing friend should be as profound as is his own self-love.¹⁰⁴ Empathic concern for one's fellow was held to be practically efficacious. A visitor removes a portion of the illness of his sick friend.¹⁰⁵ It was recognized by one partner in a debate between two of the Rabbis that it is well to speak of one's own distress in the presence of others.¹⁰⁶

The Rabbis stressed most emphatically the role of truth as an essential element in empathic relationships. As a parallel to the value Freud placed on absolute honesty as a prerequisite for both the physician and the patient, we note briefly some Rabbinic references to the virtue of *תמימות* and *כונה*. What was asserted as part of one's preparation for the act of prayer could be taken as an endorsement of the virtue of self-analysis; a man was required to take stock of himself and determine whether his heart was attuned to the Divine, i. e., to determine whether he was able to give undivided attention to his religious responsibilities.¹⁰⁷ Ethical integrity is of course a frequent theme in the Bible.¹⁰⁸ God is portrayed as the seeker after the heart of man.¹⁰⁹ He penetrates to the inmost feelings of His children.¹¹⁰ Truth is the seal of God.¹¹¹ Among the creatures who reap Divine disapproval are those who speak one way and think another way in their hearts.¹¹² In the Jewish tradition and in modern psychotherapy the highest significance is attached to honesty in the relations of man to man.

Lack of integrity is but one of the many phenomena which are felt by modern psychotherapists to impede and inhibit the empathic process. Much attention is given to the ways in which projection, rationalization, and narcissism interfere with genuine communication in human relations. It is hard to avoid the ethical implications in evaluating these mental mechanisms; modern therapists concern

¹⁰⁴ *Leviticus Rabba*, Ch. 34.

¹⁰⁵ *Nedarim* 39b.

¹⁰⁶ *Yoma* 75a.

¹⁰⁷ *Berachot* 30b: לעולם ימור אדם את עצמו אם יכול לכיין את לבו יתפלל ואם לאו אל יתפלל.

¹⁰⁸ Ps. 119.1, I Sam. 14.41, II Sam. 22.26.

¹⁰⁹ *Sanhedrin* 106b.

¹¹⁰ Prov. 17.3, Ps. 7.10, I Chron. 28.9.

¹¹¹ *Shabbat* 54a.

¹¹² *Pesachim* 113b: המדבר אחר בפה ואחר בלב.

themselves with the modification of these inhibiting factors rather than with the act of judgment or evaluation. These mental processes were not unnoticed in the Jewish tradition. It is interesting to note some illustrations of ways in which the Rabbis indicated their awareness of them. They observed that it is hard for one man really to know what is in the heart of his fellow-man.¹¹³ Man tends to be self-centered and when his own needs are met, he is less able to muster feelings of sympathy and understanding for the needs of others. The Rabbis noted that a man normally has two hearts, i. e., he has concern for himself and for others. But after he fills his own needs (eating and drinking), he has but one heart, i. e., he has no concern for the needs of others.¹¹⁴ Another reference reminds us of one more consequence of man's egocentricity. It can be presumed that a man will be able to observe the diseases of others. He cannot be trusted, however, to make a reliable count of his own diseases.¹¹⁵ It was noted generally that a man is incapable of seeing anything that will prove disadvantageous to himself.¹¹⁶

The mental mechanism known in modern psychology as "projection" was implied in the statement by R. Nathan: "Do not ascribe your defect to your fellow-man."¹¹⁷ An interesting example of intuitive psychology is afforded in the Rabbinic exposition of the somewhat unusual statement in Deuteronomy 1.27a ("Because the Lord hated us . . ."). The Rabbis observed that God actually had no such negative feelings for Israel and cited as evidence the text in Mal. 1.2 ("I have loved you, saith the Lord"). The psychological reality was clear to the Rabbis: it was obvious that Israel must have hated the Lord. As further demonstration of the psychological process involved, the Rabbis then cited the proverb:

When you have a certain attitude (negative, in this case) towards another person, you tend to assume that this same attitude is maintained by the other person vis-à-vis yourself.¹¹⁸

¹¹³ *Pesachim* 54b.

¹¹⁴ *Baba Bathra* 12b.

¹¹⁵ *Negaim* 2.5: כל הנועים אדם רואה חוץ מנעו עצמו.

¹¹⁶ *Shabbat* 119a: ואין אדם רואה חובה לעצמו.

¹¹⁷ *Baba Mezia* 59b: מום שבך אל האמר לחברך. Because of their own former marginality as strangers in the land of Egypt, they might be prone to offend the proselyte by making him conscious of his minority status.

¹¹⁸ *Sifre, Deuteronomy*, Ch. 24. The psychological process is clearly indicated in the Rabbinical commentary on Deut. 1.27a ("because the Lord hated us"): אפשר שהקב"ה שונא את ישראל והרי כבר נאמר (מלאכי א) אהבתי אתכם אמר ה' אלא הם שונאים את הקב"ה. משל הדיוט הוא מה דבלבך על רחמך מה דבלביה עלך.

The Rabbis stressed the need for self-searching as a method of overcoming difficulties in understanding and appreciating the situation of one's fellow. Moreover, a man had to practice justice (adorn himself) before demanding it of others.¹¹⁹ The Rabbis observed that if a man cannot be judged himself, how can he be permitted to judge others?¹²⁰ A Rabbinic equivalent of the more or less universal proverb "physician, heal thyself" is available in the statement: *רופא רפא הנירתך*.¹²¹ Suspicions of a lack of disinterestedness on the part of a would-be advisor are frequently justified, according to a warning issued by the Rabbis: *אמר רב כהנא משום ר"ע הוי זהיר מן היעצך לפי דרכו*.¹²² Preparation for counseling entails the process of qualifying oneself to enter into an empathic relationship; part of that qualification is the closest possible examination of one's own character and motivations. Distortions of insight and residues of inappropriate emotions are a matter of concern in Judaism as well as in modern psychotherapy. Otto Fenichel underscored the value of the training analysis for the therapist as a means of eliminating "his own unresolved love and hate tendencies."¹²³ The Rabbis considered self-mastery and the sublimation of one's passions to be a heroic achievement.¹²⁴ The process of self-searching and self-analysis received a kind of transcendental value in Judaism when the Rabbis asserted that man should examine himself because this is no more than what God practices for Himself: *איני מבקש מכם אלא כשם שבלשתי בעצמי ומצאתי י"א מדות*.¹²⁵

III. EMPATHY AS A RELATIONSHIP WITH QUALIFICATIONS

One of the most significant developments in modern psychotherapy has been the distinction made between empathy and sympathy, between *Einfühlung* and *Mitleid*. We note some allusions to this

¹¹⁹ *Sanhedrin* 18a, 19a; *Baba Mezia* 107b. קשט עצמך ואחר כך קשט אחרים. Cf. also *Baba Bathra* 15b: טול קורה מבין עיניך.

¹²⁰ *Sanhedrin* 19a.

¹²¹ *Genesis Rabba*, Ch. 23. Adam gave advice on procreation at a time when he himself was not fulfilling the commandment.

¹²² *Sanhedrin* 76b. As Rashi notes, he gives advice that will redound to his own good. Note also the statement of R. Meir (*Moed Katon* 21b) about the person who would attempt to offer consolation to a man who has already completed the twelve months of mourning. The analogy is made to a physician who fractures the healed leg of a man so that he can demonstrate the excellence of his medicine and his therapy.

¹²³ Otto Fenichel, *The Psychoanalytic Theory of Neurosis*, p. 31.

¹²⁴ *Aboth* 4.1.

¹²⁵ *Tana D'be Eliyahu* (Friedman), p. 65.

distinction in the Jewish sources but the differences have been defined more sharply by the psychologists. What is involved is not only the assessment of the actual benefit to the patient of empathy as contrasted with sympathy but also the ethical issue of respect for the individuality of each person in the meeting of two. Communication between representatives of the religious tradition and the modern psychotherapists proves most difficult in this issue. Different schools of psychotherapy are prone to debate the degree to which the therapist should involve himself in a realistic relationship with the patient.¹²⁶ In any case it is of the essence of modern psychotherapy to recognize the need for the therapist to maintain perspective on the intimacy of his relationship; support may be given to the patient but the absorption of the physician in the problems of the patient is felt to be an impediment rather than an aid to the patient's recovery. The therapist makes a "trial identification," i. e., he makes himself like the patient for a brief period but this is done as part of a therapeutic program and it is not believed that the physician should become as encumbered by the patient's problems as the patient himself.¹²⁷ The psychotherapist should have insight and control over his own reactions, notes Izette De Forest:

This understanding allows him to make right use of his trained and intuitional skill and prevents him from allowing his own personal problems to enter upon the analytic scene.¹²⁸

Reassurance through the method of offering sympathy and an uninhibited, unqualified identification with the patient are normally excluded from the modern psychotherapeutic process. The ethical aspects of the problem of empathy and sympathy are discussed fully by Max Scheler¹²⁹ and by Erich Fromm.¹³⁰ Genuine pity and love involve a relationship based on respect for the individuality of each

¹²⁶ Psychoanalytic literature on "transference" and "counter-transference." Don D. Jackson observed: "The opprobrious and restricted meaning of counter-transference suggests that we may have need for a new term which would include all those processes which make up the sum total of happenings between two people." Article, "Countertransference and Psychotherapy" in *Progress in Psychotherapy* (edited by F. Fromm-Reichmann and J. L. Moreno), *op. cit.*, p. 230. He holds that a psychotherapist is "reared as a scientist, but, like the artist, the creative aspects of his work cannot be managed by reason alone."

¹²⁷ Charles D. Aring, "Sympathy and Empathy," *op. cit.*, p. 448.

¹²⁸ Izette de Forest, *The Leaven of Love*, p. 66.

¹²⁹ Max Scheler, *The Nature of Sympathy*.

¹³⁰ Erich Fromm, *Man for Himself*, *The Art of Loving*, *Psychoanalysis and Religion*, and *Sigmund Freud's Mission*.

member of the relationship. Scheler emphasizes the low ethical value as well as the impracticality of commiseration:

The dissolution of the self in a common stockpot of misery eliminates genuine pity altogether.¹³¹

Attempting to distill the quality of love, Fromm described it as

the expression of intimacy between two human beings under the condition of the preservation of each other's integrity.¹³²

The theme of mutuality is also present in the writings of therapists like de Forest.¹³³ Psychotherapy rests on the principle of respect for differences. There is also a kind of reciprocity, for a number of references can be found in the literature to the help and insight which accrue to the physician himself in the process of working for the initial goal, i. e., the therapy of the patient.¹³⁴ Empathic relationships are therefore not only non-competitive but often tend to be mutualistic and cooperative.

In the traditional Jewish sources we find a number of references to the mutual respect that prevails in empathy but in general there is less emphasis on the distinction between empathy and sympathy. A Hebrew equivalent for "mutual respect" might be found in the term *חולק כבוד* as used in the Rabbinic description of the relationship between Aaron and Moses; one brother gave honor to the other and each added to the other's strength.¹³⁵ The psychological implications of their relationship are most relevant to a discussion of the non-

¹³¹ M. Scheler, *op. cit.*, p. 55. This volume is relevant to the interest of students of religion, ethics, and psychology.

¹³² E. Fromm, *The Art of Loving*, p. 110. In *Man for Himself*, p. 73, he notes: "The way one experiences others is not different from the way one experiences oneself."

¹³³ Izette de Forest, *op. cit.*, referring to the patient-therapist relationship, she comments that "mutually loving people will rejoice over each other's success." (p. 19). Compare this with the Rabbinic account of the mutuality between Aaron and Moses. Cf. notes 135 and 136.

¹³⁴ In an unpublished lecture delivered at the Univ. of Cincinnati Medical School (Dept. of Psychiatry) on February 29, 1956, E. Fromm commented on the insight he gained from his patients. Izette de Forest (p. xiv) observed that "in the very process of helping to free the patient's selfhood the therapist too finds self-development and self-realization." T. Reik, *op. cit.*, p. 433 wrote: "It is, therefore, legitimate to speak of the psychotherapeutic value to the analyst of the analysis of another person. *In beginning to comprehend another, we discover a clue to ourselves.*"

¹³⁵ *Mechilta* (Lauterbach), Vol. I, *Masechta d'Pisga*, III: משה היה חולק כבוד לאהרן: ואמר לו למדני ואהרן היה חולק כבוד למשה ואמר לו למדני והדבור יוצא מביניהם כאלו שניהם מדברים.

competitive aspect of empathy. The Rabbis noted the complete absence of competitive feelings; each brother rejoiced in the fulfillment that accrued to the other.¹³⁶ Some inferences can be drawn also from the qualifications and limits to the empathic relationship of God to man. Illustrations of God's feeling for man and references to His participation in the sorrows of Israel abound but note must also be taken of the implications of the concept of the Transcendence of God. God and man are not fused into one; the *Shechinah* which associated itself with man and his fate and was deeply sympathetic to man was also described as withdrawing from such intimacy (סילוק שכינה). Relevant here are Biblical passages like Isaiah 55.8 ("for My thoughts are not your thoughts") and Job 38.4 ("where wast thou when I laid the foundation of the earth"). The Rabbinic *Aggadah* which was in so many respects a literature of consolation tended to stress the immanence of God.

It was not anticipated that Rabbinic literature would afford illustrations of the distinction between empathy and sympathy in the actual situation of counseling. Notable, however, is the observation of the Rabbis concerning the dangers of "over-identification." There was a recognition that sympathy needs to be controlled. In counseling the bereaved, men should not surpass God as they seek to emulate His attribute of compassion.¹³⁷ The theme of an identity of feeling and status among two who take counsel together is conveyed in Ps. 55.14. A version of counseling given by the Rabbis in commenting on Lam. 2.13 "... what thing shall I liken to thee, O daughter of Jerusalem? what shall I equal to thee, that I may comfort thee . . ." is more in accord with the conventional belief in the efficacy of sympathy and commiseration than it is with the practice of modern psychotherapists.¹³⁸ Universalizing and citing analogous situations are felt to be less helpful than the gift of empathic understanding and the fullest acceptance of the individual as the unique person he is.

* * * * *

I hope to continue this study and in subsequent installments deal with illustrations of empathy in Jewish ethical literature and in Hasidism. I hope also to deal with the works of Martin Buber who

¹³⁶ *Midrash Hagadol*, Ch. on ווארא אהבים זה לזה ומחבבים זה את זה שבשעה שנטל: ווארא משה את המלכות ואהרון את הכהונה לא שנאו זה את זה אלא היו שמחים זה בגדולת זה וזה בגדולת זה.

¹³⁷ *Moed Katon* 27b.

¹³⁸ Rashi to Lam. 2.13. Commenting on ונחמך מה אשור לך ונחמך, he notes: כשבאה צרה על אדם אמר לו אף בפלוגי כך תחומים לו.

stands somewhere between social psychology and theology. In his "I and Thou" dialogue he defines a relationship in a form that holds interest for the student of Judaism and for the psychologist.

Modern psychotherapy has refined the concept of empathy and through several decades of clinical study of human relationships has been able to demonstrate important distinctions between sympathy (*Mitleid*) and empathy (*Einfühlung*). In the Rabbinic *Aggada* the emphasis on the value of fellow-feeling was conveyed most persuasively by materials dealing with the immanence of God. Leo Baeck caught the essence of the Jewish view of empathy when he wrote:

To be a man means to be a fellow man. I am to make the man beside me my fellow man by my will and my deed. By my choice and my duty I must make a reality in life what is already reality through God The other man is my fellow because God made him such, and yet my deed is to make him a fellow man to me! That which is becomes a commandment.¹³⁹

¹³⁹ L. Baeck, *The Essence of Judaism*, p. 195.

NOTES ON THE DEMOGRAPHY OF THE SEPHARDIM IN FRANCE

ZOSA SZAJKOWSKI, New York, N. Y.

MUCH has been written on the history of the Sephardim, their commercial activities, and other aspects of their life. However, very little is known about the demographic problems of the Sephardim during earlier periods, or even about the demography of contemporary Sephardim in many countries. The sources are scarce and not easily available. In this paper, we should like, as an example, to touch upon some demographic problems of Sephardim in one particular country — France.

The number of Sephardim in France was never larger than about 3,500. In 1752 only 327 Sephardic families (1,598 persons) lived in Bordeaux and about 1,100 in Saint-Esprit-lès-Bayonne. In 1806, 2,131 Jews lived in Bordeaux, of whom only 1,651 were Sephardim. In 1809 1,173 Jews lived in Saint-Esprit. Smaller Sephardic communities existed in Bidache, Dax, Peyrehorade, Paris and a few other places.¹

In this study we should like to examine a few problems which are connected with the demography of the Sephardim in France: births, marriages, ages and deaths. It should be noted that the sources at our disposal are not always reliable. First of all, the Jews avoided giving absolutely reliable information when registering their *état-civil*. This was already observed by the historian A. Nicolaï in regard to the Jews and Protestants of Bordeaux.² The Bordeaux registries of burials of non-Catholics in 1737–1787 (introduced by the King's

The following abbreviations were used in the notes and appendixes: Ad — Departmental archives of Gironde; AmBa — City archives of Bayonne; AmBx — City archives of Bordeaux; Jerusalem — The Jewish Historical General Archives of Jerusalem; JTS — The Library of the Jewish Theological Seminary of America; GG — Registries of the *État-civil*. On the Jewish registries see Z. Szajkowski, "The Reform of the *État-civil* of the French Jews during the Revolution of 1789," *The Jewish Quarterly Review*, XLIX (1958), 63–75.

¹ Z. Szajkowski, "Population Problems of Marranos and Sephardim in France, from the 16th to the 20th Centuries," *Proceedings of the American Academy for Jewish Research*, XXVII (1958), 83–105.

² A. Nicolaï, *La population de Bordeaux au XVIIIe siècle. 1700–1800* (Paris — Bordeaux, 1909), 7–8

declaration of April 9, 1736 on such burials) contain many cases of deceased Jews who were registered as *portugais*, or *juifs*. Many of these were not recorded in the registry of deaths which was kept by the Bordeaux *Nation* of the Sephardim.³ Many Jews were not registered at all. Thus, on August 28, 1792 the births of four children of Abraham Gomes Fonseca were registered; they were born in Bordeaux between 1736 and 1790, but were not registered before. In 1794 it was noted in a Bordeaux register that Hanna-Félicité, a daughter of Jzaac Lange and Sara Torrès had never been registered.⁴ The Jewish registries of Saint-Esprit are incomplete. On October 5, 1801, Jacob Rodrigues stated in a petition to the judge Samuel Nunes — a Jew himself — that he could not find any trace of his birth in these registries. On July 17, 1831, the Mayor of Bayonne stated in a note on the register of 1752 that the entries were faulty and should be considered only as a "nomenclature of notes made haphazardly."⁵ In the later years, in 1865-1894, Mardochée Ernest Naquet, Samuel Salzedo and Eugène Benjamin Léon compiled, from these registries and from other sources, a list of births and deaths of the Jews of Saint-Esprit.⁶ But according to their list, only old people died in the years prior to 1752 and from 1766 till the 1770's. It seems that their register of births was compiled from entries in the register of deaths.

Still, the available sources are of great value for students of Sephardic demography.

What was the rate of births and deaths among the Sephardim and how did this influence the increase or decrease of the Sephardic population?

In 1739-1792 the Bordeaux *Nation* registered 1,694 births and 1,816 deaths. In sixteen of a forty-three years period (1741-1783) the number of births among Christians of Bordeaux exceeded the number of deaths, while the number of deaths among Jews in these sixteen years exceeded the number of births. During six years the contrary could be observed — proportionately more births among Jews than among Christians and, during twenty-one years the process

³ AmBx, GG 810 (1737-1750); GG 30 (1737-1787); GG 790. It is possible that in some cases the *Nation* prohibited the burial of Jews in its cemetery. George Cirot, *Recherches sur les Juifs Espagnols et Portugais à Bordeaux* (Bordeaux, 1908), 181.

⁴ AmBx, GG 844 (Register of births in the Bordeaux *Nation*), Nos. 1880-83; I E 3, No. 681.

⁵ AmBa, GG, register of births in the *Nation* of Saint-Esprit.

⁶ In possession of the Bayonne Synagogue.

was similar in births or deaths among both groups of the population. During seventeen years, the Jews registered more births than deaths, while the Christians registered more births than deaths during twenty-seven years. The Jews registered more deaths than births during twenty-five years, and the Christians registered more births than deaths during twenty-seven years. The Jews registered more deaths than births during twenty-five years and the Christians during sixteen years. Only throughout one year none of them had more deaths than births. (See Table I.)

But we must always keep in mind that our sources are not absolutely reliable. In a municipal registry of burial permits for non-Catholics of Bordeaux, we found 167 Jewish deaths between 1739 and 1750 which were not recorded in the register of the *Nation*.⁷

According to one source, there were, in the 1741-1783 period, twenty-seven years with more births than deaths among the Bordeaux Jews but, according to another source, there were, during the same period, twenty-four years with more deaths than births.⁸

According to one document the *Nation* of Bordeaux registered forty-four births, eleven marriages and fifty-eight deaths in 1784. During the same year the community of Avignone Jews registered two births, no marriage, and one death. According to another document, the number of births among the Bordeaux Sephardim in 1786 was 56, deaths — 55, marriages — 9 and, among the Avignone, there were 5 births, 5 deaths, and 2 marriages.⁹ But the statistics of these two documents are different from the official registries of the *Nation*.

According to one source, 2,628 Jews were born in Saint-Esprit during the years 1709-1807 (see Table II). But we already noted that this list of births was largely based on information obtained from the registries of the deaths which recorded the age of the deceased. Thus we found names of Jews who were born outside of Saint-Esprit, but had died there, *e. g.* Moyse Ensheim (born in 1750 in Metz, deceased in 1839 in Bayonne). By comparing the two records of births and burials in Saint-Esprit for the period of 1780-1807, we noted 999 births and 419 burials. This is completely out of proportion to the more accurate data on the rate of births and mortality among the Jews of Bordeaux and in view of the decrease of the number of Sephardim.¹⁰

⁷ AmBx, GG 810.

⁸ Nicolai, 202; Cirot, 83.

⁹ *Journal de Guienne*, Apr. 1, 1785, 866; AdG, C 1312.

¹⁰ According to the copies of the register of names of the Jews in Saint-Esprit, 1808-1810, Jerusalem.

It is worth while to compare data on births with the analysis of the register of names of 1220 Jews in Saint-Esprit (1808-1810). The author of this curious document included the data of birth of most of 1220 Jews. Thus we were able to obtain the number of 1,051 Jews who were born during the years 1728-1808 and still resided in Saint-Esprit in 1808-1810.¹¹ Many conclusions could be drawn from a comparison of the two statistics, but both of them are not sufficiently reliable to encourage such analysis.

A register of burials on the Jewish cemetery of Bayonne (Saint-Esprit became later part of Bayonne) contains the names of 2,622 persons deceased in the years 1780-1938. (See Table III.)

According to the already mentioned analysis of the names 843 Jews who still lived in Saint-Esprit on the beginning of 1808 had died during the years 1808-1883.¹² But according to the above mentioned record the number of burials in 1808-1883 was 1,351.¹³ According to the already mentioned record of mortality compiled by Mardochée Ernest Naquet 1,527 Jews died in 1751-1795.¹⁴ According to this document 486 died in 1780-1795. But according to the above mentioned record of burials only 319 died in 1780-1795. This only proves again the unreliability of the sources.

According to one source the number of births in the Sephardic community of Peyrehorade was 119 during the period 1793-1879 and the number of deaths 30. Of course, the low mortality could easily be explained by the emigration of the Peyrehorade Jews who died elsewhere after having left Peyrehorade.¹⁵

In the entire department of Gironde, there were 93 deaths for every 100 births and 3 births for every 100 inhabitants in the years 1806-1810. In 1861-1865, there were 92 deaths for every 100 births

¹¹ See Table VII.

¹² See Table VIII.

¹³ See Table III. Another record of deaths (Jerusalem) brings the following data for Bayonne: 1891 — 20, 1892 — 21, 1893 — 15, 1894 — 16, 1895 — 20, 1896 — 12, 1897 — 10, 1898 — 11, 1899 — 9, 1900 — 16, 1901 — 10, 1902 — 9, 1903 — 12, 1904 — 17, 1905 — 20, 1906 — 25, 1907 — 7, 1908 — 2, 1909 — 13, 1910 — 7, 1911 — 11, 1912 — 10. Total — 293.

According to another register of mortality in Bayonne (Jerusalem) 195 died there in 1893-1912: 1893 — 13, 1894 — 15, 1895 — 10, 1896 — 11, 1897 — 13, 1898 — 12, 1899 — 4, 1900 — 15, 1901 — 7, 1902 — 8, 1903 — 8, 1904 — 12, 1905 — 4, 1906 — 9, 1907 — 5, 1908 — 8, 1909 — 11, 1910 — 13, 1911 — 9, 1912 — 8.

¹⁴ See Table IX.

¹⁵ In Peyrehorade were performed thirty-three circumcisions in the years 1725-1742, 1745, 1748, 1753-1754, 1756 and 1758. According to a list compiled (most probably) by the historian Henry Léon (Jerusalem). But it seems that the list is not complete.

and 2.3 births for every 100 inhabitants. In the arrondissement of Bordeaux, there were 80.2 deaths for every 100 births in 1813-1822. In the city of Bordeaux itself, there were 79.34 deaths for every 100 births in 1770-1780, 105.12 in 1801-1805, 88.41 in 1846-1850, 118.09 in 1866-1870. In 1864-1866, Bordeaux counted 3.61 births per 100 inhabitants and 21.8 deaths per 1000 inhabitants. In 1864-1866 Bordeaux, with a population of 194,241 (in 1866) had 4,964 births and 4,249 deaths.¹⁶

It seems then that the death rate was higher among the Sephardim than among non-Jews. But the rate of mortality was smaller among Ashkenazic and other non-Sephardic Jewish groups than among non-Jews, *e. g.* in Strasbourg.¹⁷

On Table IV we can compare the rate of births among the Sephardim and other Jewish groups in the middle of the 19th century. The time covered by this Table is too small to allow for definite conclusions for such a late period. But there is no doubt that, in an earlier period, the rate of mortality among the Sephardim was larger than among the other Jewish groups. In 1717-1808 the Jewish community of Metz registered 7,062 births, 1,427 marriages and 5,905 deaths, *i. e.* 1,157 more births than deaths.¹⁸

Between 1780 and 1789, the four Jewish communities of the papal province in Southeastern France (Avignon, Carpentras, Cavaillon and L'Isle-sur-Sorgue) registered 478 births, 86 marriages, and 497 deaths, *i. e.* 19 more deaths than births. In 1788 those four communities registered 29 births and 52 deaths.¹⁹ This was, probably, a result of a constant emigration of the rich Jewish families from these four communities. The same could be said for the 19th century of which statistics for a larger period are available. In the Ashkenazic community of Dijon (where 413 Jews lived in 1846), 78 births, 20 marriages and only 39 deaths were registered in the ten-year period 1836-1845.²⁰

¹⁶ E. Férét, *Statistique générale . . . de la Gironde* (Bordeaux, 1889), I, 293, 304-05.

¹⁷ E. Schnurmann, *La Population juive en Alsace* (Paris, 1936), 129-30.

¹⁸ City archives of Metz; Departmental archives of Moselle.

¹⁹ According to the Jewish registries in the City archives of Avignon, Carpentras, Cavaillon and L'Isle-sur-Sorgue, series GG.

²⁰ Census of the Jews in Dijon, 1846 (Jerusalem).

Following are, for comparison, a few data on the births in the Sephardic community of Amsterdam: 1737 — 112, 1738 — 103, 1739 — 123, 1740 — 103, 1741 — 95, 1742 — 95, 1743 — 92, 1744 — 92, 1745 — 95, 1746 — 101, 1747 — 82, 1760 — 85, 1761 — 62, 1762 — 78, 1763 — 77, 1764 — 74. But it seems that for many years not all births of girls were registered. Geboorte Register der Hollandsche Portugeesche Israelitische Gemeente te Amsterdam. Sept. 1, 1736 — 24 tamus 5571 in the City archives of Amsterdam, D. T. & B, No. 400.

The age composition of the Sephardim is one of the most phenomenal and curious facts in the subject of our study. Of course, the incompleteness and unreliability of some of our sources should always be kept in mind. Still, the percentage of old people is strikingly large. In six registries of Bordeaux and Saint-Esprit covering the years 1716–1810, the age of 4,521 Jews is mentioned. 2,721 of them were between 51 and 81 years old or older: 497 between 51 and 60 years, 1,580 between 61 and 80 and 644 of 81 years or older. (See Table V.) According to the already mentioned register of names, 653 of the 1,220 Jews of Saint-Esprit (1808–1810) were born before 1789, 205 in 1789–1799, 253 from 1800 on. (In 109 cases the dates of birth were not noted.) At the period of registration, 168 of them were younger than 6 years, 301 were between 6 and 20 years old, 261 between 21 and 40 years, 123 between 41 and 50 years, 104 between 51 and 60 years, 99 between 61 and 80 years and 3 were 81 years old or older. According to the census of June 15, 1812, eighty-two of the 1,166 Jews in Saint-Esprit were older than 60 years; over one hundred of the 706 Jews (according to a census of 1886) and eighty-four of the 427 Jews (according to a census of 1921) were of the same age.²¹ In 1854 the Jewish population of Bordeaux comprised 2,411 persons (800 families). Of these, 215 (99 men and 116 women) were between 61 and 80 years old and 30 (19 men and 11 women) were older than 80. Out of 382 electors in the Bordeaux consistory on July 30, 1849, 123 were of the age between 25 and 40, 60 between 41 and 50, 52 between 51 and 60, 47 between 61 and 80, 2 — 81 and older. The age of 98 was not noted. Out of 317 electors on June 1, 1858, 83 were between 25 and 40 years old, 71 between 41 and 50, 62 between 51 and 60, 83 between 61 and 80, 3 — 81 years or older. The age of 15 electors was not noted.²²

The percentage of older people among the general population was much smaller. Out of 349,101 inhabitants in the department of Gironde in 1872, only 9,520 were 80 years or older. Out of 215,140 inhabitants of Bordeaux in 1876, only 17,081 were of the age between 60 and 79, and 1,761 were of 80 years or older. The average age of the Bordeaux inhabitants was only about 30 years, while the average age for the entire population of France in 1860–1865 was 36½ years.²³

Further studies could probably explain this phenomenon. It is doubtful whether the economic situation had anything to do with

²¹ According to the copies of the censuses between 1812 and 1921 (Jerusalem).

²² Census of the Bordeaux Jews, 1854 (Jerusalem); Lists of consistorial electors in the Gironde department, 1849 and 1858 (AdG, V).

²³ Féret, I, 289–301.

the longevity of the Sephardim. In fact, while analyzing some records of deaths, we noted deaths of a large number of aged paupers among the Sephardim.²⁴ The longevity of the Sephardim could also contradict some statements about the poor physical condition of the Jews which resulted in their rejection from military service. In 1843 such a statement was made by A. Gautier, Deputy Mayor of Bordeaux, and repeated by the Prefect of the Gironde department. The same applies to similar statements on the Jews of the former Papal province and the Ashkenazim. In fact, such statements were most probably excuses for rejecting Jews from military service because of purely anti-Jewish sentiments.²⁵

Was this large number of older people among Sephardim only a statistical mirage, a result of a low rate of births? This may be exact only for some later periods. As noted below, the proportion of big families among the Sephardim was large.^{25a}

How did the age composition of the Sephardim look in comparison with other Jewish groups? In 1809, 402 out of 1,617 Jews in the five cities of Marseilles, Nice, Lyon, Carpentras and Nîmes were between 41 and 80 years or older. 110 of them were 61 or older.²⁶ This is a large proportion of old people among these Jews who were mostly of Avignon and Comtadin origin. But, among the Ashkenazim, the percentage of older people was much smaller, although there were more older people among the Ashkenazim than among the non-Jews.²⁷ According to a census of sixty-nine Jewish communities in the Department of Moselle (including the main community of Metz),²⁸ 7,709 Jews lived there in 1846. The census shows the ages of 7,484 of them.

²⁴ The Jewish community of Bordeaux counted fifty-three deaths in 1866. According to a curious document of the Bordeaux consistory which classified the 53 cases according to 6 classes of consistorial taxes paid by the deceased, thirteen belonged to the 6th — lowest class, thirteen to the 5th, nine to the 4th, six to the 3rd, one to the 2nd and two to the 1st class. Nine deceased were *indigents* and did not pay taxes at all. All thirteen cases (out of the 53) of deaths of infants up to one year old were among the poor and the classes six to four. Does this prove a greater mortality among the poor Sephardim? (Jerusalem).

²⁵ Z. Szajkowski, "French Jews in the Armed Forces During the Revolution of 1789," *Proceedings of the American Academy for Jewish Research*, XXVI (1957), 6.

^{25a} B. Saint-Jours noted the number of 1,785 Jews in Bordeaux in 1752 and 144 births from 1750 to 1754, or one birth per 50 persons ("La population de Bordeaux depuis le XII^e siècle," *Revue historique de Bordeaux*, IV (1911), 402, according to Ad Gironde, C 1089).

²⁶ Census of Jews in the regional consistory of Marseille, 1809 (Jerusalem).

²⁷ Schnurmann, 129.

²⁸ Censuses of the Jews in the communities of the Moselle department, 1846 (JTS).

Of these 7,484 Jews, only 525 were between 61 and 80 old, and 83 were 81 or older. According to a census taken the same year in the Department of Lower Rhine,²⁹ 4,012 Jews lived then in the six communities of Strasbourg, Barswiller, Bouxwiller, Fegersheim, and Hoënheim. Only 178 of them were between 61 and 80 years old, and 16 were 81 years or older. In the community of Dijon only 33 out of 413 Jews in 1846 were 60 years or older.³⁰

It is worth while noting a few details concerning marriages among the Sephardim, without yet drawing any conclusions. 178 marriages were registered by the Bordeaux *Nation* from 1776 until October 1792.³¹ According to one source, 131 marriages among the Sephardim of Bayonne were registered during the period 1793 to June 30, 1812. According to another source, 324 marriages were registered there during the period 1812–1882. The number of marriages was never higher than 14 a year (in 1873). We noted ten years with only one marriage annually, fifteen years — with two marriages, fourteen years — from three to five marriages, etc.³²

Another striking phenomenon in the early period is the number of large families among the Sephardim, especially in view of the above mentioned statement made in 1846 by the Deputy Mayor of Bordeaux that inbreeding among the Sephardim resulted in their physical decline.

The proportion of big families among the Sephardim was rather large, and certainly not smaller than among the other Jewish groups. Of 36 families of wealthy *Portugais* (i. e. Jews) in Bordeaux, named in a list of December 4, 1636, ten had seven or more children each. In the 1740's, Moseh François Lopez de Paz and Louis Lopez de Paz were each fathers of eleven children, and Abraham Lameyre of nine children. In 1807, out of 375 Sephardic families of Bordeaux, 149 were composed of from five to more than ten persons each (14 families — ten or more persons each). Among the Avignonese Jews of Bordeaux, sixteen out of twenty-seven families and, among the Ashkenazim, thirty-three out of sixty-nine families were composed of from five to more than ten persons. In 1809 one hundred and one out of three hundred and twelve Sephardic families in Bayonne

²⁹ Censuses of Jews in the communities of the Lower Rhine department, 1846 (JTS).

³⁰ Census of Jews in Dijon, 1846 (Jerusalem).

³¹ Number of Jewish marriages in Bordeaux: 1776 — 2, 1777 — 7, 1778 — 10, 1779 — 11, 1780 — 7, 1781 — 14, 1782 — 12, 1783 — 8, 1784 — 9, 1785 — 14, 1786 — 9, 1787 — 13, 1788 — 12, 1789 — 10, 1790 — 11, 1791 — 14, 1792 — 15 (Cirot, 183).

³² Bayonne register of marriages (Jerusalem); E. C. M. (see Table VII).

and three out of eighteen families in Peyrehorade counted from five to ten or more children each. (See Table VI.).

In the middle of the 19th century, the number of large families decreased. According to a census of 1854 eight hundred Jewish families (2,411 persons) lived in Bordeaux. Only 464 of these families had children: 162 families had one child each, 136 — two children, 70 — three children, 41 — four children, 29 — five children, 14 — six children, 5 — seven children, 3 — eight children, 3 — nine children, and only one family had ten children. 336 couples were childless. Of course, a number of grown children had, most probably, already left Bordeaux at that time. Still, this census proves a tendency toward smaller families which was then more in line with the general trend in France. According to the census of 1872, the average number of persons per family in the department of Gironde was only 3.48 while, in France as a whole, the average number was 4.62. According to a census of 1911 the number of Jews in Bordeaux was then 1,640; 428 of them poor people. The remaining 1,212 Jews consisted of 426 families. 291 of them were of 1 or 2 persons each, 172 — from 3 to 5 persons, 13 — 6 or more persons each.³³

Nor was the percentage of large families greater among the Ashkenazim. The Jewish community of Metz counted 505 families (3,075 persons) in 1708, 503 families (2,764 persons) in 1800, 456 families (2,186 persons) in 1806. In 1846, 172 Jewish families (875 persons) lived in the nine communities of the Moselle department, Bionville, Buding, Guinglange, Louvigny, Metzerville, Montigny-le-Metz, Montenach, Nelling and Servigny. 17 of them were composed of 1 person each, 17 — 2 persons, 21 — 3, 25 — 4, 23 — 5, 21 — 6, 12 — 7, 14 — 8, 12 — 9 and 10 families of 10 or more persons each.³⁴

This paper should be considered not as a complete study with final conclusions, but only as notes to an important aspect of Jewish research.

³³ Censuses of Jews in Bordeaux, 1807, 1854, 1911, and in Saint-Espirit, 1809 (Jerusalem); Ad. Detchevery, *Histoire des Israélites de Bordeaux* (Bordeaux, 1850), 59-62; Cirot, 182-83; Féret, I, 288.

³⁴ Censuses of Jews in the Moselle department, 1846 (JTS); S. Posener, "Les Juifs sous le Premier Empire," *REJ*, XCIV (1933), 163.

TABLE I

Births and Deaths in the Sephardic
*Nation of Bordeaux, 1739–Oct. 1792**

Years	Births	Deaths	+or— among Christians	Years	Births	Deaths	+or— among Christians
1739	36	26	?	1766	13	43	+
1740	23	19	?	1767	27	24	+
1741	25	20	—	1768	16	31	+
1742	14	16	—	1769	19	24	+
1743	19	8	+	1770	32	28	+
1744	22	17	+	1771	27	27	—
1745	28	49	—	1772	21	37	—
1746	20	19	—	1773	18	38	+
1747	29	21	—	1774	15	31	+
1748	20	31	—	1775	20	42	+
1749	30	26	—	1776	50	31	+
1750	25	22	—	1777	32	36	+
1751	30	22	+	1778	47	32	+
1752	24	28	+	1779	36	52	—
1753	30	39	—	1780	37	44	+
1754	37	22	+	1781	36	49	+
1755	40	25	+	1782	35	52	—
1756	30	23	+	1783	46	49	+
1757	23	29	+	1784	45	66	?
1758	20	25	+	1785	60	46	?
1759	22	25	—	1786	57	55	?
1760	30	25	—	1787	51	34	?
1761	18	21	—	1788	56	47	?
1762	25	36	+	1789	45	41	?
1763	26	36	+	1790	61	64	?
1764	24	21	+	1791	53	70	?
1765	19	33	+	1792	50	39	?
				TOTAL:	1,694	1,816	

* Cirot, 183; Nicolăi, 201.

TABLE II

Births in the Sephardic *Nation* of
Saint-Esprit-lès-Bayonne

1709-1807*

1709— 4	1734 } 34	1759—40	1784—27
1710— 3	1735 }	1760—42	1785—39
1711— 2	1736—11	1761—42	1786—38
1712— 3	1737—10	1762—38	1787—37
1713— 2	1738—15	1763—53	1788—23
1714— 3	1739—17	1764—40	1789—20
1715— 7	1740—14	1765—45	1790—25
1716— 5	1741—20	1766—24	1791—25
1717— 3	1742—13	1767—25	1792—30
1718— 9	1743—16	1768—33	1793—40
1719— 9	1744— 8	1769—42	1794—30
1720— 9	1745—16	1770—32	1795—32
1721—14	1746—16	1771—39	1796—44
1722— 8	1747—20	1772—42	1797—37
1723— 9	1748—30	1773—47	1798—40
1724— 4	1749—15	1774—36	1799—41
1725—13	1750—18	1775—38	1800—49
1726— 5	1751—13	1776—36	1801—42
1727— 7	1752—36	1777—31	1802—44
1728—11	1753—52	1778—28	1803—50
1729—19	1754—40	1779—39	1804—42
1730—20	1755—51	1780—40	1805—39
1731—17	1756—35	1781—24	1806—38
1732—20	1757—52	1782—36	1807—35
1733—15	1758—49	1783—32	
			TOTAL: 2,628

* According to the list compiled by Naquet, Salzedo and Léon.

TABLE III

A list of burials in the
Jewish Cemetery of Bayonne

1780-1938*

1780—22	1821—17	1862—18	1903—12
1781—23	1822—12	1863—17	1904—19
1782—30	1823—19	1864—22	1905—17
1783—20	1824—20	1865—18	1906—20
1784—16	1825—15	1866—21	1907—22
1785—10	1826—16	1867—13	1908—13
1786—15	1827—15	1868—27	1909—20
1787—15	1828—23	1869—14	1910—14
1788—31	1829—15	1870—21	1911—15
1789—21	1830—14	1871—25	1912—17
1790—15	1831—17	1872—30	1913—11
1791—15	1832—18	1873—18	1914—16
1792—12	1833—17	1874—17	1915—26
1793—26	1834—11	1875—20	1916—13
1794—22	1835—22	1876—31	1917—11
1795—26	1836—18	1877—11	1918—17
1796— 8	1837—25	1878—20	1919—17
1797— 3	1838—18	1879—15	1920—15
1798— 7	1839—14	1880—13	1921—10
1799— 4	1840—18	1881—19	1922—14
1800— 9	1841—16	1882—19	1923— 9
1801— 4	1842—15	1883—19	1924—19
1802— 8	1843—20	1884—10	1925—20
1803— 8	1844—10	1885—23	1926—22
1804—11	1845—18	1886—15	1927—19
1805—16	1846—21	1887—15	1928—16
1806—10	1847—18	1888—20	1929—14
1807—12	1848—17	1889—16	1930—12
1808—13	1849—18	1890—21	1931—12
1809—14	1850—21	1891—18	1932—14
1810—14	1851—16	1892—27	1933— 6
1811—22	1852—14	1893—15	1934—15
1812—20	1853— 8	1894—19	1935—15
1813—22	1854—19	1895—17	1936— 7
1814— 8	1855—31	1896—14	1937—11
1815— 7	1856—13	1897—16	1938— 8
1816—11	1857—15	1898—11	
1817—12	1858—22	1899—12	
1818—13	1859—25	1900—21	
1819—16	1860—25	1901—13	
1820—23	1861—22	1902—11	
			TOTAL: 2,622

* In the possession of the Bayonne community.

TABLE IV

Births, Deaths and Marriages in Various Regional
Jewish Consistories of France, 1858-1861†

Regional Consistory	Years	Total Number of Jews	Births	Deaths at birth (not registered)	Deaths	Marriages
Bordeaux*	1860	3,053	59	4	37	13
Bordeaux*	1861	3,053	60	3	35	9
Bayonne*	1859	1,204	16	—	34	9
Bayonne*	1860	1,192	19	—	29	8
Marseilles**	1859	3,550	67	2	41	17
Lyons***	1858	2,189	49	3	28	9
Strasbourg*	1859	16,455	473	28	335	119
Colmar*	1860	1,031?	252	32	148	68
Metz*	1859	7,253	140	9	86	30
Nancy*	1859	6,792	160	5	98	37
Paris****	1857-58	25,410	52†	96	787	253?

† According to statistical reports (Jerusalem).

* Sephardim.

* Ashkenazim.

** Mostly Comtadin Jews.

*** Mostly Ashkenazim.

**** A mixed community.

† Only in the communities outside of Paris.

TABLE V
Age of Sephardim in Five Registries of Bordeaux
and Saint-Esprit-lès-Bayonne
18th Century*

Age	Source	Bordeaux Register of Deaths 1716-1722	Bordeaux Register of Deaths Jan. 7, 1739- Dec. 23, 1792	Bayonne Register of Deaths Jan. 11, 1788- Jan. 2, 1792	Restored Bayonne Register of Births	Ibidem Age at Death	Total
Until 5		19	482	13	272	10	796
6-20		5	158	1	86	17	267
21-40		5	213	7	141	61	427
41-50		5	120	10	111	64	310
51-60		5	205	11	180	96	497
61-80		7	464	49	651	409	1,580
81 or older		1	154	2	303	184	644
TOTAL:		47	1,796	93	1,744	841	4,521

* AmBx, GG 30, GG 845; Archives of the Bayonne Community.

TABLE VI
Number of Persons per Family in Bordeaux,
Bayonne and Peyrehorade 1807-1809*

Number of Persons	Bordeaux Census of 1807			Bayonne Census of 1809	Peyrehorade Census of 1809	Total Number of Families
	Sephardim	Avignonese	Ashkenazim			
1.....	45	2	3	77	8	135
2.....	59	2	11	70	3	145
3.....	53	2	10	51	3	119
4.....	69	5	12	33	1	120
5.....	40	5	6	41	—	92
6.....	37	5	8	20	1	71
7.....	32	2	8	20	1	63
8.....	18	2	6	13	1	40
9.....	8	—	1	5	—	14
10 or more.....	14	2	4	2	—	22
TOTAL NUMBER OF FAMILIES.....	375	27	69	332	18	821

* According to registries (Jerusalem).

TABLE VII

Births in the *Nation* of Saint-Esprit who
still resided there in 1808-1810*

1728— 3	1749— 6	1770—14	1791—11
1729— 7	1750— 7	1771—12	1792—17
1730— 1	1751— 8	1772—13	1793—22
1731— 5—	1752— 7	1773—15	1794—16
1732— 8	1753— 4	1774—12	1795—18
1733— 4	1754— 7	1775—13	1796—29
1734— 6	1755—14	1776—16	1797—24
1735— 4	1756— 8	1777— 8	1798—28
1736— 7	1757—21	1778—11	1799—27
1737— 2	1758—12	1779—20	1800—30
1738— 4	1759—10	1780—13	1801—26
1739— 5	1760—13	1781— 6	1802—29
1740— 4	1761— 9	1782— 7	1803—29
1741— 3	1762—13	1783—17	1804—29
1742— 3	1763—17	1784—13	1805—27
1743— 8	1764—12	1785—21	1806—24
1744— 2	1765—11	1786—11	1807—23
1745— 8	1766—16	1787—15	1808—30
1746— 7	1767—11	1788— 9	
1747—10	1768—14	1789—11	TOTAL: 1,051
1748—15	1769—12	1790—17	

* According to a register of names (Jerusalem). According to another source, from January 1, 1793 till June 30, 1812, the Jewish community of Saint-Esprit registered 638 births, 477 deaths. E. C. M. [Coquebert de Montbret fils], *Notice sur l'état des israélites en France, en réponse à des questions proposées par un savant étranger* (Paris, 1821), 27.

TABLE VIII

Deaths in Saint-Esprit of Jews who had
resided there in 1808*

1808— 6	1827—11	1846—12	1865— 7
1809— 8	1828—19	1847—12	1866— 7
1810—21	1829—11	1848—13	1867— 5
1811—21	1830— 9	1849—20	1868—11
1812—15	1831—15	1850—19	1869— 5
1813—19	1832—14	1851—11	1870— 5
1814— 7	1833—11	1852—11	1871—12
1815— 5	1834— 5	1853— 8	1872—10
1816—10	1835—17	1854—13	1873— 6
1817— 9	1836—14	1855— 5	1874— 7
1818—14	1837—20	1856— 9	1875— 5
1819—15	1838—12	1857— 8	1876—13
1820—18	1839— 8	1858—15	1877— 6
1821—14	1840—14	1859—10	1878— 6
1822—11	1841—15	1860—10	1879— 4
1823—15	1842— 9	1861— 9	1880— 9
1824—17	1843—17	1862— 8	1881— 6
1825—13	1844— 8	1863— 7	1882— 9
1826—13	1845—16	1864— 8	1883— 6
			TOTAL: 1,351.

* See note to Table VII.

TABLE IX

Deaths in Saint-Esprit, 1751-1795*

1751—15	1763—27	1775—38	1787—19
1752—60	1764—36	1776—28	1788—34
1753—37	1765—38	1777—11	1789—31
1754—42	1766—60	1778—48	1790—21
1755—35	1767—25	1779—18	1791—23
1756—32	1768—26	1780—34	1792—14
1757—30	1769—31	1781—33	1793—38
1758—49	1770—41	1782—37	1794—62
1759—41	1771—55	1783—40	1795—32
1760—62	1772—40	1784—36	
1761—37	1773—65	1785—12	TOTAL: 1,527.
1762—39	1774—38	1786—20	

(1,662 together with an incomplete list until the end of the year VIII).

According to the record compiled by Mardechée Ernest Naquet.

SOLOMON MAIMON AND SPINOZA

SAMUEL ATLAS

Hebrew Union College - Jewish Institute of Religion, New York

IN A letter to Markus Herz, dated May 16, 1789, Kant writes that Maimon's *Versuch über die Transzendentalphilosophie*, the manuscript of which was sent to him for appraisal by Herz, is based on the assumption of Spinozism.¹ Recapitulating Maimon's position, Kant writes about Maimon's attempt to prove that in order for the capacity of understanding to have a legislative function on sensibility (meaning that objects given through the forms of sensibility, time and space, are determined by the concepts of understanding), it is necessary to show that the origin and ground of the forms of sensibility are in the understanding. The question *quid juris*, i. e., how concepts of thought can be applied to objects given through the forms of sensibility, cannot be satisfactorily answered on the supposition of the essential difference between the capacity of understanding and that of sensibility. Only on the assumption that the material of our sensibility is in itself grounded in understanding can we rightfully explain the application of concepts of thought to objects given through forms of sensibility. This can be accomplished according to the principles of Leibnitz and Wolff, who held that sensibility and understanding are not essentially different functions of the mind, but differ only in the degree of consciousness. That is, mere sensibility is a minimum of consciousness, it consists of infinitesimals of understanding, while the actual process of understanding is a definite and recognizable entity. The synthesis of understanding and sensibility has objective validity on the assumption of an infinite, divine mind, of which our mind is a part; or, in Maimon's formulation, our mind is, in a restricted mode, the presentation of the infinite mind; both are of the same kind. The concepts and forms of understanding can be applied to objects of sensibility and moulded by them, because the latter are grounded in the former, and the infinite mind is "the origin and ground of the forms of cognition and of the possibility of cognizing the things of the world."

Kant, however, doubts whether such a doctrine can be attributed to Leibnitz or to Wolff. Their followers would hardly admit that they embrace Spinozism, "for Maimon's conception is actually identical

¹ See *Briefe von und an Kant*, edited by Ernst Cassirer, *Erster Teil*, pp. 415 ff.

with that of Spinoza." Kant's criticism is thus directed not so much against Maimon's doctrine as such, as against the confounding of Leibnitz' system with that of Spinoza.

Maimon himself pointed out that his intention in his first work, *Versuch über die Transzendentalphilosophie*, was to propose a synthesis between critical philosophy and Spinozism.² However, in the same work, he defended himself against the suggestion that his doctrine of the idea of an infinite mind is identical with that of Spinoza.³ Moreover, whenever the occasion presented itself for a comparison between his philosophical world-view with that of Spinoza, he tried to show the essential differences between them.⁴ While he was conscious of the relation of his thought to that of Leibnitz, he frequently guarded himself against the identification of his thought with that of Spinoza. On the other hand, according to Maimon's conception of Leibnitz, the difference between the latter's system and that of Spinoza becomes imperceptible. This is especially manifest in Maimon's conception of Leibnitz' doctrine of pre-established harmony. This harmony is the result of the essential nature of the Supreme Being and not the effect of an arbitrary fiat of God. Leibnitz' pluralism is thus grounded in a supreme unity, and the manifold monads have their ground in a supreme monad (God).⁵

The difference between Spinoza and Leibnitz must, therefore, lie in some other doctrine which would determine the reason for Maimon's sensing the congeniality of his thought with that of Leibnitz and not with that of Spinoza.

To anticipate in advance the results of our investigation, the essential difference between Leibnitz and Spinoza, according to Maimon, is that the relation of Spinoza's substance to the attributes is fundamentally different from the relation of the supreme monad to the manifold monads.

In the philosophy of Maimon, as in the system of Spinoza, the idea of an infinite mind plays a central role. The substance, or God, consists, according to Spinoza, of an infinity of attributes, of which however, only two — extension and thought — are known to us. Through endless extension and endless thought we comprehend the

² See *Lebensgeschichte*, Berlin, 1792, II, p. 254.

³ See *Versuch über die Transzendentalphilosophie*, 1790, p. 365 f. Henceforth this work will be referred to by *Tr*.

⁴ See, for instance, Maimon's letter to Kant, *Briefe von und an Kant*, edited by Cassirer, *Zweiter Teil*, p. 32.

⁵ See *Streifereien im Gebiete der Philosophie*, 1793, p. 19 f. Henceforth this work of Maimon will be referred to by *Strf*.

substance. Just as the finite bodies are the *modi*, or parts of the infinite extension, so our finite minds, Spinoza maintains, are parts of the infinite mind, *i. e.*, the attribute of thought.⁶

As to the relation of our finite minds to the infinite mind, it is a relation which obtains between the parts of an entity to its whole. The *infinitus intellectualis Dei* is considered by Spinoza to be the sum-total of the human intellects. The essence of God, as an infinite intellect comprehending the totality of being, is made up of the totality of the finite minds. The difference between the attribute of thought as the infinite mind, and the finite minds, can be expressed in terms of a relation obtaining between the whole and its parts. God as the infinite substance is thus conceived as the all-embracing whole, and the finite minds are its parts.⁷

On the basis of the doctrine that our minds are parts of a thinking subject, that is the attribute of thought, the problem of the possibility of error naturally arises. In critical philosophy the problem of knowledge is mainly concerned with the possibility of knowing the truth. This is the meaning of the question concerning the possibility of synthetic propositions *a priori*. On the basis of the metaphysical doctrine of the infinite mind as the attribute of God, of which our minds constitute an integral part, the problem of knowledge consists in the question of the possibility of error, not in that of the possibility of true knowledge, for the latter follows necessarily from the metaphysical assumption of our mind being a part of the attribute of thought.

The human mind entertains false ideas just as it entertains true

⁶ Cf. Spinoza, *opera*, Vloten & Land Edition, Vol. 4, *Epistola XXXII*, p. 122: *et hac ratione mentem humanam partem cujusdam infiniti intellectus statuo*: Wolf's translation: "and in this way I declare that the human mind is a part of a certain infinite intellect." The word "certain" is to my mind superfluous. There is only one infinite understanding, the attribute of the substance. See rather R. H. M. Elwes' translation. Spinoza's correspondence, p. 292, which renders this passage thus: "In this manner, I maintain that the human mind is a part of an infinite understanding."

⁷ Cf. *Epistola XXXII*, Vloten Edition, p. 122: . . . *Quod autem ad mentem humanam attinet, eam etiam partem naturae esse censeo; nempe quia statuo, dari etiam in natura potentiam infinitam cogitandi, quae, quatenus infinita, in se continet totam naturam objective, et cujus cogitationes procedunt eodem modo ac natura, ejus nimirum ideatum*. "As regards the human mind I think it too is a part of nature. Since I state that there exists in nature an infinite power of thought, which in so far as it is infinite, contains in itself subjectively the whole of nature, and its thoughts proceed in the same way as nature, which, to be sure, is its *ideatum*." Wolf's translation. In the last passage of the original, Spinoza's thought is not clearly expressed. It has to be interpreted, not translated. See Elwes' translation, p. 292, note 3.

ideas. How are the false and erroneous ideas to be explained as parts of an infinitely perfect thinking subject? And if only the true ideas are parts of the infinite mind of God, what is the cause and the origin of the false ideas? The infinite attribute of extension embraces all finite bodies which constitute the parts of infinite extension. In like manner, the infinite attribute of thought must encompass all finite minds. We must assume then that the infinite mind of God embraces also the false and erroneous thoughts of the finite minds. The attribute of thought is supposed to encompass all the finite minds, just as the attribute of extension embraces all extended bodies. But how, in the face of the all-embracing infinite and perfect mind of God, can we account for the false and erroneous thoughts of the finite minds?

The answer to this question lies, according to Spinoza, in the distinction between imagination and pure thought. Only the cognition of pure reason, which is capable of conceiving the infinite and which cognizes the objects in their interrelationship to one another, is part of the attribute of thought. The imagination perceives the objects in their separateness, that is to say, in their finitude. Furthermore, the imagination perceives in the form of images, and every image is finite in its nature. Imagination is thus the source of error and false ideas.⁸ The infinite can neither be perceived nor presented in the form of an image, but can be cognized only by pure understanding. Only the cognition of pure understanding is considered by Spinoza as part of the infinite attribute of thought. By the imagination, however, the human finite mind perceives the objects not as parts of the infinite whole but as isolated and separate entities.⁹ Herein resides the origin of erroneous and false ideas.

Inasmuch as our mind cognizes the objects in their inter-relationship, it is an eternal mode of thought which is determined by another eternal mode of thought, and so on *ad infinitum*. In this way it can be said that all in the aggregate (that is, all the thoughts of the finite minds) constitute the eternal and infinite mind of God.¹⁰

The world consisting of two attributes, thought and extension, is considered by Spinoza to be an *individuum*. It is a whole, a unified

⁸ See *De intellectus emendatione tract.*, p. 27: Sic itaque distinximus inter Ideam Veram et caeteras perceptiones, ostendimusque, quad ideae fictae, falsae, et caeterae habent suam originem ab imaginatione . . .

⁹ See *ibid.*, pp. 22 ff. about the inadequate ideas as fragmentary and isolated ideas.

¹⁰ *Ethics*, V, XL, Scholium . . . quod mens nostra, quatenus intelligit, aeternus cogitandi modus sit, qui alio aeterno cogitandi modo determinatur, et hic iterum ab alio, et sic in infinitum; ita ut omnes simul Dei aeternum et infinitum intellectum constituent.

entity, made up of parts necessary for the constitution of the whole. Or, in the words of Spinoza: "All nature is an *individuum*, whose parts vary in different ways without, however, causing any change in the individual as a whole."¹¹ In the same manner the human mind is a part of the infinite intellect of God: "Thus, when we say that the human mind perceives this or that, we make the assertion that God has this or that idea, not in so far as He is infinite, but in so far as He is displayed through the nature of the human mind, or in so far as He constitutes the essence of the human mind" . . .¹²

Soul and body constitute one and the same individual which can be comprehended under the aspect of the attribute of thought as well as under the aspect of the attribute of extension.¹³

The human mind, which is capable of conceiving the object under the aspect of eternity, is a part of the infinite mind, and "it possesses the knowledge of God . . . Hence the mind, in so far as it is eternal, is capable of knowing everything which can follow from this given knowledge of God."¹⁴

While, according to Spinoza, the totality of being is an *individuum*, and the relation of the finite minds to the infinite mind is that of parts to the organic whole, an entirely different relationship obtains between the finite and the infinite mind, according to Maimon, as will be demonstrated.

Another comparison between Spinoza and Maimon suggests itself with reference to the various kinds of cognition of the human mind. Spinoza, following the tradition of Descartes, distinguishes between adequate and inadequate ideas. Not all our ideas are true, for we have also false or inadequate ideas. The human mind has inadequate ideas

¹¹ *Eth.* II, *Lemma 7, Scholium*: Et si sic porro in infinitum porgamus, facile concipiemus, totam naturam unum esse individuum, cujus partes, hoc est omnia corpora, infinitis modis variant absque ulla totius individui mutatione.

¹² Elwes' translation of the *Ethics*, II, Prop. XI, Corollarium: Hinc sequitur, Mentem humanam partem esse infiniti intellectus Dei; ac proinde cum dicimus, Mentem humanam hoc vel illud percipere, nihil aliud dicimus, quam quod Deus, non quatenus infinitus est, sed quatenus per naturam humanae Mentis explicatur, sive quatenus humanae Mentis essentiam constituit, hanc vel illam habet ideam; et cum dicimus Deum hanc vel illam ideam habere, non tantum quatenus naturam humanae Mentis constituit, sed quatenus simul cum Mente humana alterius rei etiam habet ideam, tum dicimus Mentem humanam rem ex parte, sive inadaequate percipere.

¹³ *Eth.* II, XXI: Mentem et Corpus, unum et idem esse individuum quot jam sub cogitationis jam sub extensionis attributo concipitur.

¹⁴ *Eth.* V, XXXI: Mens . . . quatenus aeterna est, Dei habet cognitionem . . . ac poinde Mens, quatenus aeterna est, ad illa omnia cognoscendum est apta, quae ex data hac Dei cognitione consequi possunt . . .

inasmuch as it cognizes the parts of reality as if they were entities separated from the whole. When we cognize an object not in its right relationship to the whole being, that is to say, not comprehending it as its part, but as a separate object in its detachment from the whole, there arises a false and inadequate idea.

Now ideas which are inadequate, in our mind, says Spinoza, are adequate in God, inasmuch as the infinite intellect contains the totality of being, that is "the minds of other things."¹⁵

Maimon, following in the Kantian tradition, is concerned rather with the problem of applying pure concepts of thought to the forms of sensibility and with the problem of the relation between synthetic and analytic propositions, instead of with the question of the relation between adequate and inadequate ideas. Maimon's doctrine, that we have to assume all our synthetic propositions to be analytic in relation to the infinite mind, corresponds to Spinoza's formulation of the relationship between adequate and inadequate ideas. We have only to replace the concept of inadequate ideas with that of synthetic propositions and the concept of adequate ideas with analytic propositions. For Spinoza our inadequate ideas are, in God, adequate ideas; with Maimon, our synthetic propositions are all analytic in relation to the infinite mind.

In the face of the apparent similarity, one should not overlook the difference which obtains between the synthetic propositions and the inadequate ideas. When we look for a resolution of the synthetic propositions into analytic propositions by the infinite mind, it implies an expectation that synthetic propositions will be verified by logical means which should grant certainty and exactitude to the propositions. That is to say, the same truth expressed in the form of synthetic propositions is comprehended by the infinite mind in the form of analytic propositions. But the Spinozian doctrine that the inadequate ideas which the human mind may entertain because of inadequate reasoning are adequate in the infinite mind of God, implies the replacement of the inadequate ideas with adequate ones. This concept of replacement of one set of ideas with another set of ideas is fundamentally different from the idea of resolving synthetic propositions into analytic propositions.

II

In dealing with the problem of the possibility of synthetic propositions, Solomon Maimon introduced the idea of an infinite mind of which the human mind is a part. But this idea plays a different role in Maimon's

¹⁵ *Eth.* III, 1 Dem. . . . et que deinde inadaequatae sunt is Mente (ideae) sunt

thought from what it does in the system of Spinoza. It also has in Maimon a different basis from what it has in the system of Spinoza. Spinoza's thought is rooted in dogmatic rationalism. It neither doubts the capacity of our cognition nor does it subject our cognitive faculty to a critical analysis. Spinoza's distinction between various modes of cognition aims at establishing a scale of degrees of cognition corresponding to the various capacities of our mind. The intuitive capacity which is the highest mode of cognition is capable of comprehending the infinite. The fact that we possess the idea of infinity is sufficient proof that our mind is part of the infinite mind. Maimon's thought is rooted in critical philosophy, in which the epistemological problem of knowledge is central. The question of the limitations of our cognitive capacity: What can we know? And how can we truly know what we do know? (*quid juris?*) — are the problems with which critical philosophy is mainly concerned.

While the progressive method is characteristic of dogmatic rationalism, the method of deduction is the hallmark of critical philosophy. The idea of an infinite mind must therefore have in the latter an entirely different ground. It could not lie in the mere intuitive capacity of our cognition. It can have validity only if it can somehow be deduced; that is to say, if it can be shown to be a necessary assumption for the possibility and reality of experience. In other words, the cognition of objects of experience cannot be accounted for, without assuming the idea of an infinite mind. But the mere fact that our consciousness holds the idea of infinity is neither sufficient proof of the reality of an infinite capacity of cognition, nor is it a guarantee of our mind's sharing in it.

Maimon writes: "We have to assume an infinite mind, at least as an idea, in relation to which all forms are at the same time objects of thought"; that is, a mind which produces out of its own self all possible relations and connections between the things which are its own creations, its own ideas. "Our human mind is of the same nature as the infinite mind, though in a restricted and limited manner. This is a sublime idea and will, I think, when fully developed, solve the difficulty," namely, that of the possibility of synthetic propositions *a priori*.¹⁶

The assumption of the idea of an infinite mind is necessary, according to Maimon, for the explanation of scientific knowledge, which consists of synthetic propositions claiming certainty and general validity. Synthetic judgments *a priori* cannot possibly be derived from

etiam in Deo adaequatae, non quatenus ejusdem solummodo Mentis essentiam, sed etiam quatenus aliarum rerum Mentis in se simul continet.

¹⁶ *Tr.* pp. 64 f.

mere experience. The certainty claimed by the synthetic propositions, of which our scientific knowledge consists, points to an idea which lies beyond the realm of empirical and sensuous experience.

We have to consider Maimon's position in the light of the idealistic trend of philosophical speculation as it arises in various phases of the history of human thought. The concept of *a priori* in whatever form it appeared in the history of philosophy, be it in the form of a metaphysical idea, such as the idea of *Anamnesis* of Plato, or in the form of a psychological concept, such as the doctrine of *ideae innatae* of Descartes, was always proposed as a necessary assumption for the explanation of scientific knowledge. The recognition was common to all of the idealistic philosophers, Plato, Descartes, and Kant, that the content of scientific knowledge comprises much more than mere empirical experience warrants. The claim of certainty and general validity which scientific knowledge raises is over and above empirical experience, and is in its very essence something totally different from mere sensuous experience. The concept of *a priori*, in whatever form it may appear, cannot be derived *from* experience but is proposed *for* the explanation of experience. Since the idea of *a priori* is totally different from concepts grounded in sensuous experience, the former cannot possibly be derived from the latter. The reality of concepts *a priori* can be posited only in view of their necessity for the explanation of scientific knowledge. The justification for the idea of *a priori* resides in the function it fulfills in the explanation of scientific experience. Thus its deduction is attained by the recognition of its indispensability in accounting for the reality of scientific experience with its claim of certainty and of general validity for its propositions.

In the same manner Maimon deduces the idea of an infinite reason. He proposes the assumption of such an idea for the sole purpose of explaining the possibility of synthetic propositions which claim certainty and general validity. The reality of synthetic propositions, of which our scientific knowledge consists, can be accounted for only on the assumption of an infinite mind, in relation to which our synthetic propositions are analytic.

Although Maimon did not designate his assumption of the idea of an infinite mind as a deduction, we are entitled, in the spirit of his philosophy as a whole, to consider this assumption as grounded in a deduction, since it is introduced by him for the sole purpose of explaining and accounting for the reality of scientific knowledge. Deduction in the Kantian transcendental sense means deriving a concept from a given fact. It consists in demonstrating the necessity and the indispensability of a concept to account for the reality of a phenomenon.

Now Maimon was critical of the Kantian deduction of the categories, in view of the consideration that the reality of synthetic propositions *a priori* is subject to doubt. For one may deny their reality, maintaining that the synthetic propositions are the result of an illusion grounded in habit. This skeptical attitude is formulated by him in the question *quid facti*? This skepticism with reference to the reality of synthetic propositions in experience, *i. e.*, natural sciences, did not, however, prevent him from recognizing the reality of synthetic propositions in our thought. The presence of synthetic propositions in mathematics, a product of thought, testifies to the reality of synthetic propositions. Their reality can be explained only on the assumption that our mind is part of an infinite mind in relation to which synthetic propositions are dissolvable into analytic propositions. The thinking process of man demands the supplementary idea of an infinite mind. Our regarding of synthetic propositions as real implies that supplementary idea. Human thought in its very essence supersedes itself; thought is self-transcending. This is apparently the implication in Maimon's conception of an infinite mind; it follows from the analysis of human thought as self-transcending. The idea of an infinite mind is necessary for the explanation of the creative nature of human thought, for synthetic propositions are not confined to the realm of thought; inasmuch as the predicate is not derived from the subject but adds something new, these propositions are creative. And, as the idea of an infinite mind is necessary for the explanation of the synthetic propositions, the method by which it is derived can be designated as a deduction.

Now, introducing the idea of an infinite mind, Maimon writes: "Let us assume, at least as an idea" . . . The words "at least as an idea," which form a subsidiary phrase enclosed in brackets, may mean that the assumption of the idea of an infinite mind, which is required for a philosophical account of scientific experience, is a mere idea but not a metaphysical reality. The hypostatization of the idea into a metaphysical reality is not warranted. We cannot deduce the transcendent reality of an idea from its assumption as an explanatory hypothesis. In positing an hypothesis for the explanation of a phenomenon we must be mindful of the principle that only the minimum required should be posited. As the idea of an infinite mind is introduced for the purpose of explaining scientific experience with the aim of granting certainty to the synthetic propositions, this function may perhaps be served by the mere idea of such a mind. That is to say, the idea is a goal we must strive to approach. We have thus to view the synthetic propositions under the aspect of this goal. So long as we have not succeeded in dissolving the synthetic propositions into analytic

ones, we assume that the former are grounded in the latter. It is an hypothesis which grants not certainty of reality but certainty of a goal. But the reality of an idea should not be converted into an idea of reality, and a hypothesis should not be transformed into a hypostasis.

This critical interpretation of the idea of an infinite mind is, however, not borne out by Maimon's system as a whole. It seems clear from the various contexts in which this idea occurs in Maimon's writings that he consciously posited it as a metaphysical reality, and not as a mere idea in the sense of a limiting concept and an endless goal. The apparently critical and non-metaphysical understanding of this idea in the text before us should therefore not be taken as an expression of Maimon's definitive and settled view of the matter, but rather as a passing remark introduced for the sole purpose of making the idea acceptable even for a follower of the critical philosophy.

And herein lies the difference between the idea of an infinite mind, *intellectus archetypus*, in Kant which is merely a limiting and methodological concept, introduced for the purpose of delimiting and defining the finite human mind by contrasting it with the infinite, intuitive mind, and Maimon's conception of the idea as a transcendent, metaphysical reality.

The function of the idea of an infinite mind is not confined to explaining the possibility of synthetic propositions; its scope is much wider. By this idea the concept of causality with reference to objects of experience is detached from the form of time with which the phenomena are associated; the causal connection acquires thus the rank of a purely logical relation. "Just as the actual coexistence of the various features of an object, has its ground in the ideal coexistence, *i. e.*, logical connection of these features in an infinite capacity of cognition, so the regular succession of various phenomena one upon another must also have its ground in the infinite capacity of cognition which thinks of this regular succession of the phenomena in terms of a logical antecedent and a logical consequent."¹⁷

In other words, our perception of a regular sequence of phenomena occurring in time, which is the ground for our conception of a causal connection between the objects, must be thought of as being conceived by the infinite mind as a logical, not as a temporal sequence. An infinite mind thinks only in terms of logical ground and consequence. The assumption of such a mind constitutes the logical foundation of our conception of causality which is derived from the observation of a

¹⁷ *Magazin zur Erfahrungsseelenkunde*, 10 Vol. 2-tes Stück, p. 55.

sequence of the phenomena occurring in time. The concept of a causal connection of phenomena in time which is based on experience does not command certainty, as the experience grants merely a succession of the phenomena, but the causal nexus between them is subject to doubt. By assuming an infinite mind of which the human mind is a part, the causal connection of phenomena in time must be thought of as being grounded in a logical connection of ground and consequence. What is for the limited human mind a regular temporal sequence of phenomena must be thought of as being grounded in a necessary logical relation with reference to an infinite mind. Our concept of causality has reality and can be applied to experience only on the assumption that the causal connection is grounded in a logical relation of ground and consequence. The relation between A and B, which we conceive in the form of cause and effect is, with regard to an infinite capacity of cognition, a logical relation of antecedent and consequent. The concept of causality can be philosophically justified only on the basis of such an assumption. "We can thus problematically assume an intellectual being whose relation to all objects of nature is akin to the relation of our thinking capacity to the objects of mathematics."¹⁸ That is, just as we think of the relation obtaining between mathematical objects in terms of logical relations between ground and consequence, so we have to think of the relation obtaining between the natural objects with regard to an infinite capacity of cognition as a relation of logical ground and consequence, and not as a relation of cause and effect bound up with the form of time, as is the case with reference to limited human cognition.

The relation of the idea of an infinite mind to Leibnitz' system of thought (of which Maimon was aware) is clearly revealed in the following statement: "The infinite mind conceives all objects in the clearest possible manner. We can, according to this system of thought, have no idea of any other substance than that of our own ego and our own capacity of representation, for the corporeal substances are in this system not real but fictitious. All possible objects as substances are therefore nothing other than all possible representations (*Vorstellungen*) by the thinking capacity. These representations are in their essence nothing but the effect, the sum total of the activity of the infinite capacity of presentation restricted in an infinite variety of ways. The infinite capacity of cognition represents itself as restricted in all possible forms and in diverse modes. The representations (*Vorstellungen*) of an infinite mind are at the same time presentations

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 61.

(*Darstellungen*) of real objects; that is, by the mere act of representation, the ideas acquire objective reality as existing substances outside the mind. Every object of nature, *i. e.*, every act of the thinking capacity is, according to Leibnitz, a mirror of the universe It represents in a restricted mode the whole universe, since it represents the infinite mind in a restricted manner. The artist of the universe operates thus all in all."¹⁹

On the assumption of the idea of an infinite mind, the phenomena of the world can be regarded as determinable. The principle of determinability has been defined by Majmon as an ideal mode of determination. Subject is neither that which endures forever, nor the substratum of the predicates, but that which can be thought of by itself. And predicate is that which cannot be thought of by itself, but only in connection with the former. It is similar to the determination of objects as thought of by the infinite mind. What the infinite mind thinks as possible is the subject; what follows from it necessarily is the predicate. The subject is thus thinkable by itself; the predicate, as the necessary consequence of the subject, is thinkable not by itself but only in connection with the former.

This ideal mode of determination is, however, applicable only to objects of mathematics, not to given objects of experience. To the infinite mind, which thinks of all objects in terms of logical and mathematical relations, all objects are thoroughly determined by this mode. Not so to the finite mind. "For finite reason, subject is not what is merely thinkable by itself, but what is merely given by itself; and predicate is that which is thinkable only in relation to the former as an object."²⁰ It seems, at first thought, that the definition of the subject which is given by itself refers to the subject of objects of experience. For, with regard to mathematical objects, the subject is not given but thought by itself. But, on the other hand, even in mathematics, the subject, such as a line, which is produced by the mind, is given to our intuition. The subject is not merely thought but also given. Hence, even with regard to mathematical objects, the subject can be defined as that which is given by itself as a result of the productive act of our thinking capacity.

In the Kantian idea of an "intuitive mind," there is implied the vision of a union of the ideal with the real, the abstract with the concrete, the transcendent with the immanent, the supra-temporal with the temporal, the timeless with the historical. These realms, which

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 62.

²⁰ *Tr.*, p. 87.

are apparently unharmonizable and incompatible entities for the human mind, are conceived in relation to an "intuitive reason" as one harmonious whole. In the theoretical realm it means a union of understanding and sensibility, of discursive thinking and intuition. While, for the human mind, the categories of thought and the forms of intuition (time and space) constitute two different realms, one dependent upon the other (the former without the latter is empty, the latter without the former is blind), for the intuitive reason, which creates the object through intuitive creative thought, no such dualism obtains. In the ethical, practical realm it means the union of the final goals of the totality, *i. e.*, humanity as a unified whole, with the ethical will of the free individual personalities constituting the totality.

It must, however, be emphasized that, for Kant, the idea of an "Intuitive Reason" was merely a methodical concept. It was construed by Kant for the sole purpose of stressing the restrictions of the human mind, its inherent limitations, and the immanent tensions of the human personality. Man should recognize his modest role and the limited possibilities in his striving for mastery of the problems in the theoretical realm. He can never attain an "intuitive reason" by which the object of knowledge is intuitively comprehended and created through intuition. A union of intuition and understanding in which the intellect is intuitive and the intuition is intellectual (*intellectuelle Anschauung*) is the prerogative of the infinitive divine mind. The finite human mind is characterized by the dualism of intuition and understanding. Thus the idea of an "intuitive reason" serves merely the purpose of emphasizing that which is closed and unattainable for the human mind in the theoretical realm. In the practical realm it serves the purpose of recognizing the dualism which obtains between being and the "ought to be," between the real and the ideal.

Kant never attempted to raise the "intuitive reason" to the status of an attainable goal of human knowledge. The finite human mind, with the inherent dualism of the capacities of sensibility and those of understanding, remains always in a state of tension in relation to the infinite "intuitive reason." The same applies to the practical ethical realm and to Ethics as a science dealing with the rules of conduct. Here the idea of "intuitive reason" takes the form of the idea of love; it means the ideal state in which there is an absolute unity of the communal good with the will of the many individuals endowed with a capacity for freedom. In the idea of a state of love, there is no dualism between the ideal good and the will of the free individuals; there is absolute unity between being and the "ought to be," between

the real and the ideal, just as there is absolute unity of intuition and understanding in the "intuitive reason" in relation to objects of cognition. This ideal state of man, however, is merely an imaginary focus conceived as an endless goal. In the concrete historical situation, man must always remain in a state of tension in relation to the ideal.

This is also what Kant meant by defining the ideal state as a "thing in itself." Just as the "thing in itself" in the theoretical realm is impossible of attainment by means of the categories of thought which are confined to the realm of phenomena, so the ideal state, as a "thing in itself," a *noumenon*, is beyond the reach of human attainment. It is an endless idea towards which to strive.

The idea of an infinite mind which fulfills for Maimon the function of the various Kantian ideas can be characterized as a metaphysical monism. This idea, however, is not proposed by Maimon as a result of intellectual intuition; it is neither an entity to be approached by a mystical act in the manner of the devout mystics who pretend to have the capacity of perceiving the ultimate reality *uno actu*, nor is it a transcendent, self-sufficient reality. Furthermore, the idea of an infinite mind is not posited by Maimon as a metaphysical, all-embracing reality in the manner of Spinoza's pantheism, nor is it to be understood as a transcendent source of all values and purposes conceived by man as guiding principles of our ethical conduct. It is rather closely connected with the thinking process of man and with the human will striving for the objectivization of his ideas and actions. It is conceived solely for the purpose of granting reality to our synthetic propositions concerning objects of experience and to our actions which are grounded in the striving for the realization of a general objective will. Furthermore, the idea of the ultimate truth, *i. e.*, a mind comprehending all objects of reality in terms of analytic propositions, gives direction and purpose to our striving for the attainment of the highest truth which consists, according to Maimon, in analytic knowledge. And the idea of an infinite will, *i. e.*, a will in which the highest good is realized, serves as a goal toward which to strive, namely, the realization of the general and objective will. It is thus tied up with the totality of human experience, the theoretical as well as the ethical.

It may seem, at first thought, that the two aspects of this idea, namely, the aspect of an infinite mind and that of an infinite will, imply a dualism. By considering, however, the function and the role of this idea and the method by which Maimon derived it, the methodological and the systematic unity of Maimon's philosophical conception is not impaired.

In the systematic monism of Maimon the assumption is implied

that reality is itself a system which can in principle be known and may in the future be fully comprehended in terms of analytic propositions. This is particularly true of the first stage of Maimon's philosophy, in which the idea of an infinite mind and the doctrine of the infinitesimals of sensation, two conceptions closely connected with one another, play a central role. The comprehension of this system in terms of human knowledge is the goal of the scientific process. The conception of a goal, the attainment of which can be reached gradually in the course of the development of scientific and philosophic thought, suggests stages leading up to it. It implies also the reality of progress. All human experience, consisting of the different stages in the development and growth of scientific and philosophic knowledge, leads up to this one systematic reality. Each stage of this endless process is real, inasmuch as it approaches the ideal of systematic unity. The concept of a hierarchy consisting of levels of truth and reality leading up to the highest truth and the highest reality is grounded in the conception of the reality of the world as being in its essence a single non-contradictory system. The various stages in the growth of human thought can be considered as rungs of the ladder leading to the ultimate goal of absolute systematic unity. On the assumption of the reality of progress, that is to say, the assumption that the history of scientific and philosophic thought is continuously approaching the highest goal, the various stages of this process can be arranged according to the rungs of the ladder of perfection.

The conception of a hierarchy of various levels of truth and value, leading up to the most real being and to the highest good, is grounded in the assumption that reality actually is or can be arranged into a single systematic unity. While the dogmatic metaphysician holds that the concept of such a hierarchy actually follows from the essence of reality as being in itself so organized, the critical idealist, who considers human thought and consciousness as the root and basis of all reality, may arrange the various levels of human consciousness, *i. e.*, the various stages of the development of scientific thought, in such a hierarchy, believing that human thought is continuously growing and ascending towards the most real being and the highest truth. Both, however, the dogmatic metaphysician and the critical idealist, envisage, as the ideal good, the attainment of absolute systematic unity; they both hold that the attainment of this goal is within the possible reach of man. Hence there follows the conception of the different levels and stages of truth as rungs of a ladder leading up to the ultimate goal.

Now Maimon actually employed the ladder as a figure of speech

to illustrate the interconnection of the various concepts into a systematic unity. It can similarly be used as an appropriate figure of speech for presenting his conception of the different levels of consciousness leading up to the highest truth and absolute unity which consists in the complete mastery of the objects of reality by our thought and the ultimate dissolution of synthetic propositions into analytic propositions. That is to say, the attainment of the highest truth consists in the realization of the absolute identity of thought and being. As a figure of speech the ladder can also be used for the illustration of Maimon's conception of the relation obtaining between the finite mind and the infinite mind, namely, for the process of ascending from the finite human mind to the idea of an infinite mind by the method of abstraction, and for the process of descending from the infinite mind to the finite mind by the method of limitation.

Maimon says that the human mind is capable of employing various methods of thought, namely, the method of abstraction which proceeds from the particular to the general, and the method of limitation or concretization which proceeds from the general to the particular. Thus, for instance, with regard to the concept of a rectangular triangle, which is an object determined by a definite relation obtaining between its sides, the particular property of the relation of the sides of the triangle to one another may be abstracted from the concept. By way of such an abstraction, a more general concept will be obtained, namely, a triangle in general. By a further process of abstraction, the property of three sides by which space is enclosed in a triangle may be ignored, thus obtaining a more general concept of a geometrical figure. On the other hand, the mind can proceed in an opposite direction: from the general to the particular. It can first entertain the idea of a geometrical figure in general and then proceed to limit this general concept by the addition of special properties to it, such as being enclosed by three sides, thus obtaining the concept of a triangle. By a further limitation of this concept the mind may add to it a definite property, namely, a special relation existing between its sides, thus obtaining a rectangular triangle. As the human mind is limited in its very essence, it is impossible for the process of abstraction or that of limitation to proceed endlessly. Each of these modes of thought respectively will reach a limit beyond which no further abstraction or limitation will be possible. Only the infinite mind can be thought of as having no limits; it can proceed endlessly in both directions. In this sense Maimon employs the symbol of the ladder representing the interconnection of the various concepts and the various levels of truth into a systematic unity, a single whole. For the human mind the ladder

has its limitations. On the one hand it is limited by material sensuous perceptions; on the other hand, it is limited by the more abstract forms of thought which the human mind is unable to transcend.

Similarly, the finite mind attains the idea of an infinite mind by abstracting the limitations of its own mind; and the infinite mind conceives the finite mind by thinking of itself in a restricted manner. That is to say, by thinking of its own self as restricted in various modes, it conceives the finite mind.²¹

It is a frequently occurring phenomenon in the history of philosophy to discover in human consciousness an appeal to an ultimate transcendent reality in which it finds rest and assurance for the validity of human thought. The way from human consciousness to an infinite, transcendent consciousness, which is supposed to be the guarantor of the reality of our limited, finite thought, is characteristic of many philosophical systems. In the center of these systems is the idea that a philosophical account of the essence of the world must start neither with the world, nor with God, nor with the absolute, but with man.

Thus Augustine maintained that the reality of the highest truth is presupposed in the very distinction between the true and the false as such; this presupposition is the indispensable condition of the possibility of our judgments and propositions. Every act of judgment is grounded in the assumption of the highest ultimate truth. Likewise Descartes proposed that our conception of a scale of the degrees of perfection, which we apply in our value judgments, is grounded in the supposition of a most perfect being. This idea makes possible the conception of a gradation of perfection, ascending as well as descending. The belief in the transcendent reality of ideas and values, without which the cognition of the temporal experiential world could not be accounted for, is posited also in the Platonic idea of recollection (*Anamnesis*) as the ground of all our cognitions. Plato could explain the process involved in the cognition of the world's phenomena only by appealing to a transcendent, super-mundane reality of ideas. And in modern times, Kant recognized, in our consciousness of the unconditional categorical imperative, the manifestation of an absolute consciousness, that is, a thing in itself in the sense of an idea, an endless goal.

When we consider the problems which Maimon tried to solve by introducing the idea of an infinite mind, and when we observe the role and function of this idea in his system, we must conclude that the

²¹ *Gib'at Ha-moreh*, Chap. 7.

originality of his conception is not impaired by our recognizing its place in the history of human thought. In spite of this metaphysical concept, Maimon still remains within the realm of transcendental critical idealism, to which he has given a new stimulus and impetus. The process of continuous perfection in all areas of human endeavor, intellectual, ethical, and esthetical, is for him the only basis of reality. The identity of thought and being is the aim of all our strivings. And the ideal of the totality of its attainment as the final goal is the product of the imagination. Thus the idea of the infinite mind is the function of the imagination.

The historical references to the occurrence of the idea of an infinite, transcendent reality in various metaphysical systems are intended merely to show that the appeal to the transcendent is, in the course of human thought, a motif occurring in various forms. It must, however, be recognized that the idea of an infinite mind in the critical transcendental system of Maimon is fundamentally different from the concept of a transcendental reality in various other metaphysical systems.

God and man, the infinite and the finite, are two ideas, each of which could lead to the other by the application of a different method. We may start from the idea of God as the infinite mind and come down to man as the finite mind by applying a method of limitation. We can imagine that the infinite mind thinks of the finite mind by a limiting process. That is, by thinking of itself as restricted and imposing limitations upon itself, the infinite conceives of the finite. Aristotle has defined God as "thought thinking thought." In order to understand the possibility of God, the infinite, thinking of the finite, Maimon invented the method of self-restriction.

On the other hand, we may start from the concept of man as the finite mind and reach out in our imagination to God as the infinite mind, by the application of a method of elimination. That is to say, by a process of thought eliminating and abstracting the restrictions inherent in the finite mind, we may reach out to the infinite.²²

However, the way from the finite to the infinite by the method of elimination, and the way from the infinite to the finite by the method of restriction, are possible only under the assumption that they differ from each other in degree but not in essence. For, if the infinite were the "wholly other," differing from the finite in its very essence, neither could the method of restriction lead from the infinite to the finite, nor could the method of elimination lead from the finite to the infinite.

²² See *ibid.*

Now this possibility of reaching out to the infinite grants a positive basis for metaphysics. Since the human mind is aware of a continuous growth and development of its thought, as manifested in the continuous growth of science and mathematics, and since it is in possession of the idea of infinite development, it can conceive the idea of an infinite mind by a process of eliminating its own restrictions. Thus metaphysics, the subject matter of which is the absolute and the infinite, is a possible science. The idea of God which is merely regulative for Kant, acquires for Maimon a sort of transcendental deduction. The idea of an infinite mind attains the rank of an idea deduced by the transcendental method. Though Maimon did not explicitly designate the method of elimination as a "transcendental method," it is, I think, legitimate to interpret it in this way. The human mind, due to its creativity, manifests itself in various cultural phenomena. The idea of endless progress is assumed and demanded, for without it actual progress would not take place. Hence progress is a necessary and indispensable idea. In other words, the idea of endless growth and development actually makes the progress of thought possible. Thus, the way from the finite to the infinite is a constitutive idea for cultural phenomena. The characteristic feature of the transcendental method consists in the deduction of a concept from the objective phenomena of culture (*e. g.*, mathematics and science) by demonstrating the necessity and the indispensability of the concept for those phenomena. Deduction is not an analysis of the subjective mind of man detached from the phenomena in which the creative function of mind manifests itself. The same applies to the idea of an infinite mind in Maimon's system of thought. This idea is deduced from the phenomena of culture produced by the human mind.

Kant's formulation of the transcendental question with reference to mathematics and science differs fundamentally from that of metaphysics. In relation to the former, assuming the factuality of mathematics and science, the question is, how are synthetic propositions *a priori* in mathematics and science possible? The reality of these sciences is assumed. The task of philosophy is to show their possibility, that is to say, to demonstrate that they are rooted in *a priori* principles. The aim is thus to deduce the reality from the logical possibility. Possibility in the transcendental logical sense amounts to a deduction of reality from *a priori* principles. With regard to metaphysics, however, the question is raised: Is metaphysics as a science possible? The very reality of metaphysics is thus in question. And the Kantian answer to this question is negative, for the *a priori* principles, such as causality and substance, are not entities in themselves but functions

of the mind in the scientific cognition of the phenomena of experience; their application and validity as ordering principles are therefore confined to the realm of experience.

Maimon, however, has shown that the possibility of synthetic propositions in mathematics and science cannot be deduced without assuming the idea of infinite mind, in relation to which the synthetic propositions are each and all reducible to analytic propositions. The idea of an infinite mind is thus necessary for the deduction of the synthetic propositions in mathematics and in science. In other words, the deduction of the transcendental possibility of mathematics and science is dependent on the metaphysical assumption of the idea of an infinite mind. The ground is thus laid for deducing the possibility of metaphysics. By proving the interdependence of the solution of the transcendental questions concerning mathematics and physical science and that of metaphysics, the latter is no longer isolated and separated from the former. The possibility of metaphysics in the form of the assumption of an infinite mind, is guaranteed by proving the possibility of mathematics and science on the basis of the same assumption. By the deduction of the latter the former is deduced *ipso facto*.

III

Maimon characterizes the essence of Spinozism as a philosophy which is diametrically opposed to atheism. Atheism rejects the idea of a first cause. The phenomena of experience are the effect of a variety of causes, known or unknown. It does not reduce the manifoldness of experiential phenomena to a single cause, to a unity. Nor does it search for a unifying principle explaining the connection between the objects of experience. The supposition of such a principle necessarily implies the reality of a single cause as the reason of the connection between the phenomena. This runs counter to a philosophy which does not recognize any metaphysical transcendent reality as the ground of the phenomena of experience. Pluralism is thus the characteristic feature of atheism. But the philosophy of Spinoza maintains just the opposite. It proposes a single substance as the immediate cause of the various effects and phenomena of nature, material or mental. They are all considered as predicates of one and the same substance. Matter and spirit, extension and thought are the two known attributes of one and the same substance which manifests itself in these various forms. The attributes of the substance are like the predicates of a subject; they are not self-sustaining and self-supporting; they are contingent upon the substance which alone exists by itself and is defined by it-

self.²³ The single substance is the only self-supported and self-sustained reality. All the particular phenomena of nature are reduced to the immediate effect of the first cause, that is, the substance which is one and the same underlying reality of all forms of existence. "In this system unity is real, the manifold is not a reality in itself and by itself, but merely ideal [*i. e.*, phenomenal] while atheism maintains the opposite: the manifold alone is real, it is grounded in the nature of the things themselves. The unity which is found in the order and the laws of nature is merely accidental."²⁴ The human mind, trying to establish some order and unity, invents a system of laws for the purpose of attaining mastery and dominion over nature.

It is inconceivable, according to Maimon, how one could consider the philosophy of Spinoza as atheism, for it is just its opposite. "While atheism denies the existence of God, Spinozism denies the existence of the world. It should rather be defined as acosmism."²⁵

The Leibnizian system is characterized by Maimon as representing the middle way between the two opposites with reference to the idea of unity. It recognizes, on the one hand, the reality of a manifoldness of immediate causes for the various effects and phenomena of nature. But it maintains, on the other hand, the reality of a metaphysical unity in which the manifold is grounded. The various phenomena of nature are thought of as being connected with one another by a single principle. The cause of the connection between the phenomena and the order and harmony prevailing in nature resides in the reality of a metaphysical principle.²⁶

Maimon's conception of Leibnitz' doctrine of the world as a manifold grounded in a metaphysical unity should be understood in the light of the way he understands the Leibnizian idea of the pre-established harmony as a necessary manifestation of the divine essence. The pre-established harmony is not the result of an arbitrary fiat or accidental act of God; it follows rather from the very nature of the deity. It is not incidental and extrinsic to God; it is rather essential and intrinsic to the very essence of God. In view of such a conception of the idea of a pre-established harmony, the experiential phenomena in their manifoldness are real in themselves, but they are grounded in a metaphysical unity beyond themselves.

²³ See S. Maimon's *Lebensgeschichte* I, pp. 152 ff. See below, p. 273, note 42.

²⁴ See *ibid.*, p. 154, where Maimon writes: . . . *ist die Einheit reel, das Mannigfaltige aber bloss idealisch*. This seems to confirm the phenomenological conception of the attributes and their *modi*, that is, that the manifold *modi* are appearances grounded in our subjective capacity of understanding. See below, p. 259 f.

²⁵ *Ibid.*

²⁶ *Ibid.*

Maimon's characterization of Spinozism as acosmism implies a special conception of pantheism. For pantheism can be understood in two ways: it can mean either the identification of God with the world or of the world with God. The first is atheism, the second is acosmism. In other words, the former is a conception of God as being in the world, the latter is a conception of the world as being in God. The identification of God with the world implies a denial of a transcendent reality beyond the world. In the identification of the world with God there is implied a denial of the substantial nature of the world. The world is not self-sustained and self-supporting; it is not a substance but an attribute. The world as an attribute of God implies identification of the world with God.

Maimon's characterization of the philosophy of Spinoza as acosmism has been adopted by Hegel in his History of Philosophy. That the priority in the invention of the term "acosmism" belongs to Maimon has been pointed out by various expositors of Maimon's philosophy.²⁷ As a matter of fact, Maimon is an important factor in determining the character of the post-Kantian systems of thought by introducing Spinozism into critical philosophy, *i. e.*, supplementing critical idealism with Spinozian metaphysics. The post-Kantian speculative metaphysics represents a fundamental departure from Kant and a continuous approach to the spirit of Spinoza. Fichte's philosophy of the ego as producing the non-ego and the philosophy of identity of Schelling and Hegel lead towards the equation of God with the world. It was Maimon who prepared the way towards this development. He saw the necessity for the assumption of the metaphysical idea of an infinite mind, without which the question *quid juris?* (*i. e.*, how can the concepts of pure understanding be applied to objects of sensibility?) cannot be answered.

Now Maimon's conception of Spinoza's pantheism as acosmism should be understood in connection with his own conception of the idea of an infinite mind, to the assumption of which he was driven by the consideration of the epistemological question concerning the relation of understanding to sensibility. Thus Maimon's conception of Spinozism as acosmism may be more than a merely historical appraisal of Spinoza; it is perhaps a critical concept in the construction of his own conception of the world. Being *per se* is identical with thought; objects given to our intuition and sensibility are not real. Only that is real which can be dissolved and penetrated by thought. Sense-perceptions are confused thought; they represent the lowest degree

²⁷ See Friedrich Kuntze, *Die Philosophie Salomon Maimons*, Heidelberg 1912, p. 20.

of thought. The highest degree of thought consists in the dissolution of all objects into mathematical and logical relations which are all analytic. Hence our synthetic propositions are to be thought of as being analytic in relation to an infinite mind. This is the ideal goal of cognition toward which we have to strive. It is an endless goal which can only be asymptotically approached but never fully attained. But, in relation to an infinite mind, the ideal of the identity of thought and being is real. If we identify God with the idea of an infinite mind, the world with all its objects given to our sensibility is conceived by Maimon as being in God, and the identification of the world with God is acosmism. Thus Maimon's own philosophy might seem to represent a sort of acosmism. Later, however, in showing the essential difference between Spinoza and Maimon, it will be pointed out that the philosophy of the latter is just the opposite of acosmism.

We understand now Maimon's appraisal of his own philosophical construction as a synthesis of Kant and Spinoza. It is a synthesis of the critical method of Kant, with its central doctrine that we conceive of objects not more than what our understanding puts into them, and of the acosmism of Spinoza with its main thesis that the world is to be seen in the light of an infinite metaphysical being which is self-supporting and independent. For Spinoza it is substance, and for Maimon it is an infinite mind. And to express the affinity of Spinoza and Maimon in theological terms, it can be said that both of them have seen the world in God, not God in the world.

In another context, Maimon interprets Leibnitz in the light of critical philosophy (the monads are not things in themselves but fictions). It seems that he considered his own philosophical synthesis as that of Leibnitz and Kant. This does not contradict his explicit statement that he was striving, in the first period of his philosophical career, for a synthesis of Kant and Spinoza. By his interpretation of Leibnitz' doctrine of the pre-established harmony as a necessary harmony flowing from the very essence of God, he brought Leibnitz close to Spinoza, so that the distinction between them with reference to the metaphysical unity of God and its relation to the world is reduced to a minimum. Both of them, Spinoza and Leibnitz, considered the world as being in God. As matter of fact, Maimon was conscious of the affinity between Leibnitz and Spinoza according to his interpretation of Leibnitz' doctrine of the pre-established harmony, for he adds: If you prefer, it is Spinozism.^{27a} Hence Maimon's statement that he strove for a synthesis of Kant and Spinoza is compatible with his attempt to interpret Leibnitz in the spirit of critical philos-

^{27a} See *Strf.*, p. 36.

ophy. The Leibnitzian distinction between "truths of fact" and "truths of reason" is not a metaphysical distinction; it is valid only with reference to the limited human mind. In relation to the infinite mind, however, the truths of fact are each and all truths of reason. Maimon was thus the first to show the way leading back from critical philosophy to Spinoza and Leibnitz. The revival of the spirit of Spinoza and Leibnitz in the post-Kantian metaphysics has its origin in Maimon.

Maimon attempted to overcome the dualism between sensibility and understanding by making the former share in the latter. The bridge between the realm of sensibility and that of understanding, and the possibility of the application of concepts of understanding to objects of sensibility was construed by Maimon with the help of Leibnitz' conception of sensibility as confused thought. The difference between the two capacities is not a difference in essence but merely in degree of clearness and distinctness. Sensibility and understanding belong to the same realm (*i. e.*, thought) and are to be measured by the same standard; they both have their allotted place on the *globus intellectualis*.

The speculative metaphysics of the post-Kantian period also grappled with the problem of overcoming the dualism between sensibility and understanding. Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel all aspired to achieve a greater union of the various cognitive capacities. The attempt of the speculative metaphysicians, however, lay in a different direction. Instead of declaring sensibility to be essentially rooted in thought, as Maimon did, they tried to stretch the capacity of understanding so as to embrace sensibility. Understanding is for them all-permeating and creative, *i. e.*, intuitive. Nothing is "given" through the forms of intuition to our understanding, but the mind is all-creative. The ego projects the non-ego (Fichte). The dialectical process of thought is all-embracing; in it the "given" has its place (Hegel).

With the Hegelian idea of the objective spirit realizing itself in the dialectical process of human thought, Pantheism reached its climax. But it is no longer an identification of the world with God; it is rather an identification of God with the world, *i. e.*, the world as conceived by the human mind. It is not a conception of the world as being in God, but rather God is conceived as being in the world. Maimon's original idea of introducing a metaphysical entity, the idea of an infinite mind, for the purpose of solving an epistemological problem, has now reversed itself; it has culminated in a sort of pantheism which is just the opposite of that of Spinoza. In Maimon's definition it is no longer acosmism but atheism. For, while the former denies the

independent substantive nature of the world and conceives of God as the only self-supporting and self-sustaining reality in which the world has its ground, the latter considers the world, when conceived by the highest form of thought, as the only substantial reality in which the objective spirit has realized itself.

We have thus seen that Maimon's conception of Spinoza as acosmism has, to a certain extent, determined his own philosophical construction. His idea of an infinite mind, in which objects and our cognitions of them are grounded, is bound up with another doctrine of his, namely, that of self-restriction and self-limitation of the infinite. It is impossible, according to Maimon, to imagine an infinite mind cognizing the finite except through an act of contraction or self-restriction. The infinite mind can conceive of the finite only by thinking of itself in a restricted manner. For it is inconceivable that objects are given to the infinite mind from without; its conceptions of the finite must be *a priori*, not *a posteriori*, *i. e.*, by way of self-thought. Hence it follows that it can think of the finite only by restricting itself and thinking of itself in a limited mode. Likewise, the individual characteristics, by which the things are distinguished, are due to self-restriction and self-limitation of the infinite creative mind.

This doctrine of self-restriction and self-limitation of the infinite can be traced back to the sources of the Cabala with which Maimon was acquainted from his early youth. Moreover, in his autobiography, Maimon describes the essence of the Cabala and explains its doctrine of creation in the following manner: "Before the world was created infinite space was filled with the divine essence. For the purpose of creation, God had to contract himself, *i. e.*, to withdraw from infinite space, in order to make place for the world . . . God then produced the ten spheres (*Sefirot* in the language of the Cabala) which present the ten gradations of being, starting with the pure and ending with our material sensuous world."²⁸

Maimon intends here to explain the Cabalistic doctrine of *Zimzum*, according to which creation of the world presupposes an act of withdrawal on the part of God. The contraction or withdrawal of the divine essence is an act of self-restriction or self-limitation. This is a fruitful idea for Maimon, which he adopted and made use of for various purposes in different contexts. Leibnitz' doctrine of the monads as individual entities having their ground in the infinite being ("the monad of the monads") was expounded by Maimon with the help of the idea of self-contraction and self-restriction of the divine being.

²⁸ Maimon's *Lebensgeschichte*, I, p. 137.

The infinite being is an absolute unity, and the monads grounded in it should therefore be homogeneous, for they all have a common source. Yet each of the monads presents, according to Leibnitz, a separate individual world ("the monads have no windows"). This is to be explained by the idea of self-limitation of the divine essence manifested in the monads. The individual nature of the monads is the result of an act of self-limitation and self-restriction on the part of the supreme monad, *i. e.*, the infinite being.

There is, however, an essential difference between the doctrine of contraction according to the Cabala, as Maimon understood it, and the idea of self-restriction which Maimon employs for his own purposes. While, for the former, the act of withdrawal and contraction is a necessary condition of creation, since without this preliminary act creation would be impossible, for Maimon the self-restriction and self-limitation of the infinite explains the reality and the nature of the individual finite minds or the individual monads. The particular characteristics of the monads are due to an act of self-restriction by the infinite.²⁹

²⁹ Cf. Harry A. Wolfson, *The Philosophy of Spinoza*, I, p. 395, who refers to the analogy between Spinoza and the Cabalistic principle of *Zimzum* to which Maimon called attention in his commentary *Gib'at ha-Moreh* on *Moreh Nebukim*, I, 74, and in his *Lebensgeschichte*, Part I, Ch. XIV, p. 146, and then adds: "However, Spinoza could have made no use of this theory of contraction (*i. e.* *Zimzum*) in the solution of his problem of the rise of the finite from the infinite, for *Zimzum*, as a solution of the problem, implies that the infinite cause is an intelligent agent, . . . but to Spinoza, who insists upon the necessary nature of the divine causality, such an assumption is entirely inadmissible."

To be sure, the Cabala understood by *Zimzum* an act of creation by an agent. But the relationship of the infinite to the finite as a mode of self-restriction or self-limitation is a valid concept even on the assumption of non-creation of the world. Just as the Aristotelian God is the first cause in a purely logical sense, *i. e.* God is logically first, not implying creation, so contraction and self-restriction does not necessarily mean an act of creation. It may express merely the kind of relationship obtaining between the infinite and the finite. When Maimon defines the relation of the infinite mind to the finite objects as a relation resulting from the self-restriction of the infinite in various modes, it does not necessarily imply an act of creation by an agent. Self-restriction can mean a mode of being of the infinite. As such it may be eternal just as the infinite itself is eternal and non-created. That is to say, the reality of the finite as such is due to the mode of self-restriction or self-limitation of the infinite. With reference to Leibnitz's doctrine of monads, Maimon interprets the relation of the supreme monad to the manifold monads by the method of self-restriction. The variety of the manifold monads is due to the various modes of self-restriction exercised by the supreme monad. The self-restriction of the infinite supreme monad does not have to be an act of creation; it may be a mode of being. Even assuming the necessary nature of the divine causality in its relation to the finite things of the world, this necessary causality manifests itself in the various modes of self-restriction and contraction of the infinite. The principle of self-restriction with reference to Leibnitz implies an act of creation; with reference to Spinoza it is a mode of being.

All the same, the very idea of self-limitation of the infinite for the explanation of finite being, Maimon has learned from the sources of the Cabala, even though he gave it a different meaning and used it for purposes of his own.

IV

Now Maimon's definition of Spinozism as acosmism seems to be grounded in the conception of Spinozism as a sort of phenomenalism. The denial of the metaphysical reality of the world as it appears to us is a necessary condition for the doctrine of acosmism. In the center of Spinoza's system stands the doctrine of substance and attributes. Substance, which is identified with God, has an infinity of attributes, of which two are known to us, the attribute of extension and the attribute of thought. As to the relation obtaining between the substance and the attributes and their *modi* (the particular extended things and the particular ideas), two conceptions are possible. The first possibility is that the substance is the only metaphysical reality, the attributes being merely modes of our conception of the substance. According to this view, the substance is the only reality and the attributes of extension and thought are merely phenomena, appearances. And since acosmism implies negating the metaphysical reality of the cosmos, Spinoza's philosophy can be defined as acosmism only on the supposition that the substance is the sole metaphysical reality, the attributes and their modes being merely the subjective forms of perception or phenomenal forms in which we conceive the substance. The definition of Spinozism as acosmism is thus grounded in a particular conception of Spinoza's doctrine concerning the relationship obtaining between the substance and the attributes of extension and thought. Such is the view of the world as an experience of extended things and of our mind's ideas, the two attributes being merely subjective phenomena or appearances, not a presentation of the metaphysical reality of the substance as it is in itself.

It is, however, possible to interpret the philosophy of Spinoza as a doctrine teaching the metaphysical reality of the attributes. In the attributes of extension and thought the substance manifests itself. Since the substance itself is presented in the attributes and their *modi*, the world of experience in the forms of the attributes is metaphysically real. If such were the relation between the substance and the attributes, Spinozism could not be defined as acosmism. The reality of the world as experienced by us is not denied in the realistic conception of the attributes. Rather is it raised to the rank and dignity of a metaphysical reality.

These two conceptions of Spinoza's doctrine of substance and its relation to the attributes, that is, the phenomenalistic and the realistic conceptions of the attributes, have their representatives in the two interpretations of Spinoza as developed by J. E. Erdmann and Kuno Fischer. Erdmann identifies Spinoza's concept of substance with the concept of being as conceived by pure understanding. The finite as such does not exist, only the infinite is real. Spinoza's substance implies the concept of being as taught by the Eleatic school. There is only one infinite unchangeable and eternal being. The finite things, *i. e.*, the *modi* which are determined and limited, are not metaphysically real; they are mere phenomena.³⁰

Kuno Fischer emphasizes the dynamic nature of Spinoza's substance. The substance cannot exist without the *modi*, as the *modi* cannot exist without the substance. The attributes are the various powers, functions, and manifestations of the substance.³¹

Thus Erdmann's understanding of the attributes, which can be designated as phenomenalism, is opposed by Fischer's doctrine of the attributes, which can be characterized as realism. The difference between these two conceptions of Spinoza hinges upon the question concerning the reality of the attributes and their *modi*. Since Maimon's characterization of Spinozism as acosmism is grounded in a phenomenalistic conception of the attributes and its *modi*, it merits a detailed analysis.

According to Erdmann's phenomenalistic conception, the relation between the substance and the attributes is a relation between an absolute metaphysical being, as it is in itself, and being as perceived by an external mind, *i. e.*, by a mind from without. The attributes have no metaphysical reality; they merely express the mode in which the substance is conceived by the human mind. The substance cannot be perceived except through the attributes. As a metaphysical reality, the substance is in and for itself; but, when it is perceived by the human mind, it implies being for others. An attribute is what the mind considers to be the essence of the substance. The very word "attribute" implies not a property of the substance as it is in itself, but what is ascribed to it by the mind from without, *i. e.*, by the human mind. The attributes are thus determinations of the substance as it is perceived by an external mind. According to the principle that every determination is a negation, the substance as the absolute cannot be

³⁰ See Johann Eduard Erdmann, *Versuch einer Wissenschaftlichen Darstellung der neuern Geschichte der Philosophie*, Leipzig, Riga und Dorpat, 1836. I, 2, pp. 53 ff.

³¹ See Kuno Fischer, *Geschichte der Philosophie, Spinozas Leben, Werke und Lehre*, 4th edition, Heidelberg, 1898, pp. 370 ff. and 385 ff.

determined by negations. Hence a determination of the substance in the form of an attribute can only express the conception of the substance by a mind from without. But it is not the expression of a property or quality of the substance as it is in itself. The attributes neither inhere in the substance nor are they necessary properties of the substance. If the attributes were real properties of the substance necessarily inherent in it, the number of the attributes would have to be limited corresponding to the peculiar features or the properties constituting the nature of the substance. But Spinoza assumed that the substance has an infinity of attributes. Infinity of attributes can therefore mean only an infinity of possible conceptions of the substance. Since the attributes are not real properties of the substance, but only ways of conceiving the substance by an external mind, infinity of attributes cannot mean infinity of qualities inherent in the substance, but an infinite variety of possible conceptions of the substance. It implies an indifference on the part of the substance to the manner and, by the same token, to the number of possible attributes or possible conceptions. Infinity is here equivalent to indefinite. Since the attributes express the conceptions of the substance by an external mind, an indefinite number of conceptions of the substance is possible. We can imagine various intelligences, even an infinity of intellects varying in degree, which would conceive of the substance in an infinite variety of modes.

Infinity of attributes means nothing except that no attribute can be excluded from the substance. For if an attribute could be excluded from the substance, such would imply that the substance has a definite nature or character which is refractory to a certain attribute. This would involve a determination of the substance; and since every determination implies a negation, the substance as it is in itself cannot be determined. The infinity of the attributes which Spinoza ascribes to the substance could therefore mean only an indifference on the part of the substance to the particular number and kinds of attributes, and the admission that there is an endless possibility of the conceptions of the substance in an infinite variety of modes. All of these modes would be real, inasmuch as they express the conception of the substance or the reaction to it, by various minds or possible intelligences.

The endless possible attributes of the substance are posited only hypothetically. Actually the substance is considered under the aspect of two attributes, the attribute of thought and the attribute of extension. God or the substance is thought, inasmuch as our understanding conceives it under the aspect of thought; it is extension, inasmuch as our understanding conceives it under the aspect of extension. The

reason that substance is conceived by us in these two attributes resides not in the nature of the substance itself, but in the capacity of the human spirit, which is capable of comprehending things either as ideas or as extended objects and which therefore conceives the substance as the infinite reality under the aspect of these two attributes.

Since the substance is the one and only metaphysical reality, nothing else is real. Hence, from the identification of substance with God there follows the identity of God and the world. By the term "world" we understand the sum-total of all definite existing objects. The question now arises, what is the relation between God or the substance and finite particular objects; or, in other words, how are we to explain the generation of the particular, finite objects out of the infinite? This question is not raised by Spinoza because the finite as such does not exist and has no reality. Only on the assumption of the reality of the finite, particular objects, does the question arise: "How is the finite generated from the infinite?" But, according to Spinoza, every determination which implies a negation is "not-being," and the finite objects are due to determinations; they are therefore not real. Only the infinite, which is not determined, exists; but not the determined finite objects. The finite things are the *modi*; they are due to the effect of the substance on our mind. In themselves the *modi* are not real. They are like the waves of the sea. The waters of the sea are substantially real; the waves, as the effects of the sea-water, are fleeting appearances. Since the *modi* are not real, it cannot be maintained that, according to Spinoza, God consists of the *modi*, or God is the sum-total, the aggregate of the *modi*. Such a conception would be tantamount to stating that being is composed of non-being. Also the generally accepted notion, that Spinoza identifies God and the world, must be understood with a certain modification. Since the world is made up of the sum-total of the aggregate of particular, finite things, and the finite does not exist (for only the infinite really exists), God or the substance cannot be identified with the non-real, non-existing finite things. The finite things have reality only as effects of the substance on our mind, that is to say, as *modi* of the attributes, but they are not real as finite things in themselves.

Now Maimon's definition of Spinozism as acosmism is, as we have already shown, closely connected with the understanding of Spinoza's system as a sort of phenomenalism. For only on the supposition that the substance is the only metaphysical reality and that the attributes are mere modes of our conception of it, is it possible to define Spinozism as acosmism. Metaphysical reality is to be ascribed only to the substance. The attributes with their *modi*, which make up the world of

our experience, do not present the substance as it is in itself, but merely our conception of it. The attributes and their *modi* are thus phenomenal forms in which the world of experience appears to us. Hence the doctrine of acosmism, which implies the denial of the metaphysical reality of the world, is bound up with phenomenalism, that is, the doctrine that the substance is the only metaphysical reality.³²

We can now support our thesis that Maimon's definition of Spinozism as acosmism is bound up with a phenomenalist conception of Spinoza's doctrine of the attributes and their *modi* in their relation to the substance. In a short account of the history of philosophical systems Maimon characterizes Parmenides' conception of the world as Spinozism.³³ According to Parmenides, the ultimate reality is without beginning or end; it is one, whole and indivisible; it is without motion; it has neither past nor future; it is all-present. Parmenides' central doctrine: "Only the real exists; the non-real does not exist," is to be understood, according to Maimon, in the following manner: The absolute, ultimate reality is the only existing reality. The reality of every existing thing is due to its share of, or participation in the absolute; it is real only because it is grounded in the one, absolute being. The concept of the thing expresses its appearance to us. But the reality of the thing as it is in itself is grounded in the absolute, which is transcendent, and beyond the capacity of our cognition.

³² The conception of acosmism as implying a denial of the world's reality may support Hugo Bergmann's suggestion that Mendelssohn's definition of Spinozism as an "endless egoism" is identical with Maimon's definition of Spinozism as acosmism. Cf. H. Bergman, *הפלוסופיה של שלמה מיימון*, Jerusalem, תרצ"ב, p. 148, note 1.

On the other hand, it can be argued that, even admitting the metaphysical reality of the attributes, Spinozism can still be defined as an "endless egoism." Saying that the attributes are positive manifestations of the substance and that there is no self-sustaining reality save the substance, is tantamount to saying that nothing really exists except the substance, which is the same as "endless egoism." While the concept of acosmism is bound up with the denial of the reality of the attributes, the concept of "endless egoism" is valid even on the assumption of the metaphysical reality of the attributes.

That the concept of acosmism with reference to Spinoza is to be understood on the basis of a phenomenalist interpretation of Spinoza was also suggested by I. E. Erdmann. After this essay was completed I came across an essay of Erdmann in his *Vermischte Aufsätze*, Leipzig, 1846, p. 137, where he writes . . . "it follows then that it is more proper to characterize Spinozism with Hegel as acosmism and not to follow Bayle in his consideration of Spinozism as teaching the identity of all being with God, thus ascribing divine nature to every thing." Erdmann did not know that Maimon originated the concept of acosmism with reference to Spinoza.

³³ See Bacon's *von Verulam neues Organon. Aus dem Lateinischen übersetzt von George Wilhelm Bartholdy. Mit Anmerkungen von Salomon Maimon*. Berlin, 1793, pp. 189 ff.

Further, Maimon proceeds, Parmenides follows his master Xenophanes in stating "that all is one." This principle has, however, with Parmenides, an entirely different meaning, and is rooted in different suppositions. For Xenophanes it means the unity of concepts, that is, the unity of thought consisting of concepts through which the things are cognized and distinguished from one another. He sees the unity of mind in the differentiation of the concepts produced by mind. But Parmenides promulgates, by the principle "that all is one," the unity of being, which is not subject to cognition by our mind, but which must be assumed as the underlying basis of all differentiation of reality. That is, the differentiation of the things is due to our concepts, but absolute being is one and indivisible. It is not cognized by the mind, but is the underlying basis of the reality of our experience. The metaphysical reality has absolute existence; it is one, unchangeable, and eternal. But our concepts of the things which differ from one another are grounded in our mind, which conceives the objects of reality in relational terms. It therefore differentiates between things, and conceives objects in their separateness and distinctiveness. But different concepts are inconceivable without assuming an absolute unity underlying them all. Every existing thing, as conceived by the human mind, consists of two components: first, its underlying ground in an absolute being which is one and indivisible; and second, its differentiation as a separate thing which is grounded in our thought in terms of relation.

Maimon then interprets the principle of Parmenides, "Along with the real, the non-real does not exist," in the following manner: Only the absolute, which is not the product of our thought, really exists. But our concepts of things, which are the product of our thought, do not refer to things existing in themselves. The concept is not a manifestation of absolute being, but is rather a deviation from the absolute ground of being. Hence "all reality is necessarily one," for things are distinguished from one another only through the concepts of thought, not through their ground in the absolute reality which must be presupposed. "The non-real does not exist," that is, a concept of thought abstracted from its underlying ground has only subjective, not objective reality. Further, "the non-real cannot enter into a union with the real." Herein Parmenides' intention is to counteract the general supposition that an existing thing consists of two components: the general undetermined existence and that particular mode of its existence which is expressed by the concept. In truth, however, the undetermined ground of the thing, that is, the absolute, indivisible one, is the only existing reality. This general ground of existence is to

be understood as the absolute being. The concept, however, is a product of the thinking subject; as such it exists in the mind, but it has no reality outside the mind and its states.

We have recapitulated Maimon's conception of Parmenides as a demonstration of Maimon's conception of Spinozism. Since Parmenides is presented by Maimon as a Spinozist, it follows that the phenomenalism attributed to Parmenides is also the characteristic feature of Spinozism. The doctrine that our concepts of things are but an expression of the mind's thought in terms of relation is nothing other than phenomenalism. Consequently, Spinoza's substance, as the only metaphysical reality, is equivalent to Parmenides' one absolute being. The attributes and their *modi* correspond to the concepts in the doctrine of Parmenides; they are grounded in the subjective mind and are therefore not real. Only the substance is metaphysically real; the attributes and their *modi* are not.^{33a}

In another chapter, under the headline *Parmenides as plusquam Leibnitzian*,³⁴ the same phenomenalism, with some modification, is presented as the common ground of the philosophy of Leibnitz and that of Parmenides. This comports with Maimon's conception of the philosophy of Leibnitz as being grounded in the same suppositions as the philosophy of Spinoza. Fichte approvingly quotes Maimon's conception of Leibnitz and Spinoza as being based on the same

^{33a} Cf. Johann Eduard Erdmann, *Vermischte Aufsätze*, p. 141, where the comparison is made between the philosophy of Spinoza and that of Parmenides, the characteristic feature of both being the distinction between absolute being which is one and the appearance of the manifold.

The affinity between Spinoza and Parmenides is grounded, as we have shown, in the conception of Spinozism as acosmism, implying the denial of the metaphysical reality of the attributes. This conception of Spinoza is especially manifest in the relation Maimon has shown to obtain between Spinoza and Parmenides. Erdmann's reference to Parmenides as the philosopher of antiquity most congenial to Spinoza is thus in line with our analysis of Maimon's conception of Spinozism. Erdmann, who knew the definition of Spinozism as acosmism from Hegel, has also characterized Spinozism as a doctrine similar to that of Parmenides and the Eleatic school of thought in general. It is not my intention here to prove the correctness of Erdmann's conception of Spinoza, but merely to show that acosmism harmonizes with Parmenides' conception of the world, and that, in accordance with our understanding of Maimon's view of Spinoza, Erdmann's conception of Spinozism is supported by Maimon. Now Erdmann had a thorough knowledge of Maimon's writings. As a matter of fact, he was the first prominent historian of philosophy in the 19th century who presented Maimon's thought and evaluated it, in his: *Versuch einer Wissenschaftlichen Darstellung der neuern Geschichte der Philosophie (Dritten Bandes, Erste Abteilung)*, Leipzig, 1848, pp. 510-537. The possibility cannot, therefore, be ruled out of a direct influence of Maimon on Erdmann's conception of the essence of Spinozism.

³⁴ See Bacon's *von Verulam neues Organon*, pp. 191 ff.

foundations and as having been fundamentally determined by the same motives.^{34a} It would seem, therefore, that such a conception of Leibnitz and Spinoza and of their relation to one another was not common at that time.

Maimon writes that the existence of a thing is bound up with its being an object of consciousness. That is, the attribute of existence ascribed to an object is the result of a concept of thought. It is thus due to a modification of our cognitive capacity. Hence, existing things as conceived by the mind are grounded in various modes of thought. Since the things are grounded in the mind, which is one, the various things are essentially one. The unity of the things is grounded in the unity of the mind. Now Parmenides' principle, that "alongside the real the non-real does not exist," means that only that is real which can become an object of consciousness. The non-real, which cannot be conceived by the mind and is not grounded in a modification of our consciousness, does not exist; that is, it has no reality as an object of consciousness. And what cannot be an object of thought and cannot be moulded by a concept cannot be designated as real.

Hence, only the real exists because it is conceived and determined by our cognitive capacity. But what cannot be an object of cognition does not exist. Thus existence is necessarily one, for the existing things are grounded in one mind. The unity of the mind is the ground for the unity of being.

Parmenides' conception of the metaphysical unity of being is compatible with Leibnitz' conception of the supreme monad, the monad of monads, as the only metaphysical reality. The manifold monads owe their reality to the supreme monad, which by self-restriction and self-limitation conceives and presents the various monads.³⁵

Parmenides is an epistemological and metaphysical idealist. The unity of being is conceived by the mind, that is, by pure thought, unalloyed by the senses. The variety and change of being, as we perceive it, is due to the senses, through which only appearances are given to us. The reality of an object consists in its cognition by our thought as a modification of the All-Being, *i. e.*, the deity. In the distinction between pure thought and sense-perception, Parmenides is in complete agreement with Leibnitz "that only the higher capacity of cognition (understanding of truth) can grant a criterion of truth, but sensuous perception can merely furnish appearances of things (in-

^{34a} See *Fichte's Werke*, ed. F. Medicus, I, p. 21.

³⁵ See *Strf.*, pp. 21 ff.

distinct and confused knowledge). Furthermore, only that can be declared as real which can be conceived as an object of thought, that is, a modification of our cognitive capacity."³⁶

Maimon's attempt to relate Parmenides' thought to that of Spinoza and Leibnitz seems to imply a contradiction with reference to the relation obtaining between the absolute being and the phenomenal world. In relating Parmenides to Spinoza the conception is clearly brought out that the one absolute being is the only metaphysical reality. The world of experience as conceived by our mind is due to our subjective concepts. It is only phenomenal, not metaphysically real. But, in relating Parmenides to Leibnitz, the conception seems to be rather that the reality of the things is grounded in the reality and unity of thought. According to the principle of the identity of thought and being, thought is the ground of reality as it is in itself, and not merely the ground of the subjective conception of it.

Furthermore, in the conception that the supreme monad produces and conceives the manifold monads by the process of self-restriction and self-limitation, the idea is implied that the former adumbrates and manifests itself in the latter, though in a restricted mode. Our cognition of experience by means of our concepts of thought obtains thus the rank of metaphysical knowledge. It is not merely knowledge of the phenomena as they appear to us, but knowledge of the metaphysically real. The supreme monad presents itself, though in a restricted mode, in the manifold of the monads of reality, as the latter are the adumbrations of the former through its own self-restriction. Thus our concepts of the phenomena as being grounded in the monads, which constitute self-restrictions of the supreme monad, acquire the rank and dignity of metaphysical knowledge.

It is of interest to note that Maimon's conception of the divine knowledge, by which the things of the world are produced, as constituting an act of self-restriction, is promulgated by him in connection with his interpretation of the system of Leibnitz. The method of self-restriction by which the infinite mind presents itself in the objects of reality is put forth by Maimon in his exposition of the relation obtaining between the supreme monad and the manifold monads.

We can now understand Maimon's conception of the essential difference between Leibnitz' and Spinoza's systems of thought as follows: According to Spinoza, only the substance is metaphysically real, the attributes and their *modi* are due to our conception of the substance. Our conception of the attributes and their *modi* can grant

³⁶ See Bacon's *von Verulam neues Organon*, p. 193.

us knowledge of the phenomenal world but not that of the metaphysically real. The supreme monad of Leibnitz, however, if we follow Maimon, simultaneously conceives and produces the manifold monads of reality by an act of self-restriction. In each of the monads of reality the supreme monad represents itself in a restricted mode. Philosophical knowledge of the phenomena of the world, leading to the conception of the monads as the ground of the phenomena, constitutes knowledge of the metaphysically real, since in the monads and through them, the supreme infinite mind is manifest.

We can now understand also Maimon's hesitance in relating his own thought of the first period of his career to that of Spinoza, while his relation to Leibnitz is referred to by Maimon unhesitatingly and unequivocally. He understood the monads as fictions or as ideas of the imagination, not as things in themselves. The system of Leibnitz is thus interpreted in the spirit of critical philosophy. The idea of an infinite mind, *i. e.* the supreme monad, is a necessary idea in order to grant reality to our synthetic propositions. These propositions are analytic propositions in relation to the infinite mind. Hence by means of our synthetic propositions we cognize reality as it is. To be sure, it is reality in relation to mind, not as it is in itself, abstracted from all relation to thought. But reality in relation to thought is the only reality to which the term "reality" is applicable, for reality abstracted from all relation to mind is unimaginable. Therefore our knowledge in the form of synthetic propositions is real, and not only phenomenal. But if we understand Spinoza's system as acosmism, our propositions concerning the objects of reality as *modi* of the attributes are merely modes of our conception of the substance and not a cognition of the substance as it is in itself. Such a conception of knowledge amounts to a phenomenalism. In this case, our synthetic propositions cannot be considered as analytic propositions in relation to the infinite mind.

It would seem therefore that Maimon's conception of the relation between the finite and the infinite mind (that is, our mind as the *schema* of the infinite mind or as part of it) can be associated with the thinking of Leibnitz, but not with that of Spinoza. However, in the interpretation of the principles of Leibnitz' philosophy, such as the relation of our finite mind to the infinite mind and the idea of God as creating the objects of nature in the manner in which we produce the objects of mathematics, — principles with which Maimon's own thought is closely tied up — Maimon adds the following remark: "In case a Leibnitzian will object to this interpretation, it may be considered as the system of Spinoza."³⁷ It seems thus that Maimon

³⁷ See *Strf.*, p. 36.

considers his thought to be rooted in that of Spinoza. And in his *Vita*, where he describes the genesis of his position as developed in his *Versuch über die Transzendentalphilosophie*, he refers to the synthesis he aimed at as one in which the philosophy of Spinoza forms a constituent part. Similarly in the *Mag. zur Erfahrungsseelenkunde*,³⁸ he relates that his intention in his *Transzendentalphilosophie* was a synthesis of Spinozism with critical philosophy. All these references revealing the roots of his thought in that of Spinoza do not agree with his definition of Spinozism as acosmism. Acosmism, as we understand it, and as it follows from Maimon's conception of Spinozism, seems to imply a denial of the reality of the world.

However, Maimon's doctrine of the idea of an infinite mind of which our mind is a part is conceived for the purpose of granting reality to our synthetic propositions. The supposition that our mind is a part of an infinite mind is the ground for the assumption that our synthetic propositions are analytic in relation to the infinite mind. Only thus can the problem of *quid juris* be solved. That is, the question concerning the possibility of applying pure concepts of understanding to objects perceived by the forms of sensibility. Our scientific conception of the objects of the world in the form of synthetic propositions is metaphysically real, since these propositions are dissoluble into analytic propositions by the infinite mind. The objects of reality thus conceived are real, and not merely subjective phenomena.

Hence, Maimon's reference to Spinoza's system, as forming a constituent of his own thought, can refer only to the idea of an infinite mind as such, of which our thought is a *modus*, according to Spinoza, or a part, a *schema* in the definition of Maimon. But if Spinozism is to be defined as acosmism with the implication of a denial of the reality of this world, from which it follows that the *modi* of our thought are capable of comprehending only the phenomena as they appear to us, it is incompatible with Maimon's conception of the relation between the finite and the infinite mind.

But, with reference to Leibnitz' doctrine of the supreme monad which produces the finite monads by a method of self-restriction, the human mind can be considered as part of the infinite mind, and our synthetic propositions can therefore be thought of as being grounded in analytic thought, for the former are dissoluble into the latter by the infinite mind. Spinoza's doctrine as acosmism implies phenomenalism; but Leibnitz' conception of the relation between the finite and the infinite mind, as interpreted by Maimon, involves a realism which is grounded in epistemological idealism. That is to say, the scientific

³⁸ Vol. 10, *Stück* 2, p. 143.

cognition which is grounded in pure concepts of thought is a cognition of reality. Our synthetic propositions, which we assume to be analytic for the infinite mind, are real; they constitute cognition of reality and not of mere phenomena.

In another context³⁹ Maimon analyzes the philosophy of Leibnitz and Spinoza and shows the common ground of their systems with reference to the epistemological suppositions underlying them. They both held that the essence of reality can be cognized only by the mind, that is, by concepts of thought, not by the senses which can grant merely confused and indistinct ideas. The question was raised concerning the source and reality of motion in Spinoza's system. Since the reality of the world consists of extension and thought, the two attributes of substance, the phenomenon of motion and change cannot be accounted for. Motion therefore cannot be considered as real for Spinoza; it can only be explained as an appearance due to our senses. But Maimon shows that Leibnitz also regarded motion as a phenomenon of our sense perceptions. It is the result of the mutual effect of the monads upon each other which is perceived by our senses in a confused manner. Thus both of them, Spinoza and Leibnitz, agree that the reality of things can be comprehended only by the concepts of thought. The things as they are perceived by our senses appear to us in a confused and indistinct mode. The senses cannot grant us knowledge of reality.

Maimon, however, is aware of the essential difference between Spinoza and Leibnitz. He writes that Spinoza follows Parmenides' principle "That only the real, which is conceived by the mind, exists." The things as individual finite objects present a limitation or a negation of reality. The metaphysical reality is infinite in its very essence. The attributes are aspects of one and the same infinite reality, the substance. Only the infinite exists. Individual things as finite objects are not real, since they involve a limitation of the metaphysical reality. They have existence only inasmuch as they share in the infinite reality. But they do not exist as individual finite things, *i. e.*, as *modi*. "With Leibnitz, however, the opposite is true: the individual, particular objects, in which a limitation of the infinite is involved, do exist."⁴⁰

In Spinoza's system the individual objects as *modi* do not exist because the finite objects are limitations of the infinite metaphysical reality and cannot be thought of in themselves without the real. They cannot be thought of otherwise than as limitations of the infinite. But

³⁹ *Strf.*, pp. 40 f.

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 41.

the metaphysical reality, the infinite, can be thought of without its limitations. Therefore, only the infinite is real. Furthermore, the real is one and the same in all objects. The different characteristics of the objects, by which they are distinguished from each other, are grounded in the various modes of limitations, that is, negations of the infinite metaphysical reality. Since the metaphysical reality, *i. e.*, the substance, is always the same, there is only one single substance. With Leibnitz, however, the limitations are real. Even though the individual finite things as contingent entities cannot be thought of without the metaphysically real upon which they depend, we can think of them as individual restricted things. And individual restricted things do exist in themselves. The monads are such individuals. The objects of experience exist as individual things, they are aggregates of monads. The finite individual things are real, and not merely appearances.

Thus, the common ground of the philosophy of Leibnitz and Spinoza resides in their epistemological suppositions. That is to say, the cognition of experience as well as of the metaphysical reality, in which objects of experience are grounded, can be attained only through concepts of thought and not through the senses. Furthermore, the reduction of the finite objects to the infinite metaphysical reality is the common ground of Spinoza and Leibnitz. The cognition of the infinite, *i. e.*, substance, or God, is the underlying reality for the cognition of finite objects. The finite is a limitation of the infinite, or its negation. The infinite which can be thought of without the finite, is thus prior, in a logical sense, to the finite.

Maimon is, however, not oblivious to the distinction between Leibnitz and Spinoza concerning the reality of the finite objects. While for Spinoza the *modi* as finite objects are not real, since they are limitations, or negations of the infinite, for Leibnitz the individual finite objects are real. Hence the characterization of Spinozism as acosmism. This definition is not applicable to Leibnitz' conception of the metaphysical reality of the individual finite objects.

V

The philosophy of enlightenment which dominated the Eighteenth Century had its roots in the metaphysics of Leibnitz and Wolff. The cultural climate of the German enlightenment was the common ground of the outstanding philosophical spirits of the time, including Kant and the earlier Fichte. According to the metaphysics of Leibnitz and Wolff, a distinction must be made between absolute necessity and hypothetical necessity. An idea or a proposition which cannot be

thought of otherwise without involving oneself in a contradiction constitutes absolute necessity. But ideas, whose opposites are not logically impossible, are hypothetically necessary. That is to say, they are necessary, if the ground for their being can be found in something else. The ground for the accidental existence of the individual things must be traced back to the reality of an absolutely necessary and eternal being, that is, God. On the basis of the generally valid principle of sufficient reason or the law of causality, we derive the existence of a necessary being, *i. e.*, God, from the accidental existence of the individual contingent things. Our world of accidental things is grounded in His will, which has called the world into existence. The universe is thus a system of purposefully operating powers, the highest degree of which is attained in man. Man is thus the final goal of creation.

Such a philosophical climate was not propitious for the acceptance of Spinoza's pantheistic monism. The attempts to revive this monism encountered violent opposition. An irreconcilable antagonism exists between the philosophy of the enlightenment and that of Spinoza. The latter does not recognize in God a will separated from his thought. In God, intelligence and will are identical. The identification of God and nature involves a denial of creation. Spinoza maintains, therefore, an exclusively mechanical connection between the things of the world, that is, the fleeting phenomena are necessarily dependent on the one constant cosmic ground of all being. The principle of purpose has no place in such a world-view. Purposefulness is nothing but appearance.

Maimon refers to Mendelssohn's criticism of Spinoza and tries to show that it is based on misunderstanding. Following Leibnitz, Mendelssohn recognizes that, on the general principle of sufficient reason, the individual things are in truth dependent upon God as the cosmic ground of all being. But this does not mean that the individual things do not subsist in themselves and have no existence of their own. Being dependent does not exclude self-subsistence. "The series of accidental things have, apart from God as their ground, their own substantiality. The finite things subsist in themselves and for themselves, though their origin is traceable to the infinite, and are thus dependent upon the infinite, without which they cannot be thought of. In their subsistence, the individual things are not one with the infinite. We live, weave, and exist as the effects of God, but we are not in Him. The Spinozist, however, maintains that there is only one and single substance . . . Since there is no completely independent finite being, it cannot be a substance and is not self-subsisting."⁴¹

⁴¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 37 f.

Mendelssohn maintains therefore that the finite things are self-subsistent, even though not independent. This idea that the concepts of "dependence" and "self-subsistence" are not mutually exclusive was regarded by Maimon as untenable. He argues that being dependent implies not being a substance and not having an existence of its own. He tries to show that, with regard to the reality of the individual finite things, there is no difference between Leibnitz and Spinoza. Since the individual finite things are, with Leibnitz, dependent for their existence on the infinite, according to the principle of sufficient reason, they are not self-sustaining. Contingent things do not have a substance of their own.

Maimon's conception of substance, as implying independence, can be related to his concept of subject and predicate in a synthetic proposition. This conception constitutes the basis of his Principle of Determinability. A concept which can be thought of by itself is the subject; a concept which can be thought of not by itself, but only in connection with the subject as its modification, is the predicate. The subject of a proposition is an independent concept. This is in consonance with Maimon's conception of substance as an independent reality. Independence is the characteristic of both, the logical concept of subject and the metaphysical reality of substance.

There is thus a consistency of thought in Maimon's logic and metaphysics. In his conception of substance as independent reality, in which he differs from Mendelssohn, Maimon follows Spinoza's definition of substance as "being in itself and being thought of by itself."

Maimon's "Principle of Determinability," according to which an independent concept, which can be thought of by itself, is the subject, and a dependent concept, which cannot be thought of by itself, is a predicate, can be related to Spinoza's definition of substance as a concept thought of by itself.⁴² Spinoza's definition of substance as an independent, and attribute as a dependent concept seems to convey

⁴² See Richard Kroner, *Von Kant bis Hegel*, Tübingen, 1921, p. 360. Kroner's suggestion that Maimon's conception of subject and predicate is grounded in Spinoza's definition of substance and attributes, is borne out by Maimon's own definition of the attributes as predicates of the subject (see *Lebensgeschichte*, I, p. 153). Since the substance, as the subject, can be thought of by itself, it corresponds to Maimon's definition of the subject as the determinable which is an independent concept. The attributes as predicates cannot be thought of by themselves, for they are conceived as different from each other and as attributes of the substance. By defining the attributes as predicates, the characteristic feature of which is dependence, there is implied the definition of the predicate, *i. e.* the determination, as a concept dependent on the subject, *i. e.* the determinable. See above, p. 252 f.

an analogy to Maimon's definition of the determinable (subject) as an independent concept and the determination (predicate) as a dependent concept.

However, while Maimon's definition of an independent concept may have its roots in Spinoza's definition of substance as being thought of by itself, the difference between them is fundamental. Spinoza's and Maimon's conceptions of dependence and independence of concepts have different grounds, and serve entirely different purposes. For Spinoza, only the one metaphysical substance complies with the conditions of independence. Consequently there is only one metaphysical reality: the substance, which exists by itself and can be thought of by itself. The connection between "being by itself" and "being thought of by itself" determines the independence of the substance as an exclusively metaphysical reality. Hence, the substance is for Spinoza the only independent concept and the only metaphysical reality. Maimon's conception of the subject as an independent concept is ground in logical and epistemological considerations. The same concept may be independent, *i. e.*, a subject, in relation to certain concepts, and may be dependent, *i. e.*, a predicate, in relation to other concepts. Thus a triangle, as the determinable, is a subject in relation to its determination as a rectangular or equilateral triangle. The concept "triangle" is an independent concept and can be thought of by itself, but its determination as rectangular or equilateral is dependent, as it can be thought of not by itself but only in relation to the subject "triangle." The same concept "triangle" becomes a determination, *i. e.*, a dependent concept, when it is thought of in relation to space. Thus, in the definition of a triangle as space enclosed by three lines, space is the subject, *i. e.*, the determinable, for it is thinkable in itself, independent of the predicate "enclosed by three lines." But the predicate is unthinkable without the subject. Being enclosed by three lines presupposes the concept of space. It follows, therefore, that the concept "triangle" is a dependent concept when it is thought of in relation to space, but it is an independent concept in relation to its determinations or specifications as a rectangular or equilateral triangle. Thus the concept "triangle" which is in one context an independent concept, *i. e.*, a subject, is in another context a dependent concept, *i. e.*, a predicate. For Spinoza such a shifting of a concept, dependent on its context, is unthinkable. There is only one independent concept, *i. e.*, the substance.

Now to return to Maimon's arguments against Mendelssohn. Though Maimon is critical of Mendelssohn's attempt to reconcile dependence with self-subsistence, that is, to show that the two con-

cepts are not mutually exclusive, he comes back to Leibnitz' view, maintaining the reality of the individual finite things. Though individual things are contingent, they are self-subsistent. Maimon fully realizes that a consistent philosophy of Leibnitz, based on the principle of sufficient reason, must lead to the same conclusions as the system of Spinoza. The recognition of the dependence of finite things on the absolute infinite reality, must lead to the denial of the substantiality of finite individual things. The realization of the logical consistency of such a position did not make him oblivious of the actual position of Leibnitz as a metaphysical pluralist who maintained the metaphysical reality of finite individual things.

Maimon was not the first to realize the impossibility of a distinction between the concepts of absolute dependence and that of not being self-sustaining, which must lead to a Spinozism. Writers before him have pointed out that the unlimited and unrestricted validity of the principle of sufficient reason, according to Leibnitz's and Wolff's system of thought, must lead to a Spinozistic fatalism. For, if nothing happens without a cause or a determining factor, every individual thing or occurrence must necessarily be just as it is. Not only that any individual thing or occurrence could not have been otherwise, but the whole series of the preceding things leading to this particular thing is of the same necessity. No member of the series could have been different. Nothing occurs by accident. And since, according to Leibnitz, the divine will is determined by His reason, His will is determined, and the freedom of God consists in nothing but "obedience to necessity." God does not have the free choice of various possibilities, since His will is determined by His reason.⁴³

VI

Maimon's conception of a world-soul, the exposition of which he presented in a special essay,⁴⁴ contains ideas which may lead to a sort of Spinozism. He recognized the possibility of such an implication, and tried to forestall it by pointing out the essential differences between the idea of a world-soul, as he conceived it, and the doctrine of Spinoza. In a letter to Kant, thanking him for the copy of the *Kritik der*

⁴³ Cf. Willy Kabitz, *Studien zur Entwicklungsgeschichte der Fichteschen Wissenschaftslehre*, Berlin, 1902, pp. 3 f., who quotes Crusius' *Ausführliche Abhandlung etc. Aus dem Lateinischen von Krause*. Leipzig, 1744. Crusius had already shown that Leibnitz' and Wolff's system leads to Spinoza's necessitarianism.

⁴⁴ "Über die Weltseele," *Berlinisches Journal für Aufklärung*, Bd. 8, 2tes Stück, pp. 47-92.

Urteilskraft which Kant had sent him,⁴⁵ Maimon traces the origin of the idea of a world-soul which he proposed for the solution of some metaphysical and epistemological problems. This idea is not to be confounded with Spinozism. "For, according to Spinoza, God and the world are one and the same substance." But, Maimon understands the world-soul as a substance which may have been created by God. God can be posited as *intellegentia pura extramundana*. The world-soul is to be understood not as a separate intelligence but as being in connection with the corporeal phenomenal world. It operates within the world of experience. The world-soul is therefore conditioned by and restricted to the objects of nature and is subject to natural laws. Furthermore, the world-soul is not meant as a "thing in itself." It is just as impossible to maintain that there is one metaphysical substance (world-soul) constituting a "thing in itself," as it is impossible to maintain the plurality of substances as *noumena*. But, as a phenomenon, Maimon writes, "I am in favor of one substance, *i. e.*, world-soul, on the ground of weighty reasons."

For an understanding of the idea of a world-soul as a basis and ground for the phenomena and not as a "thing in itself," we have to recall Maimon's criticism of the assumption that a metaphysical entity exists in itself outside of its relation to a mind with its forms of thought. Hence the idea of a world-soul can be justified only on the ground of its function in explaining the phenomena of experience, and not as a metaphysical entity in itself.

Such an idea proposed for the explanation of phenomena is worlds apart from the substance of Spinoza, which is a transcendent metaphysical reality. Maimon does not point out this decisive difference between Spinozism and his doctrine of a world-soul. He shows the difference between them on other grounds, namely, that according to Spinoza, nature and God are identical, while in his conception, the world-soul, just as the world of phenomena, can be considered a creation of God.

Thus, apart from the essential difference in their conception of substance as a creation or as an entity identical with God, they differ in that Spinoza's substance is a metaphysical reality, while Maimon's idea of a world-soul is a functional idea.

Now the reasons for the assumption of one substance, *i. e.*, a world-soul, as a functional idea explaining the phenomena of experience are as follows: The conflict between Locke and Leibnitz concerning the substantial nature of the human soul can be dissolved on the assump-

⁴⁵ See *Briefe von und an Kant*, Vol. II, pp. 32 ff.

tion of such an idea. Leibnitz maintained the substantiality of the soul as a continually active entity. From the idea of the soul as a substance, the nature of which is the presentation of ideas, there follows necessarily the continuous activity of the soul. However, the interruption of the mind's activity during sleep constitutes a stumbling block of the idea of the substantiality of the soul. The fact that our mental activity is brought to a standstill during sleep seems to refute the doctrine of the substantial nature of the soul as continuously active. Locke maintained, therefore, that the soul is not a substance continuously active in producing ideas, as the fact of the interruption of this activity fully testifies. Leibnitz, however, had recourse to the assumption of obscure ideas, meaning that the soul is continuously active in presenting ideas, even when we are not aware of these ideas because of their indistinctness and obscurity. The existence of such obscure and indistinct ideas can, according to Leibnitz, be proved by the fact of the connection which our ideas, following the interruption, resume with the ideas preceding it. Here Leibnitz anticipated the doctrine of the subconscious. The objection may, however, be raised that the obscure ideas are nothing but traces left in the mind by the movements of the organs which accompany the ideas. And there is thus no sufficient proof for the continuous activity of the soul.

On the assumption of a world-soul, the connection between the ideas before and after the interruption can be accounted for in a logically satisfactory manner. The movements of the organs are accompanied by corresponding ideas. The movement, however, must be of a definite intensity for the production of an idea. The required intensity is absent during the interruption. The world-soul cannot in such circumstances affect our mind in the production of ideas. Thus Leibnitz's doctrine of the soul, as a substance which is bound up with continuous activity, is applied by Maimon to the world-soul. The latter is a substance continuously active. The human soul is affected by the universal world-soul, subject to certain natural conditions determining its receptivity.

Furthermore, the idea of objective truth, which is assumed by all men, requires the idea of a universal soul as the ground of objective, generally valid truth. On the basis of such an idea, it is possible to explain the identity of the forms of thought of all thinking subjects and the harmony of the objects cognized in accordance with these forms. Objectivity of truth, and the compatibility of the forms of understanding with the objects of thought, can be accounted for on the assumption of a universal world-soul in which truth is grounded.

The phenomenon of purposefulness in nature, *i. e.*, teleology, also

suggests the idea of a universal world-soul. Maimon writes that a purpose cannot be realized except by some power or intelligence in which the purpose is real. The forms of thought are purposeful, as through the synthesis of thought the objects of nature as phenomena are produced. This proves conclusively the reality of a general ground for the connection obtaining between the various forms as particular purposes leading to an ultimate purpose, which consists in the harmony of cognized objects with the forms of thought.

It seems to me that the consideration of teleology in nature, proving the reality of the idea of a universal world-soul, was proposed by Maimon for the solution of some of the problems dealt with in Kant's *Kritik der Urteilskraft*. This *Kritik* deals with the problem of teleology in nature. The distinction between the forms of sensibility, time, and space, and the concepts of understanding constitutes an apparent dualism, the resolution of which could be effected by assuming an overriding teleological principle. Kant was faced with the problem of bringing about the unification of these two essentially different sources of the human mind. He expressed the hope that perhaps one day a source would be discovered in which these two functions, sensibility and understanding, have their common ground. In other words, Kant looked for a power or an intelligence endowed with the teleological function of uniting the two sources of the human mind.

Now Maimon's reference to teleology in nature (demonstrated by the harmony of the forms of thought and the objects of nature produced by these forms) as a proof for the idea of a universal world-soul, clearly indicates the connection between his doctrine and the problem dealt with by Kant in the third *Kritik*. Kant's search for a unifying source, in which the two distinct functions of the human mind are grounded, is the quest for a principle explaining the unity and the harmony of two heterogeneous capacities, without which the cognition of objects of scientific experience is impossible. Maimon's doctrine of a universal world-soul is thus an attempt to offer such a univalent source from which this purposeful harmony could be derived. Teleology in nature can be explained by the idea of a universal mind which is purposeful. This is the function of the world-soul, in which the human soul partakes, and it differs radically from Spinoza's concept of the substance and its attribute of thought. And since the idea of a universal soul was proposed by Maimon prior to the appearance of the third *Kritik* of Kant, it indicates that Maimon, realizing the problem, anticipated the development of Kantian thought.

VII

Being aware that his concept of an infinite mind could be interpreted as Spinozism, Maimon tries to show, in the explanatory notes to his *Transzendentalphilosophie*, the essential difference between Spinoza and himself. This must have been written by him after having read Kant's letter to Herz in which the identity of Maimon's concept with that of Spinoza is pointed out. Maimon writes: "Some reader may discover Spinozism in the concept of an infinite mind. In order to prevent any misunderstanding on this score, I should like to clarify my position once and for all. I consider the presentation of a thing or its concept and the thing itself not to be so distinct from each other, as is generally assumed. I hold that the real thing itself, apart from its presentation or conception by the limited human mind, is its *complementum possibilitatis*, i. e., that which makes up its possibility without our comprehending it."⁴⁶ In other words, the real thing itself is its complete rationalization. By deducing completely the reality of the thing from its logical conditions or possibilities, we attain the real thing. This is, however, only an ideal goal; our actual concept of a thing is always incomplete, as there are always problems in relation to it which are not solved. Thus the reality of the thing as perceived by us is the result of the negation or restriction of the *complementum possibilitatis*, i. e. its complete rationalization. "But, with reference to an infinite mind, the thing and its presentation or its conception are one and the same."⁴⁷

Therefore the idea of an infinite mind could not be identified with Spinozism. According to Spinoza, God, as the substance, has an infinity of attributes, two of which are known to us: the attribute of extension and the attribute of thought. These two attributes constitute different realms of being, even though the order of one realm corresponds to the order of the other realm. A thing of experience as a *modus* of extension and the idea of the thing as a *modus* of the attribute of thought are two different *modi* of two distinct attributes. But for Maimon the complete conception of a thing and the thing itself are one and the same.

With reference to an infinite mind, for which the thing is completely dissolved into analytic propositions, the thing and its idea, or its conception, are absolutely one. The difference between the thing and our conception of it is due to the limitation of our mind or to the negation of the infinite mind. We have to rely on synthetic propositions

⁴⁶ *Tr.*, p. 365.

⁴⁷ *Ibid.*

and on experience for our understanding of the thing. But, with reference to the infinite mind, for which the thing is fully dissolved into analytic thought, the thing and its idea are identical; there is no difference between the real thing and its idea.

Furthermore, Spinoza's investigation starts with the definition of the highest metaphysical concept, the substance, from which it proceeds to the derivation of the attributes and its *modi*. Instead of starting with the highest and coming down to the lowest, Maimon proceeds in the opposite direction. He comes to the idea of an infinite mind by an analysis of the limited human mind which is conceived as the *schema* of the idea of an infinite mind. "An idea is a method showing the transition from the presentation or the concept of a thing to the thing itself."⁴⁸ In our conception of a thing we realize that the thing is not fully rationalized. We know that our concept of the thing is not adequate to the thing itself, as there are problems in relation to it which are not yet fully solved. Our ideal goal, however, is its full and complete rationalization. We imagine, therefore, the idea of a mind, in relation to which the thing is completely rationalized. "Though the idea does not determine an object of intuition (*Anschauung*), it determines a real object, the *schema* of which is an object of intuition. Thus our mind is the *schema* of the idea of an infinite mind," since the realization of the limits of our mind is impossible without the idea of an infinite mind. "Our mind as the *schema* intimates the idea of an infinite mind, and the idea implies its reality or its existence, without which neither the idea as such nor its *schema* would be possible."⁴⁹

The way from the idea of an infinite mind to its reality seems to be grounded in ontological thinking. The leap from an immanent idea to the existence of an object adequate to it cannot be justified on the basis of critical philosophy, which has shown the dogmatic nature of the ontological proof for the existence of God in particular and ontological thinking in general. Maimon's attempt to show the transition from the idea of an infinite mind to its real existence by the method of *schema* can perhaps be explained in the following way: A distinction must be made between syllogistic and mediate thought, and intuitive, immediate thought. By the former method there can be no justification for concluding from an idea conceived by the mind to the reality and existence of an object corresponding to the idea. Through immediate, intuitive thought, however, we receive an intimation of the reality of an infinite mind from its *schema*, the limited human mind. Since, without the idea of an infinite mind, the process

⁴⁸ *Ibid.*⁴⁹ *Ibid.*

of human understanding cannot be accounted for, this idea is constitutive of the limited human mind. An idea which belongs to the very constitution of our mind can serve as a *schema* or a representation of the idea in its reality. The method by which Maimon arrives at the reality of an infinite mind is entirely different from that of Spinoza. While the latter proceeds from the infinite to the finite, the former proceeds from the finite to the infinite.

For Spinoza the order of things in space corresponds to the order of thought, as thought and extension are two attributes of one substance. With Maimon too the existing things are dissolvable in thought by the infinite mind. But the identity of thought and being is, for the finite mind, an ideal goal; it is an infinite task for the finite, human mind to strive to approach that identity. What is real in relation to the infinite mind constitutes an endless goal for the finite human mind. Thus the identity of the order of thought and the order of being is for Spinoza a reality of possible experience; for Maimon it is but an endless goal.

The essential difference between the limited human mind and the infinite mind consists in the fact that the former is discursive and the latter is intuitive. That is to say, the finite mind requires, as a condition for the process of thought, a material given to it in the form of perceptions. The infinite mind, however, does not require any material given to it, but thinks intuitively and creatively. Now if the human mind would always be discursive and descriptive and would have no intimation of intuitive thought, it could not have an idea of intuitive thought and it would not be able to form a concept of infinite reason. But actually the human mind is not devoid of intuitive thought, even though in a restricted manner. It partakes rather of the process of thought by intuition. The objects of mathematics are produced and thought of by the method of intuition. A mathematical line, a triangle, are construed by the human mind not on the basis of some given material from without, but by pure intuition *a priori*. Furthermore, the finite objects of mathematics are unthinkable without the concept of the infinite, since the axiom of parallel lines is a necessary condition for the construction of a triangle. And the infinite can only be thought of intuitively, not descriptively. Maimon writes: "The objects of mathematics consists of form, *i. e.*, concepts of understanding, and matter, which is intuition *a priori*. Our understanding produces the objects of mathematics by a construction *a priori*, that is to say, by a connection of a form of understanding with an intuition *a priori* of pure space."⁵⁰

⁵⁰ *Strf.*, p. 34 f.

We have thus to imagine the infinite mind as thinking all objects not in a manner similar to our discursive processes of thought, but as creating the objects intuitively. Its thoughts are at the same time presentations of objects. "Should one protest that we could have no idea of such a mode of thought, I would reply that we have an idea of such a mode of thought since we actually employ it to a certain extent. All objects of mathematics are conceived by us and produced by a construction *a priori*. We are herein similar to God." "God thinks all real objects not according to the principle of contradiction, but in the same manner as we think of mathematical objects; that is, He produces the objects through His thought."⁵¹ In mathematics we thus possess, though in a restricted manner, a mode of thought which is intuitive and creative, similar to the mode of thought of the intuitive mind. And again: "God produces the objects of nature in the same manner as we produce the objects of mathematics by real thinking (*reelles Denken*), i. e., constructing the objects by pure thought."⁵² Since the human mind experiences intuitive, creative thought, it can serve as a *schema*, a pattern, for the idea of an infinite mind which is of the same kind but in the highest degree. "The closer a mind is to perfection, the more accomplished will be its presentations . . . The infinite mind possesses perfection. All the other minds can only strive to approach it."⁵³

It follows then that the human mind which strives to approach perfect reason actually possesses an idea of an infinite reason. Just as human reason, being the *schema* of the infinite reason, intimates the idea of such a reason, so does the idea imply the reality of such a mind. For, without the reality of such a mind, the endless striving to approach it would be incomprehensible. To be sure, the transformation of an ideal goal into a reality is ontological, and is in line with modern phenomenology. But there can be no doubt as to Maimon's conceiving the idea of an infinite mind as a metaphysical reality.

VIII

When Maimon conceives the idea of an infinite mind in a manner entirely different from Spinoza's doctrine of thought as an attribute of substance, there is also implied the essential difference between Maimon's and Kant's conception of the role and function of the ideas of reason in general and those of the idea of an infinite mind in particular. Maimon writes: "I deviate from Kant in these two main doctrines.

⁵¹ *Strf.*, p. 20.

⁵² *Strf.*, p. 36.

⁵³ *Strf.*, p. 35.

First, instead of three ideas proposed by Kant, I consider this one idea, namely, that of an infinite reason, to be sufficient. Second, Kant considered the ideas of reason not as objects of cognition by understanding (reason and understanding being two different capacities), while I hold the idea of reason to be an object of understanding, though not an object of sensibility (*Anschauung*). To be sure, the infinite mind cannot be conceived directly as an object in itself, but, through the medium of our mind, the *schema*, which can be conceived by intuition, we cognize the idea of an infinite mind as a definite object of thought."⁵⁴

In his theoretical philosophy Kant has established three distinct and separate realms: forms of sensibility, time and space; concepts of understanding, the categories of thought; and ideas of reason. The three ideas of reason are, first, an absolute subject as the unity presupposed in all thought, *i. e.*, the self; second, an absolute unity and complete synthesis of all the conditions of phenomena, *i. e.*, totality of being; and third, an absolute unity of the conditions of all objects of all thought, *i. e.*, God. The first of these ideas leads to the science of rational psychology; the second leads to the science of rational cosmology, and the third leads to the science of rational theology.

Maimon has striven for greater unity. He has shown that the forms of sensibility are also grounded in thought. Time and space are not pure forms of intuition, but are closely connected with the perception of objects. Time and space are forms of diversity and differentiation of objects. Just as the forms of intuition and the concepts of understanding are not essentially different, and do not form two distinct realms of consciousness, so the ideas of reason do not constitute a separate realm, distinct from that of understanding, but must be grounded in our understanding. Thus the idea of an infinite mind, which replaces the three ideas of Kant, is grounded in our understanding. It can be deduced as an object of understanding by way of analysis of our mind's activity.

The unity of the realms of sensibility, understanding, and reason is bound up with Maimon's conception of the synthetic propositions. The imperfection and the incompleteness of human cognition constitute the origin of these propositions.⁵⁵ Ideal knowledge is cognition in terms of analytic thought. The synthetic propositions must, in principle, be reducible to analytic propositions, for truth must necessarily be expressed by and represented in the form of analytic propositions.

⁵⁴ *Tr.*, p. 366.

⁵⁵ *Tr.*, p. 9.

If we are unable to do so, it is due to our limitations. For an infinite mind, however, there can be only analytic thought. Inasmuch as we assume our synthetic propositions to be true on the basis of induction and experience, there is implied the assumption that in relation to an infinite mind they are each and all convertible into analytic propositions. Inasmuch as we assume the possible convertibility of the synthetic propositions, we entertain the idea of an infinite mind and intuit its reality. "I consider," writes Maimon, "Kant's *Critique of pure Reason* as a classic, and just as irrefutable as the work of Euclid in its kind . . . I consider, however, Kant's system to be insufficient. Our thinking being conceives of itself as a citizen of an intelligible world. Even though the intelligible world, like our thinking self, is not an object of direct cognition, the cognized objects of experience point to the reality of such an intelligible realm. The existence of ideas in our mind (ideas which could not have been derived from the world of sensuous objects) necessarily indicate a function, that is, a reality to which the ideas correspond. And, since this could not be found in the domain of the empirical, we must search for it in an intelligible realm, where the mind, by its own forms, determines and creates objects to which these ideas are related."⁵⁶ Through the ideas of understanding and reason, such as the idea of the infinite and the idea of perfection, man senses, as it were, his share in an intelligible world; that is to say, he perceives his mind as participating in an infinite mind. "Man recognizes, on the one hand, his limitations, that is, he realizes that his capacity of understanding is confined to the world of experience. On the other hand, man senses an irresistible urge to expand continuously the boundaries of the area of his possible comprehension, and to reach out towards the intelligible, thus searching for a transition from the empirical to the intelligible."⁵⁷

Herein lies the essential difference between Kant and Maimon. Kant recognizes the categorical imperative as intimating man's share of the intelligible world of ideas. "Intelligible" is a Kantian concept implying a certainty transcending that of the empirical and experiential. It has its ground in the aspect of man as a *noumenon*, a thing in itself. The intelligible in man refers, according to Kant, to the unconditional, super-temporal and absolute value of the good. Thus not the theoretical aspect of man, but the absolute character of the ethical law makes man a citizen of the metaphysical, intelligible world, transcending the sensuous realm. But Maimon considered certain

⁵⁶ *Tr.*, p. 338.

⁵⁷ *Tr.*, p. 339.

aspects of the theoretical sphere of man as revealing his share in the intelligible. There are certain ideas and concepts in human thought which are inexplicable unless they are recognized as being grounded in that aspect of the human mind which points to its share in an infinite mind. The human understanding displays definite and clearly recognizable signs of its being a part of the intelligible.

The monistic tendency in Maimon's thought, as it is manifest in his idea of an infinite mind, replacing the three ideas of reason proposed by Kant, and thus overcoming the strict Kantian division of the three realms of consciousness — sensibility, understanding, and reason — is in line with Spinoza's monism. But the ground of his monism, the method he employs for its attainment, and the ideal unity he aims at, are fundamentally different from those of Spinoza. The difference between them is grounded in the fundamental distinction between dogmatic and critical philosophy.

62	פחדים (פחדיו) (איוב מ, יז)	90	קסס (יקוסס) (יחזקאל יז, ט)
63	פחתת (ויקרא יג, נה)	91	רהה (רוהה, ישעיה מר, ח) (תרהו)
64	פימה (איוב טו, כז)	92	רום (ירום (איוב טו, יב) בעינו, ירומון)
65	פלתי (שמואל ב' ח, יח ועוד)	93	רוטפש (איוב לג, כה)
66	פענח (בראשית מא, מה)	94	רמך (רמכים) (אסתר ח, י)
67	פצירה פים (שמואל א' יג, כא)	95	רסס (לרוס) (יחזקאל מז, יד)
68	פרוים (דברייהמים ב' ג, ו)	96	רפסורה (דברייהמים ב' ב, טו) (רפסודות)
69	פרור (פרורים) (מלכים ב' כג, יא)	97	רפק (מתרפקת) (שיריהשירים ח, ה)
70	פרחח (איוב ל, יב)	98	שבץ (שמואל ב' א, ט)
71	פרעוש (שמואל א' כד, יד; כו, ב)	99	שחלת (שמות ל, לד)
72	פרשדונה (שופטים ג, כב)	100	שיט (ישעיה לג, כא)
73	פותה (פתהן) (ישעיה ג, יז)	101	שבך (כשך) (ירמיה ה, כו)
74	פתיגיל (ישעיה ג, כד)	102	שנס (וישנס) (מלכים א' יח, מו)
75	צב (ויקרא יא, כט)	103	שסע (וישסע) (שמואל א' כד, ז ועוד)
76	צינ'ןוק] (ירמיה כט, כו)	104	שסף (וישסף) (שמואל א' טו, לג)
77	צליל לחם (שופטים ז, יג)	105	שעטה (ירמיה מז, ג)
78	צלצל דיגס (איוב מ, לא)	106	שעטנו (ויקרא יט, יט; דברים כב, יא)
79	צנס (צנומות) (בראשית מא, כג)	107	שפות בקר (שמואל ב' יז, כט)
80	צנתרת (צנתרות) (זכריה ד, יב)	108	שפי (במדב' כג, ג; איוב לג, כא)
81	צפד (איכה ד, ח)	109	שצף קצף (ישעיה נד, ח)
82	צפיחית (שמות טו, לא)	110	שקערורה (ויקרא יד, לו) (שקערורות)
83	צפיע (צפיעי) (יחזקאל ד, טו)	111	ששך (ירמיה כה, כו; נא, מא)
84	צקלון (מלכים ב' ד, מב)	112	שממית (משלי ל, כח)
85	קבה (צקלון) (במדבר כה, ח; דברים יח, ג)	113	שרד (ישעיה מר, יג)
86	קבל (קבלו) (יחזקאל כו, ט; מלכים ב' טו, י)	114	תותח (איוב מא, כא)
87	קהה (קהלת י, י)	115	תרזה (ישעיה מר, יד)
88	קלשון (שמואל א' יג, כא)		
89	קין (קינו) (שמואל ב' כא, טז)		

1	אחים	ישעיה יג, כא	33	חספס (מחספס) (שמות טו, יד)
2	אנס (אונס)	(אסתר א, ח)	34	חרגל (ויקרא יא, כב)
3	אנקה	(ויקרא יא, ל)	35	חרך (יחרך) (משלי יב, כז)
4	אפריון	(שיריהשירים ג, ט)	36	חרצן (חרצנים) (במדבר ו, ד)
5	אקדח	(ישעיה נד, יב)	37	חשור (מלכים א' ז, לג) (חשוריהם)
6	אקו	(דברים יד, ה)	38	ימים (בראשית לו, כד)
7	בהט	(אסתר א, ו)	39	כח (ויקרא יא, ל)
8	בשנים	(בראשית מג, יא)	40	כזו (שמות לה, כב; במדבר לא, ג)
9	בולס	(עמוס ז, יד)	41	כילף (כילפות) (תהלים עד, ו)
10	ברומים	(יחזקאל כז, כד)	42	כימה (עמוס ה, ח; איוב ט, ט; לח, לא)
11	בתק (בתקוך)	(יחזקאל טז, מ)	43	כמה (כמהה) (תהלים סג, ב)
12	גבעול	(שמות ט, לא)	44	כמוס (דברים לב, לד)
13	נהה	(משלי יז, כב)	45	כרתי (שמואל ב' ח, יח (עוד)
14	גלבים	(יחזקאל ה, א)	46	כשיל (תהלים עד, ו)
15	נפר	(בראשית ו, יד)	47	לבה (לבתה) (עי' יחזקאל טז, ל)
16	דבייתים	(מלכים ב' ו, כה)	48	לז (בראשית ל, לז)
17	דישון	(דברים יד, ה)	49	לטאה (ויקרא יא, ל)
18	דמע (דמעך)	(שמות כב, כח)	50	מהמורה (תהלים קמ, יא) (מהמורות)
19	דק	(ישעיה מ, כב)	51	מנענעים (שמואל ב' ו, ה)
20	דבנים	(יחזקאל כז, טו)	52	משעול (במדבר כב, כד)
21	דבד	(בראשית ל, כ)	53	נהלול (ישעיה ז, יט) (נהלולים)
22	דונק	(דברים לג, כב)	54	נעצוצ (ישעיה ז, יט; נה, יג)
23	זער (זעכו)	(איוב יז, א)	55	סלד (אסלדה) (איוב ו, י)
24	זרב (זורבו)	(איוב ו, יז)	56	סלעם (ויקרא יא, כב)
25	זרויף	(תהלים עב, ו)	57	סרפר (ישעיה נה, יג)
26	זרויר	(משלי ל, לא)	58	עטישה (איוב מא, י) (עטישותיו)
27	חדרך	(זכריה ט, א)	59	עלוקה (משלי ל, טו)
28	חלבנה	(שמות ל, לד)	60	עשתייעשר (במדבר ז, עב ועוד)
29	חלד	(ויקרא יא, כט)	61	פותה (פתות) (מלכים א' ז, ג)
30	חמט	(ויקרא יא, ל)		
31	חנמל	(תהלים עח, מז)		
32	חנס	(ישעיה ל, ד)		

תִּקְעוּ חֲצוֹצְרָה בְּרִמָּה שׁוֹפָר בְּגִבְעָה
 יֹאסְפוּ עַמִּים עַל הַצֹּלָעָה
 לְהוֹצִיא מִלִּבָּה תַעֲתוּעָה דְּבָרִי בִלְעָה
 90 הִיא רֹאֲתָה בֵּן תִּמְנָה

בְּאֲזְנֵי אֶמְרַת קוֹל מְלִים
 לְאִמּוֹר נִדַּע הַמִּקְרָא בְּכָל פְּעָלִים
 לֹא יִתֵּר דְּבָר מֵרֹאשׁ וְעַד יִשְׁלִים
 הַמִּשְׁפָּח עֲצָמוּ בְּרֹב מִתְּלָלִים
 95 אִם יֵשׁ מְלִים הָשִׁיבָה.

- 87 הושע ה, ח. - לפי ש. ח. קוק, לוח ירושלים שנת התש"ו, עמ' קסג ואילך מכוון לקראים שישבו במאה העשירית ברמה ובנבעה.
- 88 הצולעה [מיכה ד, ו; ז; צפניה ג, יט. - הכוונה לקראים. עי' מאן, *Jews in Egypt*, ח"א, עמ' 276, *Texts and Studies*, עמ' 4; גנוי שכטר, ג, עמ' 189 הכוונה לעם ישראל כולו. ועי' שאלות עתיקות מחרות כה בית קוף.
- 89 צירוף תהלים נב, ו; ירמיה נא מד. - ואולי צריך להוסיף שורה במחרות זו.
- 90 תהלים מח, ו.
- 91 איוב לג, ח. - אמרת, בכה"י: אמרתי, ותיקן רחנטאל.
- 92 פעלים [= העניינים, הפירושים, המלים. ושימשה המלה כלמה - כלם (כלמה-כלם)
- 93 ישלים [= סוף, ושינה לצורך החרח.
- 95 איוב לג, לב.

70 צָבָא יִצְבְּאוּ כָל־הַפְתָּרוֹן

יְחֻזְּגוּ וַיִּנְעֻזוּ כַּמְלָאֵי שְׁכָרוֹן

זֶה אוֹמֵר בְּכָה וְזֶה אוֹמֵר בְּכָה עַד הַפְתָּרוֹן

וְהַגְדוֹל דְּבַר הַנּוֹת נִפְשׁוּ וְאִין יִתְרוֹן

וּבָם לֹא כָהָה

75 קִנְצֵי מְלִין וְשִׁכְל מַעַט אִם יִשְׁאַלּוּ

אִין כַּח לָהֶם לְהָשִׁיב כִּי אִם יִשְׁלּוּ

בְּחֻקִּים וּמִשְׁפָּטִים נִקְשׁוּ וְנִכְשְׁלּוּ

וְאִזְעַק וְאוֹמֵר אָהָה

רִוְנִים וּבּוֹגְדִים מִנְחִישֵׁי מִצַּח עַל דְּבַר כְּזָב

80 יַעֲדְרוּ הָאֲמַת וַיַּחֲזִקוּ שְׁקָר וְכָזָב

וְהֵם חֻכְמִים בְּעֵינֵיהֶם כְּגוֹי מִשְׁפָּט לֹא עָזָב

הַלִּילּוּ עֲלֵיהֶם הָהָה

שְׁמַעְזוּ שְׁמוּעַ [בְּרוּזוֹ] קוֹלֶם

וְהִנֵּה מִפִּיהֶם יֵצֵא בְּטַעְמֵי עֲקוּלֶם

85 יִשְׁאֹו רֵאשֶׁם בְּפֶשֶׁר שִׁיקוּלֶם

הַשְּׁמַחִים לֵלֹא דְבַר וְקוּמָתָם גְּבָהָה

72 ה ב ת ר ו ן] = האחרון מלשון הארמית בתרא (כהנא).

זֶה אוֹמֵר . . .] כנגד טענת הקראים כי במשנה יש מחלוקת בין התנאים בהלכות שונות.

עי מבוא.

73 מִיכָה ז, ג. 74 שמואל א' ג, יג.

75 איוב יח, ב. - קִנְצֵי מְלִין] = פתרונות מלים. עי' ש' מחרות, ק"ה' בית הא; פינסקער,

לקוטי קדמוניות, וינה חר"ד, עמ' קסו; סלמון בן ירוחם, נירורק תרצ"ד, עמ' 91; נייגר, אוצר נחמד,

ח"ד, עמ' 15. - כאן חחר מחברנו לנושא של ביאור המלים הבודדות.

76 יִשְׁלּוּ] דה"ב כט, יא.

77 ישעיה ח, טו ועוד. - הרי המטרה של הפולמוס בעניין המלים הבודדות.

78 יחזקאל ט, ח.

79 בכה': מכחישי מצח, ותיקן פורגס. - לא ידוע לי בניין הפעיל ממקור אחר.

80 מלכים א' ה, ז.

81 משלי כח, יא; ישעיה נח, ב.

82 יחזקאל ל, ב.

83 איוב יג, יז; כא, ב.

84 איוב לו, ב. - ב ט ע מ י ע ק ו ל ם] שיעורו: בטעמיהם המעוקלים, והכוונה להסבריהם

העוקמים, ועוקץ מיוחד כאן במלה. טעמי' שהרבו הקראים לטפל בהם. ועי' מחרות, ק"ה' אות עין

ש' 5.

85 איוב י, טו.

86 עמוס ו, יג; יחזקאל לא, ה.

פְּנֵי לְהִבִּים פְּנֵיהֶם כִּי הוֹרֵד לְאֶרֶץ נִצָּחִם
וְעֵינֵם מִכַּעַס כָּהֵה

סְבוּ אֶל טְרַחַה וְאֶזְלָה
וְאֶל דֶּרֶגָה וּמֵאֲרָכָה וְצִינּוֹרִי וּסְגוּלָה
60 עֲזָרָה בְּצָרוֹת אוֹלִי תִשָּׁאֲלוּ כִּי יָד מִכֶּם אֶזְלָה
אֶל אֶרֶץ עֵיפָתָה תְּלוּהָה

לְעוֹנְבֵי הַטְּעָמִים וּפּוֹרְטִים בְּשִׁיר כָּעַל יֵין
יִשְׁבְּרוּ קוֹלָם בְּאֶחָי תּוֹבֵל קֵין
בְּדוֹדִיד חֲשָׁבוּ לָהֶם חֲכָמָה וְלֵב אֵין
65 וְלֹא יוֹסִיפוּ לְגִבְהָה

פָּעֲרוּ פִּיהֶם וּבִלְשׁוֹנָם חוֹכִים
יִבֹשׁ בְּחֶרֶשׁ כּוֹחֶם בְּקִמְצָה מֵאֲרִיכִים
וַיְהִי לְאֵבֶל כְּגֹרֶם וְעוֹגֶבֶם לְקוֹל בּוֹכִים
נְהִי נְהִיָּה נְהָה

56 ישעיה יג, ח. – שם סג, ו.

57 איוב יז, ז. – כה ה' לשון זכר במקום לשון נקבה לצורך החרוז.

ו צִינּוֹרִי [בכה': ושמרי, ותיקן פורגס.

58–59 רשמה של טעמים עי' א. צ. אידלסון, תולדות הנגינה העברית, ברלין תרפ"ד, 102.
המחבר לועג לקראים המרבים לעסוק בטעמי המקרא. ואין לקבל דעת א. דותן, המבקש לבטל את
הקראים ביטול גמור ומוחלט כמינים וכופרים להכעיס. עי' סיני, כרך מא (תשי"ז), עמ' שנ.

60 תהלים מו, ב; דברים לב, לו. – אז לה' צימוד שלם לכתוב בשורה 58.

61 איוב י, כב.

ת לוה ה' באכר: מן תלה (בראשית מו, יג) בינוני פעול; פורגס מתקן: ובלהה; ונה מפריד
לשתי מלים: תל וזה; לי נראה משובש תלה והוראתה: הרימוה כמו בלשון חז"ל, ואולי פשוט במקום
תלוה = תלו אותה והכוונה תלו את עזרתכם בארץ חושך.

62 עמוס ו, ה; ועי' הרכבי, זכרון לראשונים, חלק ה, עמ' נה והערה מה בעמ' נח (רוחנטאל). –
כעל יין, דרך קצרה (עי' ילון, תורת השירה הספרדית, 'ירושלים הח"ש, עמ' 206–215), כשכורים השרים
על כוס יין.

63 = יובל. עי' בראשית ד, כא. – י ש ב ר ו' לשון סבר, והכוונה: הם חושבים כי קולם הוא כמו
קול יובל, שהיה. אבי כל תופש כנור ועוגב, אולם י"תכן לנקד: 'שְׁבְרוּ ותהיה הכוונה, כי הם שרים
בקול שבור, אולם הדימוי לא יהא נהיר.

64 עמוס ו, ה; משלי יז, טו.

65 צפניה ג, יא.

66 איוב כט, כג. – ח ו כ י ס' הוראת המלה מושפעת מן הערבית حكي = דבר.

67 תהלים כב, טו. – ב ק מ צ ה' מונח דקדוקי. עי' דקדוקי הטעמים, סעיף 11; מחברת התיג'אן,
עמ' 53; 55, שנכתב גם באלף: קמצא ('הודה הברצלוני פירוש ספר 'צירה, עמ' 230).

68 איוב ל, לא.

69 מיכה ב, ד.

כְּתַרְנִי הַשֶּׁבֶץ, שְׁחַלַת, וַיִּשְׁנֶם
וַיִּשְׁפֹּף, וַיִּשְׁפֹּעַ בְּמַשְׁעוֹל דֶּרֶךְ אֵין לְהִנֵּס
שְׁעִטָּנֹו, שְׁעִטָּת, שִׁיט, שְׁפִי, שְׁפּוֹת בָּקָר, מֶלֶךְ שֶׁשֶׁךְ וְחִנֵּס
בְּשֶׁצֶף קֶצֶף אֹנֵס
45 לַעֲת עֶרֶב וְהָנָה בִּלְהָה

לְמוֹד [ש]קְעָרוֹרוֹת, יָשׁוּר כְּשֶׁךְ יָקוֹשׁ מְאֹסָף
עַץ תְּרוּזָה הִלְבֵּן מִחֲשָׁף
לְקֶשׁ נִחְשְׁבוּ תוֹתַח מִשְׁשָׁף
אִם הַבְּרִזֵּל לֹא קָקָה

50 מְתַנִּיד תְּאֹזֵר וְקִבֵּץ כָּל עֲדַתָּךְ
חֲצִידָךְ יִרְה וְהַחֲזֹק מִלְחַמְתָּךְ
לֶךְ וְשׁוֹב וּמִחֵר תְּשִׁיב אִם יֵשׁ אֶתָּךְ
וְאַל תִּמְתֵּמָה בַּתְּמָהָה

נִקְטָה נִפְשָׁם עֲזָבוּ עֲלֵיהֶם [ם] שִׁיחַם
55 לְתוֹהוּ וְהִבֵּל כָּלָה כּוֹחֵם

- 41 כְּתַרְנִי [במקום אחוזי שבפסוק שמואל ב' א. ט לצורך האקרוסטיכון, והכוונה לדברי העמלקי בדיבור ישיר.
42 דֶּרֶךְ אֵין לְהִנֵּס [במקום הכתוב: גִּדֵּר מִזֶּה וְגִדֵּר מִזֶּה (במדבר כב, כד).
43 [שִׁיט] בְּכַהֲיִ: שׁוֹט, וְהַעִיר ש' וְהוּוּ הַקְרִי. – שֶׁשֶׁךְ [עי' שאלות עתיקות, HUCA, כרך XXI (1948), עמ' מח ש' 22–23.
43–45 מֶלֶךְ . . . סוֹף [קשור בעניין מלך בבל ומצרים הכופים בשעת כעסם . . . ומסיים בפסוק בישעיה י"ז.
46 לְמוֹד [ניקדתי את המלה מְשׁוֹרֵשׁ מִדֵּר, והכוונה לכוהן הבודק את הנגע והמלה במקום: וְרָאָה אֶת הַנֶּגֶעַ' שֶׁל הַפֶּסֶק וִיקְרָא יֵד, לוֹ–מֵאֵסָף [במקום ילכדו באותו פסוק ירמיה ה, כו לצורך החרח.
47 הִלְבֵּן מִחֲשָׁף [תיאור לעץ החרזה. רד"ק למקום זה אומר כי זהו שקראו הערבים סנאבר צ'ל: צנובר, השתמש בתיאור העץ במעשה יעקב, ושם כתוב, מחשף הלבן' (בראשית ל, לו).
48 מִשְׁשָׁף [מלת תיאור ל"תוחח". פירשו את המלה תוחח (איוב מא, כא) בימי הביניים ככלי נשק מבלי שייתדוהו למין מסויים.
49 קָהֵלַת י, י.
50 יִרְמִיָּה א, יז.
51 יִרְה [בְּכַהֲיִ: יתר, ותיקנתי. – שמואל ב' יא, כה.
52 מִשְׁלִי ג, כח. – תְּשִׁיב [בנדרס: תשוב, ותיקנתי. המלה איננה בפסוק ונוספה לעניין. – תְּשִׁיב . . . סוֹף [לקוח מהקטע שפירסם שכטר שהוא מאותו כ"י עצמו (עי' מבוא).
53 הכוונה: אל תעכב את תשובתך. – גם הפועל וגם השם אינם במקרא והאחרון חידוש.
54 עִ'פִּי אִיּוֹב י, א. – כִּלְהָ [רק בְּכַהֲיִ ונכון תהלים עא, ט; סלינסון ביקש לחקן: „כְּלוֹי“. – עֲלֵיהֶם [ם] [בְּכַהֲיִ: עליה, ותיקן פורנס.
55 עִ'פִּי יִשְׁעִיהֶם מִט, ד.

25 [בד עשתי-עשר עטיוותיו תהל אורות
לעליקה, פחתת, פחדיו, פימה, פענח נסתרות
פצירה פים, פרוורים, פרוים, פרעוש, פרחח מצרות
ואורו עליו כהה

חק פרשדנה, פתהן, פתיגיל חגרים
30 והפחות, צליל לחם שעורים
צלצל דגים, צנומות, צפיתית, צנתרות, צתולק] בו סגר לעברים
בני בלהה

טוב תואר צפר, צפיעי, צקלולו]
קבה, קבלו, קלשון, קנו
35 יקוסס, ירום בעינו
ונרו כפשתה כהה

ילידי הרמכים, רטפש מנעורות
לרום, רפסדות לעצי יערות
מי זאת מתרפקת מן המדברות
40 בלי נפש רוהה

שהביא גם רס"ג יש לפקפק אם למנותה בין המלים הבודדות, מאחר שאינה לפי האלפבית והיא באה אחרי סמך, אולם היא נמצאת במחרחת שבראשה באה מלה בודדת בלטר לפי סדר האלפבית: ולח. לעומת זאת יש להזכיר כי מלה זו מובאת בחיבור זה במקום אחר, מחרחת, [דה] בית הא. 25 הכוונה לא ברורה: חיבור אחתעשרה התעטשויות יאיר; יחד עם זה רמז לצירופי מלים של המקרא והמשנה יאיר את פירושן של המלים ויפענח את המובן הנסתר, אולם מדוע אחתעשרה? - איוב מא, י.

26 מכאן שפירשו פענח בהוראת פרש, באר.

27-28 פרחח] פירוש: צעירים, פרחים. - הכוונה: הצעיר סבל צרות וחשך עליו האור בהתאם לכוונת הפסוק באיוב ל, יב.

29 חק]: גם במחרחת [ה יש: חק בעת ההוא וירד יהודה', מסתבר, כי שניהם משורש חקק בהוראת: קבע, החלט, אולם כאן ציווי ושם עבר--פתיגיל] פירוש: חנודה.

30-32 צינוק... סוף] הכוונה ליוסף שאסר את אחיו שלושה ימים בצינוק. - מדוע כתיב בני בלהה? ושם לצורך החרת נקט לשון זו, שהרי רחל לאה חלפה אינן חורוות.

בו סגר] ש' קרא בכ"ה: מוסגר, וחיקן: מוסגרים] אולם לא נראית לי קריאת ראש המלה במים, ובמכתב פרטי אלי ביאר ש': מוסגרים: שרידי המים נראים לעין בכ"ה... ולאחרי הריש נראים שרידי אותיות נוספות. מוסגרים] הפרושים נעלמו מעיני עברים בני בלהה (בני בלהה אולי כנוי נאי לקראים שהם בני שפחה), אי אפשר להסמיק את סגר אל הלטר שלאחריי' - אולם יש במקרא למד במקום, את'.

34 קבה] ואפשר לנקד: קבה, וגם זו מלה בודדת.

35 ירום בעינו] בפסוק איוב טו, יב: ידומן ענין, ושנה לצורך החרת.

36 ישעיה טב, ג.

37 מנעורות] בפסוק איוב לו, כה מנוער, ושנה לצורך החרת.

39-40 הכוונה לעם ישראל עליפי סדרש שיריהשורים.

- לְבָעוּל, גִּלְבִּים, עֲצֵי גֹפֶר
 10 דְּבִיּוֹנִים, דְּמָעָה כְּדוֹק שָׁפֶר
 הָפֶל בְּעֵדוֹת דָּרְשׁוּ מַעַל סֶפֶר
 וְלֹא מְשִׁיקוֹל דַּעַת וְקוֹ בּוֹהָה
 דְּמִיּוֹן הֶבְנִים, יִזְק, נִזְעֻכוֹ-דּוּחִי בְּהֶבְלִים -
 יִזְרָבוּ, יִרְזִיף, יִרְזִיר חִילִים
 15 תִּדְרֶךְ, חִלְבָּנָה, הַחֲלָד וְהַצֵּב, וְהַחֲמָט, תִּנְמַל, מִחֲסָפֶס - בְּמִקְהָלִים
 בִּפְקָר נִגּוּהָ
 הִפְרַת חֲרוּל, יִחְרֶף, חֲרָצִים
 חֲשׂוּרִיהֶם, יָמִים מְשׁוּנִים
 כָּמָה, כְּשִׁיל, כַּל־לָפוֹת, כִּימָה, כְּרָתִי וּפְלָתִי, כּוֹמֵז בְּעֵדוֹנִים
 20 תִּרְבּוּ תִּדְבְּרוּ גְבוּהָה גְבוּהָה
 לָלוּ, וּמִהֲמֵרוֹת גִּחְלִים
 בְּמִנְעֻנָּעִים, סֶרְפֵּד וְנִעְצוּץ, וְנִהְלֹלִים
 סִלְעָם, וְאַסְלָדָה, שָׁרֵד, שְׁמָמִית בְּהִיכָלִים
 לִבְתָּה כְּמָהָה

10 ש פ ר = שמים. חידושו על פי שפרירו ירמיה מג, י וכמו. כדק שמים' ישעיה מ, כב, וש' ציין איוב, כו, יג. שגם שם מפרשים באותה הוראה.
 11 ב ע ד ו ת] עי' מבוא. - ישעיה לר, טו.
 12 ו ק ו] ב ו ה ה] על פי ישעיה לר, יא. - שתי השורות האחרונות הן כנגד הקראים. עי' מבוא.
 13-16 במחרות זו הוא אומר, כי רק ההשוואה למלים אחרות רבות (במקהלים) תבהיר את המלים כאור היום. - נגוהה] במקרא רק לשון רבות (ישעיה נט, ט).
 13 ה ב נ י ם] ש' לא ראה אותה כמלה בודדת, ובמכתב פרטי אלי: „דמיון הֶבְנִים לפי דעתי מוסב על דן „נור אריה“; במקום דן או אריה הוא אומר „דמיון הבנים“.
 דּוּחִי בַּה ב ל י ם] כך בכה"י: ש' תיקן: „רוחי בחבלים“ ולפי ביאורו במכתב פרטי אלי מיום 18 בספטמבר 1967: „נועכו רוחי בחבלים: זה בא במקום רוחי חבלה ימי נעוכו שבפסוק ונשמטה המלה ימי“. אולם לא אדע לפרש נוסח זה, ולדעתי זהו כנגד הקראים שאינם רוצים לפרש מתוך השוואה - במקהלים...
 17-20 המחרות באה בכה"י אחרי אות וין, ותיקן ש'.

17 ה כ ר ת] = הבנת. עי' מחברת מנחם, עמ' 8 עמודה ב ש' ג. להבנת תוכן המחרות קשורה המלה „הכרת“ בשורה 20, והכוונה כי להבנת המלים הבודדות רק תאמרו מלים רמות.
 18 י מ י ם] ש' לא ראה אותה כמלה בודדת, מאחר שלא ציין כאן מ"מ כמקרא. - כני]ל פות] כאן יותר מאשר במקום אחר היינו רשאים לצפות לנוסח: כשיל ון]כני]לפות.
 19 ב ע ד נ י ם] מחוברת ל. „כומז“ כהוראת תכשיטים, שהם דברים עדינים, ואולי יש לראות במלה הד המלה „מעדן“ הערבית (معدن) במובן: מתכת.
 21 נחלים קשורה במלה מהמורות באותו פסוק תהלים קמ, יא.
 22-24 הכוונה כי השממית מתנועעת לגור בהיכלים.
 24 ל ב ת ה ה] ש' קרא: לִבְתָּה, מאחר שציין כמ"מ את שמות ג, ב, ובתור כזו היא מלה בודדת

ד. מהדורה זו

כאן ניתנת לראשונה מחרוזת „הה“ מאוחדת, בשעה שרק חלק הימנה נתפרסם על ידי ש' וחלק אחד נתפרסם פעמים אחדות לפניו על ידי אחרים. מחרוזת זו, כולה תאחד ותנוקד כאן לראשונה ותבואר ביאור נוסף. המחרוזת תידפס בצורת שיר, בתים וצלעות, בהבלטת החריזה והאקרוסטיכון בראש הבתים. בכל בית ארבע צלעות, אולם לפעמים גם חמש: הבתים כף, צדי והבית האחרון. ואין הצלעות שקולות כי יצירה זו שייכת לתקופה שלפני המצאתו של דונש בן לבראט ולא היה עדין המשקל הערבי בספרותנו. יש איפוא צלעות קצרות וצלעות ארוכות. בהערות יצוינו דברי המבארים שקדמו פרט למ"מ במקרא, שאין ציונם מקנה בעלות מיוחדת.

מכיון שהמלים הבודדות לא באו בחיבור בסדר אלפבית ברור ומוחלט יבוא בסוף מפתח המלים הבודדות יחד עם ציון מה"מ במקרא.²⁰

מחרוזת הה

אֶן מִלִּין תִּכְתֵּן בְּדִמְיוֹן
יִדְעִים הָשִׁיבוּ לִי בְּצִבְיוֹן
אֲחִים, אֲנִיקָה וְהִלַּחַת וְהִלְטָאָה, וְאַפְרִיֹן
וְאִז לֵב שָׁמַח יִיטִיב גִּתָּה

5 בְּאֶרֶז אֶקוּ וְדִישׁוֹן, אֶקְדָּח - בְּבִאֲרִים
בְּהַט, בּוֹלֵס, בְּטָנִים - בְּאֶמְרִים
בְּרוּמִים, וּבְתִקְוָךְ בְּחֶרְפִּי גְבוּרִים
וְהָאֶרֶץ וְהַגָּז תִּהְיֶה

20 אחרי שנכתב מאמר זה נשלח לש' לעיון והעיר הערותיו שובאו להלן בשמו. אף הוא הדפיס מאמרו שנית בכתביהעת: *Acta Orientalia* כתב העת של האקדמיה ההונגרית למדעים, כרך VII (1957), חוברת 1.

1 איוב יב, יא; לר. - ב ד מ י ו] אינו כאן בהוראת המושג המופשט אלא כמו דומה, נש"ר בערבית ועי' במבוא.
2 ב צ ב י ו] = ברצון על פי הארמית. אין מלה זו במלון בניהוודה, אולם בבניין קל בהוראה זו נמצא שם. ועי' סידור רס"ג, עמ' קפא ש' 52-53.
3 א ח י ס] ש' קרא: „אח"ם", מאחר שציינ כמ"מ הושע יג, טו, אולם אין המלה בספר זה נחשבת כמלה בודדת בין מפרשי המקרא. ואמר המשורר שדרוס אבו אלעפיה „ען המשלים והחידות, חלק א, עמ' 142 ש' 33": „אח"ם נקראָה לָנוּ לְאֲחִים, וְנָתַן קוֹל נְהִי נָחֵנוּ וְהִמָּה".
4 משלי יז, כב. - כוונת המחרוזת: מבינים את הלשון, אם אפשר לדמות את המלה למלים אחרות, ואם ימצאו מלים דומות למלים הנמנות בשורה 3 ישמח הלב.
5-8 נאמר על הקראים שהם מבארים מלים בודדות בביאורים במלים גבוהות או יפות (באמרים ברומים) וחתכו את האומה בחרבות והיתה הארץ תוהו. השתמש במלים בודדות (ברומים ובתקוֹךְ) בהוראה רגילה.

5 בארו] ניקדתי כפועל בזמן עבר.

7 יחזקאל טו, מ: ובתקוֹךְ בחרבותם.

■ ירמיה ד, כג.

(ב) ויש מלים בודדות שלא לפי סדר האלפבית: (1) כשהן באות סמוכות בפסוק במקרא למלה בודדת לפי סדר האלפבית, כגון: אנקה והכוח והלמטה; אקו ורישון; החלד והצב והחמט; כרתיו ופלתיו; סרפר ונעצוץ; ששך וחנס; (2) במלות המחרות: אונס, גהה, זבר, לבתה, משעול, רוהה. וייתכן שלא כל המלים נמנו במניין, כי אולי יש כאלה שצריך להוסיף, כגון: כתרני (ש' 41), ויש מלים שנמנו ואין למנותן, כגון: לבתה, משעול, ויש בנייהן מלים שיש לפקפק אם להביאן בסוג זה, והן: גהה, זבר, חנס, פלתיו. אולם יש מלים שהן בלי ספק מלים בודדות ולא נמנו לפי סדר אלפבית, והן: אונס, רישון, למאה, סרפר, צב.

בסך הכול נמנו בחיבורנו 115 מלים לעומת רס"ג 1696 ויחד עם הנספח 17112 ובמחברת מנחם 112 מלים. נמצא כי בשלושת החיבורים מספרי ערכים קרובים זה לזה. מן 115 הערכים שבחיבורנו הביא רס"ג רק שבע: אונס, פותות, פרורים, יקוסס, לרוס, שפי, ובמחברת מנחם נמצאים 25: אפריון, בתקוך, גפר, זבר, יזנק, זריוץ, זריר, חרצן, כמה, כמוס, סלר, סרפר, עטישה, פענח, צינוק, צנורות, צקלונג, יקוסס, רוהה, ירוס, רפסורות, מתרפקת, שעטה, שפי, שצף קצף. היו איפוא שלושת החיבורים בלתי תלויים זה בזה בבחירת המלים הבודדות ורק מכיון שאף אחד מהם לא ביקש למצות את הנושא והסתפק רק בחלק קטן מאוצר המלים הבודדות מתבאר המספר הקטן של המלים המשותפות בשלושת החיבורים.

המונח „האפאכס לינומינון“ במובן המצומצם זהו מלה שאין לגזור צורתה או הוראתה משורש אחר במקרא, כגון אברך (בראשית מא, מג); אקרח (ישעיה נד, יב) וכד'. במובן הרחב זהו מלה שבצורתה היא רק פעם אחת במקרא אולם אפשר לגמרה בנקל ממלים אחרות במקרא, כגון: השמעות אונים (יחזקאל כד, כו); מעמר (תהלים סט, יג) וכד', המתקשרות בנקל במלים המרובות מהשרשים: שמע, עמר במקרא. היו חכמים שנימוקו במקרא 400 מלים במובן המצומצם ולמעלה מן אלף ושלוש מאות מלה במובן הרחב. בחיבורנו רק 72 ערכים במובן המצומצם וארבעים בערך במובן הרחב. גם מחברנו כרס"ג לא הביא את המושג „האפאכס לינומינון“ במובן המצומצם או במובן הרחב אלא מתוך גישתם המיוחדת ורשימתם המיוחדת: מלה נדירה שאין לפרשה בנקל והיא (אף אם באה במקרא יותר מפעם אחת) גזירתה ממלה אחרת במקרא קשה, אבל אפשר להסתייע לשם כך בספרות רז"ל. מתוך גישה זו אפשר להבין, כי נמנו גם מלים שנמצאות פעמים במקרא: כומו, כימה, פרורים, פרעוש, שעטנו, ויש גם יותר מפעמים במקרא הן: כרתיו ופלתיו, עשתייעשר. אין איפוא המונח „מלים בודדות“ מתאים באופן מדויק לערכים הכלולים בחיבורים ומוטב לכנותם: מלים מיוחדות, כמו שחרגם אבן תבון שם חיבורו של רס"ג.

בין המלים הבודדות נמנים גם שמות עצם פרטיים, שאין למנותם כלל וכלל בסוג זה, אלה הם: חדרך, חנס, כרתיו ופלתיו, פרורים, ששך – בסך הכול שישה ערכים. בין המלים הבודדות שהן במובן הרחב נמנות: גהה,¹⁶ דק, זבר, מחספס, חשוריהם, כומו, כילף, כימה, לבתה, מהמורות, נעצץ, עשתייעשר, פותות, פחדים, פחתת, פענח, פרורים, פרחח, פרעוש, פתהן, צליל לחם, צלצל דגים, קבלו, קהה,¹⁷ קינו, מתרפקת, שיט, כשך, וישנס, וישסע, וישסף, שעטת, שעטנו, שפות בקר, שפי, שצף קצף, שקעורות. בסך הכול שלושים ושבעה ערכים.

16 בעיניו זו קשה ביותר בחיבור רס"ג והיו שמנו 90, 91, 92.

17 חידוש זה על הנספח יידון בספר שהוא אתי בכתובים.

18 ישנה כפועל: ינהה (הושע ה, יג).

19 ישנה כפועל: תקהניה (ירמיה לא, כח-כט; יחזקאל יח, ב).

גם בבתי אחרים מובאים משפטים שיש בהם אותו רעיון: „דמיון . . . במקהלים כבוקר נגודה“, והכונה: אם מדמים מלה למלים דומות (במקהלים), הרי זה מתבאר כאור בוקר. וכן: „זכר . . . תהל אורות“, כלומר חיבור וצירוף מאיר אור. ומכיון שהקראים מבארים לפי שיקול דעתם אין ביאור אחיד אצלם: „צבא יצבאו כולם על פתרון . . . זה אומר בכה וזה אומר בכה . . . “ הדברים האחרונים הם כנגד טענת הקראים, כי התנאים אינם מאוחרים ודעותיהם מפולגות, כמו שאמר סלמון בן ירוחם:¹⁵ „זה אוסר וזה מתיר . . . זה מברך וזה מקלל“.

ג. מניין הערכים

בחיבורו של רס"ג קשה בעיית מניין הערכים בגלל הניגוד בין שם החיבור למספר הערכים המצוי בחיבור שהרי נתונה החיבור „שבעים“ ונמצאו בו ערכים רבים יותר משבעים (עי' להלן). מניין הערכים בחיבורנו אף היא בעיה קשה בגלל סיבות אחרות:

(א) סדר המלים הבודדות הוא קבוצות קבוצות לפי אלפבית כשהן משולבות בתוך המחרוזות, אולם לא נתיחדה לכל אות מחרוזת לחוד. פרט לבתים א, י, כ, יש בכל בית אותיות שונות ואין אות הבית מתאמת כלל וכלל לערכים של אותה אות. יש בתים שיש בהם ערכים מאותיות שונות, כגון בתים ד-ו, שבהם ערכים של מחצית האלפבית (עשר אותיות), כפי שאפשר לראות מהטבלה הבאה:

בית א	אות א	מלים	מאותיות אחרות
ב "	" א, ב	7 "	" "
ג "	" ג, ד	6 "	" "
ד "	" ה, ז, ח	11 "	" "
ה "	" ח, י, כ	11 "	" "
ו "	" ל, מ, נ, ס	10 "	" "
ז "	" ע, פ	12 "	" "
ח "	" פ, צ	10 "	" "
ט "	" צ, ק, ר	9 "	" "
י "	" ר	4 "	" "
כ "	" ש	13 "	" "
ל "	" ש, ת	5 "	" "

יחד עם מלים 14=115

מלים 101

אותיות 20 (חסרות ו, ט)

בתים 12

ותרגומו: ומה שהתאים כי ייכנס מהלשון בעניינים אלה נכנס בה, ומה שלא התאים כניסתו נשאר בלשון בפיות הבקאים של האומה, מאחר שהיתה הלשון רחבה יותר מהספר והספר אמנם הוא חלק ממנה . . .

הטענה הירועה של הקראים היתה, כי „תורת ה' תמימה מחכימת פתי“, ושלִימה היא בתכלית השלימות. אף כי הכוונה העיקרית היתה מבחינת ההלכה והמצוות, הרי שנכללה גם הלשון בשלימות זו. באו הרבנים וטענו אין אפשרות להבין בשלימות את ההלכה ולבארה, מאחר שאין הלשון הכלולה בה שלימה ומלים רבות יש לפרש רק מתוך לשון החכמים במשנה בתלמוד, וממילא יש לקבל גם את פירוש ההלכה לפי ספרות רז"ל.

רס"ג היה הראשון שהשתמש בטענה זו והוא: כותב בהקדמתו:¹² „ווגדרת מן לא יצדק באלפקה יתח"ר פי הר"ה אלא לפאט' לא ידרי חקיקה תפסידהא פאוג'בת אן אנ'מעחא מן אלמקרא ואפסרהא לפצ'ה לפצ'ה ואסתשהר עליהא באלכלאם אלמנת'ור אלמוג'ור פי אלמשנה אלמשהור פי מא בין אהלהא כאשהאר אלכלאם אלעאם ועלמת אן פי ד'לך מנאפעא שתי מנהא אן נכשף ללאמה מעאני הר"ה אלא לפאט' ותול אלחירה פיהא ואיצ'א ליעלמון אן אלנאקלין ללמשנה ואלתלמוד אבצר באללה ו[ן]א [סימא אד' המא אקרב אלי אלנאביא אד' כ'אטבו תלמידיהם בהר"ה אלא לפאט' אלתי הי עויצה ענר מן לס יר'ן נפסה פי דיואנהם וקאלוהא באלטבע עלי רסלהם . . .“

ותרגומו: ומצאתי מי שלא חשב את ההלכה לאמיתית היא נבוכ במלים האלה ולא ידע אמיתות פירושו, ועל כן הישלתי על עצמי את החובה שאאספן מהמקרא ואפרשן כל מלה ומלה ואביא ראיות להן מהריבור הפרואי הנמצא במשנה והמפורסם בין אנשיה כפרסום הריבור העממי וירעתי כי בואת תועלות שונות ואחת מהן שתתגלנה לאומה הוראות מלים אלה ותחדל המבוכה בהן, וכדי שידעו כי מוסרי המשנה והתלמוד היו הבקאים ביותר בלשון וביתור מכיון שהם (מוסרי המשנה והתלמוד) הקרובים ביותר לנביאים, כשפנו לתלמידיהם במלים אלה, שהן קשות למי שלא הרגיל את עצמו בקובצייהם, אמרו אותן באופן חפשי . . .

כנגד דברים אלה יובאו דברי מנחם בן סרוק הטוען:¹³ „ויש בתורה מלין אשר אין להם דמיון, אבל ענינם יורה עליהם ולולא אחיותם במחזה ותלייתם מענין לא נודע פתרתם.“

מחבר חיבורנו טוען על הקראים: „אוזן מלים תבחן בדמיון . . . הכל בעדות¹⁴ דרשו מעל ספר . . . ולא משיקול דעת וקו בזה . . .“ במלים ספורות אלה כלולות שתי ההשקפות: א) הרבנית שהיא מוכיחה בראיות מדברי רז"ל; ב) הקראית המבארת את המלים הבודדות בעזרת השכל.

11 תהלים יט, ח.

12 שם, עמ' 15-16.

13 מהדורת צבי פיליפאווסקי, לונדון ואדינבורג, תר"ד (1854), עמ' 56, ערך גלב.

14 עד-עדות בהוראת ראייה, הבאת פסוק לראייה מספרות. וכן הוא טוען מחרוזת „ה': שאלות תבררו מן המכתב . . . בעדות . . .“ ושם להלן: „יתנו עדיהם ויצדקו. רס"ג, כתאב אלסבעין לפט'ה, פתיחת ההקדמה: „אלאסתשהאר . . . ואסתשהר עליהא באלכלאם אלמנת'ור אלמוג'ור פי אלמשנה . . .“ בספרות הערבית משמשת המלה להבאת ראייה מהקוראן או מהשירה העתיקה. כוונת בעל „שאלות עתיקות“ היא להבאת ראיות מספרות רז"ל. למלה זו איפוא חשיבות מיוחדת בפולמוס בין הקראים והרבנים, שהרי כפרו הראשונים בתורה שבעל פה והירבו האחרונים להביא ראיות ממנה להבנת הכתוב בתורה שבכתב.

(ג) מחרוזת "הה" בחיבור "שאלות עתיקות", שגם בה ערימת ערכים של מלים בודדות שרובן באו בסדר אלפבית, אולם חלק מהן אנב גררה או שהן משובצות בצלעות הבתים ויש לגלותן.

על שלושת החיבורים הנ"ל יש להוסיף את המלונים המקראיים ובראשם "כתאב אלאצול" לריב"ג, שאף הם נאלצים לדון בסוג מלים אלה באופן מיוחד.

ב. המטרה

בחיבורנו ובמחברת מנחם רק רמזים למניעים לטיפול במלים הבודדות, אולם בחיבורו המיוחד שהקדיש רס"ג לנושא זה נאמרו הדברים באופן מפורש, ובוה יתרון רב לחיבורו על השנים האחרים, ואף בידון זה היה "ראשון המדברים".

מן הראוי לציין כי המלומדים במאה התשע־עשרה כבר הרגישו במניע המיוחד לנושא זה ושיערו כי היה לנושא זה חלק בפולמוס נגד הקראים. ראש וראשון היה גייגר⁶ ואחריו ציינו זאת גם פירשט⁷ ושטיינשניידר⁸ והגדיל לעשות בבעיה זו קלאר⁹. אולם כולם נאלצו להביא דבריהם מרחוק כדי לבסס את השערתם, ואילו כיום, שבידנו נמצאים המקור הערבי של חיבור רס"ג ודברי הקדמתו, הרי נוכל לשאוב דברים ישר מן המקור.

חזו לשון רס"ג: "ואני ראית קומא מן אלעבראניין יג'הדון מא נקל ען אלאנביא מן אלשראיע ואלאחכאם אלתי הי [גיר] מכתובה . . .".

ותרגומו: וראיתי אנשים עברים הכופרים במה שנמסר בשם הנביאים מהמצוות והדינים שאינם כתובים . . .

משפט יחיד זה בהקדמה דיו להוכיח את מגמת הפולמוס האנטיקראית בחיבור זה ואין כל צורך להרבות דברים על כך. אולם על סמך הקדמתו אפשר לציין ארבע מטרות, ואלה הן:

- (א) ההכרח לבאר את מלות המקרא בעזרת לשון רז"ל.
- (ב) לשון רז"ל היא לשון עממית ופשוטה ולא לשון חכמים.
- (ג) ההכרח להבין את המצוות והדינים בהתאם לפירוש בספרות רז"ל.
- (ד) החזרת חלק מהקראים לעדת הרבנים.

במאמר זה תידון רק מטרה א שהיא משותפת לרס"ג ולבעל חיבורנו. הרבנים טענו, כי לא כל מה שהיה בלשון נכלל בספרי המקרא ולא נכתב המקרא לשם ידיעת הלשון, ועל כן לא נכנס בו מהלשון אלא מה שגדרש לביאור המצוות ושכר ועונש וכדי לספר על אנשים שבידיהם מעשים טובים ולהללם ואנשים שמעשיהם רעים ולגנותם. רס"ג אומר בדברי הסיום:¹⁰ "פמא אהפק אן ידכל מן אללה פי הד'ה אלמעאני דכל' פיהא ומא לס יתפק דכ'ולה תחתה בקי פי אללה פי אפואה אלבצרא מן אלאמ'ה אד' כאנת אללה אוסע מן אלכתאב ואלכתאב אנמא הו בעצ'הא . . .".

WZfJ 5, לייפציג 1844, עמ' 323 הערה 3.

6 ליטרטורבלאט של האורינוט, X (1849), עמ' 685.

7 Bodleiana . . . Catalogus, עמודה 2198.

8 קובץ רס"ג, ירושלים תש"ג, עמ' רעה-רפ (=עיונים ומחקרים, תלאביב תש"ד, עמ' 259-265).

274-275). ועי' אברמסון, הגניזה שכתוך הגניזה, פרוסידינס של אגודת הרבנים השמרנים, תשי"ב, עמ' 229.

9 בנדרס (לפי הערה 3), עמ' 14-15.

10 שם, עמ' 40.

המלים הבודדות ב"שאלות עתיקות"

מאת

נחמיה אלוני, ירושלים

א. פתיחה

בשנתון האחרון של ה"היברו יוניון קולג'": פירסם פרופ' אלכסנדר שייבר (להלן=ש') שני דפים נוספים מהחיבור "שאלות עתיקות" והם מאותו כ"י עצמו שפירסם לראשונה מחיבור זה ש. ז. שכטר,² והם משתלבים שילוב רצוף אלה עם אלה. חשיבות נוספת נודעת לקטע החדש, כי בו נמצאים אלף עד מים שהמשכס (נון עד תיו) נתפרסם בקטע הקודם, והחרוזה בכל הבתים היא "הה". בחלק החדש, בבתים אלף עד למד, נמצא פרק שלם של מלים בודדות. למחרות "הה" זו וביחוד לפרק המלים הבודדות יוקדש מאמר זה, שרק הודות לעיסוקי בנושא זה בימים האחרונים יש בידי להאירו אור חדש ולבארו ביאור נוסף.

כבר ידועים לנו כיום שלושה מחברים מימיהבינים שעסקו בנושא של המלים הבודדות: א) רבי סעדיה גאון ב"כתאב אלסבעין לפט'ה" (ב) מנחם בן סרוק בערך גלב, "במחברת" ג) מחבר "שאלות עתיקות" (אנונימי) במחרות "הה".

א) חיבורו של רס"ג כתוב פרוזה בלשון ערבית יהודית, ורס"ג הוא היחיד, שהקדיש לנושא המלים הבודדות חיבור שלם מיוחד לו ושם ערבי לו.³ אין הערכים בסדר אלפבית אלא קבוצה ראשונה של עשרה ערכים, שבה מלים בודדות שכיחות מאד בלשון, וקבוצה שנייה מערך אחד עשר ועד סוף החיבור מלים מיוחדות ונדירות במקרא בלא סדר ובלא שיטה.

ב) פרק המלים הבודדות בערך "גלב" במחברת מנחם בן סרוק הוא ערימת שרשים של מלים בודדות בסדר אלפבית (לפעמים בצורתם כמו בפסוק), והוא פותח בדברי הקדמה קצרים בלבד. אלה ניתנו בדרך אנב ובלא כוונה מיוחדת כאילו נזכר המחבר לרדון בנושא זה רק באות גימל ("גלב"), אף כי יכול היה לעשות זאת כבר באות אלף, מאחר שמנה בערך זה שש מלים מן האות אלף. לפרק זה יוקדש מאמר בפני עצמו.⁴

1 ע"י HUCA, כרך XXVII (1956), עמ' 291-303.

2 HUCA, כרך XXI (1948), עמ' 374-375; הנורן, ה (1906), עמ' 5-42; HUCA, כרך XXI (1948).

עמ' כט-צא.

3 נתפרסם רק הנוסח הערבי בספר גולדציגהר, כרך ב, ירושלים תשי"ח, עמ' 1-48. משמנה עשר קטעים נעשה נסיון להרכיב את הנוסח המקורי ולשחזרו לצורתו המקורית. עדיין חסר כשליש החיבור לשם השלמתו, אבל יש בה הקדמת המחבר, הערכים באופן מלא ואף דברי סיום. במבוא הקצר יוכל למצוא המעיין דברים נוספים על הכתוב כאן ואילו בשלימותו יתפרסם לעתיד לבוא.

4 עומד להתפרסם בספר יובל לכבוד טורסיני העומד להופיע עליידי החברה לחקר המקרא.

ירושלים תשי"ט.

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